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Chapter 14: Validating the Conceptual Framework (pp. 135-161), p. 151
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6.33 Passing resolutions and platforms
6.34 Publishing position papers

Although these variables were all positively intercorrelated, there were major differences in the correlational pattern, with the first two tactics (r = .54) and the last two tactics (r .56) sharing more variance between themselves than among the others (the remaining correlations averaged .16). If these four items were combined into a "propagandizing" scale, the resultant reliability would be an inadequate .61. So the evidence does not serve to validate the proposed classification of these indirect tactics.

For the moment, let us skip the set of "alliance" tactics and progress to the next set. Five tactics were proposed as indicators for another more general activity dimension called "providing for members' welfare." These tactics were

6.51 Providing food, clothing, shelter (from party resources, not governmental)
6.52 Running employment services (through party facilities)
6.53 Interceding with government on members behalf
6.54 Providing basic education, not primarily political education.
6.55 Providing recreational facilities or services

These tactics were again all positively intercorrelated, and this time the intercorrelations were substantially higher, ranging from .19 to .76 with a mean of .37 (in comparison with an overall mean of .29 for the "propagandizing" tactics). The reliability coefficient for the resulting five-item "members' welfare" scale was only a marginally acceptable .75, however. Upon further analysis, it was seen that the first two propagandizing tactics-party operation of mass communications media and operation of political schools-tended to be more highly related to the "members' welfare" tactics than to the tactics of passing resolutions and publishing position papers, the other two tactics originally proposed as indicators of propagandizing. This finding led to one of the very few reconceptualizations of the original conceptual framework. Party operation of mass communications and party operation of political schools were added to the five "members' welfare" tactics to produce a seven-item "social activities" scale with an acceptable reliability of .80. Note that, contrary to all the other scaled identified to this point, this scale was identified aposteriori rather than a priori and thus the establishment of this scale cannot be counted in the validation of the conceptual framework.

The remaining set of indirect tactics pertains to party activities in engaging in "alliances" with other parties. Remember that scoring had been curtailed on this set of party tactics and that less than 25 percent of the parties in the study were coded for party tactics, which were

6.41 Engaging in electoral agreements with other parties
6.42 Engaging in legislative blocs
6.43 Engaging in cabinet coalitions
6.44 Supporting other parties' candidates for presidential elections

The intercorrelations among these tactics averaged .47, with all the correlations below the average involving variable 6.44 (supporting other candidates in presidential elections).

Because this variable was inapplicable (and thus left uncoded) for parties in nonpresidential systems, the incidence of missing data for variable 6.44 was compounded, yielding valid scores for only 10 percent of the parties. Although the empirical results rather strongly fulfilled the expectations of the conceptual framework, the proportion of missing data is too great to include these findings in a claim for validation. Indeed, the whole cluster seems unnecessary in light of variable 7.04, one of the proposed "autonomy" indicators, discussed next.

Autonomy. The assumptions in the original conceptual framework broke down completely only for one conceptual domain, autonomy. "Autonomy" was defined as the party's structural independence from other institutions and organizations, whether in or out of the country. Five types of dependence on outside institutions were identified.

7.01 Sources of Funds. The greater the party reliance on its own sources of finances (membership dues or business ventures) rather than contributions from other sectors of society (e.g., labor unions, business community, church, etc.), the greater its autonomy.
7.02 Sources of Members. The greater the direct affiliation with a party (as opposed to "indirect" membership through church or labor unions, for example), the greater the autonomy.
7.03 Sources of Leaders. The more varied the sources of party leadership (i.e., the more diversity among parliamentary delegations in terms of business, labor, professional, religious, and other social groupings), the greater the autonomy.
7.04 Relations with Domestic Parties. The more independent the party is of "entangling alliances" (e.g., electoral agreements or cabinet coalitions) with other domestic parties, the more autonomous it is. (One can see the similarity of this indicator with the "alliance" variables, 6.41 to

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