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from our definition of parties as "organizations that pursue a goal of placing their avowed representatives in government positions. " The salience of this variable for parties research has been cogently expressed by Schattschneider: The nominating (i.e., candidate selecting) process . . . has become the crucial process of the party. The nature of the nominating procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can make nominations is the owner of the party. It is therefore one of the best points at which to observe the distribution of power within the party," (1942, p. 64). Moreover, according to Ranney, "the candidate selecting process is . . . central to party structure and activity" (1968b, p. 142). Clearly, the selection of candidates offers an important indicator of the centralization of power within the party. For purposes of cross-national comparison, we focus on the selection of parliamentary or legislative candidates. Party candidates for other government positions might have been studied, but no other office or set of offices provides as much opportunity for comparability. For countries which feature a popularly elected chief executive, the preceding variable, "selecting the national leader," often includes party candidates for the top national office. Although the method of selecting candidates might be conceived in terms of a distinction between "election" and "designation," we view this as a side issue and direct our attention instead to the structural position and functional composition of party organs which dominate the process, whether one of competitive election or noncompetitive designation. We are interested in the number of participants in the decision and their location in the organizational hierarchy. Hence, the more restricted the privilege to participate in candidate selection, the more highly centralized is the party. Operational Definition. The highest applicable value was assigned from this set:
Coding Results. The proportion of parties that could be scored on "selecting parliamentary candidates" was limited by the number of countries with functioning legislatures during our time period as well as by the availability of data. Tables 10.3a and 10.3b record that almost 70 percent of the parties were successfully assessed for their methods of candidate selection. The most common procedure was local selection requiring national approval (code 5). The next most frequent method was central determination by the national committee (code 9). At the other extreme of the continuum, only two parties out of more than 90 included in this assessment employed the radical technique of allowing party supporters to select candidates directly. The method of candidate nomination through primary elections seems unique to the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States. Regardless of the sources of party funds, a concept embraced in variable 7.01, the levels at which collection and allocation of those funds occur are important in establishing the distribution of power within the party. As Heidenheimer notes, "Crucial to the nature of the support transfer that takes place is who controls the distribution of funds, and whether they are distributed among individual candidates or parties, and if so, on the basis of what criteria" (1963, p. 804). The organizational level that controls the allocation of funds is in a powerful position to set priorities for the attainment of party goals. It is difficult to think of "allocating" funds apart from "collecting" funds, for funds can hardly be allocated unless they are in hand. Collection can occur at different stages, however, with the collection agencies' transferring funds for subsequent allocation by different agencies. In general, we contend that power resides mainly in the agency or level of the party with responsibility for allocating funds obtained either by direct collection or transference of funds collected at another level, although a premium is put on funds collected directly rather than transferred. Recognition must be given also to the lack of established organizational mechanisms with responsibilities for collecting and allocating funds. In some parties, the |
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