Open Competition in the Electoral Process

6.01 to 6.05

Direct Tactics of Electoral Competition

Restricting Party Competition

6.11 to 6.16

Direct Tactics of Restricting Compeition

Subverting the Political System

6.21 to 6.26

Direct Tactics of Subverting the System

6.31 to 6.32

Propagandizing Ideas and Programs

6.41 to 6.44

Allying with Other Parties

6.51 to 6.55

Providing for Social Welfare

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6.00 open competition in the electoral process

3 for 1950-56, AC7

1 for 1957-62, AC7

In the first half the PDG's primary strategy was to engage in open competition in the electoral process in an attempt to place party members in representative positions. After independence and the merging of all opposition parties into the single PDG, the party continued to run in elections, but its primary strategy shifted to restriction.

6.10 restricting party competition

1 for 1950-56, AC7

3 for 1957-62, AC7

Although the PDG's primary strategy was to engage in open competition in the first half, it did restrict competition in the sense that it attempted to merge opposition tendencies into a single PDG. By the second half, all opposition parties did merge into the PDG and there was no opportunity to compete with the PDG in elections, except as an independent.

6.20 subverting the political system

0 for 1950-56, AC5

0 for 1957-62, AC9

There is no evidence that the PDG engaged in subversion in the first half. In the second half, the party was firmly in control of the government and clearly would not engage in subversion.

6.30 propagandizing ideas and program

6.31--2, AC8. While the data are not extensive, it appears that the PDG has been regularly publishing a newspaper since 1950. The regularity is open to question until 1957 or 1958. After independence, the newspaper "Horoya" became the one source of mass communication for the country.

6.32--1 for the first half, AC3, and 2 for the second half, AC9. Political education through the JRDA, the military, and the general education system is a fundamental tenet of the PDG program. There is no data for 1950-56, but undoubtedly there was some political education program within the PDG.

6.33--AC1. No information for the first half, and 2 for the second half, AC9. The BPN, JRDA, and Party Congress are continually grinding out platforms and resolutions concerned with education, national development, and a myriad of other issues.

6.34--AC1 for the first half, and 1 for the second half, AC6. Position papers are seldom issued. Resolutions are more often employed since a "position" in Guinea is the position of the PDG and therefore can be transformed into a resolution and implemented as such.

6.50 providing for welfare of party members

6.51--1 for 1957-62, AC8. Investissement Humain built civilian shelters on occasion, but this was not one of the normal outputs of the program.

6.52--2 for 1957-62, AC9. Investissement Humain employed many Guineans in public works projects since its inception.

6.53--2 for 1957-62, AC9. The party men on the quartier level interpret national laws and resolutions for the local citizenry. The hierarchy charts of the PDG indicated that it was the function of the PDG mass membership to relate government policy to the nation.

6.54--1 for 1957-62, AC4. The PDG continually emphasized the importance of education and reorganized the entire curriculum, stressing vocational and technical education as well as African culture and history. But it is not clear whether the party itself engaged in basic education as opposed to the activities of the state.

6.55--2 for 1957-62, AC9. The PDG sponsored theatricctions and through the JRDA sports section sponsored nationwide athletic activities. The PDG also sponsored the ballet Africaines.