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9.01 nationalization of structure
- 6, AC7
- The structure of the CPSU forms a very definite
hierarchy ranging from the national organs at the apex
through the apparatus at the republic, territorial, and
provincial levels, which are supported by a myriad of
organizations at the area, city, county, and borough
levels--all based upon a network of primary party
organizations. One of the guiding principles of this
organizational hierarchy is democratic centralism, which
among other points, specifies that decisions of higher
bodies are obligatory on lower bodies. It would be most
natural for any challenges to the central organs within
the hierarchy to come from the republic level. However,
the powers at the republic level are not very strong.
Indeed, the party statutes describe the common duties of
the republics and inferior bodies--excepting the primary
party organizations--as exercised within their
territorial limits in the same paragraphs. One source
states that although the republic Central Committee
controls all inferior party organizations, in party and
legal status it occupies the same position as the lower
provincial or regional committees. The republican party
organization, therefore, has rarely if ever, been a
competing source for power for the central organs during
the period under study, and the practice of democratic
centralism invites the most centralized score on this
variable.
- 9.02 selecting the national leader
- 7, AC7
- The party rules state that in between congresses, the
Central Committee selects and places executive cadres.
Indeed, shortly after Stalin’s death Khrushchev was
elected first party secretary of the CPSU by the Central
Committee and in the 1957 struggle for power within the
Presidium, Khrushchev was able to maintain his position
as First Secretary only by the supporting vote of the
Central Committee, the body that had originally elected
him. It is not uncommon, however, for the literature to
question the selection process, alluding to power
struggles and the leadership as being self-elected with
election in the Central Committee amounting merely to the
formal endorsement of a previously determined
decision.
- 9.03 selecting parliamentary candidates
- 5, AC6
- Candidates for the Supreme Soviet are selected by
delegates of organized groups such as trade unions,
cooperatives, youth and public organizations at a joint
conference convened in each electoral district. The
groups represented may nominate more than one candidate
and the process is not restricted to party members alone.
The candidates themselves need not be party members, and
approximately 20 percent of the deputies elected to the
Supreme Soviet during our time period were not party
members. While this process might seem decentralized, it
seems that the central electoral commission operates to
insure that only one candidate is certified within each
electoral district. This amounts to approval of local
selection by a national organ and reflects a good deal of
centralization.
- 9.04 allocating funds
- 5, AC5
- The major source of funds for the CPSU are membership
dues, which are collected at the local level by primary
party organizations. The remaining portion of funds,
coming mainly from publishing enterprises, is most likely
collected at other levels. Information on the
transference and allocation of funds is fragmentary,
probably because, as one source states, budgetary
accounts have not been published since the revolution. It
would appear that party finances are controlled and
allocated at the national level by the Central Auditing
Commission--formerly the Central Revision
Commission--which is elected by congress along with
members of the Central Committee. It is the
responsibility of this body, according to the party
rules, to supervise and audit the party’s accounts.
Yet, according to one source, effective control rests in
the administrative department of the Central Committee
Secretariat with the Minister of Finance, who draws up
the budget in which allocations are made to local party
organizations. These account for approximately 90 percent
of the budgetary expenditure as based on figures for the
mid-1950’s. Along with the post-Stalin movement
towards decentralization, increasing control over
expenditures was extended to the republic and lower level
committees by budgetary decrees of the Central Committee.
The determination of expenditures at these levels,
however, was made within the limits of a budget drawn up
at the national level.
- 9.05 formulating policy
- 7, AC9
- Major policy decisions are formulated within the
Presidium (or Politburo), which is composed of several
top party leaders, including the First Secretary of the
CPSU. While there is no doubt that the First Secretary
plays an important role in influencing decisions, his
power to enact policy is not total. Once a decision is
reached among the members of the Presidium, it usually
presents a united front to the rest of the party.
- 9.06 controlling communications
- 7, AC9
- The party maintains direct and indirect control over
all media primarily through the department of agitation
and propaganda within the party Secretariat. Departments
of Agitprop exist at all levels of party administration,
and while the tendency has been for the republic and
lower party echelons to assume greater responsibility for
the guidance of local press, radio and TV for the latter
half of our time period, the locus of control still rests
at the national level. The central organs enjoy a wide
circulation, and--according to one source--approximately
30 percent of their content is reprinted by local
newspapers. Radio Moscow, another influential source of
communication, also falls under the supervision of this
department.
- 9.07 administering discipline
- 4, AC5
- While no data dealing directly with disciplining
government officials is available, information on
disciplining party functionaries can be used and applied
to this variable. According to the 1961 party rules, the
party organization discusses and imposes penalties on
members up through the republic Central Committee. On
questions of expulsion, however, decisions are made by a
2/3 vote of the committee involved at the appropriate
level. Operating at the national level, the party control
committee elected by the Central Committee of the CPSU,
enforces party discipline and also reviews appeals
against disciplinary decisions of the republic,
provincial and territorial Central Committees. Members
and candidates of the Central Committee of the CPSU may
be expelled by the Party Congress or 2/3 vote of the full
committee when the congress is not in session. Before the
1961 rules, expulsion was voted upon by all candidates
and members of the Central Committee and the party
control committee.
- 9.08 leadership concentration
- 5 for 1st half, AC7
- 4 for 2nd half, AC7
- A high score was assigned to the first half of the
time period because Stalin dominated the leadership until
his death in March 1953. Shortly after his death, three
men emerged in top positions--Khrushchev as First
Secretary of the CPSU, Malenkov as chairman of the
Council of Ministers, and Voroshilov as chairman of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Khrushchev assumed the
chairmanship of the Council of Ministers in the
government apparatus in 1958, thereby further extending
his power. The latter half of our time period however, is
marked by power struggles within the Presidium of the
CPSU and Khrushchev’s attempts to eliminate his
opposition from this body. By virtue of the size of the
Presidium--numbering 11 members in 1961--this variable
ought to be scored 3. But the score has been upgraded
because of Khrushchev’s influence and leadership,
which was tempered somewhat by the fact that his power to
control the Presidium was not fully consolidated.
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