The "ac" code is for "adequacy-confidence"--a
data
quality measure ranging from 0 (low) to 9
(high)
Party name and code number
Peruvian Democratic Movement,
375
Movimiento Democratico Peruano,
MDP
Institutionalization Variables,
1.01-1.06
1.01 Year of Origin and 1.02 Name
Changes
1955, AC9
7, AC8
Shortly after General Odria, the Peruvian
Dictator, surprisingly announced his decision to allow openly
contested elections at the conclusion of his one term, six-year
"presidency" (in deference to the constitution), several parties,
including the MDP, were organized. Originally founded as the
Movimiento Democratico Pradista, the party sought the election of
former dictator Manuel Prado Ugarteche as President. In 1956, the
year of the election, the party's name was revised to Movimiento
Democratico Peruano. No other name change occurred during our time
period.
1.03 Organizational
Discontinuity
0, AC3
There is no evidence which would suggest
that the MDP experienced any splits or mergers during our time
period. The party was closely allied with APRA throughout the
1956-63 period, but the coalition does not constitute a
merger.
1.04 Leadership Competition
2, AC3
Manuel Prado was the leader of the MDP from
its inception through the remainder of our time period. Although
he was unable to constitutionally succeed himself as president in
1962, Prado apparently remained the party's leader through the
1962 and 1963 elections. Our low adequacy-confidence score
reflects our assumption that Prado was the legitimate leader as
well as the effective leader of the MDP.
1.05 Legislative Instability
Instability is 1.11, AC6
MDP representation in the congress
fluctuated from nearly 40 percent of the seats to only 2 percent
at the close of our time period. APRA appears to be the party that
benefited the most from the shift of support away from the
MDP.
1.06 Electoral Instability
Instability is 1.67, AC4
The MDP was formed as the campaign vehicle
for Manuel Prado, who won the 1956 elections with APRA support.
With Prado ineligible to succeed himself as president, the MDP
offered no candidate of its own for the 1962 and 1963 elections,
and of course the party did not exist for the 1950
elections.
Governmental Status Variables,
2.01-2.07
2.01 Government Discrimination
0 for 1956-63, AC5
There is no convincing evidence of
government discrimination in favor of or against the MDP during
our time period. In 1962, President Prado may have attempted to
influence the outcome of the national elections by appointing only
MDP supporters to the national electoral board. These men ignored
the numerous voting irregularities which apparently aided the
MDP-supported presidential candidate of APRA, Dr. Haya. Other than
refusing to annul the elections, the board's impact on the
election results was negligible. The use of indelible ink which
washed off the voter's hand cannot be considered government
discrimination in favor of the MDP.
2.02 Governmental Leadership
7 out of 8 for 1956-63, AC9
Manuel Prado, leader of the MDP, became
President of Peru in 1956. His predecessor, General Odria, served
throughout the first half of our time period. In 1962, only months
before Prado's rule would have terminated, a military coup deposed
the president. Belaunde Terry of the Accion Popular party won the
presidential elections of 1963.
2.03 Cabinet Participation
7 out of 8 for 1956-63, AC5
Information concerning the party
affiliation of cabinet members is scarce. It is assumed that MDP
people held cabinet posts in the Prado administration. Beltran,
who became Premier and Minister of the Economy midway through
Prado's reign, was an independent. A publisher and head of the
newspaper "La Prensa," whose views paralleled those of the MDP,
Beltran was appointed in order to cease his charges of economic
mismanagement. These charges appeared in one of Lima's most
influential newspapers, "La Cronica," also published by
Beltran.
2.04 National Participation
5 for 1956-63, AC3
Information concerning the MDP's national
orientation is incomplete. The party apparently competed
nationally, but with varying success . Since the party drew the
support of business, landed aristocracy, and commercial interests,
its support was probably greatest in the Lima area and the coastal
region. After 1962, the party largely disappeared except in
Lima.
2.05 Legislative Strength
Strength is .28 for 1956-63,
AC6
MDP representation in the congress
fluctuated from nearly 40 percent of the seats to only 2 percent
at the close of our time period. APRA appears to be the party that
benefited the most from the shift of support away from the
MDP.
2.06 Electoral Strength
Strength is .45 for 1956-63,
AC9
The MDP was formed as the campaign vehicle
for Manuel Prado, who won the 1956 elections with APRA support.
With Prado ineligible to succeed himself as president, the MDP
offered no candidate of its own for the 1962 and 1963 elections,
and of course the party did not exist for the 1950
elections.
2.07 Outside Origin
6, AC5
The MDP was formed in 1955 by friends and
supporters of Ex-President Prado. The Prado family was one of
Peru's "forty families," those traditionally wealthy in land,
business, and commerce. These prominent citizens seem to have
originated the party.
Issue Orientation Variables, 5.01-5.15
5.01 Ownership of Means of
Production
3, AC3
There is little information concerning the
issue orientation of the MDP. A code can be inferred from
references to the general ideological outlook of the party and the
policies pursued by the Prado administration. Representative of
conservative, wealthy business and commercial interests, as well
as the landed gentry, the MDP probably opposed government
ownership of the means of production. The Prado administration
opposed expropriation of undeveloped hacienda farmland and
cooperated with foreign-owned industry. Beltran served Prado in
the capacity of Minister of the Economy and was apparently
supported by the MDP in his "free enterprise" approach. Government
regulations were relaxed under Jose Prado, Prado's relative and
first economic minister, and Beltran.
5.02 Government Role in Economic
Planning
3, AC3
Although information is scarce, a code can
be inferred from references to the party's general ideological
outlook and the policies pursued by the Prado administration. As
Prado's Economic Minister, Beltran attempted to create a free
market economy. Although many of his measures (tariff adjustments,
credit restrictions, and investment benefits) appear to increase
the government's economic role, they generally had the opposite
effect.
5.03 Redistribution of Wealth
5, AC5
Although the Prado administration improved
Peru's financial position considerably, most of the new riches
benefited wealthy business, commercial, and landed interests, both
domestic and foreign. The tax structure, which apparently favored
the wealthy, remained intact despite promised reforms. Business
boomed and foreign investors were allowed to increase their prices
and , therefore, their profits. The International Petroleum
Company was noted in particular in this context. Undeveloped
estates remained in the hands of landed interests as squatter
Indians were driven off by the military. Prado suggested the
development of jungle areas for the Indian poor, rather than
redistribute land. No action was taken, however. These policies in
all likelihood conformed to the position of the MDP on wealth
distribution.
5.04 Social Welfare
AC2
Although the MDP probably opposed
government programs of social welfare, information is too sparse
to assign a definitive code for the party's position.
5.05 Secularization of Society
AC2
The church and state were separated
constitutionally in Peru. Although most Peruvian parties were
probably favorably disposed towards the Catholic Church, no
information concerning party policy towards secularization is
evident.
5.06 Support of the Military
AC2
Information is unsatisfactory for the
purpose of coding the MDP on the issue of support of the armed
forces. The MDP, like most Peruvian parties, avoided clashes with
the powerful military. Relations between the Prado regime and the
army were apparently good until 1962, when the MDP-supported
presidential candidate, Dr. Haya of APRA, appeared to have won the
presidential contest. The military disapproved of APRA in general
and Haya in particular.
5.07 Alignment with East-West
Blocs
5, AC3
A code can be inferred from available
evidence. The MDP, as implied by Prado's policies, actively sought
foreign investments, especially those of US companies. The party
also desired military and economic aid from the United States.
There is no indication that the party wished to withdraw from the
Organization of American States.
5.08 Anti-Colonialism
3, AC5
It is assumed that the MDP position was
similar to that of the Prado regime. Foreign investments were
encouraged by Prado through increased profit margins and price
limitations, exemption of US-owned IT+T and IPC from export taxes,
the new convertibility of Peru's currency, and "other
benefits."
5.09 Supranational Integration
AC1
No information
5.10 National Integration
AC1
No information
5.11 Electoral Participation
AC1
No information
5.12 Protection of Civil Rights
AC1
No information
5.13 Interference with Civil
Liberties
3, AC3
Although Prado is often criticized in the
literature on various points, his record of non-interference with
civil liberties is only lauded. Prado ended General Odria's
suspension of constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties. The
media was no longer censored, and APRA was legalized. Outside of a
temporary restriction in 1958, parties were allowed to convene
freely. This record probably reflects the position of the
MDP.
5.14 / 5.15 US--Soviet Experts Left-Right
Ratings
Us says 1, conservative
Soviets say nothing
Goal Orientation Variables, 6.01-6.55
6.00 Open Competition in the Electoral
Process
4, AC7
The MDP relied exclusively on open
competition in the electoral process as its strategy for gaining
governmental power. The party participated in the elections of
1956, 1962, and 1963, while in coalition with APRA.
6.10 Restricting Party
Competition
0, AC7
The MDP did not rely upon restricting
competition as its strategy. The party did win the 1956 elections
because it received the support of an illegal APRA, but the party
did not restrict competition itself. APRA was legalized as Prado's
first presidential act, and parties acted rather freely during his
reign.
6.20 Subverting the Political
System
0, AC7
The MDP did not rely on the strategy of
subverting the political system. The voting irregularities in
1962, and the subsequent non-action of the MDP dominated electoral
board, cannot be considered party subversion. (see variable
2.01.)
6.30 Propagandizing Ideas and
Program
6.31 0, AC3 although information is
negligible, the party probably did not engage in operating mass
communications media to an appreciable extent.
6.32 0, AC3 although information is
negligible, the MDP probably did not engage in operating party
schools.
6.33 0, AC3 although information is
negligible, the MDP probably did not engage in passing resolutions
and platforms to an appreciable extent.
6.34 0, AC3 although information is
negligible, the MDP probably did not engage in publishing position
papers to an appreciable extent.
6.50 Providing for Welfare of Party
Members
6.51 AC1 no information
6.52 AC1 no information
6.53 AC1 no information
6.54 AC1 no information
6.55 AC1 no information
Autonomy Variables, 7.01-7.05
7.01 Sources of Funds
2 (sectors 04, 05), AC5
Although information concerning party funds
is incomplete, the MDP apparently received most of its funds
(which were considerable) from the business, commercial, and large
landowner sectors of Peruvian society.
7.02 Source of Members
6 (sectors 04, 05), AC3
Information regarding party membership is
scarce. There were probably no membership requirements in the MDP.
Most party members were probably businessmen, commercial artisans,
and landed gentry.
7.03 Sources of Leaders
2 (sectors 04, 05), AC3
References to the MDP suggest that its
leadership was dominated by business, commercial, and landed
interests.
7.04 Relations with Domestic
Parties
5, AC9
Throughout the second half of our time
period, the MDP was in coalition with APRA. Occasionally referred
to as the "Allianza Democratica," the coalition was formed ten
days prior to the 1956 elections. APRA, which may have controlled
as much as forty percent of the vote, supported the MDP candidates
in return for legality, which Prado bestowed upon the party as his
first presidential act. Although promised and later offered
cabinet posts, APRA chose to reject them in order to avoid further
internal party dissention. This coalition supported the Prado
regime in the legislature. The MDP, after much hesitation, chose
to support the APRA candidate in the 1962 presidential elections
and, apparently, again in the 1963 elections. The party seems to
have remained in the coalition through 1963. Our code reflects the
mutual dependence of the coalition partners in the
legislature.
7.05 Relations with Foreign
Organizations
5, AC3
There is no evidence of MDP relations with
any foreign organizations.
Organizational Complexity Variables,
8.01-8.07
8.01 Structural Articulation
2, AC3
Only one national organ of the MDP was
mentioned in the literature. The party's national convention was
convened in 1961, prior to the elections of 1962. There is no
information concerning selection of the convention
delegates.
8.02 Intensiveness of
Organization
AC1
No information
8.03 Extensiveness of
Organization
AC1
No information
8.04 Frequency of Local
Meetings
AC1
No information
8.05 Frequency of National
Meetings
0, AC3
There is no information regarding the
existence of a national committee.
8.06 Maintaining Records
0, AC3
No references to party propaganda, archive,
or membership lists are present in the literature. It seems likely
that the MDP did not carry on these activities.
8.07 Pervasiveness of
Organization
0, AC3
The small following of the MDP probably had
no socioeconomic organizations of its own, nor would they have
enlisted a significant membership.
Organizational Power Variables, 9.01-9.08
9.01 Nationalization of
Structure
AC1
No information
9.02 Selecting the National
Leader
8, AC5
Prado was the effective leader, and
probably the legitimate leader, of the MDP throughout our time
period. No means of transferring leadership were noted in the
literature.
9.03 Selecting Parliamentary
Candidates
AC2
No information concerning the selection of
parliamentary candidates is apparent. However, all candidates were
probably subject Prado's approval.
9.04 Allocating Funds
AC1
No information
9.05 Formulating Policy
7, AC5
Major policy decisions were announced by
Prado or his spokesmen. Policy was probably determined by Prado,
although others in the MDP may have influenced policy
decisions.
9.06 Controlling Communications
0, AC3
The MDP did not appear to control any
influential media at any level.
9.07 Administering Discipline
0, AC6
The MDP had no means of disciplining its
members. Party members were subject to government rewards and
Prado's approval for candidacy from 1956 to 1962.
9.08 Leadership Concentration
6, AC3
Prado apparently exercised sole leadership
of the MDP. His power to commit the party to courses of action was
probably real, although some believed him to be a puppet of
interest groups.
Coherence Variables, 10.01-10.06
10.01 Legislative Cohesion
.80, AC3
While MDP legislators were not disciplined
by the party by any method other than Prado's power of candidate
approval, government favors and disfavors under the Prado regime
seemed to evoke considerable legislative cohesion.
10.02 Ideological Factionalism
AC2
Ideology, while not an important MDP
characteristic, may have beenebated. However, there is no reason
to suspect that ideological concerns provoked
factionalism.
10.03 Issue Factionalism
AC2
Issues may have been debated by MDP
members, but there is no evidence of issue factionalism in the
party.
10.04 Leadership Factionalism
0, AC5
There is no reason to suspect the existence
of a leadership faction in the MDP. The party was personalistic
and apparently gave full support to Prado.
10.05 Strategic or Tactical
Factionalism
3, AC3
Some disagreement probably arose within the
MDP when the 1956 coalition with APRA was negotiated. It is likely
that this faction remained through the convention of 1961, when it
was decided to continue the coalition and support the presidential
candidate of APRA.
10.06 Party Purges
0 for 1956-63, AC3
No purges seem to have occurred in the MDP
during our time period.
Involvement Variables, 11.01-11.06
11.01 Membership Requirements
AC1
No information
11.02 Membership Participation
AC1
No information
11.03 Material Incentives
3, AC3
The amount of rewards received by MDP
militants during Prado's reign was probably immense. Patronage was
apparently extensively employed. The economic policies of the
Prado regime certainly favored the wealthy, many of whom were MDP
militants.
11.04 Purposive Incentives
0, AC3
Purposive incentives motivated few MDP
militants, although some nominal members may have been so
affected. The party's purposes, other than the election of Prado
in 1956 and the material rewards to members, were difficult to
identify.
11.05 Doctrinism
0, AC5
The MDP referred to no written literature
to justify its activities.
11.06 Personalism
1, AC3
While some nominal members may have been
motivated by Prado's personality, personalism was a minor
motivator of militants. Although Prado apparently lacked charisma
he was a leader.