The "ac" code is for "adequacy-confidence"--a
data
quality measure ranging from 0 (low) to 9
(high)
Party name and code number
Peruvian Popular Revolutionary Alliance,
373, also known as Peruvian Aprista Party, PAP
Allianza Popular Revoluncionaria
Americana, APRA
Institutionalization Variables,
1.01-1.06
1.01 Year of Origin and 1.02 Name
Changes
1924, AC7
0, AC7
The Allianza Popular Revolucionaria
Americana (APRA) was founded in 1924 at Mexico City. Dr. Haya de
la Torre and other student leaders, exiled by Peruvian dictator
Leguia following the student-worker demonstrations of 1920,
originally conceived the party as an international movement. The
organization flourished in its homeland, Peru, and was legalized
in 1930, subsequent to Leguia's reign. Its Peruvian name became
the Peruvian Aprista Party (PAP), and PAP and APRA have since been
used interchangeably in reference to the party. In 1945, APRA
apparently changed its name to Partido del Pueblo in order to
participate in the national elections. The new name seems to have
terminated immediately following the election and will not affect
our code.
1.03 Organizational
Discontinuity
7, AC7
APRA experienced one split of minor
proportions in 1958. APRA disillusioned many of their supporters
by endorsing the candidates of the conservative MDP in 1956 and
continuing the alliance in the legislature in support of the MDP
government. Several radical members, led by Luis de la Puente
Uceda, left the party in 1958 and formed the APRA
Rebelde.
1.04 Leadership Competition
2, AC7
Dr. Haya de la Torre, one of APRA's
principal founders and philosophers, was considered the party's
leader from its founding through our time period. Haya was the
party's presidential candidate in 1962 and 1963, the only
elections during our time period in which APRA was able to
nominate its own candidate. When in exile prior to 1956 (except
for three years during the Bustamante administration), and while
touring Europe during much of Prado's reign, APRA was managed by
the party's secretary generals. These men apparently attended to
the more routine party affairs while Haya was in Peru. During our
time period, Ramiro Priale served as Secretary General of APRA.
Priale rejuvenated the party organization in 1955, when he
returned from exile, and served through 1963. Manuel Seone was
apparently his predecessor and he remained second-in-command under
Priale. For coding purposes, Haya was both the legitimate and
effective leader of APRA during our time period.
1.05 Legislative Instability
Instability is .86, AC4
APRA had been declared illegal and was not
allowed to participate in the 1950 or 1956 elections. After the
1956 elections, the party was legalized, and many independents
announced their affiliations with APRA. When the party was allowed
to field candidates for the 1962 elections, APRA's strength jumped
from 16 percent of the seats to 44 percent.
1.06 Electoral Instability
Instability is 1.0, AC6
APRA was not allowed to contest the 1950 or
1956 elections, but it took approximately one-third of the votes
in the 1962 and 1963 elections.
Governmental Status Variables,
2.01-2.07
2.01 Government Discrimination
16 for 1950-55, AC9
0 for 1956-63, AC5
APRA was illegal during General Odria's
presidency (1948-1956), although the party was allowed to conduct
limited business activities after 1954. No governmental
discrimination directed at APRA occurred during the second half of
our time period. The Prado regime appointed MDP members to the
National Electoral Board prior to the 1962 elections which were
marred by voting irregularities. These infractions, which probably
benefited MDP-supported Dr. Haya of APRA, were ignored by the
board. This incident will not affect our code regarding government
discrimination.
2.02 Governmental Leadership
0 out of 6 for 1950-55, AC9
0 out of 8 for 1956-63, AC9
General Odria served as Peru's president
during the first half of our time period. President Prado of the
MDP reigned from 1956 through 1962, when he was deposed by a
military coup. In 1963, Belaunde of the AP became
president.
2.03 Cabinet Participation
0 out of 6 for 1950-55, AC9
0 out of 8 for 1956-63, AC8
No APRA members were included in General
Odria's cabinets during the first half of our time period.
Although APRA people were offered cabinet positions by President
Prado, the party chose to oppose an APRA-MDP governmental
coalition since it would further tarnish APRA's liberal image,
which suffered by the parties" electoral and parliamentary pact.
No cabinet seats were held by the party under Belaunde
.
2.04 National Participation
5, AC6
APRA competed nationally, but its success
was highly variable across regions. Its main stronghold was the
north. The party was rather successful in the east. Based on a
1968 sample survey, APRA's support deviated from the population
distribution by an average of 5.8 percentage points calculated
across four regions, eastern jungle, coast, highlands, and
Lima.
2.05 Legislative Strength
Strength is .22 for 1956-63,
AC4
APRA had been declared illegal and was not
allowed to participate in the 1950 or 1956 elections. After the
1956 elections, the party was legalized, and many independents
announced their affiliations with APRA. When the party was allowed
to field candidates for the 1962 elections, APRA's strength jumped
from 16 percent of the seats to 44 percent.
2.06 Electoral Strength
Strength is .34 for 1956-63,
AC6
APRA was not allowed to contest the 1950 or
1956 elections, but it took approximately one-third of the votes
in the 1962 and 1963 elections.
2.07 Outside Origin
11, AC9
APRA was formed in Mexico City by exiled
student radicals, led by Dr. Haya de la Torre.
Issue Orientation Variables, 5.01-5.15
5.01 Ownership of Means of
Production
3, AC5
Originally favoring general nationalization
of basic industries, APRA moderated its position after it was
banned in 1948. The party apparently favored government ownership
of some basic industries, including some not then nationalized,
during our time period. Expropriation and nationalization on a
general basis was no longer advocated. By 1962, many political
observers believed that APRA was favorably disposed towards
capitalism.
5.02 Government Role in Economic
Planning
3, AC8
The party had increasingly become favorable
towards a "free-enterprise " economic system. Although APRA no
longer advocated government prescription of resource allocation,
as it did in 1924, the party did not repudiate its entire plan for
a government controlled economy. During our time period, APRA
proposed the creation of a National Economic Congress, which would
formulate an economic "game plan." A proposed national bank would
offer government credit to approved businesses.
5.03 Redistribution of Wealth
3, AC8
Originally APRA was a party of the
"oppressed masses" and favored a major redistribution of Peru's
wealth. During our time period, the party advocated limited land
redistribution in order to supply the Indian population with
farming land. As for further redistribution of wealth, APRA
conceded that such plans were premature since Peru had not yet
acquired substantial wealth. The party advocated tax
reform.
5.04 Social Welfare
3, AC8
During our time period, APRA advocated a
comprehensive social security plan which would be available to all
workers. The party favored government requirements whereby
industry would provide its employees a pension plan and other
fringe benefits. APRA was apparently concerned about raising the
standard of living for Indians and labor.
5.05 Secularization of Society
3, AC9
Since APRA's history dates back to 1924, it
is the only Peruvian Party whose views on secularization are
documented. However, information only cites the party's desire for
separation of church and state. This position remained intact
through our time period. Dr. Haya, APRA's founder, leader, and
philosopher, allegedly abhorred the Catholic Church, and the party
was supposedly atheistic.
5.06 Support of the Military
0, AC5
Historically, APRA opposed the military in
principle. In the past, the party advocated the abolishment of the
military in favor of an Indo-American Army. However, the party's
post-war plans included compulsory military service and the
utilization of army personnel and training in the development of
Peru's industrial and agricultural resources. The size of the army
would be increased, but the organization would be more technical
than defensive. The army would become a tool of socialization,
education, and training, as well as a government controlled
manpower resource. The army had traditionally opposed the APRA
party, and two military coups (1948 and 1962) can be in part
attributed to this animosity.
5.07 Alignment With East-West
Blocs
3, AC7
APRA was strongly Anti-Communist in Peru,
probably due to competitive reasons. Since World War II, APRA has
softened its Anti-US policies. The party accepts United States aid
and wishes to remain friendly. However, APRA denounces the OAS as
US-dominated. The party seeks Latin American Unity, development,
and power.
5.08 Anti-Colonialism
1, AC7
APRA, once violently opposed to foreign
investments, advocated a reduction of foreign influence in Peru's
economy during our time period. The party accepted some foreign
investment with the condition that the Peruvian government
controls its use in some manner. APRA did not wish continued
economic dependence on foreign capital. The party desired a
gradual movement to economic self-sufficiency while remaining
friendly to the United States and US investments.
5.09 Supranational Integration
3, AC9
APRA proposes the creation of a United
States of Latin America. Including South and Central America,
Mexico, and the Caribbean Isles, the federation would be modeled
after the United States of America. As an initial step towards
this goal, APRA favors the establishment of an Indo-American
Common Market. The party has also proposed an Inter-American bank
system, a volunteer Indo-American army, and Indo-American
citizenship.
5.10 National Integration
1, AC8
APRA advocated the decentralization of
Peruvian Government. The federal system would include economic and
political regions. Within regions, municipalities would be
developed. The federal government would have jurisdiction over
questions involving two or more regions.
5.11 Electoral Participation
1, AC3
The file contains no information concerning
APRA's position on extending the franchise. Our consultant,
however, states that a 1967 study of party leaders finds APRA
leaders to be opposed to further expansion. No details concerning
the nature of this opposition were revealed.
5.12 Protection of Civil Rights
2, AC5
APRA favored elimination of discrimination
against women and Indians. The party probably preferred
discouragement of discriminatory practices through a free
educational system and socialization in the armed
forces.
5.13 Interference with Civil
Liberties
3, AC4
During the 1945-48 period, when APRA held
considerable influence as the majority party in the legislature,
the party advocated press censorship of political content. It is
unlikely that APRA favored this policy during our time period,
however, as it was opposing the government and seeking political
power.
5.14 / 5.15 US--Soviet Experts Left-Right
Ratings
U.s. says 3, non-communist left
Soviets say 2, it has represented the
interests of the upper bourgeoisie, although the party included
significant numbers of workers, white collar workers, artisans,
and the petty bourgeoisie.
Goal Orientation Variables, 6.01-6.55
6.00 Open Competition in the Electoral
Process
3 for 1950-55, AC7
4 for 1956-63, AC7
APRA relied mainly on the strategy of open
competition during the first half of our time period, despite
illegality. After legalization in 1956, APRA relied exclusively on
this strategy. The party participated covertly in the 1956
elections, and nominated candidates in the elections of 1962 and
1963.
6.10 Restricting Party
Competition
0, AC7
APRA did not attempt to restrict party
competition during our time period. The party strongly supported
the government in its suppression of the Communist Party of Peru,
for this group threatened to draw many of APRA's members. However,
the act of restricting communist competition was a governmental
one. APRA also refused to support Belaunde's presidential
candidacy in 1956 because his program might have attracted
considerable APRA defections. APRA chose to criticize Belaunde as
an opponent to APRA's goals, thereby discrediting him before party
members.
6.20 Subverting the Political
System
1 for 1950-55, AC7
0 for 1956-63, AC7
APRA opposed any undemocratic seizure of
power. The party may have been able to initiate a revolution with
its massive following (estimated at fifty percent of the
population), but this action was not considered. Accusations of
APRA subversion were generally unfounded, although occasional
subversive acts were carried out by APRA members during Odria's
reign. Before our time period, moreover, APRA was involved in
several plots and uprisings.
6.30 Propagandizing Ideas and
Program
6.31--0 for 1950-55, AC5. 2 for 1956-63,
AC7. Since APRA was illegal during the first half of our time
period, it is quite unlikely that the party operated any type of
mass communications media. The name "APRA" was seen carved into
mountains and trimmed onto the hair of dogs, but these devices
will not be considered communications media. After the party was
legalized in 1956, APRA operated a newspaper, "La Tribuna," and a
party radio station.
6.32--2, AC5. APRA's program of political
education was apparently an important party activity. In some
areas, many public schools were APRA by default. Many teachers and
pupils were party identifiers and their classrooms were often
politicized. APRA also established its own schools.
6.33--2, AC5. APRA apparently held party
conventions rather frequently. Resolutions and platforms were
passed at these meetings. When the party was illegal, these
activities were clandestine.
6.34--2, AC5. APRA and its leader, Haya,
published many position papers. Many were quite extensive,
especially those published prior to our time period.
6.50 Providing for Welfare of Party
Members
6.51--2, AC3. It is likely that APRA
provided Indian villages with needed supplies. In 1945, the party
created mobile units which sent doctors, nurses, teachers, etc.,
to villages.
6.52--AC1. No information
6.53 1, AC3. An APRA peasant and Indian
affairs bureau was established in 1945 as a legal aid service. It
is likely that the party continued this activity in some manner
during our time period.
6.54--2, AC5. APRA's program of education
included the use of party schools and public schools which were
dominated by APRA supporters. These schools provided APRA
sympathizers with basic, as well as political,
education.
* 6.55--AC1. No information
Autonomy Variables, 7.01-7.05
7.01 Sources of Funds
AC1
Although UNO was apparently quite wealthy,
there is no information pertaining to the sources of these
funds.
7.02 Source of Members
AC1
No information
7.03 Sources of Leaders
4 (sectors 4 and 3), AC5
The literature file contains no specific
information concerning sources of leaders for the party. Our
consultant, however, reports that a 1967 survey of party leaders
listed 23 percent as entrepreneurs and another 23 percent as
lawyers. A few were large landowners.
7.04 Relations with Domestic
Parties
7, AC7
UNO failed to enter into an electoral pact
with APRA in 1956. The party occasionally cooperated with the
MDP-APRA coalition in the legislature during Prado's reign, but no
alliance existed. Rumors of an UNO-APRA governmental and
legislative pact in 1962 led to a military coup, but the alleged
alliance was denied by Odria. After the 1963 elections, UNO and
APRA joined in a legislative alliance of opposition. This occurred
late in the time period and does not affect our code.
7.05 Relations with Foreign
Organizations
5, AC3
There is no evidence suggesting UNO had
relations with any foreign organization.
Organizational Complexity Variables,
8.01-8.07
8.01 Structural Articulation
4, AC3
The APRA organization included an Executive
Committee, a National Convention, and a Labor Affairs Bureau. The
Secretary General was elected by the convention, but the selection
procedures for delegates were not discussed in our file. Our
consultant states that the delegates were simply
coopted.
8.02 Intensiveness of
Organization
5, AC3
APRA's lowest level of organization seems
to have been the branch. Branches included one village or
factory.
8.03 Extensiveness of
Organization
5, AC5
APRA apparently established branches
throughout the nation. Coverage was probably incomplete. The
northern areas of Peru were highly organized.
8.04 Frequency of Local
Meetings
6, AC3
It appears that some APRA locals met quite
often, about once per week. Other branches seldom met.
8.05 Frequency of National
Meetings
AC1
No information
8.06 Maintaining Records
4 for 1950-55, AC5
6 for 1956-63, AC5
There is no evidence suggesting that APRA
maintained a party archive during our time period. APRA did not
publish party propaganda during the first half of our time period,
when the party was illegal. After 1956, APRA published its own
newspaper, "La Tribuna," and operated a radio station. Political
adds probably appeared in non-party media. APRA maintained
membership lists, most likely at the lower level of organization.
These may not have been complete.
8.07 Pervasiveness of
Organization
15, AC5
APRA was divided into numerous
socioeconomic sections which had their own organizations. APRA
workers, peasants, businessmen, professionals, civil servants, and
employers, in addition to many "others," were each organized
separately. Party control was probably high since membership was
given only to those of extreme loyalty. Some ancillary
organizations claimed many adherents
(such as labor and peasants), but most
could not.
Organizational Power Variables, 9.01-9.08
9.01 Nationalization of
Structure
6, AC3
APRA apparently was highly organized with a
discernible party hierarchy. National organs decided policy which
was conveyed to socioeconomic sections and local branches. No
regional organs were evident.
9.02 Selecting the National
Leader
8, AC9
Dr. Haya de la Torre was the founder and
leader of APRA. No means of transferring leadership were apparent.
Much of the routine of party activities was carried out by the
Secretary General, Priale, during our time period. He was elected
by vote of the National Convention, as Haya's choice.
9.03 Selecting Parliamentary
Candidates
5, AC3
Local organizations seem to decide upon
parliamentary candidates, but locals probably select candidates
approved or suggested by the national level. In 1956, local
organizations rallied support for MDP candidates with only ten
days notice from the national leadership.
9.04 Allocating Funds
AC1
No information
9.05 Formulating Policy
7, AC5
The executive committee officially proposes
party policy, which is routinely approved by the National
Convention. Dr. Haya, APRA's founder and philosopher, actually
decided policy. Haya, the party leader, controlled the executive
committee via his popularity. He could commit the party without
the committee's action.
9.06 Controlling Communications
0 for 1950-55, AC3
5 for 1956-63, AC3
APRA controlled no important communications
media at any level during the first half of our time period. After
the party was legalized in 1956, APRA published "La Tribuna," a
newspaper of comparably small circulation, and controlled a party
radio station. Both media were apparently controlled at the
national level.
9.07 Administering Discipline
4, AC3
The Executive Committee of APRA accused
party members and suggested disciplinary measures which were
administered after a vote (pro forma) of convention
delegates.
9.08 Leadership Concentration
6, AC5
Dr. Haya de la Torre exercised sole
leadership of APRA. He could commit the party to binding courses
of action personally. Yet in his frequent absences, others, such
as Priale, were key actors.
Coherence Variables, 10.01-10.06
10.01 Legislative Cohesion
.90, AC3
APRA's legislative organization appears to
have voted together on most occasions. The party required blind
loyalty of its members.
10.02 Ideological Factionalism
0, AC5
APRA ideology, embodied in the works of Dr.
Haya, was not subject to debate or disagreement by party members.
A prime prerequisite to membership was a strong conviction to APRA
ideology. Party factions, often labeled "radical" and "moderate,"
were concerned with strategy and tactics.
10.03 Issue Factionalism
2, AC5
Our information file reports no evidence of
issue factionalism in APRA . Our consultant, however, states that
some members favored stronger opposition to united states
investments and that these people tended to be driven from the
party.
10.04 Leadership Factionalism
0, AC5
Dr. Haya de la Torre was the uncontested
leader of APRA. While party factions were led by competing
individuals, the factions were strategical and tactical. Each
faction sought to place its leader, the "radicals" Seone and the
"Moderates" Priale, in the position of secretary
general.
10.05 Strategic or Tactical
Factionalism
6, AC7
Since the 1940's, APRA has been divided
into two factions. The "Moderates," led by Ramiro Priale,
consisted of the older APRA leaders who were willing to temper
ideological fervor in order to secure and maintain power. The
"Radicals," led by Manuel Seone, included the younger APRA leaders
who repudiated compromise with Peru's conservative "oligarchy" as
a means of gaining power. In 1945, when APRA, controlled by
Seone's group, gained a legislative majority in support of
President Bustamante, the party chose to initiate radical
legislation against the wishes of Bustamante. The resulting
military coup of 1948 convinced many APRA leaders that moderation
was necessary . Priale's faction led the party to its 1956 pact
with the MDP. The party gained legality, but several disillusioned
radicals left APRA and formed another party in 1958.
10.06 Party Purges
0 for 1950-55, AC3
1 for 1956-63, AC6
In 1959, APRA purged itself of eight
"treasonable" members, and our consultant says there were periodic
purges of radicals, especially after 1956. Our coding reflects the
sum of these expulsions.
Involvement Variables, 11.01-11.06
11.01 Membership Requirements
5, AC8
An applicant for membership in APRA was
scrutinized for a period of time by local party chiefs. When these
leaders were convinced of the applicant's sincerity, conviction,
and loyalty, the applicant received a membership card. There is no
evidence of required dues.
11.02 Membership Participation
6, AC3
APRA membership was estowed to only those
who demonstrated prospective militancy in party activities. Rigid
organization and strict discipline was said to ensure continual
member participation in APRA meetings, demonstrations, rallies,
and other party activities, but our consultant feels that the
situation has been exaggerated.
11.03 Material Incentives
1, AC3
APRA strongly opposed the use of party
membership in furthering the material well-being of its members.
The fact that APRA mentioned this suggests that material
incentives may have motivated a few militants in APRA-dominated
areas, but is likely that their number was small. The party
nurtured purposive incentives through ideological training and
exclusion from membership of those not committed to APRA's goals.
In non-APRA regions, party membership may have been a financial
liability.
11.04 Purposive Incentives
3, AC3
APRA's members and followers received
extensive training in party ideology. Membership was supposed to
be contingent upon proven purposive incentive. But our consultant
contends that knowledge of party doctrine was weak and much of the
APRA's membership consisted of semi-literate sugar plantation
workers.
11.05 Doctrinism
3, AC5
APRA's leaders and members frequently
referred to the early writings of Dr. Haya, the party's founder,
philosopher, and leader. Haya himself interpreted this literature
as APRA altered its program.
11.06 Personalism
0, AC3
Although Dr. Haya's charismatic character
probably drew many APRA supporters, most of the militants were
probably motivated by purposive incentives.