The "ac" code is for "adequacy-confidence"--a
data
quality measure ranging from 0 (low) to 9
(high)
Party name and code number
Odria's National Union Party of
Peru, 371
Union Nacional Odrista,
UNO
Institutionalization Variables,
1.01-1.06
1.01 Year of Origin and 1.02 Name
Changes
1955, AC7
8, AC5
As his control over the Reformist APRA
Legislature waned, Peruvian President Bustemente, elected with
APRA support in 1945, increasingly disgruntled the Anti-APRA
military. In 1948, a military coup deposed the President and
installed General Manuel Odria in the office, giving him
dictatorial powers. Odria won the presidential elections of 1950
as the only candidate, receiving votes from eighty percent of
those who voted in the national elections. Although Odria's
candidacy was supported by a multitude of groups and parties, no
political organization was established. In 1955, General Odria
unexpectedly announced that national elections would be held in
1956 as he would defer to the constitutional limit of a one-term,
six-year presidency. Following this announcement, a group of
Odria's supporters organized the Partido Restaurador del Peru
(PR), or Restoration Party, with the intention of nominating and
endorsing candidates who favored a continuation (restoration) of
Odria's policies. Information concerning political developments in
1956 is incomplete and confusing. Often referred to as the
Odriista Party, the PR joined several minor parties, including the
once-powerful Union Revolucionaria Party, in support of the
independent presidential candidate Hernando de Lavalle, who vowed
to continue the policies of the Odria Administration. Odria
apparently chose to support Lavalle despite the protests of Julio
de la Piedra, a leading Odriista Party figure with presidential
ambitions. The Restoration Party changed its name to Union
Nacional Odriista (UNO) as it apparently merged with the Union
Revolucionaria in 1956, prior to the elections. UNO remained in
existence through the Prado Administration and nominated its
leader, Odria, for president in 1962 and 1963.
1.03 Organizational
Discontinuity
7, AC5
UNO apparently merged with the small Union
Revolucionaria Party prior to the national elections of 1956. This
was probably the time at which the name Union Nacional Odriista
was adopted.
1.04 Leadership Competition
2, AC7
UNO was led by General Odria from its
inception in 1955, as the Restoration Party, through 1963.
Although several sources name Julio de la Piedra as the party's
leader, Piedra probably served as titular head while Odria held
legitimate and effective power in his Odriista Party.
1.05 Legislative Instability
Instability is .86, AC6
Although Odria's followers were in the
legislature from the 1950 election to 1956, they were not
organized into a political party during that period. UNO begins to
get credit for legislative representation following the 1956
election, when the Odriistas won 21 percent of the seats, which
was their high point during our time period.
1.06 Electoral Instability
Instability is .49, AC9
Odria won an uncontested election in 1950,
but this was before he formed his party. Contested presidential
elections were held in 1956, 1962, and 1963. The UNO supported
Lavalle in 1956, when Odria was prohibited from succeeding himself
as president, and the party received only 18 percent of the vote.
In the 1962 and 1963 elections, when Odria himself was the
candidate, the party polled 28 and 26 percent of the vote,
respectively.
Governmental Status Variables,
2.01-2.07
2.01 Government Discrimination
0 for 1956-63, AC3
UNO was not subject to government
discrimination during our time period. The party occasionally
cooperated with the Prado regime in the legislature and formed an
anti government legislative coalition with APRA in
1963.
2.02 Governmental Leadership
0 out of 8 for 1956-63, AC9
Although Odria led Peru's government
throughout the first half of our time period, UNO, in existence
only during the second half, did not hold the position of
president. President Prado of the MDP served from 1956 to 1962,
and, after a brief military dictatorship, President Belaunde of
the AP Party led the government in 1963.
2.03 Cabinet Participation
0 out of 8 for 1956-63, AC9
No members of UNO were awarded cabinet
posts in either the Prado regime or the Belaunde administration.
Several UNO members probably served in this capacity prior to the
party's founding in 1955.
2.04 National Participation
6 for 1956-63, AC6
UNO draws its support rather evenly across
regions. A 1968 survey of Peru showed the party's support
deviating from the population distribution by an average of 4.5
points when the country is divided into eastern jungles, coastal
areas, highlands, and Lima. The party runs disproportionately
stronger in Lima.
2.05 Legislative Strength
Strength is .16 for 1956-63,
AC6
Although Odria's followers were in the
legislature from the 1950 election to 1956, they were not
organized into a political party during that period. UNO begins to
get credit for legislative representation following the 1956
election, when the Odriistas won 21 percent of the seats, which
was their high point during our time period.
2.06 Electoral Strength
Strength is .24 for 1956-63,
AC9
Odria won an uncontested election in 1950,
but this was before he formed his party. Contested presidential
elections were held in 1956, 1962, and 1963. The UNO supported
Lavalle in 1956, when Odria was prohibited from succeeding himself
as president, and the party received only 18 percent of the vote.
In the 1962 and 1963 elections, when Odria himself was the
candidate, the party polled 28 and 26 percent of the vote,
respectively.
2.07 Outside Origin
1, AC9
The Partido Restaurador del Peru was formed
in 1955 by President Odria and his followers, among whom were
several legislators and government officials. In 1956, the party
changed its name to UNO.
Issue Orientation Variables, 5.01-5.15
5.01 Ownership of Means of
Production
1, AC5
UNO supported the policies pursued by
general Odria during his 1948 to 1956 rule. During his reign,
Odria opposed nationalization of industry. Government ownership
was opposed, but regulations were apparently accepted.
5.02 Government Role in Economic
Planning
1, AC5
UNO supported the policies of General
Odria's administration, 1948-56. Odria generally opposed
government planning of the economy, but the dictator sponsored
programs of economic development. Odria's government raised
salaries for some workers, gave land to Lima's poor, and
constructed the Quiroz Irrigation System. His regime abandoned
government subsidization of metal producers.
5.03 Redistribution of Wealth
0, AC5
Odria, whose policies were supported by
UNO, believed that economic development would increase the wealth
of the poor as well as aiding the rich. While Odria supposedly
represented the rich, he also took a paternalistic view of the
poor. Land redistribution was not opposed, but, outside of a token
conferral of suburban land to Lima's impoverished, no measures
were implemented. Odria's famous irrigation project supposedly
enriched the poor farmers but actually benefited the large
landowners. Odria forced several industries to increase their
wages, but did not reform the system of tax collection which
benefited the wealthy. His record, and therefore the position of
UNO, is best described as ambiguous.
5.04 Social Welfare
1, AC3
General Odria, whose policies were
supported by UNO, held a paternalistic concern for labor and the
urban poor. His administration initiated a social security program
and some insurance and pension plans. The regime generally
disfavored welfare. UNO probably advocated voluntary assistance
programs.
5.05 Secularization of Society
AC2
The church and state were separated
constitutionally in Peru. Although most Peruvian parties were
probably favorably disposed towards the Catholic Church, no
information concerning party policy towards secularization is
evident.
5.06 Support of the Military
AC2
General Odria was installed in the
Presidency by the military in 1948. His administration apparently
remained on good terms with the military through
1956, and Odria pleased the army leaders by
suppressing APRA activities. After the 1962 elections, the army
executed a coup to prevent an UNO-APRA government coalition.
Thereafter, the military apparently favored Belaunde and the AP
Party. While Odria and UNO may have favored substantial defense
expenditures, information is insufficient for coding
purposes.
5.07 Alignment with East-West
Blocs
5, AC9
President Odria, who received the legion of
merit from US President Eisenhower in recognition of his
Anti-Communist activities, desired and received both economic and
military aid from the united states. Odria apparently supported
Peru's membership in the OAS. UNO advocated the policies of the
Odria regime.
5.08 Anti-Colonialism
3, AC5
General Odria, whose policies were
supported by UNO, encouraged foreign investment. Under his
administration, new investments flowed to Peru and no
nationalization occurred.
5.09 Supranational Integration
AC1
No information
5.10 National Integration
AC1
No information
5.11 Electoral Participation
1, AC5
The literature in our file contains no
reference to the party's position on extension of the franchise,
but our consultant reports that a 1967 survey of UNO leaders
revealed opposition to the principle.
5.12 Protection of Civil Rights
1, AC3
General Odria believed that economic
development would integrate the Indian population into Peruvian
society without government action. UNO supported the policies of
Odria.
5.13 Interference with Civil
Liberties
1, AC3
General Odria's regime suspended several
civil liberties and initiated limited press censorship in 1956,
prior to the national elections of that year. Political content
was censored prior to the 1950 elections as well, supposedly
because Odria feared that a student riot would develop into a
revolution. Odria's administration also arrested and exiled
leaders of the APRA Party, disqualified all presidential
candidates in 1950, and prevented party conventions in
1956.
5.14 / 5.15 US--Soviet Experts Left-Right
Ratings
US says 1, conservative
Soviets say 1, party represents the
interests of the Peruvian oligarchy and US imperialism in Peru. It
unifies owners of large cotton and sugar plantations and bankers
with an interest in foreign monopolies. The UNO heads all Peruvian
reaction, receiving the support of the most reactionary circles of
the army.
Goal Orientation Variables, 6.01-6.55
6.00 Open Competition in the Electoral
Process
4, AC3
UNO relied exclusively upon the strategy of
open competition in the electoral process. The party participated
in the national elections of 1956, 1962, and 1963. Although
General Odria restricted party competition while dictator
(1948-1956), his party did not employ this strategy afterwards.
UNO did not attempt to subvert the political process.
6.10 Restricting Party
Competition
0, AC3
UNO did not rely upon the strategy of
restricting party competition. General Odria employed this
strategy in 1950, before the party's inception. The dictator's
suppression of APRA activity virtually ceased in 1955, although
the party remained illegal. APRA support was sought by each party
in 1956, including UNO.
6.20 Subverting the Political
System
0, AC3
There is no evidence which would suggest
that UNO employed the strategy of subverting the political
process. The party relied upon the strategy of open
competition.
6.30 Propagandizing Ideas and
Program
6.31--0, AC3. UNO did not operate any mass
communications media, although the party employed existing media
for propaganda purposes.
6.32--0, AC3. There is no evidence of
UNO-operated party schools during our time period.
6.33--1, AC3. It seems likely that UNO
passed resolutions and platforms at its national conventions.
Odria's domination of the party probably lessened the frequency
and necessity of the activity.
6.34--1, AC3. UNO probably published
position papers, although the activity was not common. Odria's
policies were rather well-known, in a general sense, through the
nation. The party probably published position papers on newer or
more controversial subjects.
6.50 Providing for Welfare of Party
Members
0, AC3 for variables 6.51 through 6.55. UNO
probably did not engage in the activities of providing social
welfare.
Autonomy Variables, 7.01-7.05
7.01 Sources of Funds
AC1
Although UNO was apparently quite wealthy,
there is no information pertaining to the sources of these
funds.
7.02 Source of Members
AC1
No information
7.03 Sources of Leaders
4 (sectors 4 and 3), AC5
The literature file contains no specific
information concerning sources of leaders for the party. Our
consultant, however, reports that a 1967 survey of party leaders
listed 23 percent as entrepreneurs and another 23 percent as
lawyers. A few were large landowners.
7.04 Relations with Domestic
Parties
7, AC7
UNO failed to enter into an electoral pact
with APRA in 1956. The party occasionally cooperated with the
MDP-APRA coalition in the legislature during Prado's reign, but no
alliance existed. Rumors of an UNO-APRA governmental and
legislative pact in 1962 led to a military coup, but the alleged
alliance was denied by Odria. After the 1963 elections, UNO and
APRA joined in a legislative alliance of opposition. This occurred
late in the time period and does not affect our code.
7.05 Relations with Foreign
Organizations
5, AC3
There is no evidence suggesting UNO had
relations with any foreign organization.
Organizational Complexity Variables,
8.01-8.07
8.01 Structural Articulation
4, AC5
Only two national organs of UNO can be
identified, and selection procedures are unknown. The party's
national convention convened in 1962 and declared Odria its
presidential candidate. The Restoration Party of 1956 contained a
Supreme Committee, and it is likely that such a body continued
after the name change to UNO.
8.02 Intensiveness of
Organization
AC1
No information
8.03 Extensiveness of
Organization
AC1
No information
8.04 Frequency of Local
Meetings
AC1
No information
8.05 Frequency of National
Meetings
AC1
No information
8.06 Maintaining Records
0, AC3
There is no evidence which suggests that
UNO published party propaganda, maintained a party archive, or had
access to membership lists.
8.07 Pervasiveness of
Organization
8, AC3
One source mentions the existence of the
National Grouping of Odriista Workers, a labor affiliate of UNO.
This organization apparently drew few members, and party control
is unknown. It is unlikely that UNO was represented by other
socioeconomic organizations.
Organizational Power Variables, 9.01-9.08
9.01 Nationalization of
Structure
AC1
No information
9.02 Selecting the National
Leader
8, AC7
General Odria was leader of UNO from its
inception through the remainder of our time period. No means of
transferring leadership are apparent.
9.03 Selecting Parliamentary
Candidates
AC2
UNO candidates probably ran on their own
volition, although they most likely required the approval of
general Odria, UNO's leader. However, information is insufficient
for coding purposes.
9.04 Allocating Funds
AC1
No information
9.05 Formulating Policy
7, AC9
General Odria, leader of UNO, determined
the party's policies. Most policy positions were also announced by
Odria, although some, especially in 1956, were announced by his
spokesmen.
9.06 Controlling Communications
0, AC3
UNO apparently controlled no important
communications media at any level.
9.07 Administering Discipline
AC1
No information
9.08 Leadership Concentration
6, AC7
While several sources mention Piedra as UNO
leader, Odria actually exercised sole leadership over the party.
Piedra was apparently the "manager" of the party "owned" by
Odria.
Coherence Variables, 10.01-10.06
10.01 Legislative Cohesion
.90, AC3
While information is scarce, UNO evidently
was characterized by a fairly cohesive legislative
body.
10.02 Ideological Factionalism
0, AC3
No evidence suggests the existence of
ideological factionalism in UNO during our time period.
Disagreements were probably not open to public debate.
10.03 Issue Factionalism
0, AC3
No evidence suggests issue factionalism in
UNO during our time period. Disagreements were probably not open
to public debate.
10.04 Leadership Factionalism
0, AC3
General Odria was recognized as the sole
leader of UNO during our time period. No leadership factionalism
was apparent.
10.05 Strategic or Tactical
Factionalism
2, AC4
A large faction reportedly erupted in 1956
when Odria decided to support Lavalle for president. Many UNO
leaders wished to nominate Senator de la Piedra, one of UNO's
founders. The factionalism was covert and probably short lived. If
any faction arose in opposition he alleged UNO-APRA Agreement of
1962, it was concealed from the public.
10.06 Party Purges
0, AC3
No evidence suggests the occurrence of a
purge in UNO during our time period.
Involvement Variables, 11.01-11.06
11.01 Membership Requirements
AC1
No information
11.02 Membership Participation
AC1
No information
11.03 Material Incentives
3, AC3
Most UNO militants were probably motivated
by material incentives. The party sought development of Peru's
economy as its major goal, to be achieved by restoring Odria to
the presidency. Party praganda concentrated upon Odria's record in
the economic sphere.
11.04 Purposive Incentives
0, AC3
Few militants were probably motivated by
purposive incentives. The party's chief purpose was the
restoration of Odria's economic policies, which suggests a
predominance of material incentives.
11.05 Doctrinism
0, AC3
No written literature seems to have served
as UNO doctrine.
11.06 Personalism
1, AC3
Personalism probably motivated some UNO
militants. Odria was a somewhat charismatic leader. Personalism
probably affected nominal members of the party to a greater
degree.