The "ac" code is for "adequacy-confidence"--a
data
quality measure ranging from 0 (low) to 9
(high)
Party name and code number
Paraguayan Men of February
Revolution Party, usually called Febrerista, 362
Partido Revolucionario
Febrerista, PRF
Information base and
researchers
The information base for party
politics in Paraguay consists of 771 pages from 51 documents, nine
of which are in Spanish. A total of 309 pages or 40 percent
pertain to the Febrerista Party. Marcelino Miyares, Judith Newsome
Gillespie, and Jean Jacobsohn indexed the literature for
retrieval. Doreen Kostel Ellis coded the variables.
Institutionalization Variables,
1.01-1.06
1.01 year of origin and 1.02 name
changes
1936, AC9
5, AC8
The Febrerista Party grew out of
the 1936-7 revolutionary government, although the party did not
actually have a convention until 1951. The party did control the
state for a few months in 1936 and has since been competing for
political power. Since its formation as a loosely organized group
after the Chaco War, the Febrerista Party has been becoming more
and more centralized. Each stage of development and centralization
has been accompanied by a different name--Committee of
Revolutionary Organizations (1937-1945), Concentracion
Revolucionaria Febrerista (1945-1951), and Partido Revolucionario
Febrerista (1951 and on).
1.03 organizational
discontinuity
12, AC8
There has been great factionalism
in Paraguayan parties. In the case of the Febreristas, the
Vanguardia and the List 17 Febrero became autonomous political
groups whereas many members of the Bloque, another faction, joined
the Communist Party.
1.04 leadership
competition
2, AC7
Colonel Rafael Franco has been
the leader of the party since its inception. Any mention of other
leaders is probably in reference to the leaders of the splinter
groups.
1.05 / 2.05 legislative
instability and strength
Instability is
undefined
Strength is .00 for 1st half, AC9
and .00 for 2nd half, AC9
The Febrerista Party was banned
during our time period. It thus had no legislative strength but
its instability is undefined.
1.06 / 2.06 electoral instability
and strength
Instability is 1.83,
AC3
Strength is undefined
The Febrerista Party was declared
illegal and did not participate in elections during our time
period. This accounts for its high instability score.
Governmental Status Variables,
2.01-2.07
2.01 government
discrimination
16, AC9
The Colorado party has displayed
the typical Paraguayan policy of eliminating the opposition
parties from the political arena. Thus the Febreristas have been
declared illegal.
2.02 governmental
leadership
0 out of 7 for 1st half,
AC9
0 out of 8 for 2nd half,
AC9
The Febreristas have not been
allowed to participate in national politics.
2.03 cabinet
participation
0 out of 7 for 1st half,
AC9
0 out of 6 for 2nd half,
AC9
There have been no cabinet
members of Febrerista origin--all are hand-picked by Stroessner's
party.
2.04 national
participation
5, AC9
The Febreristas are an
interesting example of a party that is nationally based, but gets
most of its support from exiles or from certain social groups
(e.g., students and labor). Thus its membership is spread out over
great geographic area, cutting across borders where persons are in
exile, but at the same time its ideology is very nationalistic.
Its membership varies in each area due to the limited bases of
support which the Febreristas have. There is some
over-representation of the urban areas in the Febrerista Party due
to the greater appeal to social groups found there (e.g.,
students, labor) as compared with the peasantry who tend to belong
to the older Colorado or Liberal Parties.
2.07 outside origin
6, AC9
The Febrerista Party was formed
in the aftermath of the Chaco War. The leaders in its organization
were Franco, a war hero, and other war veterans , with the
additional aid of discontented students and labor.
Issue Orientation Variables, 5.01-5.15
5.01 ownership of means of
production
1, AC6
The more conservative wing of the
Febrerista Party, that wing that is in control of the party's
legitimate actions, agree with the radical wing as far as the
necessity for state-owned subsoil and soil rights but stop at the
radical notion of state ownership of all land. The
Institutionalists believe that private property gives the worker
initiative, but maintain that property must not become more
important than the importance it retains in aiding society (food,
shelter, resources, etc.).
5.02 government role in economic
planning
5, AC9
The Febrerista Party has
historically utilized an ideology that contained the idea of
governmental direction in the economic sphere of activity as one
of importance. During our time period the Febreristas maintained
this ideology, proclaiming the necessity for the state direction
of reform and the distribution of wealth. In terms of agrarian
Paraguay, this means also that the state is to expropriate and
divide all unproductive latifundios and to designate their
use.
5.03 redistribution of
wealth
4, AC9
Probably the most important type
of reform for agrarian Paraguay is the redistribution of land. The
Febreristas desire a seizure and re-distribution of land by the
government, but the Institutionalists shy away from the
all-encompassing state-ownership of land which the List 17 Febrero
( radicals) desire. Instead the Institutionalists feel that
private property is important to the peasant for psychological
reasons which would impel the peasant to work harder. Thus their
re-distribution of land would involve selling it to the
peasants--it stops short of any communalism. This variable is
coded according to the ideas of the Institutionalists, not only
because they are the faction that has the power, but also because
they are the lowest common denominator as far as the degree of
radical thought. This practice will be followed throughout this
variable cluster.
5.04 social welfare
5, AC9
The Febrerista movement wishes to
realize the ideal of making available to all persons the means for
the proper standard of life in Paraguay. They are especially
concerned with those very basic needs without which many
Paraguayans live, namely health, nourishment and education. They
feel that the best method for reaching these goals is through the
nationalization of all public services. It is important to
remember that the Febrerista plans are basically just in the
planning stage and are not being carried out during our time
period, due to their illegal status and their lack of
funds.
5.05 secularization of
society
AC1
There is no actual mention of the
degree of secularization of the Febrerista Party, beyond the fact
that they tolerate other religions (than the general Latin
American Catholicism).
5.06 support of the
military
0, AC3
Although the Febrerista program
states their desire to depoliticize the army and to take away some
of their expenditures, I would hesitate to describe this as their
policy in that at the same time as they are declaring these
principles, they were in favor of violence, if necessary, to oust
Stroessner, and they did have many guerilla attacks on Paraguay.
Naturally, being an illegal party subjected to many repressive
measures, they would be in favor of less government expenditure on
the armed forces, but yet I find it difficult to label them
anti-military.
5.07 alignment with east-west
blocs
0, AC9
The Febreristas feel a great
anti-imperialism against both the U.S.S.R. And the U.S. they
desire independence from any rival blocs of nations in an effort
to find a new democracy for Paraguay. This is a very interesting
reaction to U.S. aid to the repressive dictator and to what they
view as the international interests of communism. Both are viewed
as the menace.
5.08 anti-colonialism
5, AC9
The Febrerista Party is an
extremely nationalistic party. Thus they desire no political ties
that would in any way subordinate them to another nation. As Lewis
has described it, they are opposed to "U.S. intervention and
communist penetration." They desire a truly Paraguayan culture,
economy, and nation state.
5.09 supranational
integration
3, AC5
The Febrerista Party has been
described as belonging to a general type of Latin American
political party--the Aprista type. The Febrerista Party has
attended conventions of the Latin American popular parties and has
shown its agreement with the convention's general policy statement
by signing that statement. One of the portions of the statement
called for the parties to work towards the eventual economic and
political unification of Latin America. Yet I would hesitate to
give full confidence to this statement, in that it is not a party
statement, but rather a statement by a group of parties--in other
words, this statement was not of Febrerista origin, and perhaps it
would not have been quite as much in favor of the eventual
federation of Latin America (or it may have been more in favor of
it).
5.10 national
integration
5, AC8
As stated previously, the
Febrerista Party is extremely nationalistic, and in our time
period has been attempting to integrate the rest of the Paraguayan
population into their culture. This is an effort to create a
different mass-based political culture and to integrate the entire
population under the Febrerista banner.
5.11 electoral
participation
5, AC3
The Febrerista Party wants
uniform civil rights for all men and women in Paraguay. In the
past they have not followed through on this theory, and in our
time period they could not practice their theory because they were
illegal. It would be interesting to see exactly how the Febrerista
Party would treat the problem of franchise if they were in power
again.
5.12 protection of civil
rights
3, AC9
The Febreristas desired equal
rights for men and women and equal political rights for all
persons regardless of their political party or social group. They
were not in a position to legislate their theory during our time
period, and thus did not make any statements about possible
enforcement of civil rights legislation, nor did they speak in a
more specific sense about their population, beyond the desire to
mobilize the masses. Thus, again this is an example of a theory
expounded without the actual practice.
5.13 interference with civil
liberties
AC1
There is not enough information
about this variable beyond the fact that the Febreristas were
desirous of freedom of the press.
5.14 / 5.15 us--soviet experts
left-right ratings
US says 3, non-communist
left
Soviets say 3, supported by the
radically oriented petty bourgeoisie, democratic intelligentsie,
students and sectors of peasant classes. Favors nationalization of
resources, agrarian rorm, and constitutional
reorganization.
Goal Orientation Variables, 6.01-6.55
6.00 open competition in the
electoral process
1, AC9
The Febreristas wanted electoral
reform and wished to compete in elections, but felt that they
could not due to the repressive actions of the Stroessner regime.
Thus they took part in boycotts and subversive tactics, including
some guerilla warfare. Again in this case there was a more radical
viewpoint that could not see any possibility of reconciliation
with the Stroessner government. They desired revolution, but I
feel that it is important to account for the majority of
Febreristas who would be willing to work for institutional change
if at all possible. However, the channels for such cooperation
appeared to be closing up in the second half of our time
period.
6.10 restricting party
competition
0, AC5
The Febreristas desire reform
through constitutional processes and through revolution if
necessary. They do not speak about restricting party competition,
but rather, being an illegal party, want party competition to
regain some ability to take part in the electoral
process.
6.20 subverting the political
system
3, AC9
The Febreristas have been
throughout this time period the more radical of the non-communist
opposition parties, allowing, if not supporting, guerilla warfare
and boycotting elections in an effort to pressure the government
into some reform. In the second half of the time period, due to
their unification with the Liberals in a coalition, their tactics
were made a bit more moderate, although they still saw the need
for a possible armed uprising against the Stroessner regime. This
slight change should not affect the code.
6.30 propagandizing ideas and
program
6.31--2, AC9. When allowed by the
Colorados and/or when it can be sold on the black market, the
Febreristas operate their newspapers. An interesting mode of
communication which seems widely used and which is ignored by this
variable is graffiti, which can be described as a mode of mass
communication. The Febreristas utilize this also.
6.32--2, AC6. The education
process in the Febrerista Party is important for recruitment
because most Paraguayans have belonged to one of the traditional
political parties. The underground classes are the Febrerista's
best means of screening their recruits and of teaching the
recruits the Febrerista political culture (political
socialization). The schools also serve as a general information
center for members.
6.33--2, AC9. It appears that
Febreristas have passed many definitive resolutions and platforms,
the "new Paraguay" program being an example that has been
incorporated into the Colorado program. Interestingly enough, many
of the Febrerista programs have been adopted in some way by the
Colorados to assist reform in Paraguay.
6.34--2, AC9. In an effort to
survive, the Febreristas must publish position papers. These
papers are basically to illustrate the way the Febreristas view
Paraguayan life and the way they feel it can and should be
changed. The papers are generally published to enlighten the
Paraguayan people to the possibilities that the Febreristas feel
they can offer them and to show the people the wrongs of their
society.
6.50 providing for welfare of
party members
6.51, 6.52, 6.53, 6.54--AC1.
There is generally very little material on this variable cluster.
There is only one illustration of an experiment in living, where
the Febreristas aided a village for six months, but it appears
that this did not occur as a common practice, and this only
applied to providing shelter.
6.55--1, AC8. There have been
cases described in the literature of social activities planned and
executed by the Febreristas to promote unity and/or raise
funds.
Autonomy Variables, 7.01-7.05
7.01 sources of funds
7, AC8
Due to their illegal status and
the fact that many of the Febreristas are in exile, their source
of funds is generally only a sporadic income from membership dues
and party activities for fund-raising. The financial insecurity of
the exiles resulted in a very shaky economic foundation for the
party. The illegal status of the party made it very difficult to
extricate funds from new sources. There was a general statement
made as to the possibility of funding from the German Social
Democrat Party because the Febrerista Party belongs to the same
general category as the APRA and other popular parties in Latin
America. Some CIA support has also been rumored.
7.02 source of
members
5, AC6
During our time period,
membership in the Febrerista Party was by recruitment. There was
no special organization from which the members were chosen, in
fact, there was an effort to broaden the Febrerista base of
support.
7.03 sources of
leaders
2 (sectors 03, 07),
AC8
Between 1952 and 1962 the
Febrerista Party was illegal and therefore did not nominate
representatives to the Paraguayan chamber of deputies. The leaders
of the party that are documented in the material do appear to come
from two sectors of society, the intellectuals and the war
veterans association, with some overlap between them.
7.04 relations with domestic
parties
7 for 1st half, AC3
5 for 2nd half, AC9
In the first half of our time
period we can infer that the Febreristas were completely
autonomous of any domestic alliances because all political actions
which they were undertaking appeared to be completed by them,
alone. They were more radical in their tactics than the Liberal
party, and yet not radical enough in their ideology to be in an
alliance with the communist-oriented groups. In the second half of
our time period this changed and the Febreristas merged into a
very loose coalition with the Liberals called the Union Nacional
Paraguaya. This coalition was formed to coordinate the
anti-Stroessner forces.
7.05 relations with foreign
organizations
4, AC6
This, again, is a tricky variable
to code because the Febreristas are related in a very general way
to the Latin American popular parties, but it is difficult to say
if they adhere to their international policy because they have
been illegal. There was not much mention of the Febrerista support
for this organization, other than the fact that they do attend its
meetings and that they signed a policy statement. They have not
been in any position to prove their allegiance to this policy
statement, except on paper, thus the Febreristas are coded as
being more independent of this organization.
Organizational Complexity Variables,
8.01-8.07
8.01 structural
articulation
11, AC9
There are many national organs in
the Febrerista Party, structuring the many processes and interests
of the party. The congress of the party is the national convention
which elects the national executive committee and other national
committees, which are generally interest-based. There is
prescribed selection, but within this type of selection it is not
clear how much co-optation occurs.
8.02 intensiveness of
organization
6, AC6
The cell is the smallest
organizational group in the Febrerista hierarchy, although the
party is also structured along branch lines for collecting funds
and representational (to the national convention) purposes. The
cells are for political action, education, propaganda and for
membership recruitment.
8.03 extensiveness of
organization
5, AC6
The local units of the
Febreristas are spread all over Paraguay and the surrounding
countries. They are not spread throughout the country evenly, but
rather there is an over-representation of cells where there is an
over- representation of members, i.e., cities. Since the cell is
their means of recruitment, they are created as a means of
broadening party support in the more traditional
countryside.
8.04 frequency of local
meetings
6, AC6
The party cells, in their
position as information transmitters and receivers, meet very
often--generally once a week. Approximately once every three
months the cells of a particular area meet together under the
auspices of the local administration of the party in order to
coordinate their activities.
8.05 frequency of national
meetings
AC1
The National Executive Committee
(CEN) meets regularly from what I can gather in the material, but
no actual frequency is defined for their meetings.
8.06 maintaining
records
12, AC6
The Febreristas have a party
newspaper that is circulated in Paraguay but printed in other
nations due to Colorado pressure. The party also keeps a
membership list of all its members.
8.07 pervasiveness of
organization
3, AC3
Previous to 1951 the Febreristas
had youth groups and were intricately tied to the war veteran's
association, but there is no information on such groups and their
relations to the Febreristas after 1951. There is a group called
the Ateneo Cultural which appears to be some sort of organization
related to the Febreristas, but there is no certainty of their
exact function beyond the fact that they published the party's
cultural paper. Thus they are not coded as being representative of
a socio-economic sector, but are included as a possible ancillary
group.
Organizational Power Variables, 9.01-9.08
9.01 nationalization of
structure
6, AC8
In the Febrerista structure there
is a hierarchy with the CEN in the position of power. The CEN
contacts both the regional and local organizations, but there is
no evidence of the hierarchy running through the regional
organization before it reaches the local organization. In looking
at the Febrerista Party structure it is important to remember that
there is a reduced effectiveness of control from the top due to
lack of funds, their illegal status and their physical dispersion.
Thus many times the local units may act by their own volition out
of necessity.
9.02 selecting the national
leader
6, AC6
It appears that the CEN selects
the party leaders and the choice is then "ratified" by the
national convention. The CEN hold the power in the Febrerista
organization. Their choice is generally upheld, even in the case
of alternative lists of leaders being presented to the national
convention.
9.03 selecting parliamentary
candidates
Not applicable
The Febreristas did not compete
in parliamentary elections due to their illegal status. They did
not select at any time during our time period candidates for any
governmental position.
9.04 allocating funds
2, AC6
One of the telling problems of
the Febrerista organization is their inability to collect great
amounts of funds. This is often due to the types of social groups
to which the Febrerista Party appeals, i.e., students and labor.
Thus collection of funds is generally a haphazard affair,
depending upon the success of social activities with an admission
fee, etc. What fees are collected in this method are partially
kept by the sponsors of the activity and partially sent to the
higher committees for further distribution.
9.05 formulating
policy
6, AC6
The CEN generates all policy.
This fact has been examined by Lewis as an example of the
centralization of power, oligarchical tendency of parties. The
main party leader, Col. Rafael Franco, does not hold any
decision-making powers, but rather serves his party in a
psychological sense as the founder of the Febrero
movement.
9.06 controlling
communications
4, AC3
The Febrerista use of mass
communications is restricted due to their illegal status. It
appears that the national organization tries to prepare pamphlets
and newspapers, but the distribution is often difficult due to
their illegality. It is likely that the local and regional units
also publish papers , outside of the country if necessary, and
then distribute them.
9.07 administering
discipline
4, AC8
Because there are no governmental
or parliamentary candidates from the Febrerista Party, we must
look at the disciplinary actions of the party to control the party
members, themselves. The executive committee administers all forms
of discipline, the most common being the purge.
9.08 leadership
concentration
4, AC8
The five key posts in the CEN are
the leaders of the party most involved in the decision-making
process. With the changing structure of the Febrerista Party and
the consolidation of power within the CEN, these five posts have
become institutionalized as the policy-makers of the party. One
specific group, during our time period, succeeded in maintaining
their control over the party by continually filling these posts
with their members.
Coherence Variables, 10.01-10.06
10.01 legislative
cohesion
Not applicable
On paper this is not really a
one-party system, but the Febreristas have been completely
excluded from any participation in the decision-making processes
of the nation.
10.02 ideological
factionalism
6, AC7
Ideological problems have caused
grave conflicts and the formation of factions within the
Febrerista Party throughout our time period. Within the twelve
years there were four factions formed dividing the Febrerista
unity greatly. Therefore this variable is scored for a "large"
faction because of the ever-presence of an opposing
faction.
10.03 issue
factionalism
6, AC7
The Febrerista Party is also
badly split on different issues, including labor and social
reform, ideas basic to their program. The factions are large as
defined in the previous code, and they are organized in that they
prepare alternative lists for election of Febrerista candidates to
the national convention and alternative programs.
10.04 leadership
factionalism
6, AC9
Nichols views the Febrerista
factions as strictly generational conflicts, in other words, the
factions are solely the results of leadership competition. Many
other authors have also been aware of this type of competition,
but have still maintained that there might be other causes for the
factions in addition to this leadership competition (Lewis). This
competition is not based on the personalistic virtues of the
leader, but rather on the possibilities for patronage.
10.05 strategic or tactical
factionalism
6, AC7
The basic reason that is given
for most of the factions is the fact that the Institutionalists
are not radical enough in their tactics. The factions generally
desire guerilla action and other war-like tactics to overthrow the
Stroessner government, whereas the Institutionalists (the moderate
Febreristas) wish to work through the governmental
system.
10.06 party purges
1 for 1st half, AC5
3 for 2nd half, AC5
In the first half of our time
period the Bloque faction was expelled from the Febrerista Party,
and in the second half of our time period the Vanguardia, the List
17 Febrero and Ricardo Franco's group were expelled. There is no
data on the percentage of the party that these expulsions
included.
Involvement Variables, 11.01-11.06
11.01 membership
requirements
3, AC8
There is formal enrollment in the
Febrerista Party. Each member must have certain qualifications and
must be sponsored by an active member of the party. The members
are asked to pay membership dues, although they are often waived
when a member cannot afford to pay them.
11.02 membership
participation
6, AC6
The Febrerista Party, being
structured on the cell basis and requiring its members to remain
active in cell activity, would by necessity be mainly composed of
militants.
11.03 material
incentives
0, AC9
During our time period the
possible material advantages for joining the Febrerista Party did
not exist, due to their illegal status. In a country where the
political system is based on patronage, the Febrerista Party had
no means of aiding their followers materially.
11.04 purposive
incentives
4, AC5
Because there are no patronage
benefits in joining the Febrerista Party, whereas they existed for
other parties, Lewis has stressed the fact that there are
purposive incentives for recruitment, that the members remain in
their party for "voluntary commitment to its principle" (p. 191).
The Nichols thesis modifies this idea in a way that could
supplement this idea and possibly discount it. Nichols believes
that there are no differences between the major parties on
ideological issues, thus the parties are formed solely by solidary
incentives. This probably has a great deal to do with the joining
of the party , but it is necessary to remember that during our
time period the Febreristas were illegal, and many of them were in
exile. In order to remain a member of that party, it would seem
that one would have to be committed to some ideal that it
represented, if one had to leave his or her homeland. Thus there
probably are purposive incentives behind the militant loyalty to
the Febrerista Party, whether there are real differences in the
purposive incentives or not in reality.
11.05 doctrinism
1, AC9
The Febreristas have a
declaration of principles and a program. It does not appear that
they consult this body of literature to any great
extent.
11.06 personalism
0, AC5
Personalism, in relation to
leadership competition, has been manifested in the Febrerista
Party by the competing factions to get their leaders on top of the
party governing structure. I would hesitate to say that this is
the only motivation of any of the militants, except perhaps for a
few who link party ideals with the charismatic leader of a
faction.