The "ac" code is for "adequacy-confidence"--a
data
quality measure ranging from 0 (low) to 9
(high)
Party name and code number
EcuadorianConcentration of Social Forces,
355
Contracion de Fuerzas Populares, CFP
Institutionalization Variables,
1.01-1.06
1.01 year of origin and 1.02 name changes
1950, AC9
0, AC9
The Concentration of Popular Forces began as an active Party
in 1950, founded by Carlos Guevara Moreno. Throughout the
literature this Party was constantly referred to as the
Concentration of Popular Forces, and thus did not seem to undergo
any name changes during its entire existence.
1.03 organizational discontinuity
0. AC8
In 1950, 1500 members of the Concentration of Popular Forces
quit the Party because of the practices of their leader Guevara
Moreno. The nomination of another leader besides Guevara, in an
effort to reunify the Party, may have split Party lines even
further.
1.04 leadership competition
12, AC9
Carlos Guevara Moreno founded the Concentration of Popular
Forces in 1950. He remained the leader of this Party and ran for
president in 1956. He lost, and three years later, in 1959, was
ousted by a majority of the members of the CFP. He was replaced by
Vicente Norero de Lucca just before the 1960 elections.
1.05 legislative instability
Instability is .01, AC6
The data on legislative representation for the CFP is not
good, especially before 1956. It seems that the
Party had 10 percent of the seats in 1950 and 1951 but that it
lost all its seats until the presidential
elections of 1956, when it again won 10 percent. Its
representation dropped again in 1960 to 2 percent.
1.06 electoral instability
Instability is 1.33, AC4
The high instability score for the CFP is due to the fact that
it sponsored a candidate for the presidency only in 1956, when
Guevara won 24 percent of the vote.
Governmental Status Variables,
2.01-2.07
2.01 government discrimination
-4 for 1950-56, AC5
0 for 1957-62, AC3
It is difficult to code the CFP on government discrimination
because of the problem in separating the treatment given Guevara,
the CFP leader, and the CFP itself. In 1952, the CFP was indeed
denied access to government owned newspapers, and following the
elections that year, Guevara was banned from the country. But he
was allowed to return and to run as the CFP presidential candidate
in 1956. Basically, however, it seems that the CFP itself was not
the target of severe government discrimination. In the second
period, there were no incidents of repression reported against
either Guevara or the CFP.
2.02 governmental leadership
0 out of 7 for 1950-56, AC9
0 out of 6 for 1957-62, AC9
During our time period, the perennial leader of the
Concentration of Popular Forces, Carlos Guevara Moreno, never
became president of Ecuador, although he ran a strong third in the
1956 presidential election.
2.03 cabinet participation
0 out of 7 for 1950-56, AC4
0 out of 6 for 1957-62, AC4
It appears that the CFP never received any cabinet positions
during our time period.
2.04 national participation
3, AC8
This Party was established by the mayor of Guayaquil, Guevara
Moreno. Thus support for it came mainly from this area. In the
1956 election, the CFP received 77 percent of the vote from the
coastal area, which contains Guayaquil, although the region cast
only 44 percent of the total vote.
2.05 legislative strength
Strength is .04 for 1950-56, AC5, and .07 for 1957-62,
AC8
The data on legislative representation for the CFP is not
good, especially before 1956. It seems that the
Party had 10 percent of the seats in 1950 and 1951 but that it
lost all its seats until the presidential
elections of 1956, when it again won 10 percent. Its
representation dropped again in 1960 to 2 percent.
2.06 electoral strength
Strength is .24 for 1950-56, AC6
The high instability score for the CFP is due to the fact that
it sponsored a candidate for the presidency
only in 1956, when Guevara won 24 percent of the vote.
2.07 outside origin
5, AC9
The Concentration of Popular Forces was founded by Carlos
Guevara Moreno. Previously, he was a legislative member and a
member of the president's cabinet. At the time he founded the
Concentration of Popular Forces, he was mayor of Guayaquil.
Issue Orientation Variables, 5.01-5.15
5.01 ownership of means of production
AC1
No information.
5.02 government role in economic planning
AC1
No information.
5.03 redistribution of wealth
AC1
No information.
5.04 social welfare
AC1
No information.
5.05 secularization of society
AC1
No information.
5.06 support of the military
AC1
No information.
5.07 alignment with east-west blocs
0, AC3
The Concentration of Popular Forces was thought to be a
Nazi-Fascist Party. Moreno was previously a Communist.
5.08 anti-colonialism
AC1
No information.
5.09 supranational integration
AC1
No information.
5.10 national integration
AC1
No information.
5.11 electoral participation
AC1
No information,
5.12 protection of civil rights
AC1
No information.
5.13 interference with civil liberties
AC1
No information.
5.14 / 5.15 us--soviet experts left-right ratings
US says 3 non-Communist left
Soviets say 2, founded by representatives of various classes,
from the proletariat to the bourgeoisie.
Goal Orientation Variables, 6.01-6.55
6.00 open competition in the electoral process
2 for 1st half, AC6
2 for 2nd half, AC3
Although Guevara ran for the presidency in 1956, electoral
competition played only part of the CFP strategy.
6.10 restricting Party competition
1, AC6
Guevara headed the anti-Ponce Forces in 1956 which attempted
to keep Ponce from assuming the presidency.
6.20 subverting the political system
1, AC6
Guevara headed a plot to overthrow the Plaza government in
1951. Subversive activity but later allowed to return.
6.30 propagandizing ideas and program
6.31, 6.32, 6.33, 6.34, AC1
No information.
6.50 providing for welfare of Party members
6.51, 6.52, 6.53, 6.54, 6.55, AC1
No information.
Autonomy Variables, 7.01-7.05
7.01 sources of funds
AC1
There is no information in our data collection describing the
source of CFP funds.
7.02 source of members
6, AC3
Guevara Moreno appealed to many, ranging from wealthy
businessmen to the discontented lumpen proletariat, especially in
Guayaquil. Because the CFP has incorporated the lumpen proletariat
of Guayaquil, the Party probably has no membership
requirements.
7.03 sources of leaders
AC2
The only leader whose background is illustrated at any length
in our data is Guevara Moreno. We are told that he was minister of
the interior and mayor of Guayaquil. In reverse of this
governmental orientation, it is important to note that he was
allied with the Communists before forming his Party, and was in an
alliance in 1962. He can hardly be considered from the
governmental bureaucracy (which would lead one to misinterpret his
political leanings as pro-government). He is generally
anti-government during our time period, becoming Velasco's enemy
(after one-time alliance) and strongly anti-Conservative. This
variable should not be coded because it would give us the wrong
impression of Guevara Moreno and a narrow description of the
leadership of the CFP.
7.04 relations with domestic parties
5 for 1st half, AC3
5 for 2nd half, AC5
During the first half of our time period, the CFP supported
Velasco in his regime. The data does not fully describe what type
of alliance this was, but it certainly was not a lasting one.
Velasco grew tired (or afraid) of Guevara Moreno and relieved him
of his governmental duties. Around 1960 the CFP entered into a
nongovernmental (perhaps anti-governmental is a better
description) alliance with the Communists and the Socialists. The
dependence or responsibility engendered is not considered to be
particularly great in this second alliance.
7.05 relations with foreign organizations
5, AC3
It appears that this Party, with its caudillistic beginnings,
is a national Party with no international linkages.
Organizational Complexity Variables,
8.01-8.07
8.01 structural articulation
4. AC5
The information for this variable is in the forms of indirect
statements about the CFP. There appear to be at least two distinct
national organs, an executive and a convention (following the
structure of the Liberal and Conservative parties). But there is
no further information describing the responsibilities or the
selection process of the membership of these Party bodies.
8.02 intensiveness of organization
AC1
There is no documentation of the structural levels of the
CFP.
8.03 extensiveness of organization
AC1
There is no information defining the local structure and its
regional variation of strength, besides the fact that the CFP
stronghold is Guayaquil.
8.04 frequency of local meetings
AC1
There is no information concerning the frequency of local
meetings.
8.05 frequency of national meetings
AC1
Our data collection does not enumerate the national meetings
during our time period.
8.06 maintaining records
2, AC5
Guevara Moreno's weekly, 'El Momento,' is famous for caustic
remarks about Ecuadorean governmental policy and CFP (or Guevara
Moreno) propaganda. As with the other Ecuadorean parties, there
are no membership lists. There is also no evidence of a Party
archive for the CFP.
8.07 pervasiveness of organization
0, AC3
There is no evidence in our data collection of any ancillary
socioeconomic organizations of the CFP. Naturally, they may have a
tendency to belong to other organizations, such as the Guayaquil
workers union. But it does not appear that this organization is
directly related to the CFP.
Organizational Power Variables, 9.01-9.08
9.01 nationalization of structure
AC1
There is no information defining the structural hierarchy of
the CFP.
9.02 selecting the national leader
8, AC7
It appears that there may be some institutionalized means of
selecting the national leader, but either it has not often been
used (except temporarily during Guevara moron's ouster), or
Guevara Moreno is the founder/leader and the presidential
candidate of the CFP, or the mode of writing about this Party has
become institutionalized into defining Guevara Moreno as the
self-selecting leader (caudillo) although he is actually selected
by a governing body. (This is a possibility as seen in the action
taken by the CFP leaders during Guevara Moreno's purge. If there
was more information about this event and the means by which
Guevara Moreno regained power, it may have added a new dimension
to the possible coding of this variable.) There is no doubt that
Guevara Moreno is generally the national spokesman, but perhaps
the literature does not emphasize the power of the Party
structure.
9.03 selecting parliamentary candidates
AC1
Our data collection does not document the CFP selection of
parliamentary candidates.
9.04 allocating funds
AC1
There is no information about the allocation of funds by the
CFP.
9.05 formulating policy
AC1
The formulation of Party policy is not described for the
CFP.
9.06 controlling communications
7, AC3
If we can define Guevara Moreno's weekly, 'El Momento,' as
always speaking for the CFP, we can then view the control of
communications of the CFP as being national. There is not really
sufficient evidence as to the relationship between El Momento and
Party leadership. Therefore, this variable is given the lowest
adequacy confidence code.
9.01 administering discipline
4, AC3
In reference to this variable we have only the cases where
Guevara Moreno quit the Party and where he was temporarily ousted.
It appears that top Party leaders caused his actions in both
decisions.
9.08 leadership concentration
6, AC7
Guevara Moreno is generally seen as the CFP caudillo who is
able to direct the Party. The only problem with concluding this
never-failing leadership for the Party is that in 1958 he quit the
Party temporarily in an effort to re-integrate angry Party
members, and in 1959 he was ousted temporarily. It is not
discussed whether the temporary leader was also considered the
centralized authority, or if the authority existed in some other
group during this time. These are the exceptions, it is generally
fair to say that Guevara Moreno is the central leader of the
Party.
Coherence Variables, 10.01-10.06
10.01 legislative cohesion
AC1
As with the other Ecuadorean parties, the CFP may have had
intra-party dissension during our time period, but there is no
information in our data collection as to its reflection in the
parliamentary cohesion of the Party.
10.02 ideological factionalism
AC5
There do not appear to be any factional tendencies in the CFP
that are created by ideological differences.
10.03 issue factionalism
2, AC5
Protest by various groups in the CFP leads to disruption and
disagreement among members. Often great numbers may (temporarily)
leave the Party, but it does not appear that factions are formed
in the sense of a group of Party members organized to act as a
permanent bloc within or outside of the Party. These people simply
leave, provoked by a member of the Party. It is not described how
or whether these people return to the Party fold, but these
momentary disruptions appear to be effective protests.
10.04 leadership factionalism
AC1 for 1st half
2 for 2nd half, AC6
My interpretation of the data is that Guevara Moreno's 1959
ouster was not performed by a faction supporting a specific
leader, but a group of leaders (perhaps an institutionalized
organ) who felt that in order to retain unity in the Party, they
would have to oust Guevara Moreno, at least temporarily. There is
no evidence of this 'coup' being part of a greater leadership
competition among factions.
10.05 strategic or tactical factionalism
AC1
There is no information enabling me to define factionalism
caused by strategy disputes in the CFP.
10.06 Party purges
0, AC5
There is no evidence of a true purge of CFP members during our
time period. The only `purge' was really more of a disciplinary
action against Guevara Moreno in an effort to re-unite the
dissatisfied INIP.
Involvement Variables, 11.01-11.06
11.01 membership requirements
0, AC3
There is no indication of any membership requirements in the
data. And it is assumed there are no requirements.
11.02 membership participation
AC1
There is no data relating to the levels of Party participation
by the membership during our time period.
11.03 material incentives
AC1
There is no information describing the possibility of material
incentives for militants in the CFP. At first one might attempt to
code this variable by the fact that the CFP, as a perpetual
opposition Party during most of our time period, could not offer
strong material incentives, but it is important to remember that
the CFP rules Guayaquil and thus material incentives may be
available in that specific region.
11.04 purposive incentives
0, AC3
Because there is no reference to a Party program, it is
assumed that purposive incentives cannot be a significant
motivational factor.
11.05 doctrinism
0, AC3
There is no evidence of a written doctrine for the CFP. The
fact that the Party is a young nationally-oriented Party supports
the conclusion that there probably is no such body of written
literature.
11.06 personalism
3 for 1st half, AC3
2 for 2nd half, AC3
Our data gives two opposing impressions of the importance of
personalism to the CFP. One impression is based on the word choice
of the authors who spoke about the CFP. They constantly refer to
Guevara Moreno as a caudillo: a personalistic leader, a leader who
selects himself and attracts his members by his charisma. Yet
there are unanswered questions developing from this
interpretation--why was he ousted in 1959, and why did he
temporarily step down from power in 1958. It appears that Guevara
Moreno's power and authority were limited in some way; that his
charismatic hold was not complete. Further investigation should be
made on this subject in order to clear up the disagreement evident
in the available data.