The "ac" code is for "adequacy-confidence"--a
data
quality measure ranging from 0 (low) to 9
(high)
Institutionalization Variables,
1.01-1.06
1.01 year of origin and 1.02 name
changes
1898, AC7
0, AC9
There is room for disagreement concerning
the exact date of origin of the Christian Historical Union. In
1894, the parliamentary party of the ARP divided over the
extension of the suffrage. The faction which opposed extension of
the franchise was organized in 1898 as the Free Anti Revolutionary
Party. In 1903, the Free ARP joined with a smaller group, the
Christian Historical Electoral League, to become the Christian
Historical Party. In 1908, this party merged with a smaller
Frisian Christian historical organization, to form the Christian
Historical Union. Most authors fix the year of origin of the Chu
as 1908, the year the party took its present name. However, we
have chosen 1898, for the literature states that the two groups
which joined in 1903 and 1908 were distinctly smaller than the
free anti- revolutionary group. Thus the events of 1903 and 1908
are considered instances of early name changes, but they were too
early to be counted as name changes for the purposes of scoring
variable 1.02. There were no changes in the party's name during
our period of interest.
1.03 organizational
discontinuity
1, AC6
The Chu experienced one very minor split in
1946 when a small number of the party's leading personalities in
the pre-war Chu joined other groups to form the Dutch labor party.
The party has not experienced any mergers.
1.04 leadership competition
11, AC5
Our information file contains no discussion
of the process of leadership change in the chu. It is clear that
our period began with H.W. Tilanus holding both positions of party
chairman and leader in the second chamber. In 1958, H.K.J.
Beernink replaced him as party chairman, but Tilanus continued as
leader in the second chamber throughout our period. In keeping
with our conception of "legitimate" leadership, we regard the
chairmanship as the relevant position for our scoring of
leadership change.
1.05 legislative instability
Instability is .05, AC9
The Chu held 8 to 9 percent of
legislature's seats during our time period. During the entire 1st
half of the period, the Chu held 9 percent of the seats, and
varied between 8 to 9 percent during the second half.
1.06 electoral instability
Instability is .05, AC9
The Chu won 8 to 9 percent of the votes in
legislative elections throughout our time period.
Governmental Status Variables,
2.01-2.07
2.01 government discrimination
0 for 1950-56, AC6
0 for 1957-62, AC6
There is no information which would suggest
any government discrimination either for or against the chu, and
our consultant concurs.
2.02 governmental leadership
0 out of 7 for 1950-56, AC9
0 out of 6 for 1957-62, AC9
The position of prime minister in the
Netherlands was filled by a representative of the Labor Party from
1950 through 1958, and thereafter by representatives of the
Catholic People's Party through the end of our time
period.
2.03 cabinet participation
7 out of 7 for 1950-56, AC9
6 out of 6 for 1957-62, AC9
The Chu was represented in every cabinet
coalition formed during our time period, usually occupying two
cabinet posts.
2.04 national participation
5, AC6
Based on a 1956 survey (sample size of
1234), the chu's average deviation of votes from the population
distribution was 6.75. The party is national in character, but its
success is highly variable across region. The Chu finds greater
support in the north and east where the Dutch Reformed Church is
strongest, and finds its least support in the south where the
Catholic church dominates.
2.05 legislative strength
Strength is .09 for 1950-56, AC9, and .08
for 1957-62 , AC9
The Chu held 8 to 9 percent of
legislature's seats during our time period. During the entire 1st
half of the period, the Chu held 9 percent of the seats, and
varied between 8 to 9 percent during the second half.
2.06 electoral strength
Strength is .08 for 1950-56, AC9, and .08
for 1957-62 , AC9
The Chu won 8 to 9 percent of the votes in
legislative elections throughout our time period.
2.07 outside origin
4, AC9
The Chu was formed by leaders of the Dutch
Reformed Church who were also members of parliament and, until
1894, members of the Anti-Revolutionary Party.
Issue Orientation Variables, 5.01-5.15
5.01 ownership of means of
production
3, AC5
The Chu opposes nationalization of
industries and is an advocate of free enterprise. The party
pursues policies resembling those of the ARP concerning ownership
of the means of production.
5.02 government role in economic
planning
1, AC3
Based on limited information, the Chu
position on government economic planning is similar to that of the
ARP. The party opposes extensive government interference, but does
support limited activity.
5.03 redistribution of wealth
3, AC5
The Chu and most of the party's supporters
(according to a survey) oppose any large change in the
distribution of wealth. The party seems to favor government
inactivity in this area.
5.04 social welfare
3, AC4
Like the ARP, the Chu favors a program of
social welfare which is initiated and operated by the private
sector. Only when the private sector fails to provide sufficient
coverage should the government interfere, and then only to amplify
coverage.
5.05 secularization of society
5, AC7
The uniting force within the Chu is the
Dutch Reformed Church, which is the protestant church of the
monarchy and nobility. The Chu, more than the ARP, favors the idea
of a state church as a central focus for the nation's existence
and the individual's life.
5.06 support of the military
5, AC5
Since the Chu strongly supports Dutch
membership in NATO and seeks the reestablishment of Dutch power
and influence, it is quite likely that the party is very
pro-military.
5.07 alignment with east-west
blocs
5, AC5
The Chu is in agreement with the other four
major parties of the Netherlands (KVP, VVD, PVDA, ARP) concerning
the nation's role in the "cold war " between the USSR and the USA.
The party strongly favors continued Dutch membership in NATO.
However, some Chu members advocate some rapproachment with the
USSR, short of abandoning NATO.
5.08 anti-colonialism
5, AC7
The Chu totally opposed any plan which
would solve the new guinea issue by relinquishment of some Dutch
control over the colony. The position of the Chu throughout the
controversy remained adamant--new guinea must remain a colony of
the Netherlands until the population was fully ready to accept the
responsibility of independence. At that time, new guinea should be
granted independence within the kingdom of the Netherlands. The
Chu remained firm in its position until the cause became obviously
hopeless.
5.09 supranational integration
1, AC5
The position taken by the Chu concerning
the integration of Western Europe seems to be quite similar to
that of the ARP. The Chu formally supports furthering such
integration, but opposes any deterioration of Dutch national
identity. Some Chu leaders openly question the wisdom of uniting
European nations.
5.10 national integration
1, AC3
The Chu seems to advocate some measure of
decentralization in Dutch government, but without eroding the
symbolic and actual powers of the monarchy.
5.11 electoral participation
5, AC5
Historically, the Chu opposed the concept
of universal adult suffrage. The Chu was formed principally by the
nobility and the upper-middle class of the 19th century who
disagreed with ARP policies and theology. The main policy
disagreement was concerning the enfranchisement bill, which was
debated for many years before being introduced. The ARP favored
the bill, while the new Chu opposed it. The Chu voted against the
enfranchisement bill of 1917 which nevertheless passed.
Presumably, the Chu now accepts the situation.
5.12 protection of civil rights
1, AC3
The Chu probably considers the protection
of civil rights to be an inappropriate matter for government
action.
5.13 interference with civil
liberties
3, AC3
The Chu seems to advocate freedom of
expression as an acknowledged and enforced government policy. The
party seems to believe that the media should be totally free of
government action, except for moral censorship.
5.14 / 5.15 us--soviet experts left-right
ratings
US says 1, conservative
Soviets say 1, it is the party of the upper
protestant bourgeoisie and major landowners. Its program, with the
exception of church questions, is not very different from that of
the Anti-Revolutionary Party.
Goal Orientation Variables, 6.01-6.55
6.00 open competition in the electoral
process
4, AC9
The Chu relies exclusively upon open
competition within the electoral process in order to place party
representatives in government positions. The Chu participated in
every election during our time period.
6.10 restricting party
competition
0, AC8
No evidence suggests that Chu goal
orientation includes the strategy of restricting competition. The
party relies solely on open competition to achieve its
ends.
6.20 subverting the political
system
0, AC8
There is no indication of Chu strategy
oriented to subverting the political system. The Chu professes
that the party does not seek political power, but only wishes to
provide its followers a channel through which they may participate
in the political system and voice the authority of god's word. It
is highly unlikely that the Chu would include within its strategy
the subversion of the political system.
6.30 propagandizing ideas and
program
6.31--1, AC5. The Chu does not own or
operate any national media, but there is some indication that the
party occasionally performs this activity in some local areas by
means of local newspapers.
6.32--0, AC5. The Chu does not operate any
party schools.
6.33--2, AC8. The Chu publishes election
platforms and resolutions passed by the party.
6.34--1, AC5. Since the Chu is often
divided on various positions, it probably does not publish
position papers as often as other Dutch parties.
6.50 providing for welfare of party
members
0, AC5
The Chu seems to perform no activities
related to social welfare. Some members do teach at the Free
Calvinist University, but this is not party activity.
Autonomy Variables, 7.01-7.05
7.01 sources of funds
7, AC6
Members of the Chu pay dues ranging between
12 and 25 guilders per year. These funds provide approximately 98
percent of the total resources available to the party.
7.02 source of members
5 (sector 06), AC9
Membership in the Chu is entirely direct,
and nearly all members belong to the Dutch Reformed
Church.
7.03 sources of leaders
1 (sector 06), AC8
Most leaders of the Chu are recruited from
the Dutch Reformed Church and protestant-Calvinist
organizations.
7.04 relations with domestic
parties
4, AC9
The Chu participated in government
coalitions, and therefore weaker parliamentary alliances in
support of the coalitions, throughout our time period.
7.05 relations with foreign
organizations
4, AC8
The information in our file suggests that
the Chu belonged to the NEI through an Equipe in conjunction with
the Catholic People's Party and the ARP. Our consultant confirms
this assertion.
Organizational Complexity Variables, 8.01-8.07
8.01 structural articulation
4, AC3
The only national organs of the Chu which
have been identified are the parliamentary group and the executive
committee. The functional responsibilities and selection
procedures of these organs are unknown from the information in our
file.
8.02 intensiveness of
organization
4, AC3
The Chu seems to be organized down to the
ward basis, as evidenced by mention of Chu political meetings in
the village of Sassenheim.
8.03 extensiveness of
organization
5, AC3
The Chu probably is well organized at the
ward level throughout the nation, but with much less strength in
the catholic south than in the protestant regions of the
north.
8.04 frequency of local
meetings
AC1
No information in our files.
8.05 frequency of national
meetings
AC1
No information in our files.
8.06 maintaining records
11, AC5
The Chu expends little if any energies in
publishing party propaganda , although the party may publish some
small local newspapers. Our consultant states that the Savorin
Lohman foundation is the research division of the Chu. Since the
Chu collects dues from its members, it is quite likely that the
party maintains quality membership list
8.07 pervasiveness of
organization
13, AC7
The Chu has penetrated many socioeconomic
sectors by means of protestant organizations such as the
Protestant Labor Union, employer's association, and farm union.
The Chu wields little control over these organizations since there
are no formal links between them and the party. Relatively few
adherents are claimed by the organizations.
Organizational Power Variables, 9.01-9.08
9.01 nationalization of
structure
4, AC3
There is little information regarding the
distribution of power within the Chu, but it seems that the
national organs exercise some authority over the regional and
local organs. Since party leaders from the executive committee and
parliamentary group often disagree with official party policies,
it is likely that national organs constitute competing power
centers.
9.02 selecting the national
leader
AC1
No information in our files.
9.03 selecting parliamentary
candidates
AC1
No information in our files.
9.04 allocating funds
5, AC3
Since nation wide figures are available
concerning the collection of membership dues, it is highly
probable that funds are allocated by national organs of the
party.
9.05 formulating policy
6, AC3
The Chu strongly believes in allowing its
parliamentary organization representatives to formulate party
policy as decisions become necessary. But since the party does
announce party positions before elections, the parliamentary group
probably is not the only policy formulator.
9.06 controlling communications
3, AC3
The Chu does not own nor operate any
national media, but may control some local, more insignificant
newspapers.
9.07 administering discipline
0, AC8
The Chu does not seem to administer any
type of discipline concerning its representatives and members.
Each Chu parliamentarian is allowed to vote his wishes without
fear of party disciplinary measures.
9.08 leadership concentration
1, AC5
Many leaders of the Chu frequently make
pronouncements on behalf of the party, but none are considered to
be authoritatively binding as spokesmen.
Coherence Variables, 10.01-10.06
10.01 legislative cohesion
0.40, AC5
Parliamentary representatives of the Chu
are allowed to vote as they wish on any issue. As a result, it is
not uncommon for the party's parliamentarians to split in half, or
60-40, on any given vote. The party does display some cohesion on
bills which draw Chu members together, such as those pertaining to
religion or an issue basic to Chu beliefs and the theology of the
Dutch Reformed Church. The "average" split in votes for the Chu
probably approximates 70-30.
10.02 ideological factionalism
5, AC5
The Chu, due to its religious base, is
comprised of both liberal and conservative Calvinists. These
groups can be considered as forming separate party factions, and
in fact often are the source of the lack of parliamentary cohesion
experienced by the party.
10.03 issue factionalism
5, AC6
The Chu split into two separate, and nearly
equal, factions during the new guinea controversy. While one
faction favored the retention of new guinea in the status of a
Dutch colony indefinitely, another advocated the eventual
independence of the colony within the kingdom of the
Netherlands.
10.04 leadership factionalism
2, AC3
There is some evidence to suggest that the
leadership of the Chu is often contested. The lack of party
discipline leads to factional tendencies concerning leadership,
but does not establish labeled groupings of leadership
followings.
10.05 strategic or tactical
factionalism
1, AC3
There is no indication of strategic or
tactical factionalism within the Chu. Disagreements probably do
arise, however, since the party is quite lacking in
cohesiveness.
10.06 party dues
0 for 1st half, AC5
0 for 2nd half, AC5
No involuntary departures from the Chu
occurred during our time period.
Involvement Variables, 11.01-11.06
11.01 membership requirements
3, AC5
Members of the Chu pay annual dues ranging
from 12 to 25 guilders, and since dues are collected, it seems
likely that members must register with the party.
11.02 membership participation
2, AC3
Although little information exists
pertaining to the activities of party members, it seems likely
that the majority of members at least attend occasional meetings
(often held in church halls) and perform some type of service on
behalf of the party.
11.03 material incentives
AC1
No information.
11.04 purposive incentives
1, AC3
Since the Chu represents the interests of
the Dutch Reformed Church and seeks the establishment of a state
church dominated by the Dutch Reformed, it is probable that some
militants are motivated by purposive incentives.
11.05 doctrinism
1, AC5
There is some evidence of Chu doctrinism in
that occasional references are made to the principles of the Chu
which basically are religious oriented.
11.06 personalism
0, AC3
Because leadership is not really
concentrated in any single individual , personalism does not seem
to figure as a motivational basis for militants.