Greek National Radical Union

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Greek National Radical Union 143
Variables and Codes for 1950-1962

For the concepts and variables below, use these links to Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey:
Institutionalization
Governmental Status
Issue Orientation Goal Orientation
Autonomy
Organizational Complexity Organizational Power
Organizational Coherence
Membership Involvement

The "ac" code is for "adequacy-confidence"--a data quality measure ranging from 0 (low) to 9 (high)
Party name and code number: Greek rally and later the National Radical Union, ERE, 143, Ellinikos Synagermos, ES, and later Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis, ERE
Information base and researchers: The information base for party politics in Greece consists of 509 pages from 45 documents, with 72 pertaining to the Greek rally and 105 pertaining to the National Radical Union. Combined, the pages total to 150 or 29 percent of the file. George Antunes indexed the literature. Alan Kaplan coded the variables.
Institutionalization Variables, 1.01-1.06
1.01 year of origin and 1.02 name changes: 1951, ac8
5, ac9
General Papagos was the leader of the Greek army which defeated the communist guerrilla forces in the 1946-1949 civil war. He was a very popular and respected leader who turned his attention to politics in 1951 by forming the Greek Rally Party. He preferred to call the "party" a "movement " because of his dislike of politicians. After General Papagos died on October 4, 1955, Constantine Karamanlis, a cabinet minister, was named premier by the king of Greece. In January, 1956, before the campaign and new elections, Karamanlis reorganized the Rally Party and in so doing changed the name of it to the National Radical Union, or the ERE.
1.03 organizational discontinuity: 13, ac7
Between 1950 and 1956, the Rally Party experienced three minor splits (Papandreou in January, 1953, Markezinis and twenty-three deputies in November, 1953, and Papayannis and twenty-one deputies in November, 1954) and two minor mergers (twenty-four deputies in October, 1952, and three ex-ministers of the Liberal Party in January, 1956). The ERE had far less discontinuity. Between 1957 and 1962, the party experienced only one minor split (fifteen deputies left in March, 1958). But, this split was very important because it created a situation where the ERE did not have a majority of the seats in parliament. Therefore, Karamanlis was forced to dissolve his cabinet and announce new elections.
1.04 leadership competition: 14, ac7
The leadership structure of the Rally Party changed twice between 1950 and 1962. After Papagos' death in October, 1955, the leadership was jointly shared by the rally's five top lieutenants. This was an overt process. The second change, in 1956, was covert and was the result of an inner power struggle. This change saw Karamanlis reorganize and change the name of the Rally Party to the ERE. In 1963, after our time period, a third change took place. When the ERE lost the election to the Center Union in 1963, Karamanlis resigned and left Greece to live in Switzerland. He maneuvered Kanellopoulos, a long-time politician and his wife's uncle, into the leadership of the ERE.
1.05 / 2.05 legislative instability and strength instability is .21, ac8: Strength is .57 for 1st half, ac8 and .57 for 2nd half, ac8
Because of our treatment of the ERE as a continuation of the Greek rally, the party emerges as relatively stable in its legislative representation , as Greek parties go. From no seats in 1950, the year before it was formed, the party jumped to 44 percent of the seats in 1951 and then 82 percent in 1952 , which was its high point. Thereafter, its share of the seats dropped to between 55 and 60 percent during each of the years in the second half of our time period.
1.06 / 2.06 electoral instability and strength instability is .17, ac9: Strength is .44 for 1st half, ac9 and .46 for 2nd half, ac9
With the exception of the election of 1950, which was held the year before the Greek rally/ere was founded, the party contested all of the elections during our time period--the 1951 and 1952 elections as the Greek rally and the 1956, 1958, and 1961 elections as the ERE. In all elections it was strong, receiving from 37 percent of the vote in 1951 to 51 percent in 1961 .
Governmental Status Variables, 2.01-2.07
2.01 government discrimination: -1 for 1st half, ac8
+1 for 2nd half, ac8
The change in the code from a negative to a positive "one" illustrates a simple fact of politics. When a party is in control of the government, it will pass electoral laws to help it stay in power. This was especially true in Greece, where a new election law was passed before every election. In the elections of 1951 and 1952, the rally was discriminated against when the EPEK-Liberal Party coalition passed election laws allowing gerrymandering, excluding women and the military from voting, and favoring the districts that were expected to vote for the EPEK-liberal coalition. However, the next election law was passed in 1956 when the ERE ( formerly rally) controlled the parliament. In this, and in the 1958, 1961, and 1962 election laws, discrimiNATOry provisions favored the ERE. In the 1956 law , for example, a mixed (proportional and majority) system was used, depending on ERE's strengths and weaknesses.
2.02 governmental leadership: 4 out of 7 for 1st half, ac9
6 out of 6 for 2nd half, ac9
From November, 1952 until his death in October, 1955, General Papagos held the position of prime minister. Starting in October, 1955 and lasting until the election of 1963, Karamanlis held the position of prime minister. The party, whether rally or National Radical Union, provided Greece with its greatest amount of stability since the 1930"s.
2.03 cabinet participation: 4 out of 7 for 1st half, ac9
6 out of 6 for 2nd half, ac9
From November, 1952 until the election in 1963, the rally (later ERE) party controlled every ministerial seat of the cabinet. In fact, when the rally won the 1951 general elections, Papagos refused to take part in a coalition cabinet. Therefore, EPEK and the Liberal Party formed a coalition government until the 1952 election. It was this election which put the Rally Party in control of the entire cabinet. It maintained control by winning the 1956, 1958, 1961, and 1962 elections.
2.04 national participation: 5, ac7
The rally (and later the ERE) was primarily a national party competing in all sections and presenting itself as representing all sections of the country. Its success was somewhat variable across regions, however.
2.07 outside origin: 5, ac7
General Papagos, a highly respected army official, joined with several political leaders who were presently or had previously been in the parliament to form the Greek Rally Party. One source states that the party was formed by the union of the Populist-Unionist Party of Panayiotis Kancellopoulos and Stefanos Stefanopoulos with the new party of Syprus Markenzinis, but the party is given the lower or more "inside" code for origin due to the key role of Papagos in its founding.
Issue Orientation Variables, 5.01-5.15
5.01 ownership of means of production: -3, ac6
There is no evidence of any advocation of governmental ownership. Most industries were privately owned, but the government did engage in some production of electricity and did some mining.
5.02 government role in economic planning: 3 for 1st half, ac8
4 for 2nd half, ac7
Both the rally and the ERE advocated an active governmental role in the economy. Under Papagos and his economic adviser markezinis, the fiscal system was reformed and the drachma was devalued. Under Karamanlis, the government's role increased. This included some attempt at long-range planning, subsidies, control of wages, and the application of government resources.
5.03 redistribution of wealth: -3, ac5
The rally, and later the ERE, at no time used the term "distribution of the wealth" to explain taxing policies. Indeed, there was the complaint of low wages for the poorer classes plus heavy taxation.
5.04 social welfare: ac1 for first half
4 for 2nd half, ac7
Although no information is available for the Rally Party in the first time period, the ERE advocated social welfare programs in the second half. Included in the programs were health insurance for the workers, farmers and senior citizens, lower interest rates for the poor and other groups, and a moratorium on the payment of debts by the poor. However, there appeared to be no general program for unemployment insurance.
5.05 secularization of society: ac1
no information is available.
5.06 support of the military: 3, ac7
During the entire period under both Papagos and Karamanlis, the party was generally supportive of requests for military expenditures. During the second half, some cuts were advocated--but these cuts would not have diminished the defense capability of the government.
5.07 alignment with east-west blocs: -4, ac7
Both the rally and the ERE advocated entering and continuing Greece's participation in NATO and in the late 1950"s, the EEC. It approved the Eisenhower doctrine and talked about Greece's historic friendship with the west . At the same time, however, they were willing to enter into negotiations with the eastern bloc to improve or open trade and formal diplomatic relations.
5.08 anti-colonialism: 0, ac9
Greece was not involved in a colonial relationship during this time period.
5.09 supranational integration: 3, ac8
During this period, the party advocated the entrance and continued participation in NATO, the united nations, the eec, and the balkan pact. They also favored keeping the individual state identity of Greece.
5.10 national integration: 5 for 1st half, ac6
1 for 2nd half, ac8
under Papagos, the rally advocated complete emosis (union) of Greece and Cyprus. Papagos lent support to the rebels. Also, he advocated the predominance of national authority structures and symbols (the king and queen of Greece). Under Karamanlis, the latter policy continued, but the party advocated only self-determination for the cypriots. The 1959 agreement maintained the subnational distinctions between Cyprus and Greece.
5.11 electoral participation: 5, ac6
In 1952, the Rally Party voted against a new election law because it postponed universal suffrage to women and to members of the military. From 1952 until 1962, the party advocated maintaining universal suffrage.
5.12 protection of civil rights: ac1
no information
5.13 interference with civil liberties: 1, ac6
Throughout the entire period the party advocated private ownership of news media. However, in 1953 the rally-controlled parliament passed several laws restricting newsmen on the definition of libel and on the circulation and reporting of "false news." in 1958, Karamanlis began to crack-down on the EDA, the so-called communist front organization, by hampering the distribution of its party newspaper, AGVI.
5.14 / 5.15 US--Soviet experts left-right ratings: US says 1, conservative
Soviets say 1, the party represented the interests of the large industrial-financial bourgeoisie, which was connected with foreign capital, and also major landowners. In domestic politics, it favored the consolidation of the anti-democratic regime, persecution of political opposition, and subjugation of the national economy to foreign and Greek monopolies.
Goal Orientation Variables, 6.01-6.55
6.00 open competition in the electoral process: 4 for 1st half, ac7
3 for 2nd half, ac7
The rally, and later the ERE, was oriented primarily to competition in the electoral process. The party competed in the 1951, 1952, 1956, 1958, 1961, and 1962 elections. During its period in office, however, there were persistent reports of interference with elections.
6.10 restricting party competition: 0 for 1st half, ac7
1 for 2nd, ac7
Although the party was oriented to open competition, the EDA charged in 1958 that the ERE-controlled government was restricting its party's functions by hampering the sale of their newspaper and shadowing, arresting, and deporting party members. There were also reports of vote fraud, especially in the rural areas.
6.20 subverting the political system: 0, ac7
Both the rally and the ERE were not oriented to subverting the political process. However, in 1951 a group of army officers friendly to Papagos planned a coup d"etat. This organization was called the idea. More research is needed to determine the relationship between idea and Papagos and the Rally Party.
6.30 propagandizing ideas and program: ac1
no information
6.40 allying with other parties: ac1
no information
6.50 providing for welfare of party members: ac1
no information
Autonomy Variables, 7.01-7.05
7.01 sources of funds: for first half, ac1
1 (sector 04), for 2nd half, ac7
Although little information is available on the Rally Party, the ERE's financial support came from conservative business and commercial leaders and associations.
7.02 source of members: 6 (sectors 03, 07), ac6
For the entire period, no membership requirements are discernible. The Rally Party may have had indirect members who belonged to military organizations--for example, a retired officers" club. More data is required to substantiate the relationship of these military organizations to the party. The other group in the rally was of professional background. These two groups also were in the ERE. In 1958, for example, 45 percent of the members were lawyers, 13.4 percent were doctors, 7 percent were military, and 8 .2 percent were civil servants (the government bureaucracy ctor).
7.03 sources of leaders: 1 (sector 03), ac7
For both the rally and the ERE, the leadership came mainly from the educational and professional sector. Examples include Kannelopoulos, a professor, and Karamanlis, a lawyer. Our consultant notes that Papagos, a former general, was about the only prominent leader with a military background.
7.04 relations with domestic parties: 7, ac8
During the period, the party (rally or ERE) never engaged in any local or national relationships with the other parties. They therefore had complete autonomy. They also demanded complete autonomy. In 1951, for example, the rally, which won a plurality of the parliamentary seats but not enough to form a government without forming a coalition, refused to form a coalition. Papagos demanded a clear and exclusive mandate to form a cabinet in which the rally could rule autonomously. In 1952, he succeeded by winning a majority of the seats in parliament. The ERE continued this policy of never encumbering itself with relationships with other parties. Our consultant, however, notes that a form of coalition developed through the practice of allowing politicians to run for office under the rally or ERE label.
7.05 relations with foreign organizations: 5, ac3
no evidence is available which suggests that the rally or the ERE was affiliated with any outside organization.
Organizational Complexity Variables, 8.01-8.07
8.01 structural articulation: 4, ac6
Between 1950 and 1962 two national organs are identifiable, the meetings of the parliamentary deputies and the central secretariat--the prime minister and the cabinet. The first group met rarely. Its most important meeting was held in October, 1955, to change the leadership of the party after Papagos died. One author described the parliamentary group as disunified and uninvolved in party matters. The central secretariat decided party and government matters. The deputies were given little information on the party's policies or strategies. Incidentally, the ERE provided for a more structured articulation. A general assembly, general council, and executive committee were talked about but never called into session.
8.02 intensiveness of organization: for 1st half, ac1
3 for 2nd half, ac6
Although no information is available on the rally, one source describes the intensiveness of the ERE. In practice, permanent organizations extended only to the major cities.
8.03 extensiveness of organization: 0 for 1st half, ac3
2 for 2nd half, ac5
under Papagos's leadership, the only organs identifiable are the national organs. Under Karamanlis, in the second time period, national and regional organs are identifiable. These regional organizations established permanent party centers in the major cities of Greece . Popular support of the party came from all geographical subdivisions of Greece.
8.04 frequency of local meetings: 0, ac6
no formal local organs existed. The organizations that existed on the local level consisted of a political figure who owned a number of votes because of personal loyalty.
8.05 frequency of national meetings: 0, ac6
The national committees and organizations existed only on paper. They never met during or after the time period.
8.06 maintaining records: ac1
no information is available on the party's propaganda, archive, or membership lists.
8.07 pervasiveness of organization: 7 for 1st half, ac3
5 for 2nd half, ac5
For the first time period, it is possible to infer that some military organizations supported or were linked to the Rally Party and its much respected leader, field Marshall Papagos. For the second time period (the ERE) the variable code assigned above does not correspond to the operational definition of the code. Nevertheless, it is chosen because it is the mid-point between the two operational definitions that do fit the pervasiveness of the ERE. First, the party was represented by youth and women's organizations with medium party control (a "2"). A group of women" s organizations were established in Athens and its suburbs. They were only active at election time and did not enlist significant proportions of the women in Greece. The youth organizations were established at the universities around Athens and Thessaloniki. These organizations were active all year round. Second, two socioeconomic sectors were linked to the ERE. These included the retired, active, and reserve army officers" organizations and some commercial associations (the chamber of commerce and the merchants" association, for example). These gave reserved and unenthusiastic support to the ERE and were not controlled by the party (a "7").
Organizational Power Variables, 9.01-9.08
9.01 nationalization of structure: 5 for first half, ac3
5 for second half, ac6
A party hierarchy is discernible. It began at the top national organ identified as the central secretariat (the prime minister and the cabinet). The parliamentary organization was the next step down. It was subordinate to the central secretariat. The deputies were the links to the provincial, communal, regional , and city units and their leaders. The lowest step in the hierarchy was the local leader who owned a number of votes. This was the hierarchy for the ERE. For the rally, the little information only supports the existence of the top two levels--the central secretariat and the parliamentary deputies.
9.02 selecting the national leader: 8, ac7
For the entire period, no formal means of selecting a leader were established. During the first time period, General Papagos died leaving the leadership of the party in question. Although he named Stephanopoulos acting premier, King Paul of Greece intervened in the party process and named Karamanlis premier. The deputies of the party then met to decide the leadership of the party. The deputies decided that the leadership of the party should be a five-man committee made up of Karamanlis, Stephanopoulos and three other top leaders. Karamanlis did not attend the meeting, but he held the real power in the party because he was premier. He soon reorganized and changed the name of the rally to the ERE. For the second time period (when Karamanlis was leader), no formal means of selecting a leader were developed, and no leadership change took place between 1956 and 1962.
9.03 selecting parliamentary candidates: 7, ac5
Only one source mentions the nomination of candidates. It refers to the 1954 local elections when the Rally Party did not make nominations. It is possible to infer from this evidence that some kind of national party council nominated the candidates. From data collected for the ERE, it becomes apparent that some national selection was involved. However, our consultant reports that the leaders often had to defer to the primary politician in the district or the sitting representative.
9.04 allocating funds: for 1st half, ac1
6 for 2nd half, ac6
The central secretariat of the ERE had a section responsible for the party's finances. No information is available on the Rally Party.
9.05 formulating policy: 7, ac7
The ministers and premier (a party subgroup) formulated the policies. These policies were announced by the ministers and premier at meetings of the parliament or the party's deputies. Both the ERE and the rally practiced this policy. The ERE slightly changed the process. It had a policy section in its central secretariat--the premier and cabinet ministers. Also, during the second half, the parliamentary deputies had little contact with the ministers. To find out what the party's position was on an issue, they had to read the newspapers or wait until the parliamentary debates to hear the ministers.
9.06 controlling communications: ac1
The control of media and propaganda in the party is unclear and undefinable.
9.07 administering discipline: 0, ac3
no techniques of discipline are discernible.
9.08 leadership concentration: 6 for 1st half, ac7
6 for 2nd half, ac8
There were two leadership structures during the existence of the Rally Party. From 1951 to October, 1955 , General Papagos exercised the leadership. He personally committed the party to binding courses of action. After his death in October, the leadership concentration is unclear. Karamanlis was premier but was also a member of a five man committee set up by the parliamentary deputies. The roles and interrelationships of these five men are unclear, but the committee rule ended with Karamanlis" reorganization of the party in 1956. In the second period, ERE leadership was again exercised by one individual--Karamanlis.
Coherence Variables, 10.01-10.06
10.01 legislative cohesion: 1.0, ac5
Although no source has complete data on legislative cohesion, two sources indicate that both the rally and the ERE were united, tightly organized , and well-disciplined.
10.02 ideological factionalism: 0, ac3
Ideological concerns were neither subject to open debate nor clearly discernible from the data. Also, no clear ideology existed which would have caused debate or have decided policy positions.
10.03 issue factionalism: 4 for 1st half, ac6
1 for 2nd half, ac3
under Papagos, one disagreement over an issue emerged in full view of the party members. The disagreement began in december, 1954, and terminated when markenzinis and twenty-three deputies split from the Rally Party in february, 1955. Under Karamanlis, no factions were later discernible. Issues were discussed, however, by the ministers and premier.
10.04 leadership factionalism: 2 for 1st half, ac6
0 for 2nd half, ac3
During Papagos" life no leadership contests were discernible, although more data is needed to examine the role of markezinis and the cause for his break with Papagos. After Papagos died, a leadership contest did emerge into view of the party members but no clear and labeled factions are discernible. Under Karamanlis, between 1957 and 1962, no leadership contests are discernible.
10.05 strategic or tactical factionalism: 1 for 1st half, ac3
4 for 2nd half, ac6
no factions, splits, or disagreements are discernible between 1950 and 1956. Under Karamanlis, one disagreement emerged in full view of the party's membership. This occurred when fifteen ministers split from the party in march, 1958 over the proposed electoral bill.
10.06 party purges: 0 for 1st half, ac3
no purges are discernible. The loss of membership was totally voluntary.
Involvement Variables, 11.01-11.06
11.01 membership requirements: 0, ac3
no membership requirements are discernible.
11.02 membership participation: for 1st half, ac1
1 for 2nd half, ac3
no data is available for the first time period. From 1957-1962, the members of the party were either nominal or marginal. The local leaders who owned a certain number of votes exhibited some interest in the party. Along with the provincial notables and parliamentary deputies, they were the marginal members. Those who voted for the ERE out of personal loyalty to the local leader or provincial notable were the nominal members.
11.03 material incentives: 1, ac3
Advantages of office-holding appeared to be salient to some rally/ere militants.
11.04 purposive incentives: 1, ac3
Anti-communism and support for capitalism appeared to be uppermost for some rally/ere activists.
11.05 doctrinism: 0 , ac3
There is no discernible written literature to which the party members or leaders referred. Neither leader (Papagos or Karamanlis) developed a political ideology. The policies that did exist consisted of support for the status quo, nationalism, democracy, pro-westernism, and economic prosperity.
11.06 personalism: 2 for 1st half, ac3
1 for 2nd half, ac3
Although the sources are incomplete , it appears that almost all of the militants were motivated by the personalism of General Papagos, a great national hero. For Karamanlis, less personalism is involved. Loyalty to local notables and the ideology and views of Karamanlis and the ERE were a larger and more important factor.