The "ac" code is for "adequacy-confidence"--a
data
quality measure ranging from 0 (low) to 9
(high)
Institutionalization
Variables, 1.01-1.06
1.01 Year of Origin and 1.02 Name
Changes
1867, ac7
3, ac9
Several alternate dates can be advanced for
the origin of the Progressive-Conservative Party. Those seeking
early roots can trace it to 1854 (Engelmann and Schwartz,
1975--27). Those who seek the origin of the party as a national
organization might choose 1874 or even 1896 (Reid, 1967--16, 21).
We have picked 1867, the date of the first general election and
the time when John A. Macdonald emerged as the party's
acknowledged spokesman (Hougham, 1967--3). The name of the party
has been changed on several occasions since its inception. It
started out under the contradictory name of liberal-conservative
in 1854. In 1920 it went under the title of National Liberal and
Conservative Party, but became known as simply the Conservative
Party. In 1938 another change was made, this time to the National
Conservatives. Moreover the party campaigned in the 1940 elections
as the national government (beck, 1968--227). Finally in 1942, "in
a serious attempt to revise its policies and improve its fortunes,
it changed its name to the familiar Progressive-Conservative
Party" (Corry and Hodgetts, p.251)--at the insistence of its new
leader, John Bracken, a former progressive (beck,
1968--242).
1.03 Organizational
Discontinuity
0, ac9
The change of the name to the
Progressive-Conservatives in 1942 in no way constituted a merger
with the Progressive Party of Canada. It is true that the
Conservative Party did integrate many of the progressives into
their party well before 1941. The addition of the term
"progressive," however, was a political tactic employed by John
Bracken for the party to carry the western progressive vote.
Bracken was the former Progressive Party Premier of Manitoba
before his entry into the conservative ranks. He stipulated in
1942 that before he would become the national leader, the party
must add the title progressive, for he saw the need for a more
progressive approach.
1.04 Leadership Competition
12, ac9
In December of 1942 the
Progressive-Conservatives held a convention at which they elected
John Bracken on the second ballot as their national leader. In
1948 George Drew won the nomination for national leader with the
majority of the convention's 1242 delegates. In 1956 John
Diefenbaker was elected on the first ballot to head the National
Party. He lost the leadership of the party in 1967 to Robert
Stanfield, who defeated ten other hopefuls in the September
convention.
1.05 Legislative Instability
Instability is .59, ac9
The legislative representation of the
conservatives changed dramatically during our period. The party
rose from 15 percent of the seats in 1950 to a high of almost 80
percent following the Diefenbaker triumph in the 1958
elections.
1.06 Electoral Instability
Instability is .17, ac9
Parliamentary elections were held in 1953, 1957, 1958, and 1962.
The conservative percentage of the vote peaked at 54 in the 1958
election, which gave the party nearly 4/5 of the seats in the
lower chamber. Its low point was 31 percent of the vote in
1953.
Governmental Status Variables,
2.01-2.07
2.01 Government
Discrimination
0, ac9
The term government is often used in Canada
to mean the elected " cabinet" which was made up of members of the
Conservative Party during the second half of our period. The party
charged that many higher civil servants, who with permanent tenure
were liberal government appointees, did not fully support and
implement cabinet policy. Nevertheless on elections the rules of
objectivity and fairness are very strict and non-partisan. On the
national level there is merely a 50 name petition and a $200
deposit required to get one "s name on the ballot. In Quebec a
candidate must declare a party affiliation, or declare himself an
independent. The major parties in Quebec also enjoy the benefit of
being put first in line on the ballot sheet.
2.02 Governmental Leadership
0 out of 7 for 1950-56, ac9
6 out of 6 for 1957-62, ac9
The liberal party held power from 1935
through 1956. The succession of liberal governments ended in 1957,
when John Diefenbaker won control with less than a majority of the
House of Commons. Another election was called in 1958 and the
Diefenbaker government won an unprecedented 208 of 265 seats. In
1962 the Progressive-Conservatives under the leadership of Prime
Minister Diefenbaker won only a plurality of the seats in the
House of Commons, and the party lost control of the government to
the liberals in the 1963 elections.
2.03 Cabinet Participation
0 out of 7 for 1950-56, ac9
6 out of 6 for 1957-62, ac9
Although Diefenbaker had less than a
majority of the seats in the House of Commons after both the 1957
and 1962 elections, he still recruited his cabinet entirely from
the Progressive-Conservative Party.
2.04 National Participation
5 for 1950-56, ac9
6 for 1957-62, ac9
When Canada is divided into five geographic
regions--Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario, prairies, and British
Columbia--the distribution of PC voters deviated an average of 5.4
percent from the regional distribution of the vote in 1953 and 3.2
percent in 1962. The noticeable change in regional strength can be
partially attributed to the pc's strong showing in Ontario in 1953
and its relatively weak performance in the prairies. Based on 1962
election results it appears that the PC party better reflected the
distribution of the electorate in the latter half of the time
period.
2.05 Legislative Strength
Strength is .18 for 1950-56, ac9 and .67
for 1957-62, ac9
The legislative representation of the
conservatives changed dramatically during our period. The party
rose from 15 percent of the seats in 1950 to a high of almost 80
percent following the Diefenbaker triumph in the 1958
elections.
2.06 Electoral Strength
Strength is .31 for 1950-56, ac9 and .43
for 1957-62, ac9
Parliamentary elections were held in 1953,
1957, 1958, and 1962. The conservative percentage of the vote
peaked at 54 in the 1958 election, which gave the party nearly 4/5
of the seats in the lower chamber. Its low point was 31 percent of
the vote in 1953.
2.07 Outside Origin
2, ac9
The Progressive-Conservatives originated from an establishment
coalition of Tories, who had helped obtain responsible government
and the federal union, and moderate liberals, together with
French-Canadians. It was augmented by small groups from other
provinces, (Williams, pp.3-10).
Issue Orientation Variables, 5.01-5.15
5.01 Ownership of Means of
Production
1, ac7
The Progressive-Conservatives have
consistently supported a system of free enterprise. Nevertheless
they launched or accepted government ownership through independent
statutory corporations for radio-TV (CBC), the railroad, films
(national film board), and electric power (e.g., Ontario hydro).
(Scarrow, 1965--62, 64).
5.02 Government Role in Economic
Planning
1 for 1950-56, ac8
3 for 1957-62, ac9
The Progressive-Conservatives program on
economic development has continually been one of promoting and
stimulating the economy, although this stressed stimulating
private corporations rather than more direct government
intervention. With Diefenbaker, greater government intervention
was accepted. In their 1953 platform they called for the
decentralization of industry so that opportunities for employment
and advancement would be extended to the widest possible base.
They encouraged a National Development Program, including programs
such as the construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway, the
Saskatchewan River Power and Irrigation Project, and Hydroelectric
Power Projects in the Maritimes. In 1957, John Diefenbaker, the
party leader, developed a new national policy of his own,
overstepping the more limited conservative position. It
specifically dealt with developments in the northern frontier, the
development of national resources, an energy board, a national
highway policy, adjustment grants to the Atlantic Provinces and a
modest reduction in corporate income taxes. This policy was
associated with a record unemployment level, five successive
deficit budgets, the devaluation of the dollar, and eventually the
fall of Diefenbaker himself, and the resurrection of the
Progressive-Conservative tradition of restricted economic
intervention.
5.03 Redistribution of Wealth
1 for 1950-56, ac9
3 for 1957-62, ac9
In 1949 the Progressive-Conservative
platform asked for reduction of taxes of the working class, but
nothing more than rhetoric came of these proposals and the PC
generally continued to support business. The Diefenbaker interlude
again saw a drastic change in the PC tradition. He reduced
personal taxes, and his program was judged to be left of the
liberals. He attempted to encourage the welfare of social
institutions through multiplying government handouts.
5.04 Social Welfare
1 for 1950-56, ac8
3 for 1957-62, ac9
In the first time period, the position of
the PC's was one of a contributory social security program, with
contributory health insurance. Diefenbaker brought increased
old-age pensions, extended and enlarged unemployment insurance
benefits. His social programme was even more welfare-oriented than
that put forward by the liberals. (see Meisel, 1962--53.) Most of
his proposals were enacted during his tenure in office. It should
be noted that the Canadian tradition for major parties has been
generally sympathetic to social welfare programs since World War
II.
5.05 Secularization of Society
0, ac7
This is only slightly applicable in
national party politics. Under the BNA Act such questions as
property and civil rights and education-&endash;which have major
religious implications--come under provincial jurisdiction. The
federal government may become involved in making treaties or
activities of international organizations and would normally
consult provinces in these matters. Since in the first time period
the PC Quebec vote never pulled more than 9 out of 75 Quebec
seats, the party was accused of being less sympathetic to Quebec
Roman Catholics. The charge was sometimes made even after the
winning of 50 seats in the 1958 election. The religious issue
elsewhere appears to be of minor significance in terms of this
category definition.
5.06 Support of the Military
1, ac9
The party platforms may appear
contradictory to the traditional Conservative Party position of
strong support of the armed forces as illustrated by the
conscription crises in both world wars. Responding to growing
sentiments for economic prosperity measures and protection against
increased USA influence, conservatives have opposed several
pro-armed forces policies. The PC platforms continually stressed
the cutting down of waste on defense measures. The 1949 platform
asked for a standing committee on defense to assure the effective
use of money. In 1953 the party advocated a reorganization of the
department of national defense. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962
initiated a concern with Canada's military involvement with the
US. Diefenbaker objected to the placement of nuclear war heads on
Canadian soil and failed to give full support to his Minister of
Defense, who resigned in 1963 just after the end of our
period.
5.07 Alignment with East-West
Blocs
5, ac9
The PC's gave their unqualified support of
the North Atlantic Security Pact. The PC's resistance to communism
was in their words "in keeping with our conception of freedom of
the individual and our international commitments."
5.08 Anti-Colonialism
0 for 1950-56, ac9
2 for 1957-62, ac9
Canada's relationship to the United States
is our focus for coding the party on anti-colonialism. Up until
the Diefenbaker ascendance to power the PC's were content with
their relationship with the United States. In 1957 Diefenbaker
brought the latent dissatisfaction out of the Canadian public,
saying that the U.S. was a danger to Canada's sovereignty by its
shipment of Canadian natural exhaustible resources in raw
materials to the U.S. He called the American investors
carpetbaggers, and attacked the liberal "buddy-buddy" position. He
asked for all investment to benefit Canada, and this position
struck a nationalist chord. This anti-Americanism divided the
country, and the side favoring American investment was partially
responsible for his removal from office.
5.09 Supranational Integration
1, ac9
The PC's valued their British and
commonwealth trade, and supported the United Nations. There was
also interest by the PC's in the Colombo Plan, the first
multi-national aid program. As a middle power, Canada found
comfort in international organizations.
5.10 National Integration
0, ac7
The PCs endorsed the BNA
Act--constitutional separation of authority between the federal
and provincial governments--although in this time period their
positions sometimes appeared inconsistent. Their 1949 platform
stated that "national unity depends on respect for the federal
constitution." In 1957 they asked for a dominion provincial
conference with a spirit of unity and mutual tolerance. In 1958,
one of the chief issues was the centralizing of the federal
government by the liberals, and Diefenbaker consequently gave
extra attention to a policy of strict federalism. Once in power,
the Diefenbaker position sometimes appeared more
centralist.
5.11 Electoral Participation
4, ac9
Although the PC platforms accepted equality
of suffrage for all Canadians at 21 years of age, there was an
obvious omission concerning the extension of the franchise to
Indians. In 1960 the Indians received the right to vote. It was
the liberal initiative that brought about this action in the PC
administration.
5.12 Protection of Civil Rights
3, ac7
The PC platforms repeatedly assured that
all Canadians would have the opportunity for industry, skill and
enterprise. "The PC platform of 1957 advocated a vigorous
immigration policy consistent with Canada's ability to absorb,"
(Meisel, 284). An independent board was recommended to review
certain decisions by the department of immigration. Diefenbaker
had little predisposition to grant Quebec special status. The
historically negative image of the conservatives partially
collapsed in the 1958 election, but his conduct following this
election appeared, by subsequent election results, not to have
impressed the French Canadian voters. Personally, Diefenbaker was
committed to protection of civil rights and liberties and won
passage of a Civil Rights Bill in 1960.
5.13 Interference with Civil
Liberties
3, ac9
The Canadian Government has a unique
relationship with its system of mass communication. Until the 1961
establishment of the private CTV network, the independent
statutory corporation, the CBC controlled the network facilities,
and privately owned stations were network affiliates or broadcast
exclusively for local audiences. Pre-eminence does not negatively
affect the freedom of speech of the population. The PC platforms
continually stressed the widest possible measure of media liberty
consistent with the law. The platform of 1949 warned against the
government owned radio stations becoming a
Propaganda agency. It asked for the abolishment of license fees
for radio receiving sets. In 1957 the party recommended the
establishment of a board independent of the CBC and of the
independent stations to regulate radio and television in Canada.
Newspapers were, of course, privately owned and
operated.
5.14 / 5.15 US--Soviet Experts Left-Right
Ratings
U.S. says 1, conservative
Soviets say 1, represents the interests of monopolistic circles
tied to English capital, a national bourgeoisie (mainly middle
class) and wealthy farmers of the plains provinces. Domestically,
more reactionary than the liberals.
Goal Orientation Variables, 6.01-6.55
6.00 Open Competition in the
Electoral Process
4, ac9
The PC relies on working within a
constitutional system of open competition.
6.01-6.05--2, ac9. It is common practice
for the PC party to advertise candidates through various media, to
canvass votes during campaigns, to hold campaign rallies, and to
facilitate voting for PC supporters.
6.10 Restricting Party
Competition
0, ac9
The practice of subverting the political
system is incongruent with the PC's political
practice.
6.11-6.15--0, ac9. The Conservatives,
although occasionally not following the letter of the electoral
law in presenting names to the courts of revision, cannot be
characterized as often guilty of fraudulent practices.
6.20 Subverting the Political
System
0, ac9
The PC's, being one of the major parties of
the Canadian political system, have nothing to gain from
subverting the political system.
6.21-6.26-0, ac9. Subversive tactics were
never employed by the PC's.
6.30 Propagandizing Ideas and
Program
6.31--1, ac5. A bimonthly newspaper "Public
Opinion," is published by National Headquarters. In 1949 the
circulation had risen to about 30,000, (Williams, p.132). In the
1957 election the PC's received 30 percent of the free programme
time offered by the CBC several newspapers such as the Ottawa
Journal adapt an editorial policy which generally supports the PC
party, but are not controlled by the party.
6.32--0, ac9. The conservatives run no
party school, but do support conservative youth
groups.
6.33--1, ac9. The practice of adopting
platforms usually coincides with leadership
conventions.
6.34--1, ac9. The election year usually
brings about various position papers by the PC's.
6.50 Providing for Welfare of Party
Members
6.53--0, ac3. Individual party leaders,
notably members of parliament, may intercede with the government
on behalf of citizens or raise questions in "question hour."
Little is done regarding party operated social welfare
activities.
Autonomy Variables, 7.01-7.05
7.01 Sources of Funds
1 (sector 04), ac9
The PC's main source of money for campaign
funds and operating funds between general elections is obtained
from "a few wealthy supporters, manufacturers, distilleries, the
Canadian pacific railway, brokerages, retail distributors,...and a
myriad of other large and small businesses," (Williams, p.144).
The PC's have tried to widen their base of financial support to
their rank and file members, but most of these attempts have had
little success (Paltiel, 1970--42).
7.02 Source of Members
5, ac6
The literature does not discuss membership
in the Conservative Party at any length, but it is clear that
membership exists and is direct (Engelmann and Schwartz,
1975--170).
7.03 Sources of Leaders
2 (sectors 03, 04), ac9
The PC's have shown a tendency to select
leaders with a background in law, or another professional field.
Kornberg notes that 26 percent of all conservative candidates for
parliament during the period 1945-1965 were members of the legal
profession, (Kornberg, p.44). Businessmen also represent a high
proportion of PC MP's.
7.04 Relations with Domestic
Parties
7, ac9
There were no parliamentary coalitions
during our time period, and such are rare in Canada. The PC's were
a minority government in 1957. The overwhelming victory of the
1958 election made all dependence on another party unnecessary.
The election of 1962 resulted in a major drop in conservative
support and dependence on voters of the social credit party in the
House of Commons, but this occurred at the very end of our period
and is excluded from our scoring.
7.05 Relations with Foreign
Organizations
5, ac6
Though there may be vague philosophical sympathy with parties like
the British Conservative Party, the Canadian PC party is not
affiliated with any international political party
organization.
Organizational Complexity Variables,
8.01-8.07
8.01 Structural
Articulation
10, ac6
The literature contains only limited
material on the conservative national structure. The national
progressive-conservative association has four major national
organs--the structure of the PC national party seems similar to
the liberal's organization. The PC's hold an annual meeting called
the "general annual meeting," which includes all senators, members
of commons, and defeated candidates for the house plus equal
federal constituency association, two from each. The PC's seat
more members at large from the provinces than the liberals and
must include women and young people. They also seat all provincial
legislators. The function of the convention is to either elect a
new party leader, draw up a program, or in most cases usually
provide an opportunity to bolster party support. The PC also has a
national council called the executive officers of the national
association. This organization meets twice yearly. The
representation of the council includes 8 members from each
province (the leader of the party, a woman, student, and youth).
The functions of this organization are basically related to
federal-provincial party relations. The third organ is the
executive committee. This committee is elected at the conventions
and is basically composed of the national table officers and the
party leader and cabinet (if in office). Their function is to
coordinate the actions of the executive officers. This group does
not represent all provinces. The final national organ is the
national director and his staff. His activities are conducted
under the overall direction of the national leader. His party
organ is especially important around campaign time.
8.02 Intensiveness of
Organization
5, ac9
The poll organization appears to be the
smallest unit visible in the PC national structure. The local
structure is very tenuous, except for the constituency
organizations working for the success of a PC candidate prior to
an election. The local party organization largely ceases to
function between elections. Permanent poll organizations are not
normally established in the Conservative Party (Engelmann and
Schwartz, 1975--172).
8.03 Extensiveness of
Organization
5, ac5
Meisel reports "during the 1957 election
there were 44,055 polling stations in Canada. It is likely that
both the conservative and liberal parties tried to establish an
adequate poll organization in a vast majority of those." The
strength of these organizations is variable, however (Meisel 1962,
p.86). Throughout our period the conservatives always contested at
least 93 percent of the seats in federal elections (Beck,
1968).
8.04 Frequency of Local
Meetings
2, ac6
The conservative poll organization probably
operates like the voluntary liberal organization, appearing
magically before elections and disappearing thereafter (Van Loon
and Wittington, 1976--255).
8.05 Frequency of National
Meetings
3, ac9
The executive officers of the national
association meet twice yearly. The officers are comparable to the
liberal"s council.
8.06 Maintaining Records
9, ac6
The PC party, like the liberals, puts out
great quantities of policy papers and propaganda, but mainly at
election time. The data on the PC research division were recent
but quite extensive. "in 1969 parliament voted funds for the
establishment of research offices for the parliamentary wings of
opposition parties. The conservatives, as the official opposition,
were granted $125,000 annually." (Van Loon and Whittington). The
research office provides information and suggestions for MPS, and
helps provide critiques for government bills. The assistance of
this office to the PC's national structure is extensive.
Membership lists of the PC's appear to only include local party
activists and financial contributors. Lists swell at election
time, but are apparently forgotten during the interim.
8.07 Pervasiveness of
Organization
3, ac9
The PC's have a women's division as well as a youth's division.
The women's association is integrated into the party as a standing
committee. The PC's also have youth organizations, but loosely
integrated into the party. The PC's pay close attention to the
interests of middle class and business Canada, but avoid
establishment of direct ancillary organizations.
Organizational Power Variables, 9.01-9.08
9.01 Nationalization of
Structure
3, ac6
The organization of Canadian parties makes
the provincial organization the most significant unit (Engelmann
and Schwartz, 1975--66). But in comparison with the liberals, the
conservatives may be somewhat motralized. The powers of the
national leader, the control imposed by the national office on the
party organization in the provinces and the constituencies and the
virtual disappearance of local organizations in some provinces had
conspired to make the PC party a political machine largely
dominated from the centre," (Meisel 1, p.74). There was a
competing party hierarchy. Prior to the 1957 election, John
Diefenbaker the prime ministerial candidate, usually won the
battles over the national director.
9.02 Selecting the National
Leader
3, ac9
The national leader is selected at the PC's
"general annual meeting." In 1948 the PC Ottawa Convention
selected George Drew, and in 1956 in Ottawa John Diefenbaker was
selected as the party leader. The rules governing the 1956
convention clearly stipulated that delegates or alternate
delegates should be selected at meetings of the PC associations in
each riding called for such purpose. In 1967, after our time
period, Diefenbaker attempted to head off a leadership convention
by arguing "that his position as leader of the opposition was a
parliamentary office," but the convention rejected the argument
and Diefenbaker as leader (Smiley, 1968--374).
9.03 Selecting Parliamentary
Candidates
3, ac9
In the two older parties, the Liberal and
Progressive-Conservative, the procedure for selecting
parliamentary candidates is similar. In the 1957 election the
practice was that the local party organization selects the person
it desired to run, and in the case of 1957, the provincial party
always accepted the local party's decision. Nonetheless, the
provincial executive of each party has the final responsibility
for seeing that each constituency party picks a suitable candidate
(Meisel, p. 120). At the local level, when an active local
organization exists, there is a special nominating meeting at
which the choosing of a candidate is the main business. Exceptions
to the rule exist in "safe" seats. Selection committees sometimes
appoint candidates without bothering to have their choice
confirmed by a meeting of the constituency party. This instance is
prevalent in constituencies where local organizations have
degenerated.
9.04 Allocating Funds
5, ac6
Paltiel contends that "there are some
fundamental distinctions between the two major parties in the
treatment of funds." (p. 12). For the more financially centralized
PC party funds appear to be pooled and distributed centrally.
Since 1956, when Allister Grosart assumed the position of national
organizer of the PC party, funds collected centrally are
distributed to candidates through provincial organizations. (p.
12). A quota of $5000 was assigned to every candidate by the
National Party in 1957. This was paid to the provincial party
headquarters, not to the constituency directly.
9.05 Formulating Policy
6 for 1950-56, ac9
7 for 1957-62, ac9
Policy is normally formulated by the
National Party Organs. The policy positions derived from the
National Conventions are usually ignored by these committees. When
John Diefenbaker came to power in 1957, experts write that he
apparently ignored the advice of even his closest advisors and
made up his own policy statements. Dawson reports "the mass of
resolutions of the party's 1956 convention was not only not used
as a coherent platform, but was reportedly ordered burned by the
party leader" (Dawson, p.489).
9.06 Controlling Communications
4, ac6
At election time it appears that the
national office controls most of the party media. However, the
provincial and national organizations each publish printed
materials, but essentially these are not very important in
controlling information flow within the party.
9.07 Administering Discipline
3, ac6
The principal disciplinary techniques are
found in the Conservative Party's House of Commons caucus and in
the traditional parliamentary control of the Prime Minister and
party leadership over the backbenchers, with implicit threats of
loss of party support and funds at the next election for MPS not
following the party leadership. The caucus in collaboration with
the party leadership decides how the party members are to vote on
important issues.
9.08 Leadership Concentration
3 for 1st half, ac6
6 for 2nd half, ac9.
The leader of the opposition or Prime Minister generally is
considered the leader of the party. The PCs were out of power from
1950-56 and George Drew, the leader of the opposition in the House
of Commons, was responsible for leadership duties. His role as
party leader did not however, make all his decisions binding. The
members of the National PC Association's executive also played a
substantial part in policy formation. When John Diefenbaker became
Prime Minister in 1957, he not only played a dominant role in his
relationship with the party's national director, it was also
highly evident that he made his cabinet subservient to
him.
Coherence Variables, 10.01-10.06
10.01 Legislative
Cohesion
.90, ac3
The information on voting along party lines
with respect to the PC MP's, is very scarce. However, it can be
inferred that party lines are broken only in cases where
conditions are understood beforehand by the party member and the
party (Engelmann and Schwartz, 1975--249-250).
10.02 Ideological Factionalism
2 for 1st half, ac8
5 for 2nd half, ac8
The conservative wing of the Conservative
Party has been associated with the business and financial
interests dominant in Ontario Province. It often stood opposed to
strains of populism in the Prairie Provinces, and the conflict
grew significantly with Diefenbaker's ascendance in the second
half of our period (Scarrow, 1965--70, Engelmann and Schwartz,
1975--36).
10.03 Issue Factionalism
0 for 1950-56, ac7
1 for 1956-62, ac7
At the outset of the time period, there
were no issues that perpetrated factionalism. However,
Diefenbaker's policy of anti-Americanism of the late 50"s was
rejected by many conservatives. However, no clear factions within
the party were formed because of this position.
10.04 Leadership Factionalism
1 for 1st half, ac6
5 for 2nd half, ac4
The PC convention of 1956 was contested by
numerous candidates, but factional tendencies did not arise.
However, Diefenbaker's leadership, or lack of it, was a cause of
factionalism within his own party in the second half of our time
period.
10.05 Strategic or Tactical
Factionalism
2, ac9
Regenstreif notes "the conservative
approaches to campaigning in the elections of 1957 and 1958 rank
as classics of ingenuity unequalled in Canadian political
history," (p. 29). Diefenbaker's advice "reinforce success not
failure" was recommended to the party on two separate occasions
before 1957. It was eventually adopted and the PC's came into
power. No deep factions were formed to oppose this
strategy.
10.06 Party Purges
0, ac9
The PC's conducted no purges during the time period.
Involvement Variables, 11.01-11.06
11.01 Membership Requirements
2, ac5
The PC's appear to be more exacting than
the liberals on their insistence of the membership fee, one
dollar. The members are basically self-defined, despite this
fee.
11.02 Membership Participation
0, ac5
It appears that most PC party members do
not participate in meetings and are members in name
only.
11.03 Material Incentives
1, ac3
The dearth of material on incentives made
this variable difficult to code. Kornberg, et al., Feel that
material incentives play a relatively minute part in a militant's
participation level (p.27). It appears, however, that conservative
poll captains tend to be paid (Engelmann and Schwartz,
1975--278).
11.04 Purposive Incentives
1, ac3
From the same data used in variable 11.03,
Kornberg et al., Find participation levels not being correlated
with genuine objective concerns. But surely some significant
portion of the militants have a vision of improved
Government.
11.05 Doctrinism
0, ac9
No material is present that can be labeled
as PC doctrine (Engelmann and Schwartz, 1975--108).
11.06 Personalism
0 for 1950-56, ac3
1 for 1957-62, ac3
Personalities have been extremely important in attracting voter
support to Canadian parties, but this variable concentrates on
party militants, not voters. Before the Diefenbaker ascendancy,
few militants seemed motivated by personalism. Regenstreif states
that concerning the 1957 campaign "in view of the relatively low
level of traditional support upon which the conservatives as a
party could depend, the emphasis on the person of John Diefenbaker
instead of the label "conservative" in the campaign is
understandable," (p. 29). It is evident that a discernible number
of PC militants were motivated by Diefenbaker personally, but
probably no more than a third.