Discussions of
political parties normally focus on the present, on the
policy positions and political leaders that define
current party images. Nevertheless, historical
experiences have deeply etched their features on the
framework of party systems. The Democratic tendencies
of American Catholics, for example, result from their
class position when they first emigrated to America and
the history of their integration into society and
politics.
The legacy
of history is even more evident in Western Europe.
Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan
(1967) described the development of European party
systems in terms of the historical conditions of national
and socioeconomic development. They maintained that
two successive revolutions in the modernization of
Western societies--the National Revolution and the
Industrial Revolution--created social divisions that
still structure partisan competition today. Although
their discussion deals primarily with Western Europe, the
approach has relevance to other Western democracies
including the United States.
The
National Revolution involved the process of nation
building that transformed the map of Europe in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The National
Revolution spawned two kinds of social cleavage. The
center-periphery cleavage pitted the dominant
national culture against ethnic, linguistic, or religious
minorities in the provinces and the peripheral sectors of
society. It involved conflicts over values and cultural
identities. Were Alsatians to become Germans or French;
was Scotland a separate nation or a region within
Britain? The westward expansion of the United States
during its history generated similar tensions between
regional cultures.
This
cleavage is visible today in persisting regional
differences in political orientations; between the
English, Welsh, and Scots; between Bretons and the
Parisian center; between the "Free State of Bavaria" and
the Federal Republic of Germany; between the "old"
Federal Republic and the new German Ldnder in the East;
and between the distinct regional cultures in the United
States.
The
church-state conflict cast the centralizing,
standardizing, and mobilizing forces of the national
government against the traditional influence of the
Catholic church. In the face of a growing secular
government, the church sought to protect its established
corporate privileges. Furthermore, Protestants often
allied themselves with nationalist forces in the struggle
for national autonomy. Contemporary divisions between
religious denominations and between secular and religious
groups are--a continuation of these earlier social
divisions.
The
Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century
also generated two new social cleavages. The
land-industry cleavage aligned the rural and agrarian
interests against the economic concerns of the rising
class of industrial entrepreneurs. The Ruhr
industrialists challenged the power of the Prussian
Junkers; the landed gentry of Britain and the United
States were challenged by the barons of industry. We see
this cleavage in contemporary conflicts between rural and
urban interests.
As the
industrial sector became dominant, a second cleavage
developed between owners and workers. This cleavage
furnished the basis of the Marxian class conflict between
the working class and the middle class composed of
business owners and the self-employed. The struggle for
the legitimization and representation of working-class
interests by labor unions often generated intense
political conflict in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Today this cleavage is seen in the
political competition between business associations and
labor unions, and more generally between members of the
middle class and working class.
These
historical events may seem far removed from contemporary
party systems, but Lipset and Rokkan (1967) demonstrated
that a linkage exists. These four dimensions of
cleavage defined the potential major bases of social
conflict. As social groups related to these cleavages
developed, they won access to the political process
before the extension of the voting franchise. When mass
voting rights were granted to most Europeans around the
turn of the century, this political structure was already
in place. In most instances new voters were mobilized
into supporting the party groups that already were
represented in the political process. New voters entered
the electorate with preexisting partisan tendencies. The
Conservative Party in Britain, for example, became the
representative of the middle-class establishment, and the
Labour Party catered to the interests of the working
class. The working class in France and Germany supported
the Communist and Socialist parties. The American party
system developed more gradually because the voting
franchise was granted earlier and social groups were less
polarized; still, the modern party system reflects the
experiences of the Civil War and class alignments created
in the 1930s. The formation of mass political parties
thus tended to institutionalize the existing elite
coalitions, creating the framework for modern party
systems. Once voters formed party loyalties and interest
groups established party ties, the potential for dramatic
partisan change lessened and the parties became
self-perpetuating institutions. In one of the most
often cited conclusions of comparative politics, Lipset
and Rokkan (1967) stated: "the party systems of the
1960s reflect, with but few significant exceptions, the
cleavage structures of the 1920s" (P. 50).
Early
electoral research substantiated Lipset and Rokkan's
claims. Regional voting patterns from early in this
century were mirrored in later election returns (Clubb et
al. 1980; Miller 1977, chap. 5). Survey research found
that social cleavages, especially class and religious
differences, exerted a potent effect on voting. Richard
Rose and Derek Urwin's (1969, 1970) comparative studies
of postwar party systems found striking stability in
electoral results.
As this
theme of partisan stability became the conventional
wisdom, dramatic changes began to affect these same party
systems. The established parties were presented with new
demands and challenges, and the evidence of partisan
change became obvious (Dalton et al. 1984 ).7 At the root
of this development was a decreasing relationship between
traditional social cleavages and partisan choice. In
their comparative study of Western democracies, Mark
Franklin (1992) and his colleagues found broad evidence
that traditional social divisions were losing their
ability to predict voting choices (also see chapter 8).
Because of this erosion in traditional social-based
voting, party systems became more fractionalized.
Fluctuations in voting results increased. Voting is
now characterized by higher levels of partisan volatility
at the aggregate and individual levels (Crewe and
Denver 1985). Popular attachments to political parties
weakened and discussions of the crisis of party systems
became commonplace (see chapter 9). In sum, the major
research question changed from explaining the persistence
of contemporary party systems to explaining their
instability.
Several
unique national circumstances contributed to these
patterns: the Vietnam war and Watergate in the United
States, regional and economic tensions in Britain, the
green movement in Germany. In addition, a similar set
of new issues are visible across national boundaries.
Party systems derived from the National and Industrial
revolutions faced the issues of environmental protection,
social equality, nuclear energy, sexual equality, and
alternative lifestyles. Citizens demanded more
opportunities for participation in the decisions
affecting their lives and pressed for a further
democratization of society and politics. Once these
trends began, they evoked a conservative counterattack
that opposed the liberalization of social norms, women's
rights, environmentalism, and related issues. These new
political conflicts are now an important aspect of
contemporary politics.
A major
factor in the destabilization of modern party systems was
the initial inability or unwillingness of the major
parties to respond fully to the new demands. As a
result, several new parties formed specifically to
represent the new political perspectives. The first
wave included environmental parties, such as the green
parties in Germany and France or Left-libertarian parties
(Miiller-Rommel 1989; Kitschelt 1989). This stimulated a
counter wave of New Right parties, such as the National
Front in France or the Republikaner in Germany (Betz
1994; Ignazi 1992). It is unclear whether these parties
reflect temporary adjustments to new issues or a more
long-lasting realignment of political conflict. American
history is filled with third-party movements eventually
incorporated into the established parties. Is the present
partisan instability in advanced industrial democracies
just another case of this recurring pattern?
Several
scholars claim that we are witnessing a permanent
restructuring of political alignments as a result of the
socioeconomic trends of advanced industrialism. They
maintain that advanced industrial democracies are
experiencing a third revolution, the Postindustrial
Revolution (Bell 1973; Inglehart 1977, 1990). Indeed, new
issue interests, new styles of participation, and new
expectations about the citizen's role in society seem to
flow from the value changes discussed in chapter
5.
Party
systems are in a state of flux, and it is difficult
to determine how fundamental and long lasting these
changes will be. It is clear, however, that the new
political conflicts of advanced industrial societies have
contributed to this situation. While we wait for history
to determine the significance of these trends, we can
look more closely at the political alignments that now
exist in America, Britain, Germany, and
France.
The
Structure of Political Alignments
Most
parties and party systems are still oriented primarily
toward the traditional political alignments described by
Lipset and Rokkan. We shall refer to these alignments
collectively as the Old Politics cleavage. The Old
Politics cleavage is based on the political conflict
between Old Left and Old Right coalitions. Lipset and
Rokkan considered the class cleavage to be the primary
factor in structuring the Old Politics alignment because
class issues were the most salient during the extension
of the franchise. The Old Left therefore identifies
itself with the working class and labor unions, as well
as secular groups and urban interests (also see Lijphart
1981). The Old Right is synonymous with business
interests and the middle class; in some nations this
conservative coalition also includes religious and rural
voters. When political issues tap the concerns of the Old
Politics cleavage--for example, wage settlements,
employment programs, social security programs, or
church-related legislation--party positions reflect their
traditional social orientations.
The
political conflicts of advanced industrial societies have
created a new dimension of cleavage in recent
years. This New Politics dimension involves conflict
over a new set of issues: environmental quality,
alternative lifestyles, minority rights, participation,
and social equality. This dimension represents the
cleavage between proponents of these issues, the New
Left, and citizens who feel threatened by these issues,
the New Right.
The Old
Politics cleavage is likely to remain the primary basis
of partisan conflict in most advanced industrial
democracies for the immediate future. The New Politics
dimension is significantly affecting these party systems,
however, because it can cut across the established Old
Politics cleavage. Despite their differences, labor
unions and business interests occasionally join forces to
fight the opponents of nuclear energy. Farmers and
students sometimes become allies to oppose industrial
development projects that may threaten the environment.
Fundamentalist blue-collar and white-collar workers unite
to oppose changes in moral codes. An emerging New Left
and New Right potentially may restructure social-group
alignments and party coalitions. In sum, the simple
dichotomy between Old Left and Old Right is no longer
adequate to describe present patterns of political
competition. The contemporary political space is now
better described by at least two dimensions.
In the last
edition of this book we mapped the sociopolitical space
using cross-national data from the Political Action study
(Dalton 1988, chap. 7). Contemporary data of this sort
are available only for the United States, and we will
use the American case to illustrate the Old Politics and
New Politics cleavages.
For much of
this century, the Old Politics cleavage provided the
frame-work for party competition in the American party
system. The New Deal coalitions created by the Great
Depression determined the social bases of party support:
the Democratic Party and its labor union supporters
against the Republicans and big business. Religious
differences were muted because of the formal separation
of church and state in the United States.
In the
1960s the New Politics began to affect American
politics. Student protesters, the women's movement,
and the alternative movement challenged the symbols of
the political establishment. Herbert Weisberg and Jerrold
Rusk (1970) described how this cultural conflict
introduced new dimension of cleavage into American
politics, as represented by dissident Democratic
candidates in the late 1960s and early 1970s. New Politic
issues entered the agenda of subsequent campaigns. Rusk
and Weisberg found, however, that the Democrats and
Republicans were not clearly divided on New Politics
issues; these issues divided parties internally rather
than separating them politically.8 Another study of party
cleavages in 1974 found that the Democrats and
Republicans were only slightly differentiated on the New
Politics dimension (Dalton 1988, chap. 7).
The
policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations
stimulated a convergence of Old Politics and New Politics
alignments over the1980s and early 1990s. The tax and
spending priorities of the Reagan administration sharply
favored business and the more affluent sectors of
society. This served to reinforce ties between business
interests and the Republican Party. Furthermore, the
Reagan administration pursued a conservative social
agenda and developed strong political links to religious
groups such as the Moral Majority and other
fundamentalist organizations. To an extent atypical of
modern American politics, religion was injected into
partisan politics.
The Reagan
and Bush administrations also clarified party positions
on the New Politics agenda. Environmental protection was
an issue that had roots in the Republican Party; Richard
Nixon, for example, had established the Environmental
Protection Agency during his first presidential term and
had introduced a variety of environmental legislation.
Yet Ronald Reagan openly speculated that "killer trees"
were a major cause of air pollution. The policy
initiatives of the Reagan administration demonstrated its
hostility toward the environmental movement. Although
George Bush claimed to be the environmental president,
the assault on environmental protection legislation
continued under his administration. Similarly, the Reagan
and Bush administrations were openly antagonistic toward
feminist organizations. The abortion issue became a
litmus test of Republican values in the appointment of
federal judges and the selection of
candidates.
As the
Republicans became critical of the New Politics agenda,
the Democrats became advocates of these issues. The
Democrats became the partisan supporters of the
environmental movement in congressional legislation. The
Democrats were the first to nominate a woman and feminist
for national political office, Geraldine Ferraro in 1984.
Alternative political groups also developed a political
base and prominence among the activist core of the
Democratic Party.
In
short, political cleavage lines seemed to overlap and
become more polarized during the1980s. This pattern
of ideological convergence was simplified because only
two parties exist in America; if one party adopts a
position, the opposition naturally gravitates toward the
other party. Furthermore, the Reagan and Bush
administrations consciously sought to clarify their
position on New Politics issues because they thought this
could benefit them electorally. The Democrats were as
enthusiastic in embracing these same
constituencies.
We can
test these expectations with data from the 1992 American
National Election Study. The survey asked respondents
about their feelings toward a set of sociopolitical
groups and the political parties.9 [KJ: These are the
"thermometer" measures.] These data can identify the
structuring of major social groups and the political
parties in relation to Old Politics and New Politics
dimensions. We used a statistical analysis method to
represent the interrelationship of group perceptions in
graphic terms.10 This technique maps the political space
as defined by Americans. When there 's a strong
similarity in how two groups are evaluated, they are
located near each other in the space. When groups are
evaluated in dissimilar terms, they are positioned a
distance apart in the space.
The
American sociopolitical space in 1992 is depicted in
figure 7.1. The traditional Left/Right cleavage of the
Old Politics is quite evident. Clinton is located at the
left of the horizontal dimension, along with labor
unions. Bush is located at the opposite end of this
continuum, and the nearest group is big business;
fundamentalist religious groups are part of the
conservative Republican cluster.
Figure 7.1: The Sociopolitical Space in the United
States
SOURCE:
American National Election Study,
1992
We also
find a second dimension of political cleavage, which has
Texas billionaire Ross Perot juxtapositioned against
minority groups, such as Hispanics, blacks, and the poor.
This pattern fits the tone of the Perot campaign in 1992
and the social base of Perot supporters. What is
distinctive about the 1992 patterns, however, is the
movement toward fusion of the Old Politics and New
Politics cleavages. Instead of two dimensions of conflict
aligned at right angles, as seen In earlier studies, one
sees that New Left groups have apparently moved toward
the Democratic Party. The cluster of Clinton support
groups includes the unions and feminists, gays, and
environmentalists. Even if some tensions exist among
groups within each cluster, the bipolar nature of
contemporary American politics is becoming
apparent."
Comparable
and current data on the sociopolitical space in Britain,
Germany, and France are not available, but another study
uses a different method to illustrate party positions on
Old Politics and New Politics issues in all four party
systems. Michael Laver and W Ben Hunt (1992) asked
experts to position the parties in their respective
nations on a set of policy dimensions. Figure 7.2
presents party positions on two issues: taxes versus
social spending as a measure of the socioeconomic issues
of the Old Politics, and the environment versus economic
growth as a measure of New Politics
priorities.
Figure 7.2: Party Positions on Two Policy
Dimensions
SOURCE: Laver and Hunt (1992, appendix)
The top
panel of the figure locates parties on the spending/taxes
issue. Here we find a traditional Left/Right party
alignment in each nation. The Democratic Party in the
United States is located at the left end of this
continuum, following the pattern found above in mapping
the sociopolitical space. At the opposite end of the Old
Politics dimension are the Republicans. Even before the
present "Contract with America," the Reagan
administration had developed a strong commitment to
cutting public services and cutting taxes. This is now
ingrained in the Republican policy image.
In Britain,
the Labour Party has been the representative of the
working class and the advocate for socialist policy. The
party's working-class orientation is institutionalized
through formal ties to the labor unions. Normally,
membership in a union automatically includes a
dues-paying membership in the Labour Party; union leaders
also control this large bloc of votes at Labour Party
conventions. Past Labour governments have nationalized
several major industrial sectors, expanded social welfare
programs, and vigorously defended the interests of their
working-class supporters. The Labour Party is located to
the left of both the American Democrats and the German
SPD on this dimension The British Liberal Democrats are a
small centrist party that occupies a midpoint on this
dimension. The party was traditionally a representative
of liberal, middle-class values. In recent years it has
formed and reformed itself, but still holds a centrist
position on issues of the government's socioeconomic
role.
Margaret
Thatcher's Conservative Party government aggressively
attempted to roll back the scale of national government
during the 1980s. Thatcher's government privatized many
government-owned industries, reduced government social
and educational programs, sold off public housing, and
generally tried to lessen the scope of the government's
involvement in society. These policies reinforced the
Conservatives' traditional image as a party that favors
business interests and that draws disproportionate
support from middle-class voters. Reagan and Thatcher
became synonymous with the retrenchment of government
programs in the 1980s (Pierson 1994). The present
Conservative administration of John Major has continued
these policies.
The major
representative of Old Left in Germany is the Social
Demoratic Party (SPD). The SPD emerged from the socialist
working-class movement and still consistently represents
working-class interests. Alhough German labor unions no
longer have institutional ties to the SPD he relationship
nevertheless remains close. 12 Because of these liberal
traditions, the SPD favors increased social spending. In
1980 the Greens joined he German party system. Herbert
Kitscheit (1989) has described the Greens as a
Left-Libertarian party because it combines an advocacy
for new Left causes with a distinctly liberal position on
many traditional issues of the social spending and the
welfare state. Thus political experts position the Greens
to the left of the SPD on the social spending dimension
in figure 7.2. 13
The
Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union
(CDU/CSU) is a major political force on the right in
Germany. The CDU was formed after the war as a
conservative-oriented catchall party (Volkpartei). In the
state of Bavaria the CSU runs as the party of the
conservative bloc. As their names imply, both
conservative parties represent religious voters on the
church-state cleavage. The Union parties also advocate
conservative economic policies and a free-market economy.
The CDU/CSU now forms a governing coalition with the
small Free Democratic Party (FDP). The CDU/CSU and FDP
occupy similar conservative positions on the services/
taxes dimension. Indeed, during the 1980s the CDU/CSU-FDP
government limited benefits for every single social
program, decreased the government's budget deficits, and
pursued conservative economic reform. The exceptional
costs of German unification have forced these parties to
turn temporarily away from these policies, but their
commitment to smaller government remains strong. The
National Democratic Party (NPD) is a small, extreme-Right
party known for its nationalistic and reactionary
policies, more so than for its economic agenda.
Nevertheless, experts locate the NPD at the conservative
end of the social services dimension.
France has
two major parties that represent traditional Old Left
positions: the Communist Party (PC) and the Socialists
(PS). The PC strongly believes that the government is
responsible for social needs and is the most Leftist
party In all four nations. The PC depends very heavily on
working class votes and has formal ties with the
communist labor union, the CGT. Furthermore, while other
communist parties have lost their Marxist ideology with
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the French Communist
Party remains committed to these values. The French
Socialists, by comparison, have moderated their
ideological image during the 1980s to appeal to liberal
middle-class voters. Still, political experts see the PS
as strongly committed to extensive governmental social
programs.
France has
two major conservative parties, the Rally for the
Republic (RPR) and the Union for French Democracy (UDF).
The RPR is the modern successor to the Gaullist forces
that created the Fifth Republic and governed the republic
for most of its history. The party is a representative of
conservative business interests and the middle class; it
favors a reduction of government social programs and
taxes. The UDF is a moderate conservative party that
attracts liberal elements of the middle class. Together
the RPR and UDF form a conservative majority in the
present parliament, advocating a traditional conservative
economic agenda. The president of France, Jacques Chirac,
is a leader of the RPR. At the far right of the political
spectrum is the National Front (FN). The IN is an example
of a New Right party, focusing its attention on cultural
and social issues, such as opposition to foreigners, a
nationalistic foreign policy, and traditional social
values. Its identity is formed more as a backlash to the
liberal themes of the New Politics than by traditional
economic issues; but on issues of social spending it is
perceived as sharply conservative.
If Old
Politics issues, such as government social spending, were
the only factors structuring electoral competition, then
Lipset and Rokkan would still be correct in describing
contemporary party systems in terms of the cleavages of
the 1920s. The class-based Left/Right party alignment
that historically structured partisan politics remains
clearly visible in how political experts position the
contemporary parties on the services/taxes
dimension.
The
content of the political agenda, however, now includes
more than the economic and security concerns of the Old
Politics. The New Politics introduce new interests
into the political debate, and this has led to a
different alignment of parties. The partisan alignments
along the New Politics cleavage can be seen in the bottom
panel of figure 7.2, which positions parties on the
environment/economy policy dimension.
In the
United States, we find the same Left/Right ordering of
the parties. The Democrats are seen as the advocates for
environmental protection. The Republicans are perceived
as more concerned with protecting the economy even at a
cost to the environment. This party cleavage was aptly
illustrated in the 1992 presidential election. The
Democrats nominated Albert Gore, a political figure who
is closely identified with environmental protection and
the author of a best-selling book on the environment, as
their vice-presidential candidate. Despite earlier claims
to be the environmental president, Bush opposed
environmental regulations and, in the heat of the
campaign, took to slurring Gore as the "Ozone Man"
because of Gore's concern about the depletion of ozone in
the upper atmosphere. In the United States, the alignment
of the two parties is now similar on both Old Politics
and New Politics dimensions.
In
most other party systems, the environmental issue creates
a new pattern of partisan alignment (Dalton 1994,
chap. 9). In Britain, for example, the centrist Liberal
Democrats have distinguished themselves among the
established parties as the most sympathetic to the
environmental issue.14 In Germany, the Green Party is
seen as a strong advocate for environmental causes and is
located at the far end of this continuum. Over time the
SPD has become more sympathetic to the environment, but
experts still position the SPD near the center of this
policy scale. The Social Democrats are closer to the
conservative CDU and FDP on this dimension than they are
to the Greens. On the far right of this continuum is the
extremist NPD, which illustrates where this party and the
New Right Republikaner would be located on the New
Politics dimension. As the Greens are advocates for
modernization and liberal issues, the NPD (and more
recently the Republikaner) are the most vocal critics of
social and cultural change. Overall, the major cleavage
on the environmental dimension separates the Greens from
all the other German parties.
The
ability of New Politics to transform party alignments is
most clearly illustrated in the French party system. The
French Greens are strong supporters of the environment,
occupying an extreme New Left position. But the
traditional Leftist parties are neutral or critical of
environmental protection. The French Socialists are at
the center of this scale and have an ambivalent record on
environmental matters. The French Communists, who are
extremely Leftist on Old Politics issues, are positioned
between the conservative UDF and RPR on the environmental
dimension. On the environmental dimension, the Communists
and the National Front hold similar positions. Overall,
as we saw in the German party system, the New Politics
cleavage separates the Greens from all the other French
parties.
If we
combine the evidence in this section, we can begin to map
the sociopolitical space that voters use to orient
themselves to partisan politics. In each nation there
is a clear representation of political positions along
the traditional socioeconomic issues that formed the
initial structure of party competition in these
democracies. In addition, the political controversies of
advanced industrial societies are bringing new issues to
the fore, and this is prompting the formation of new
parties or the realignment of the established parties to
represent these positions. Much of the current
research on electoral politics can be seen as an attempt
to assess the relative position of the political parties
on both dimensions and the relative weight of both
dimensions in structuring political choice for the
electorate. The mix of these forces is what fuels the
current processes of electoral change in these
nations.
Contemporary
Party Systems
This
chapter has described broad similarities in the
ideological structure of contemporary party systems.
Most political parties are still organized around the
Old Politics cleavages of class and religion. Even if
these cleavages have become less salient, the group ties
and institutional structure of the parties have
perpetuated these images. Parties are, after all, still
turning to the same interest groups and associations for
the core of their support. Contemporary publics see
Rightist parties as linked to business interests (and
sometimes the Catholic church) and Leftist parties as
allied with the labor unions.
While
major party differences exist on the Old Politics
dimension, there are indications of the increasing
importance of the New Politics cleavage. Earlier
chapters (5 and 6) found that citizens are developing
postmaterial values that lead to new policy interests.
These new issue demands initially manifested themselves
outside the established parties. The growth of citizen
action groups, for example, often reflected a mix of the
new style of citizen participation and New Politics issue
concerns. These interests are now gaining representation
through partisan politics, which places new demands on
the established parties.
Some
indications of partisan change along the New Politics
dimension are already evident. New parties, such as the
German and French Greens, have been formed to represent
New Politics concerns. These small parties have drawn
their support from the young, the better educated, and
post-materialists-key groups defining the New Politics
cleavage. A more basic change would occur if the larger
established parties adopted clearer positions on New
Politics issues. There is some evidence of this change in
the recent actions of the German SPD and French
Socialists. Both parties are attempting to combine Old
Left and New Left issue appeals into a single program;
the French PS found this an especially difficult task for
a governing party. The Democratic and Republican parties
in the United States also have developed closer ties to
New Left and New Right groups respectively.
Despite
these indications of partisan change, we should not
underestimate the difficulty of integrating the New
Politics cleavage into party systems based on the Old
Politics cleavage. The established parties have been
understandably hesitant to formalize close ties to New
Left or New Right groups, especially in Western Europe
where the Old Politics ties remain strong. Parties are
naturally cautious about taking clear stands on a new
dimension of conflict until the costs and benefits are
clear. The major European Leftist parties are divided on
many issues that involve Old Politics/ New Politics
conflicts. While most industrial labor unions favor
economic development projects that will strengthen the
economy and produce jobs, Leftist environmentalists often
oppose these same projects because of their ecological
consequences. Many conservative parties also face
divisions between conservative business elites and
liberal middle-class voters. Political alliances between
Old Politics and New Politics groups so far have been
temporary because of the conflicting values of these
groups.
Added to
these uncertainties are the new questions of partisan
identities in the post-Cold War era. The end of communism
requires a rethinking of the foreign policy stances of
many parties. Many conservative parties used
anticommunism as part of their political image, and this
must now be replaced by other political themes.
Similarly, the collapse of East European socialism has
weakened the ability of social democratic parties to
advocate programs to expand the role of government. In
short, parties of the Left and the Right are rethinking
some of the themes that created their electoral
identities. It is too soon to know what the implications
of these reevaluations will be.
Because of
the uncertainties facing the parties and the difficulties
in integrating a new political cleavage into the existing
party systems, future partisan change is likely to follow
a slow and uncertain course. Continuing changes in
citizen values and issue interests mean that the
potential for further partisan change is real.
Notes
1 There are
several good analytic studies of recent American
elections (Pomper 1989, 1993; Abramson et al. 1994),
British elections (Butler 1995; Heath et al. 1985, 1994),
German elections (Dalton 1993b, 1996), and French
elections (Boy and Mayer 1993)
2. Vote
share was based on most recent national election: United
States (1992), Britain 1992), Germany (1994), and France
(1993). Years in government is complicated by the
separation of powers in the United States and France; we
decided to count the number of years a party was part of
the legislative majority between 197o and 1995 as the
most comparable cross-national statistic.
3. In 1994
the Republican seats in the House rose to 230, and the
Republicans had a majority of Senate seats (54). In
addition, the party made broad gains in state and local
offices (Wattenberg 11996).
4. Because
of the single-member district electoral system, the
Liberal Democrats are routinely disadvantaged in winning
seats in Parliament. In 1992, for example, the party won
18 percent of the popular vote nationwide but won only 3
percent of the seats in the House of Commons.
5. In 1994
the western Greens allied themselves with the eastern
Alliance 90 and ran under the heading Alliance
90/Greens.
6. The
German electoral law requires that a party win 5 percent
of the national vote on the second ballot, or three
district seats, in order to share in the proportional
distribution of Bundestag seats. In 1990 this requirement
was separately applied to East and West; in 1994 the PDS
won four district seats in East Berlin and thus received
additional seats in parliament based on its national
share of the vote.
7.
Bartolini and Mair (1989) forcefully argue that earlier
historical periods were also marked by high levels of
partisan volatility. But their methodology underestimates
the degree of the current levels of partisan change
(Dalton 1993c).
8. For
instance, the 1984 Democratic primaries featured a
confrontation between Old Left and New Left Democrats.
Walter Mondale was identified with the traditional New
Deal policies of the Democratic Party and won early
endorsements from labor unions and the party
establishment. Gary Hart, in contrast, explicitly claimed
that he was the New Politics candidate, the
representative of new ideas and a new generation. Hart's
core voters were the Yuppies--young, urban, upwardly
mobile professionals--one of the groups linked to the New
Politics cleavage.
9. These
are the so-called feeling thermometer questions that
measure positive and negative feelings toward each
object. Respondents are given a thermometer-like scale to
measure their "warmth" or "coldness" toward each
group.
10. The
group items were factor analyses using a principal
components analysis involving the methods described in
Barnes, Kaase et al. (1979, 58183) and extracting only
two dimensions. For earlier analyses of similar
sociopolitical spaces, see Barnes, Kaase et al. (1979),
Inglehart (1984), Dalton (1988, chap. 7). Cees Middendorp
(1991) has conducted an extensive longitudinal analysis
of the Dutch political space using a different
methodology, and he identifies two very similar
dimensions.
11. Similar
results are obtained from the American portion of the
Cross National Election Project. This study found even
stronger evidence of a convergence in Old Politics and
New Politics cleavages using a question on political
representation. Furthermore, a follow-up question asking
about the partisan leanings of social groups found that
Clinton was perceived as the preferred candidate for the
women's movement (73 percent), the civil rights movement
(68 percent), labor unions (66 percent), and
environmental groups (64 percent). Bush was perceived by
a plurality as the favored candidate of business
associations (48 percent) and religious fundamentalists
(45 percent). See Beck and Curtice
(forthcoming).
12. The
German portion of the Cross National Election Project
also contained a question on the partisan leanings of
social groups. About three-quarters of the German public
saw labor unions as leaning toward the SPD, and an equal
number saw business associations and the Catholic church
as leaning toward the CDU/CSU; nearly 8o percent saw
environmental groups as favoring the Greens. See Dalton
(1993a, 266) and Wessels (1993).
13. A new
entrant to the German party system is the Party of
Democratic Socialism (PDS), a successor of the communist
party of the German Democratic Republic. The PDS would be
positioned on the far left of this scale.
14. Even
the Liberal Democrats' advocacy of environmental issues
was insufficient for some environmentalists. In the 1989
European Parliament election a newly formed British Green
Party won 14 percent of the vote. The structure of the
British electoral system handicaps minor parties,
however, and the Greens have been unable to
institutionalize this support.