Clark and Wilson include "purposive incentives" as one of their three major motivational bases for organization behavior. A general discussion of their threefold classification appears under the previous variable, 11.02. Purposive incentives are distinguished from the other two by their explicit reliance on the stated policy goals of the organization--thus excluding election of the party's candidates. These incentives derive from the party's issue orientations and the state of affairs that the member wants to experience in the future. His or her purpose for participating in the party is to help realize this state of affairs.

The concept of purposive incentives includes instances of intellectual agreement with the overall government philosophy of the party or support of one or more particular issues that the party advocates. As with material incentives, we are interested in purposive incentives only as they guide the behavior of party militants rather than rank-and-file party members.

Operational Definition. Parties are scored according to the extent party militants seem motivated by purposive incentives, using the following scale.

0	Few militants, if any, seem motivated by purposive incentives.
1	About one-third of the militants seem motivated by purposive incentives.
2	About half of the militants seem motivated by purposive incentives.
3	About two-thirds of the militants seem motivated by purposive incentives.
4	All or almost all of the militants seem motivated by purposive incentives.

Parties were scored on this variable in conjunction with BV1103, in a zero-sum model. No party received more than a sum of 4 on both variables for that would have accounted for the motivational bases of more than 100 percent of the militants. At the same time, the sum of the codes for BV1103 and BV1104 did not need to total to 4, allowing for the possibility of other incentives, for example, "solidary" incentives in the Clark and Wilson typology, or charismatic leadership (see variable 11.06, "personalism").

Coding Results. The cautionary remarks about problems in coding the previous variable, "material incentives," apply equally to "purposive" incentives, BV1104. While the literature was more apt to discuss policy concerns as motivating factors (permitting us to code nearly an additional 10 percent of the parties on purposive incentives as opposed to material incentives), the empirical basis of these discussions was so weak that the means for AC1104 were little better than those for AC1103-although there was no significant relationship between BV1104 and AC1104. The relevant data are in Tables 12.4a and 12.4b, which also reveal the interesting finding that the average party has about one-half of its militants motivated by purposive incentives as opposed to one-third being motivated by material incentivesbased on a comparison of the higher means for BV1104 as opposed to those for BV1103.

Political parties, like organized religions, differ in their concern with doctrine, which may be defined as established principles of values, belief, and action. Some parties adhere to doctrine "religiously," continually referring to established principles and seeking to justify actions according to these principles by citing chapter and verse. Other parties are exceptionally "unprincipled" or pragmatic in their approaches to politics and can point to no specific body of doctrine as a source of

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