David M. Farrell Comparing Electoral Systems (London: Macmillan, 1998) Chapter 3: Majoritarian Electoral Systems: Second Ballot and the Alternative Vote

As we saw in the previous chapter, Sir Russell Johnston (Liberal Democrat) won the seat of Inverness, Nairn and Lochaber in the 1992 British general election with just 26 per cent of the vote. It is results like this which give the first past the post (FPTP) system a bad name. One view often expressed in political circles is that if it were possible to clear up these sorts of anomalies without 'destroying' the 'essen tial' character of FPTP, then the system would not receive such a bad press. The ideal compromise is said to be one where the electoral system is still easy for the average voter to understand; where it produces strong and stable government; where there still is a single MP representing a single constituency, and, in addition, where that MP enjoys the support of the majority of his or her constituents. The critical new ingredient, therefore, is that each MP is elected with an overall majority, as opposed to the situation which prevailed in the 1992 British election when only 60 per cent of MPs were elected with an overall majority of all the votes in the constituency, a not uncommon result (Punnett, 1991).

In terms of the three main features of electoral systems introduced in the previous chapter, the main point of distinction between the majoritarian systems and FP'I'P is over the 'electoral formula'; there are also some differences over 'ballot structure'. The electoral for mula distinction may appear quite simple, but it is seen as crucial by the proponents of majoritarian systems. Instead of requiring only a plurality of votes (i.e. more votes than any of the other candidates but not necessarily an overall majority) in order to win the seat, a candidate must get an overall majority (i.e. at least 50 per cent plus one), hence the title 'majoritarian' systems.

The ballot structure distinction really only relates to the Australian majoritarian system. As we shall see, under the alternative vote, voters rank-order all the candidates on the ballot paper; in other words, the ballot structure is 'ordinal'. Things are not quite so straightforward under the French second ballot system which, as we see in section 3.1, consists essentially of two 'categoric' ballots on different polling days either a week or a fortnight apart. Both majoritarian systems share in common with FPTP a 'district magnitude' of one; the country is divided into a series of one seat constituencies. Once again, we are dealing with non-proportional electoral systems: proportionality on a seat-by-seat basis can only occur when there are multi-seat constituencies.

Majoritarian electoral systems are seen as a compromise by those people who wish to see improvements to the FPTP system, but who are not in favour of the adoption of proportional representation (PR) systems. Whether, in fact, it is correct to view majoritarian systems as a compromise is dealt with later. First, however, we need to examine the two main types of majoritarian system in use. We start, in section 3.1, with a discussion of the second ballot system used in France. Section 3.2 outlines the alternative vote system which is used for Australian lower house elections, and a variant of which has recently been proposed for Britain. The chapter concludes, in section 3.3, with an assessment of the majoritarian electoral systems.

3.1 The second ballot system

This system (also referred to as the two-ballot system, or the runoff system) is most closely associated with France, Germany and Belgium (though with multi-member constituencies) made use of second ballot systems in the last century. It is used quite widely for lower-level elections in the USA, and in some southern states even for congressional elections. Versions of it are used for presidential elections in Austria, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Finland, Mali, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Ukraine, and for legislative elections in Mali and Ukraine. Bulgaria and Hungary have incorporated it into their variant of the German two-vote system (see chapter 5). In France it was used for elections to the Chamber of Deputies from 1928-45, and was readopted by the Fifth French Republic in 1958 for legislative elections and later, when direct elections for the presidency were introduced, for presidential elections (Cole and Campbell, 1989). From time to time it has been replaced - most recently in1986-88 by PR (also France has opted for a PR system for its Euro elections) - but it remains quintessentially a French electoral system.

As the title suggests, the central feature of this system is a second ballot, with polling taking place on two separate days. The principal objective is to increase the likelihood that the candidate elected will have an overall majority of support in the constituency, i.e. more than 50 per cent of the votes cast. Two different versions are used in France, one for legislative elections in single-seat constituencies and one for presidential elections. In both cases the first stage is deceptively like a FPTP election. The French voters simply select their preferred candidate. If a candidate receives an overall majority of the votes (such as happened in 22 per cent of cases in the 1988 French legislative elections and 12 per cent of cases in 1993 (Cole and Campbell, 1989: 191; Goldey, 1993); as, indeed, happened in 60 per cent of cases in the 1992 British election), then he or she is deemed elected and there is no need for a second ballot. Where no candidate receives an overall majority, then a second round of voting takes place one or two weeks later. This is where the two French systems vary.

In the case of legislative elections only those candidates who receive a minimum percentage of votes are allowed to proceed to the second ballot. This minimum is set at 12.5 per cent, not of those who voted, but of the registered voters.' In other words, in the 1993 legislative election, when 69 per cent of the electorate turned out to vote, on average candidates needed 19 per cent of the total vote in order to qualify for the second round of voting. This minimum figure is designed to reduce the number of candidates in the second ballot and therefore to increase the likelihood that the MP finally elected has an overall majority of votes. Note that it does not guarantee a majontarian result. This is because there is always the possibility that more than two candidates receive 12.5 per cent of the vote in the first round - in theory anything up to seven or eight candidates could receive 12.5 per cent of the vote - and once there are more than two candidates, then there is no guarantee of a majoritarian result. Only with two candidates can such a result be guaranteed. Of course, often candidates who manage to receive the minimum percentage of votes in the first round pull out of the race anyway so as to increase the chances for a particular candidate from another party (such as when there is a coalition bargain). (Indeed, it used to be possible for candidates to enter the race for the first time in the second round. Since 1958 all candidates must have been on the first ballot to qualify.) According to Cole and Campbell (1989: 168) in the 1988 legislative elections there were nine 'triangular contests' in the second ballot. In 1993 there were fifteen triangular contests, representing 3 per cent of all constituencies (Goldey, 1993).

An unusual feature of the French electoral process is that the ballot papers are produced by the parties themselves, not by the state. There are a set of regulations which govern the style and content of the ballot paper: it should measure approximately 10cm x 15cm; it should have the candidate's name (and that of the replacement, thus avoiding the need for a by-election) and party affiliation; it can contain further information as desired, such as a party's slogan or symbol, or background on the candidate (Holliday, 1994). Each party provides its own ballot paper. To vote, the elector chooses the appropriate ballot paper of the party he or she supports, places it in the envelope provided, and drops it into the ballot box. An example of a ballot paper for one of the French green parties is provided in Figure 3.1.

ELECTIONS LEGISLATIVES - SCRUTINS DE MARS 93

Departement du NORD - 13o Circonscription

ENTENTE DES ECOLOGISTES

GENERATION ECOLOGIE - LES VERTS

Mme DOMINIQUE

MARTIN-FERRARI

Journaliste

Suppl6ant: RENAUD JOUGLET

Conseiller Municipal de Thteghem

GENERATION

ECOLOGE

Figure 3.1 A French legislative election ballot paper

The electoral rules for presidential elections are simpler. In this case, only the candidates with the highest and second highest number of votes are allowed to run in the second round; all other candidates are excluded. With only two candidates left in the race, the final result is majontarian. Technically speaking, of course, the final result often does not actually represent a majority of the electorate because only a certain percentage actually turn out to vote and therefore it is only a majority of the voters which determines the result. This point is even more significant in the cases where the turnout is lower in the second round of voting, as happened in 1965 and 1969. For instance, in 1969 turnout dropped from 77.6 per cent in the first round to 65.5 per cent in the second. As a result General de Gaulle's 'majority' over Francois Mitterrand of 52.2 per cent represented, in reality, just 45.3 per cent of the French electorate.

The 1995 French presidential election result is given in Table 3.1. This provides a good example of the strategic nature of the system. On the face of it, this election was a battle between the Left and the Right, with the Socialist candidate, Lionel Jospin, taking up the mantle from the extremely unpopular Fran~ois Mitterrand who was retiring from politics. Underlying this battle was an even more bitter strategic struggle between the two main candidates of the Right, the former prime minister and long-standing mayor of Paris, Jacques Chirac, and the current prime minister, Edouard Balladur, who had entered the race as favourite.

Table 3.1 The 1995 French presidential election
	First	Second
	round	round
	(%)	(%)
Lionel Jospin (Socialist Party)	22.3	47.4
Jacques Chirac (Rally for the Republic)	20.8	52.6
Edouard Balladur (Rally for the Republic)	18.6
Jean-Marie Le Pen (National Front)	15
Robert Hue (Communist Party)	8.6
Arlette Laguiller (Workers' Struggle)	5.3
Phillippe de Villiers (Another Europe)	4.7
Dominique Voynet (Greens)	3.3
Jacques Cheminade (Federation for a New Solidarity)	0.3
Turnout	78.4	79.7
Invalid Votes	2.8	6
Valid Votes	75.6	73.7
Source: Keesing's Record of World Events.

At the start of the campaign there were predictions that Jospin would be defeated in the first round, leaving the second round to be fought over by the two candidates of the Right. This was seen as a potentially dangerous scenario and one of the weaknesses of thesecond ballot system. If it had actually occurred, the supporters of left-of-centre parties would have been denied the right to vote for any candidate of their persuasion in the second round. In the event, and despite the fact that his campaign started late, Jospin managed to produce a dramatic recovery in the Socialist vote, and topped the poll in the first round with 23.3 per cent of the vote. Meanwhile, Chirac, who fought a blistering campaign, pushed Balladur into third place and out of the race.

In the second round, a fortnight later, Chirac emerged the victor with 52.6 per cent of the vote. It should be noted, however, that this second round election saw an unprecedented 1.9 million voters (6 per cent) who spoiled their votes. As a result, Chirac received the active support of less than half the total French electorate.

The fact that French voters are given two opportunities to declare a preference for a candidate means that, in essence, the electorate as a whole is ranking the candidates in terms of first and second choice. In this respect, the second ballot system shares some features in common with preferential systems such as the alternative vote or the single transferable vote (STV). However, there are two peculiar features of the second ballot system. First, it is unusual in that, on the second round, certain parties and candidates are disqualified from running: electoral choice is constrained; electors are forced to think and vote in categorical terms (either candidate A or candidate B). Arguably the very high number of invalid votes in the second round of the 1995 election (Table 3.1) could, in part, reflect voters' dissatisfaction with the choices available. Second, party competition is quite different than in preferential systems because the parties, knowing how their first preferences have panned out, have two weeks to regroup and design strategies to maximize their vote. As Taagepera and Shugart (1989: 22) have noted, this 'encourage[s] the formation of bargains among the parties in between rounds'.

3.2 The alternative vote system

The alternative vote electoral system was devised in the 1870s by W. R. Ware, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. As Jack Wright (1980: 54) points out, in the debates of the late nineteenth century about Australian independence and the setting up of the federation, considerable interest had been shown in the merits of preferential voting. This interest continued into the early years of the new federation. The basic argument was that FPTP - the system first adopted - risked a situation where parties would suffer unfairly from vote splitting. This point was illustrated by a by-election in Western Australia, when a Labor candidate was elected with 35 per cent of the vote, reflecting the fact that the support of the non-Labor side was split between three other candidates. Soon after that, in 1918, what was known as preferential voting, or majority-preferential voting, was introduced for elections to the Australian House of Representatives. (In fact, the first use of the alternative vote system in Australia was in the state of Queensland in 1893.) Almost uniquely an Australian system - where it is used for federal lower house elections as well as for most state lower house legislative elections - it was also used in parts of Canada in the 1950s. The Irish Republic uses it for presidential elections and by-elections.

Although outside Australia this electoral system is usually referred to as the alternative vote, preferential voting is a more appropriate title. 'Alternative' implies an either-or system - such as the second ballot system for instance; whereas, in reality, the voters are being asked to rank order a number of candidates, 1, 2, 3, and so on. Indeed, in Australia, voters have to rank-order all the candidates on the ballot paper; otherwise, their vote is declared invalid. An example of an Australian ballot paper is provided in Figure 3.2 for the electoral division (i.e. constituency) of Moore. In essence very similar to a standard FPTP ballot paper, the big difference is that voters vote in order of preference for all the candidates, in this case all five. (Note the non-alphabetical ordering of candidates names; the parties determine the order of the candidates.)

BALLOT PAPER
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
ELECTORAL DIVISION OF MOORE
Number the boxes from 1 to 5 in the order of your choice.
	LLOYD, Alan R AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS
	WATSON, Mark GREY POWER
	FILING, Paul LIBERAL
	STEELS, Brian THE GREENS (WA)
	BLANCHARD, Allen AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY (ALP)
Remember...number every box to make your vote count.
	AEC

Figure 3.2 An Australian alternative vote ballot paper

Table 3.2 provides an illustration of how the alternative vote system can produce a result quite different from one obtained in Britain. In the Hume division of New South Wales in the 1993 Australian federal elections, there were five candidates running for one seat, with 71,248 valid votes. The first count consisted of the sorting of the ballot papers in order of the first preference votes. Under FPTP, Phil Archer (Labor Party) would have been elected as the candidate with the most votes (a respectable 42 per cent of the valid vote, as compared to 34 per cent for his nearest rival, John Sharp of the National Party). However, under the alternative vote system, a candidate must receive more than 50 per cent of the vote (i.e. at least 35,625 votes in this case). Therefore, the weakest candidate, Ian Buchanan (Australian Democrats; 1,824 votes) was eliminated and his ballot papers were re-sorted according to the second preferences.

Table 3.2 An alternative vote election result division of Hume (New South Wales) in the 1993 Australian federal elections
		Next		Next		Next
	Count one	count	Count two	count	Count three	count	Count four
Dave Cox (ND)	2028	864	2,892 eliminated
Ian Buchanan (Democrats)	1,824 eliminated
Phil Archer (Labor)	29773	562	30335	1605	31940	1035	32975
Stephen Ward (Liberals)	13681	140	13821	392	14213 eliminated
John Sharp (National)	23942	256	24198	872	25070	13174	38,244 elected
Non-transferable	2	23	4

Source: Australian Electoral Commission (1993).

Note how more of Buchanan's votes transferred to Archer than to Sharp. This reflects the relatively close relationship between the Australian Democrats and the Labor Party (Bean et al., 1990; Marks and Bean, 1992). The result of this second count was inconclusive; none of the candidates had an overall majority. The third count, therefore, consisted of the elimination of the weakest candidate - this time Dave Cox (Independent; 2,892 votes). Again more of his preferences transferred to Labor than to the other parties, and as a result, Phil Archer was still ahead of his nearest rival, John Sharp, and the margin separating them had increased. Archer now had 45 per cent of the vote (31,940 votes; a gain of 3 per cent since the first count); Sharp had 35 per cent (25,070 votes; a gain of just 1 per cent). The only other candidate remaining in the race was Stephen Ward (Liberal Party) with 14,213 votes.

The fourth, and final count, consisted of Ward's elimination and the transfer of his 14,213 votes between Archer and Sharp. Since only two candidates were left in the race this meant that one of them had to be elected in this round; one of them had to get an overall majority. Despite the fart that Archer had been leading from the outset, the final victory went to Sharp, who received 93 per cent of Ward's transfers, giving him a final vote tally of 38,2M (54 per cent) as against 32,975 votes (46 per cent) for Archer. The huge transfer from Ward to Sharp was due to the fact that the Liberal and National parties work closely together in a coalition arrangement, whether in government or opposition, and so their supporters are actively encouraged to transfer votes between the two parties (McAllister, 1992).

At first glance, the alternative vote system certainly seems fairer than any of the other systems considered so far. Unlike FPTP (and, in some circumstances, second ballot), the candidate elected has more votes than all the other candidates combined; he or she enjoys majority support in the constituency. This system also allows the voters a greater say over who they want to represent them: if it is not to be their first choice, then they can choose a second. Arguably there is a third advantage of this system over the second ballot system. Because the voting takes place on one day, there is no possibility for the parties to adopt manipulative strategies to try and maximize their gains; there is no second round of voting a fortnight later.

Whether in fact this is a fairer system than FPTP is not as clear as might at first appear. For instance, under the Australian electoral rules, a voter must vote for all the candidates on the ballot paper (though some exceptions are allowed, as shown by the twenty-nine non-transferable votes in Table 3.2). Such a requirement is peculiar to Australia, and it is one major reason for the higher number of invalid votes in Australia than elsewhere (Farrell et al., 1996; McAllister and Makkai, 1993). Whether the requirement to complete all the preferences produces a 'more democratic' result is debatable. It adds considerable burden to the vote process and has opened the way for the party machines to make use of 'how to vote' cards to direct voters on how to complete preferences. Arguably it diminishes the whole point of preferential voting if the order of preferences is pretty much determined in advance by party strategists (Farrell et al., 1996; Wright, 1986).

There is no particular reason why another country adopting the alternative vote system should incorporate such a rule. However, this would then open the possibility of large numbers of non-transferable votes, in some cases resulting in the candidate finally elected not actually having the support of the majority of voters. In any event, there are still a large number of wasted votes under the Australian system; 46 per cent of those who voted in the Hume division in 1993 did not support the winning candidate. In common with the second ballot and the FPTP systems, a large proportion of voters remain unrepresented.

3.3 Is the majoritarian electoral system appropriate for Britain?

Would a majoritarian electoral system deal adequately with the apparent problems of the current FPTP system in Britain? One way to assess this is to examine the record of the existing systems in Australia and France. In the concluding chapter we assess the question of relative proportionality of the various electoral systems in a systematic manner, but we can already obtain some impressions of how 'fair' they are by examining election results over time in the two countries.

Tables 3.3 and 3.4 present percentages of votes, seats and vote- seat differences in both countries in post-war elections (since 1962 in France, the first election held under the Fifth Republic). These tables provide easy comparisons with the trends in British elections which we saw in the previous chapter (Table 2.1). Overall, when drawing comparisons between FPTP and the two majoritarian systems, the trends are strikingly similar. Table 3.3 reveals a systematic bias in the French system against the parties on the two extremes, reflecting the tendency - in the second ballot - for voters to gravitate towards the centre as the candidates of the extreme parties (more usually the Communists or the National Front) are excluded. The 1993 election was particularly interesting in this regard. For instance, despite having its highest ever vote, the National Front (with 12.7 percent of the vote) ended up without any seats. Note also how in this election the two mainstream parties of the Right, the Gaullists and the Union for French Democracy (UDF), both benefited from very high vote- seat distortions in their favour (the Gaullists' seat percentage was twenty-four points higher than their share of the vote; for the UDF the difference was thirty-seven points), while the Socialists had 9 per cent fewer seats than their share of the vote. The single exception to this trend was in 1986 when a PR electoral system was used. Note how in this case the percentage variations between votes and seats were much smaller across the board, and how the smaller parties tended to fare much better, particularly the extremist National Front.

Table 3.3 French legislative elections, 1962-93: vote and seat percentages
	Socialist Partya			Communist Party			Gaullists
	Vote	Seat	Diff	Vote	Seat	Diff	Vote	Seat	Diff
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	('%)
1962	19.8	22.5	2.7	21.9	8.8	-13.1	33.7	49.5	15.8
1967	18.9	25.1	6.2	22.5	15.3	-7.2	33	40.6	7.6
1968	16.5	12.1	-4.4	20	7	-13.0	38	60	22
1973	19.1	18.8	-0.3	21.4	15.4	-6.0	26	37.6	11.6
1978	22.8	21.5	-1.3	20.6	18.1	-2.5	22.8	30	7.2
1981	36.6	56.5	19.9	16.1	9.2	-6.9	21.2	16.9	-4.3
1986b	31.3	35.6	4.3	9.7	5.8	-3.9	26.8	26.3	-0.5
1988	36.6	46.8	10.2	11.2	4.3	-6.9	19.1	22.2	3.1
1993	19.1	9.9	-9.2	9.1	4	-5.1	20.2	44.5	24.3

	Union for French Democracy			National Front
	Vote	Seat	Diff	Vote	Seat	Diff
1978	22	26.2	4.2	0.3	0	-0.3
1981	18.9	12.4	-6.5	0.2	0	-0.2
1986b	15.8	23	7.2	9.8	6.3	-3.5
1988	18.6	23.4	4.8	9.8	0.2	-9.6
1993	19.6	37.3	17.7	12.7	0	-12.7
Notes Percentages do not add to 100 because not all parties have been included. a Including Radical Socialist Party from 1962-8.
b PR election in 1986.
Sources: Mackie and Rose (1991); Godley (1993); Ysmal (1994).

In Australia, smaller parties (the Democratic Labor Party and the Democrats) have never managed to win a seat (Table 3.4), even though in some cases they have more votes than the British Liberal Party which does win seats under FPTP. This indicates how majoritarian systems can, and do, produce results which are even more inequitable than FPTP. The interesting case to note here is the National Party which consistently benefits from more seats than its relatively small vote warrants. This reflects the fact that, as a farmer's party, its vote is geographically focused in agricultural areas (McAllister, 1992). Just as with FPTP in Britain, a party benefits greatly from a large geographical concentration in its vote.

Table 3.4 Australian House of Representatives elections, 1949-96: vote and seat percentages
	Labor Party			Liberals			Country/National
	Vote	Seat	Diff	Vote	Seat	Diff	Vote	Seat	Diff
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
1949	46	38.8	-7.2	39.4	45.5	6.1	10.9	15.7	4.8
1951	47.6	43	-4.6	40.6	43	2.4	9.7	14	4.3
1954	50	47.1	-2.9	38.6	38.8	0.2	8.5	14.1	5.6
1955	44.6	38.5	-6.1	39.7	46.7	7	7.9	14.8	6.9
1958	42.8	36.9	-5.9	37.2	47.5	10.3	9.3	15.6	6.3
1961	47.9	49.2	1.3	33.6	36.9	3.3	8.5	13.9	5.4
1963	45.5	41	-4.5	37.1	42.6	5.5	8.9	16.4	7.5
1966	40	33.3	-6.7	40.2	49.6	9.4	9.7	16.3	6.6
1969	47	47.2	0.2	34.8	36.8	2	8.6	16	7.4
1972	49.6	53.6	4	32.1	30.4	-1.7	9.4	16	6.6
1974	49.3	52	2.7	34.9	31.5	-3.4	10.8	16.5	5.7
1975	42.8	28.4	-14.4	41.8	53.5	11.7	11.3	18.1	6.8
1977	39.6	30.7	-8.9	38.1	54	15.9	10	15.3	5.3
1980	45.1	40.8	0.3	37.4	43.2	5.8	8.9	16	7.1
1983	49.5	60	10.5	34.4	26.4	-8.0	9.2	13.6	4.4
1984	47.5	55.4	7.9	34.4	30.4	-4.0	10.6	14.2	3.6
1987	45.8	58.1	12.3	34.6	29.1	-5.5	11.5	12.8	1.3
1990	39.4	52.7	13.3	35	37.2	2.2	8.4	9.5	1.1
1993	44.9	54.4	9.5	37.1	33.3	-3.8	7.2	10.9	3.7
1996	39.2	32.4	-6.8	39	52	13	8.2	12.2	4

	Democratic Labor Party				Australian Democrats
	Vote	Seat	Diff		Vote	Seat	Diff
	(%)	(%)	(%)		(%)	(%)	(%)
1955	5.2	0	-5.2	1977	9.4	0	-9.4
1958	9.4	0	-9.4	1980	6.6	0	-6.6
1961	8.7	0	-8.7	1983	5	0	-5.0
1963	7.4	0	-7.4	1984	5.4	0	-5.4
1966	7.3	0	-7.3	1987	6	0	-6.0
1969	6	0	-6	1990	11.3	0	-11.3
1972	5.2	0	-5.2	1993	3.8	0	-3.8
1974	1.4	0	-1.4	1996	6.7	0	-6.7
1975	1.3	0	-1.3
1977	1.4	0	-1.4
1980	0.3	0	-0.3
Notes: Percentages do not add to 100 because not all parties are included.
Sources: Mackerras (1996); election results.

Apart from the unfair treatment of smaller parties, the majoritarian systems can also produce anomalous majorities, similar to those we saw with FPTP in the previous chapter. For instance, in eight of the twenty Australian elections in Table 3.4 (i.e. in 1949, 1955, 1958, 1963, 1975, 1977, 1980, 1996), the Liberal Party was awarded more seats than the Labor Party despite having won fewer votes. For a period, from 1983-93, there was a systematic bias in the seats-to-votes ratio for the governing Labor Party - a trend which bears a marked resemblance to that of the British Conservatives under FPTP (see Table 2.1). This helps to explain the dominance of the Labor Party in Australian politics over the past decade or so, a dominance which was shattered in 1996 (and when, for the first time in a decade, the party was awarded a lower share of seats than its vote warranted). In conclusion, the evidence from both majoritarian systems suggests electoral trends which are strikingly similar to those for FPTP. Smaller parties are disadvantaged; larger parties are advantaged; parties with a good geographical concentration in support tend to do better, and governments with a majority of seats are the norm.

A second way of assessing the merits of majontarian electoral systems is to test them out among British voters, to see what difference they might make to an FPTP election result. In the immediate aftermath of the 1992 British general election, Patrick Dunleavy and his colleagues tested out a range of different electoral systems on a sample of almost 10,000 British voters (Dunleavy et al., 1992; 1993). One of the systems tested was the alternative vote. The respondents were given mock ballot papers which included the names of real party candidates to fill out. The idea was to replicate the British election in the same constituencies but using a different electoral system.

Table 3.5 shows the comparison between the actual (FPTP) 1992 result and what might have been the result had the alternative vote electoral system been used. As would be expected, there is little improvement in the overall proportionality of the result: the larger parties continue to win more seats proportionate to votes, the smaller parties continue to win fewer; the Liberal Democrats in particular remain grossly underrepresented. As Dunleavy et al. comment (1992: 5): 'The most striking impression from these results is of how little difference the alternative vote would make ... The Conservative majority in the House of Commons would disappear, but they would be only one seat short of overall control and would be certain still to form the government.' These findings are consistent with an earlier study by Denver and Hands who suggested that 'the major parties have little to fear from a modest move in the direction of electoral reform which is all that the alternative vote represents' (1989: 27).

Table 3.5 Party Seats in the UK under Alternative Vote Compared with the 1992 FPTP Election Results: the Rowntree/ICM survey
		Alternative vote result				FPTP 1992 result
	No. of seats	Con.	Lab.	LD	Other	Con.	Lab.	ID	Other
South	261	203	44	14	0	209	45	7	0
North and Midlands	263	114	146	3	0	110	150	3	0
Scotland	72	5	52	9	6	11	49	9	3
Wales	38	3	28	4	3	6	27	1	4
Britain	634	325	270	30	9	336	271	20	7
Net change in seats		-11	-l	10	2
Source: Derived from Dunleavy et al. (1992: Table 5).

The research by Dunleavy and his colleagues reveals some interesting trends about British party support under the alternative vote electoral system. For instance, they found that, when allowed the choice, one in ten Liberal Democrat voters actually gave their first preference vote to another party. The supporters of the larger parties tended to be more loyal. As for what the voters did with their second preference votes, Table 3.6 suggests two distinct patterns. In the case of supporters of the two large parties, there is a far greater tendency to vote only for their party and not to transfer their votes to any other party (a quarter of them declared no second preference). And of those who did declare a second preference, the bulk of them (more than half in each case) transferred votes to the Liberal Democrats. This stands to reason as we would expect voters to gravitate towards the centre.

Table 3.6 Inter-party transfers by British voters in 1992: the Rowntree/ICM survey
First party supported
	Conservative	Labour	Liberal Democrats	Green	Scottish Welsh Nationalist
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Second party
Conservative	-	9	38	12	12
Labour	9	-	33	31	43
Liberal Democrats	56	50	-	47	23
Green	6	11	15	-	9
Scottish/Welsh Nationalists	1	7	2	3	-
No second preference	28	23	12	7	14
(N)	3108	2343	1253	98	191
Source: Dunleavy et a!. (1992: Table 3).

By contrast, in the case of supporters of the smaller British parties, far more of them are prepared to declare a second preference and, when they do so, they have a greater tendency to spread the vote across two or more parties (e.g. note how the second preference vote of Liberal Democrat supporters divides evenly between the Conservatives and Labour). On this latter point, Dunleavy et al. (1993: 184) suggest that 'British voters receive much more political information about the Conservative and Labour parties than about rival parties. Hence it is inherently easier for "minor" party voters to form multiple preferences about the "major" parties, than for "major" party voters to rank the "minor" parties.'

Of the two majoritarian systems (second ballot and alternative vote), the alternative vote has received by far the most positive coverage in the UK. From time to time it has been proposed as the best available option for electoral reform. Most recently, the Report of the Working Party on Electoral Systems (Labour Party, 1993) - an internal inquiry by the Labour Party, referred to as the Plant Report - recommended an adapted form of the alternative vote (which incorporates some aspects of the second ballot system) for elections to the House of Commons. Entitled the 'supplementary vote', its invention is credited to the Labour MP, Dale Campbell-Savours. The idea is that instead of voting in order of preference for all the candidates on the ballot paper, the British voter would have just two preference votes. It was proposed that there should be two columns of boxes next to the candidate names on the ballot paper, with the voter marking an 'X' in the first column next to one candidate (first preference), and another 'X' in the second column next to another candidate (second preference). Much like the presidential version of the French second ballot system, if no candidate receives at least 50 per cent of the vote in the first round of counting, then all but the top two candidates are eliminated and the second column of votes is redistributed. The candidate with the most votes (and thereby an overall majority) wins.

According to the Plant Report, the supplementary vote electoral system enjoys all the advantages of the alternative vote system - in particular that it is constituency-based and has a strong likelihood of producing majority governments. It is credited with two further advantages: first, that it is simple to understand, and second, 'that it avoids the counting of "weak" preferences, because only first and second choices would be registered by voters, and only the candidates who came first or second on the first count would be included on the second count, should one be needed. Thus, it does not allow a third-placed candidate to come through the middle' (Labour Party, 1993: 20). Dunleavy et al. (1992) are not so sure on the second point. In their analysis they could find only one constituency where the result would be different if the supplementary vote were used instead of the alternative vote. They do agree, however, that the supplementary vote would be far easier for British voters to understand. In chapter 7 we will assess the relevance of this latter point. After all, why should British voters be so different from their counterparts elsewhere that they require a 'simple' electoral system? (For further criticism of the Plant Report, see Norris, 1995.)

A final point in assessing the two majontarian systems is raised by Douglas Rae who argues that neither system is 'unalloyed' i.e. neither is really a majoritarian system. The second ballot system used for French legislative elections does not ensure a majoritarian result unless just two candidates are left in the second round, and even if only two candidates remain (and we can include the presidential system here), there is some question over whether the final result is majoritarian. Fewer people may turn out to vote in the second round, and voter choice has been reduced. There are also problems with the alternative vote which, Rae argues, is not 'the exact equivalent of majority rule, since votes are not to be equated with voters' (Rae, 1967: 24). For instance, as was discussed above, a high number of non-transferable votes may mean that the successful candidate is elected with less than an overall majority of the votes cast.

3.4 Conclusion

The majoritarian electoral systems have their supporters. We have seen how much of the British debate on electoral reform has tended to focus on the attributes of the alternative vote, proposing it (or some variant) as a suitable replacement for FPTP. Some of the leading scholars on electoral systems have also declared a preference for the second ballot system. In his recent study on Comparative Constitutional Engineering, the eminent Italian political scientist, Giovanni Sartori (1994), promotes the second ballot (or 'double ballot' as he calls it) as the best available electoral system on the grounds that it allows voters to re-vote: 'All other electoral systems are one-shot; the double ballot, and the double ballot only, is a two-shot system. With one shot the voter shoots very much in the dark; with two shots he or she shoots, the second time, in full daylight' (Sartori, 1994: 63; also Blais and Massicotte, 1996).

The majoritarian electoral systems - particularly the alternative vote - have a great appeal to British electoral engineers. These systems maintain the tradition of constituency representation, with single-seats. The two countries best-known for using these systems, Australia and France (Fifth Republic), have good records of stable government, incorporating strong parliamentary majorities (although the same cannot be said of France's earlier experiences with the second ballot system from 1928-45). There is little scope for voter confusion: both the second ballot and the alternative vote systems are easy to use and easy to understand. While the Australian practice of requiring that voters turn out and complete all vote preferences may add to the burden of voting, there is no reason why such rules need to be incorporated in any such system in the UK - certainly the supplementary vote' system proposed by the Plant Report does not.

If the majoritarian electoral systems share the positive features of FPTP, they also share most of the negative features. Smaller parties are disadvantaged, certainly small parties which lack geographic concentrations in their support bases. For the same reasons as apply under FPTP, it is questionable how 'fair' such systems are to smaller parties and to the supporters of smaller parties. These issues can only be resolved by a move towards some form of PR. However, as we shall see in the following chapters, the introduction of PR cannot be achieved without some costs of its own.

---

Note

¹The minimum of 12.5 per cent was set in 1978. Between 1962-78, it was 10 per cent; between 1958-62 it was just 5 per cent.