confronted with a military without officers (they had been imprisoned by the enlisted men in their counter-coup which brought back the previously elected APC government) and a history of political intervention. The conclusion to *Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone* is disappointing. It is weak, particularistic, and includes few attempts at generalization.

The major contributions of this work consist of some interesting data, analysis and speculations about alliances and cleavages in the military and some very useful information on the period of military rule. This material is suggestive for those concerned with the military in politics in general and for those who are interested in Sierra Leone in particular.

**FRED M. HAYWARD**

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This is a study of some characteristics of cabinet members in three Middle Eastern countries. Cabinet members were chosen because Dekmejian believes that the “cabinet constitutes the most important institutional power collectivity” (p. 4). Elites are described as a component of the polity, and if politics are defined “in terms of power, nothing can be more central to it than the study of those who hold power” (p. 3). The book does not attempt “to find the locus of power and identify the individuals who exercise it” (p. 4). Instead, Dekmejian contents himself with assembling some interesting and some not so interesting information about individual cabinet members. The regime context is passed over lightly, but average age, jobs held before and after, religion, and education are tabulated, graphed, listed and discussed in the text. Three chapters about Lebanon, Israel and Egypt briefly recapitulate major cabinet changes. A final chapter compares the three and briefly notes that similarities and differences among cabinet members are due to a number of independent variables which are not the major subject of the book (e.g., the party system). Finally a few paragraphs are devoted to the cabinets’ effectiveness and possible changes in policy as the result of changes in cabinet members’ education, occupation, and socialization. The most significant conclusions are that the Egyptian elite has been strengthened by winning the war in 1973 while the Israeli cabinet has been weakened. Nasser’s and Ben Gurion’s departures improve the prospects for peace.

It is unrealistic to expect that area studies applications of elite analysis will yield significant theoretical breakthroughs, or even useful methodological innovations. For the most part, the area specialist is handicapped by a dearth of quantifiable data, by contact with only limited segments of the population, and often by a lack of adequate knowledge of the languages used in the area. To cope with these difficulties and at the same time to employ analytical paradigms critically might appear to be too much to expect. On the other hand, the essence of comparative analysis is revealed precisely when a paradigm which appears to make sense in one context is recognized as obviously inappropriate in another. By failing to take advantage of an opportunity to make such meaningful distinctions, Dekmejian has deprived us of a useful comparison of these three regimes and he has passed up an opportunity to offer a critique of elite analysis itself.

**LEONARD BINDER**

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For many political scientists, coalition theory has at best only a heuristic value for theoretical exercises in scope and methods classes. But coalition theory has another dimension to its reputation: it is thought to be empirically sterile concerning problems of importance to many teachers who nonetheless find it a useful pedagogical tool. Dodd’s important book should go far toward removing the stain of empirical sterility from coalition theory in the study of parliamentary politics, for it demonstrates that the theory has considerable utility when imaginatively applied.

Dodd sees his own study as “an extension and synthesis of two schools of comparative analysis” (p. 226). The first is represented by the work of A. Lawrence Lowell and others who emphasized “the potentially critical influence that a parliament’s party system may have on cabinet durability” (p. 226), arguing “that durable cabinets require majority party government” (p. 6). Unfortunately, Dodd notes, the Lowell school was essentially inductive and descriptive, and its practitioners “failed to develop a coherent framework that could ex-
plain the linkage between party systems and cabinet durability” (p. 226).

The second school of analysis, of more recent origin, is reflected in the works of many contemporary political scientists like Riker, Axelrod, Browne, Groenings, De Swaan, and especially Michael Leiserson, who “emphasized the potential utility of game-theoretic models in the study of multiparty parliamentary settings” (p. 21). Unfortunately, Dodd contends, the Leiserson school focused primarily on predicting the appearance of “minimum winning coalitions” while failing to link “the study of parliamentary coalitions to fundamental political questions” (p. 227).

Dodd proposes to make this link by relating cabinet coalitional status to cabinet durability. For “cabinet coalitional status,” Dodd envisions a continuum ranging from “undersized or less-than-minimum winning cabinets” through “minimum winning cabinets” to “oversized or greater-than-minimum winning cabinets” (p. 18). This sounds very much like the application of Riker’s “size principle” to the prediction of coalition formation, and indeed it is—and it isn’t. Dodd is not really interested in predicting which coalitions will form; hence he does not introduce any constraints of ideological compatibility among parties as a criterion for coalition eligibility (p. 121). Instead, Dodd is interested in specifying the parliamentary conditions which predict to the formation of undersized, oversized, or minimum-sized coalitions. Specifically, he considers (1) the degree of a priori willingness to bargain (cleavage conflict among the parties, or their issue positions weighted by their proportion of seats), and (2) information certainty (party system fractionalization and instability).

Dodd’s treatment of these factors is primarily verbal rather than mathematical, so no one should be prevented from following his theory for lack of mathematical facility. Nevertheless, his discussion is complicated by the interactions hypothesized in his theory, as different degrees of willingness to bargain and degrees of information certainly will “produce exactly the opposite behavioral patterns” (p. 128). At high levels of willingness to bargain, low information certainly produces oversized coalitions. At low levels of willingness to bargain, low information produces undersized coalitions. At moderate levels of willingness to bargain, high information produces coalitions of minimum winning size (pp. 132–33, 208).

Dodd tests his propositions about parliamentary conditions predicting to coalitional status primarily with data on 238 cabinets in multiparty parliaments (those with no majority party) in 17 “western” nations from 1918 to 1974, omitting the war years of 1941–1944. Additional data on 41 cabinets in majority parliaments enable him to extend his analysis beyond the multiparty situation. Using mainly regression analysis, Dodd concludes “that the complex interaction between party system fractionalization, instability, and cleavage conflict determines cabinet coalitional status,” with these three variables accounting for over 40 percent of the variance.

Despite his evaluation of these findings as “strong, parsimonious, and theoretically coherent,” Dodd asks the critical question “whether they matter: is cabinet coalitional status related to cabinet durability?” He employs an admittedly limited definition of durability: “a cabinet exists so long as there is no change in the parties that compose the cabinet” (p. 122). The distribution of cabinet durability by coalitional status is triangular, and Dodd’s grappling with the relationship conclude that coalitional status explains from 21 to 27 percent of the variance in durability (pp. 140–42). It follows from his theory that “cabinet durability is an indirect function of the parliamentary party system,” and Dodd estimates that the same three variables that explain coalitional status also explain about 20 percent of the variance “among peace-time multiparty parliaments, 1918–1974” (p. 143). Dodd devotes considerable time to examining the stability of his findings for the “interwar” (1918–1940) and “postwar” (1945–74) periods and to extending his findings to cabinets in majority parliaments. By and large, the theory applies in both investigations.

For Dodd, his research is important for puncturing the “myth of multipartism” and its corollaries: “the myth of party coalitions: coalition governments are necessarily nondurable; the myth of majority partism: countries seeking durable cabinets must achieve majority party government and hence a majority party system” (p. 10). By stating these “myths” so categorically, Dodd can be accused of constructing straw men, for the presumed consequences of multipartism are surely couched in statistical rather than universal statements. Disregarding Dodd’s bit of hyperbole, one can hope with Dodd that his study “will help remove the blinders from scholars concerned with parliamentary politics” by revealing that “party coalitions can and do endure” (p. 243). Dodd’s findings encourage him to speculate about the positive contributions rather than the negative consequences of multiparty politics. Regardless of one’s reactions toward his speculations concerning demo-
cratic theory, it is significant to note that a book on coalition theory yields empirical findings that prompt such speculation. It is to Dodd’s credit that he has convincingly demonstrated the empirical utility of the theory in the study of parliamentary politics.

KENNETH JANDA

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June Dreyer’s excellent study fills a long-standing need for an account of China’s policies toward her national minorities. Six percent of China’s population, some 40 million people, belong to approximately 50 recognized national minorities. Although some of these groups are small, primitive tribes, others are large populations with complex cultures living in areas of great strategic importance and containing important natural resources—for example, the Tibetans, Uighurs, and Mongolians.

Anyone who teaches about China has been asked for reading materials on China’s minorities policies. If the Chinese have dealt creatively with problems of agricultural modernization, health care delivery, and law and order, have they also found new ways to deal with the intractable problems of ethnic and cultural diversity? Have the dominant Han (ethnic Chinese) managed to integrate minorities politically while protecting their cultural autonomy? Has Chinese policy in this area, as in others, diverged from Soviet practice? What is the influence of the Chinese tradition? Dreyer answers all these questions in clear, unpretentious language which will be accessible to students interested in China mainly as a comparative case study; at the same time, she connects trends in minorities policies to national political events (for example, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution) with sophisticated Pekingology that China specialists will admire.

The book is organized chronologically, beginning with chapters on minorities policies under the traditional dynasties and the precommunist republic. There are excellent analyses of Soviet theory and practice and of Chinese Communist policies before the assumption of national power in 1949. The next five chapters deal with variations in policy during the consolidation of power, the Great Leap, the post-Leap retrenchment, the Cultural Revolution, and the recent period up to 1975. The conclusion (and sections throughout) point to the relevance of the Chinese experience for the general problem of cultural pluralism. Each chapter, as appropriate, discusses not only overall central government policy but the specific experience of major nationality areas.

Dreyer handles a complex subject with verve. Her analysis covers not only a wide geographical and temporal scope but a great range of topics and methods. At one extreme she deals with policy toward national arts and costume; at another, with the composition of successive Central Committees. Whether describing foreign policy, agricultural policy, language policy, cadre policy, shifts in propaganda messages or changes in leadership composition, her judgment is sound and her command of the context firm.

In principle, the book should open the way to more detailed studies of the experiences of particular minority areas under Chinese Communist rule. In practice, there may not be sufficient source material to support such studies, except perhaps for the largest areas and those from which refugees are available such as Tibet. In any case, Dreyer’s findings are not likely to be overturned. Students of cultural pluralism can now include the Chinese case in their studies with confidence.

ANDREW J. NATHAN

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Organizational theory for the most part emphasizes bureaucratic and essentially undemocratic organizations. The components of organizational democracy are seldom given more than tangential recognition and are considered of no more than peripheral relevance in general scholarship in the field. Most social theorists have argued that oligarchy in complex organizations is highly likely, have offered reasons for this, and let it go at that. Large unions, like large business enterprises and government agencies, are considered to have certain essential structural characteristics which predispose them, no matter how formally democratic they may be, to domination by the few. This pessimistic bias regarding complex