

Six Issues in Regulating Political Parties

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In an earlier work for the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, I compiled a database of 1,100 national regulations concerning party politics. That body of party law dealt with the legal status of political parties, what constitutes party membership, how parties must be organized, how they should campaign, how they must handle party funds, and so on.¹ In doing that research, I formulated five models reflecting different ways in which nations have regulated parties through their policies. These models were described as ones of *proscription*, *prescription*, *permission*, *promotion*, or *protection* of parties and party activities.²

These policy models were conceptualized as pure forms; nations may not follow any one of them exactly in making party law. Although I argued that nations tend to follow these models, specific laws or rules may fit different regulatory policies, reflecting the complexity of the law-making process. In general, nations that *proscribe* parties by law forbid them from operating entirely; nations that *prescribe* for parties seek to mold them to fit an ideal; nations that *permit* parties allow them to operate freely; nations that *promote* parties actively support them; and nations that *protect* parties favor certain ones over others.³

In the course of that research, I identified six key issues in regulating parties that deserve special attention. These were (1) civil prerequisites of the political system, (2) the legal level of the regulation, (3) the role of political parties in presidential governments, (4) differences between parliamentary and presidential governments in the regulation of political parties, (5) differences between intra-party and inter-party democracy, and (6) the type of produced by the regulations—aggregative or articulative. Each issue will be discussed in turn.

¹ The database is on NDI's website at <http://www.ndi.org/globalp/polparties/programspp/db.asp>

² Kenneth Janda, "Adopting Party Law," *Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives*, a research paper series published by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (Washington, DC: NDI, 2005). These models are also described in a separate paper, "Measuring National Performance on Models of Party Regulation," prepared for this conference.

³ This section draws heavily on my NDI publication, "Adopting Party Law," pp. 8-12. However, the order in which the models are presented has been altered, and the text has been edited and expanded for this presentation.

1. Civil Prerequisites: Is the Country Ready for Party Law?

Contemporary party systems in most advanced democracies predated party law. Usually, these countries' constitutions did not mention parties, which were either nonexistent or embryonic when the constitution was adopted. Moreover, party law in these countries usually regulated parties only after they had taken shape, grown strong, and participated in government. Through party law, nations can preserve a competitive party system once it has been created, but states or their rulers are unlikely to create a system of independent competitive political parties through legislation or fiat.

To illustrate the limits on even a strong state's ability to create a competitive party system from scratch, consider the case of Iran in the mid-1950s under the rule of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. At the time, Western leaders welcomed the shah as a modernizer. He enacted some economic reforms, advanced the status of women, generally curbed the power of religious leaders, and even attempted to create a friendly two-party system. The shah's flirtation with two-party politics ended on learning that party competition can be messy and unpredictable, even for parties created in-house.⁴ As Ingrid van Biezen observes, many parties in democratizing countries today also had "almost no presence on the ground" before they were "created from within the party in public office," or acquired "parliamentary representation (and often also government responsibility) almost immediately after their formation."⁵

In political life, every organization is a rival to every other organization. Once formed, parties do not encourage rivals. Creating a political party is a risky business, and the business analogy is instructive. Indeed, Issacharoff and Pildes evaluate court decisions on party regulation according to whether the decisions advance or obstruct the "market" for the partisan control of government.⁶ Economic entrepreneurs incur financial costs when starting companies that may not repay their investments, but political entrepreneurs incur both financial and political costs when starting parties. Beyond risking money, party founders risk the loss of their reputations and even political retaliation. There are other parallels between starting a business and founding a party: Just as comprehensive and detailed government regulations can prevent economic entrepreneurs from starting, building, and growing their businesses, comprehensive and detailed party law can prevent political entrepreneurs from starting, building, and growing parties.

Therefore, before drafting party law for a nation in transition to democracy, one should ask: "Are the nation, and its parties ready for party law"? Simon Chesterman cautions that elections held in developing nations soon after the end of armed conflict can spawn political parties "that are primarily—and sometimes solely—vehicles to provide local elites with access to governing power. Such parties may be little more than a repackaging of the armed groups that fought the original conflict."⁷ Governing without parties, however, is not the answer. In that

⁴ Kenneth Janda, *Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey* (New York: Free Press, 1980), 861.

⁵ Ingrid van Biezen, "On the Theory and Practice of Party Formation and Adaptation in New Democracies," *European Journal of Political Research* 44 (January 2005): 154, 165.

⁶ Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, "Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process," 643.

⁷ Simon Chesterman, *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 221.

case, Chesterman warns, “political life is dominated exclusively by the elite personalities involved: this is the danger of a ‘no-party democracy’ such as that embraced in Yoweri Museveni’s Uganda.”⁸

2. The Level of the Law: Starting at the Top?

Suppose a nation has a young but vigorous multiparty system. Suppose also that those in power, or those exerting external influence, find that it is *too* vigorous. Perhaps the parties do not campaign very civilly; or perhaps so many parties split the popular vote that none has close to a parliamentary majority, making stable government impossible. If it is decided that some law is needed to impose order, at what level should it be written? Should party law be enacted in constitutions or in legislative statutes?

The database reveals that many countries use their constitutions as a vehicle for party law, prescribing party organization and behavior in considerable detail. Given that constitutions are more difficult to change than statutes, enshrining party law in constitutions produces rigid regulation that can freeze parties and party systems in awkward, dysfunctional shapes. If party law is needed, legislative statutes provide more nimble vehicles than constitutions for carrying the needed regulations. As illustrated in the discussions below, party forms and functions have often been elevated into constitutional issues.

3. Parties and Presidents: Are They Incompatible?

The powers of presidential office vary greatly across nations. In some, as in the United States, the president is both head of government and head of state. In others, as in Germany, the president is head of state (serving largely in a ceremonial role) but not head of government. If presidents do indeed head governments composed of political parties, one would expect that presidents should be linked to parties in their governments.

Nevertheless, presidents are prevented from engaging in party activities in about 20 national constitutions. The wording in constitutions for 11 countries—Albania (1998), Belarus (1996), Bulgaria (amended in 2003), Chad (1996), Estonia (1992), Kazakhstan (amended in 1998), Kyrgyzstan (amended 2003), Lithuania (1992), Niger (1999), Turkey (amended 2002), and Uruguay (amended 1996)—is given in Box 1. All contain nearly blanket prohibitions against leading a party in government. Because this rule does not prohibit parties but prescribes how they should be run, it fits the prescription model, not the prohibition model.

Box 1 does not take into account the political powers of the presidency. However, the presidents of some of these countries serve as both head of government and head of state. It is likely that nullifying any party role for the president reflects a romantic attempt to portray the president as “above” party politics.⁹ (Russian President Boris Yeltsin took that posture during his tenure—with unsatisfactory results.) To the extent that constitutions insulate government leadership from political parties, their framers deny that parties play a positive role in democratic

⁸ Simon Chesterman, *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building*, 223.

⁹ Ivan Doherty, “Democracy out of Balance: Civil Society Can’t Replace Political Parties,” *Policy Review* (April–May 2001): 25–35.

government. Of these 11 nations, only 4 (Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, and Uruguay) can be classified as democracies, while Turkey is a semi-democracy. The other 6 are non-democracies.¹⁰

Box 1: Constitutional Prohibitions against Party Politics by Presidents

Albania, Article 89

The President of the Republic may not hold any other public duty, may not be a member of a party or carry out other private activity.

Belarus, Article 86

The President shall suspend his membership in political parties and other public associations that pursue political goals during the whole term in office.

Bulgaria, Article 95

(2) The President and the Vice President may not be national representatives, engage in another state, public, or economic activity, and participate in the leadership of any political party.

Chad, Article 71.

The functions of the President of the Republic are incompatible with the exercise of any other elected mandate, any public employment and of any other professional and lucrative activity.

They are also incompatible with any activity within a party or a group of political parties or a syndical organization.

Estonia, Art. 84.

Upon assuming office the authority and duties of the President of the Republic in all elected and appointed offices shall terminate, and he or she shall suspend his or her membership in political parties for the duration of his or her term of office.

Kazakhstan, Article 43.

2. For the period he exercises his powers the President of the Republic suspends activity in a political party.

Kyrgyz, Article 43

5. The President of the Kyrgyz Republic must suspend his activity in political parties and organizations during the term of office until the beginning of new elections of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic.

Lithuania, Article 83

The President of the Republic may not be a member of the Seimas or hold any other office, and may not receive any remuneration other than the salary established for the President as well as compensation for creative activities.

A person elected President of the Republic must suspend his or her activities in political parties and political organisations until a new presidential election campaign begins.

Niger, Article 44

During the duration of his mandate, the President of the Republic may not be President or member of the government body of a political party or of any national association.

Turkey, Article 101

The President-elect, if a member of a party, severs his relations with his party and his status as a member of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey ceases.

Uruguay, Article 77

5) The President of the Republic and members of the Electoral Court may not belong to political committees or clubs, nor hold directive positions in party organizations, nor take part in any way in political election propaganda;

¹⁰ Pippa Norris classified 191 nations using Freedom House data according to whether they were “older democracies” (39 nations), “new democracies” (43), “semi-democracies” (47), or “non-democracies” (62). This variable was taken from a 2004 file originally available at <http://www.pippanorris.com/>.

4. Type of Government: Parliamentary or Presidential?

Parties operate differently in parliamentary and presidential systems. More than 50 years ago in his classic book, *Les Partis politiques*, Maurice Duverger wrote that political parties are influenced by the structure of government, especially by the separation of powers in presidential systems versus the joining of powers in parliamentary governments.¹¹ Recently, however, David Samuels has argued that party scholars have ignored this factor, writing:

Comparative research on political parties truly began with the study of western Europe, where parliamentarism dominates and constitutional structure is thus not an independent variable. Because comparativists interested in political parties have largely built on concepts developed for the western European experience and have ignored potential insights from presidentialism in the United States, we lack general hypotheses about how the separation of powers affects political parties.¹²

Moreover, many emerging democracies have adopted presidential forms of government. Long characteristic of Latin America, presidentialism has become common in postcommunist and African states. Noting the “limited degree of scholarly attention” given to the effect of presidentialism on party systems, Terry Clark and Jill Wittrock found in their cross-national study of postcommunist states in Europe that “strong presidents greatly reduce the incentives for parties to vie for control of a legislature that lacks control over either policy making or the process of making and breaking governments.”¹³ Other studies have shown the distorting effect of strong presidents on party politics in Latin America and Africa.¹⁴

Whether the governmental structure is presidential or parliamentary is especially important for the power structure within a political party. In *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*, the editors state at the outset: “Cohesion and discipline matter in the daily running of parliaments. The maintenance of a cohesive voting bloc inside a legislative body is a crucially important feature of parliamentary life.”¹⁵

Many nations (see Box 2) have enacted constitutional provisions to protect the power of existing party leaders by preventing party dissidents in a parliamentary delegation from “crossing the floor” to leave the party without losing their seats. Also called “anti-hopping” provisions, these regulations are often defended as a way to increase party discipline and cohesion in parliament.¹⁶ Of the 8 nations in Box 2, only Belize and Namibia are classified as democracies.

¹¹ Maurice Duverger, *Les Partis politiques* (Seuil: Paris, 1992).

¹² David J. Samuels, “Presidentialized Parties: The Separation of Powers and Party Organization and Behavior,” *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (May 2002): 461–62.

¹³ Terry Clark and Jill Wittrock, “Presidentialism and the Effect of Electoral Law in Postcommunist Systems: Regime Type Matters,” *Comparative Political Studies* 38 (March 2005), 172–73.

¹⁴ Luigi Manzetti, “Keeping Accounts: A Case Study of Civic Initiatives and Campaign Finance Oversight in Argentina,” (Washington, D.C.: USAIDPCE-I-00-97-00042-00, Working Paper No. 248, November 2000.; Todd A. Eisenstadt, “Catching the State Off Guard: Electoral Courts, Campaign Finance, and Mexico’s Separation of State and Ruling Party,” *Party Politics*, 10, No.6 pp. 723–745; Matthijs Bogaards, “Counting parties and identifying dominant party systems in Africa,” *European Journal of Political Research* 43: (2004), 173–97.

¹⁵ Shaun Bowler, David M. Farrell, and Richard S. Katz, *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998), 3.

¹⁶ Benjamin Reilly, “Political Engineering of Parties and Party Systems,” paper prepared for delivery at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

The others are either semi-democracies or non-democracies. Given that democracies are less likely to enact “anti-hopping” legislation than other nations, these laws don’t seem to promote democratic government. This leads to the next issue, whether it is more important to promote inter-party democracy or intra-party democracy.

Box 2: Protecting Parties with Constitutional Provisions against “Crossing the Floor”

Belize, Article 59. Tenure of Office of Members

(1) Every member of the House of Representatives shall vacate his seat in the House at the next dissolution of the National Assembly after his election.

(2) A member of the House of Representatives shall also vacate his seat in the House—

(e) if, having been a candidate of a political party and elected to the House of Representatives as a candidate of that political party, he resigns from that political party or crosses the floor.

Namibia, Article 48. Vacation of Seats

(1) Members of the National Assembly shall vacate their seats:

(b) if the political party which nominated them to sit in the National Assembly informs the Speaker that such members are no longer members of such political party;

Nepal, Article 49. Vacation of Seat

(1) The seat of a member of Parliament shall become vacant in the following circumstances:

(f) if the party of which he was a member when elected provides notification in the manner set forth by law that he has abandoned the party.

Nigeria, Article 68. Tenure of Seat of Members

(g) being a person whose election to the House was sponsored by a political party, he becomes a member of another political party before the expiration of the period for which that House was elected:

Seychelles, Article 81. Vacation of Seats

(1) A person ceases to be a member of the National Assembly and the seat occupied by that person in the Assembly shall become vacant—

27[(h) if, in the case of a proportionally elected member—

(i) the political party which nominated the person as member nominates another person as member in place of the first-mentioned person and notifies the Speaker in writing of the new nomination;

(ii) the person ceases to be a member of the political party of which that person was a member at the time of the election; or

Sierra Leone, Article 77. Tenure of seats of Members of Parliament

(1) A Member of Parliament shall vacate his seat in Parliament—

(k) if he ceases to be a member of the political party of which he was a member at the time of his election to Parliament and he so informs the Speaker, or the Speaker is so informed by the Leader of that political party;

Singapore, Article 46

(2) The seat of a Member of Parliament shall become vacant—

(b) if he ceases to be a member of, or is expelled or resigns from, the political party for which he stood in the election;

Zimbabwe, Article 41. Tenure of Seats of Members

(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the seat of a member of Parliament shall become vacant only—

(e) if, being a member referred to in section 38 (1) (a) and having ceased to be a member of the political party of which he was a member at the date of his election to Parliament, the political party concerned, by written notice to the Speaker, declares that he has ceased to represent its interests in Parliament.

5. Political Parties and Democracy: Inter or Intra?

A vexing issue in the prescription model of party law is the tension between achieving democracy through *inter-party competition* versus *intra-party democracy*. Inter-party competition means competition among parties to win popular votes in order to gain political office. Intra-party democracy is manifested in internal party procedures that extend, if not maximize, the participation of the party rank-and-file in decisions of public policy and party practice. Of course, these two are not necessarily incompatible, but the tension between them may be great, even critical, based on gaps among what other parties are offering to voters, the centrifugal demands of social and political development, and the limited speed in adaptability of party organizations.¹⁷ Should laws be drafted that promote intra-party democracy as well as inter-party competition?

Party scholars distinguish between internal reforms adopted by parties to promote diversity and decentralize power versus external legal requirements to induce intra-party democracy. Approximately 30 nations in the database have laws or one form or another that require political parties to be democratic.¹⁸ To the extent that practitioners want party law to require and prescribe how parties should organize themselves, they may be going against what party scholars understand to be the connection between political parties and democracy—and risk damaging the ability of parties to adapt.

6. Type of Party: To Aggregate or Articulate Interests?

Party scholars often use the terms “aggregation” and “articulation” as functions of political parties without elaborating on their meanings. For example, Gunther and Diamond refer to parties as “vehicles for the articulation and aggregation of interests” but then list only interest aggregation as one of seven key party functions.¹⁹ The differences between these often linked but rarely differentiated concepts need to be considered carefully.

To *articulate* an interest means to express it clearly. To *aggregate* interests means to collect and balance different interests (often competing interests). Parties with broad social bases normally aggregate diverse interests rather than articulate specific ones. And parties normally differ from interest groups by aggregating rather than articulating interests.²⁰ However, some parties (such as European Green and religious parties) rate higher than other parties in interest articulation and lower in interest aggregation. Ethnic parties in particular are thought to articulate their ethnic interests ahead of societal concerns. That explains why Reilly writes that

¹⁷ See Susan Scarrow, “Implementing Intra-Party Democracy,” *Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives* (Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute, 2005).

¹⁸ For example the 1991-1997 Amendments to the Constitution of Costa Rica, says about parties: “Their internal structure and functioning must be democratic.”

¹⁹ Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Types and Functions of Parties,” 3, 8. Presumably, Gunther and Diamond would include interest articulation under the “societal representation” function.

²⁰ Kenneth Janda, “Comparative Political Parties: Research and Theory,” in Ada W. Finifter (ed.), *Political Science: The State of the Discipline II* (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1993), 163–91.

scholars and policymakers alike have frequently identified the need to build broad-based, aggregative and multi-ethnic political parties if inter-ethnic violence is to be avoided and the routines of peaceful democratic politics consolidated in fragile multi-ethnic states.²¹

That ethnic parties promote domestic instability and threaten democratic institutions is the prevailing view in comparative politics.²²

However, there is a contradictory view, often associated with Arend Lijphart, that sees democratic potential in ethnic parties. Lijphart argues for a “consociational” democracy in which ethnic groups are directly represented in government.²³ More recently, Kanchan Chandra has argued that ethnic parties can sustain a democracy if the political institutions are appropriately devised—for example, to ensure variation of ethnic identities across public policy contexts and levels of government.²⁴ Others involved more directly in democracy promotion in multiethnic countries argue similarly that ethnic parties are in some cases inevitable. On making party law in contemporary Iraq, Morton Abramowitz writes:

The instinctual reaction may be for members of the drafting committee to press for legislation outlawing religious political parties. However, an outright ban on religious parties may have the effect of adding to the groups’ luster as well as decreasing the legitimacy of the burgeoning democracy. A law that requires all political parties to be secular is not natural to the region and would most likely be seen as forced upon the people by the American government.²⁵

These considerations on the articulative functions of political parties should lead one at least to reexamine the tendency to view the prevention of ethnic parties as an unalloyed good. Consider Box 3, which lists sixteen nations with constitutional provisions that prescribe that nations should aggregate, not articulate, social interests. Only one is classified as a democracy (Bulgaria). Four (Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone) are semi-democracies. The remaining eleven are non-democracies. These data do not make a strong case in favor of requiring that parties aggregate rather than articulate interests.

Unfortunately, there has been little recent cross-national research attempting to measure the extent to which individual political parties aggregate and articulate social interests. Appendix A reprints material that describes a method for measuring these concepts.²⁶ Jin-Young Kwak offers a recent application of the methodology.²⁷ Future research on the relationship between parties’ aggregative and articulative functions and parties’ contribution to democratic government may benefit from systematic measurement of these party traits.

²¹ Benjamin Reilly, “Political Engineering of Parties and Party Systems,” 4.

²² For example, see Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory in Democratic Instability* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1972).

²³ Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).

²⁴ Kanchan Chandra, “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability,” *Perspectives on Politics* 3 (June 2005): 235–52.

²⁵ Morton Abramowitz, *Establishing a Stable Democratic Constitutional Structure in Iraq: Some Basic Considerations* (New York and Washington: Century Foundation, 2003), 50.

²⁶ Janda, *Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey*. The full text of Part I of this book is available at <<http://janda.org/ICPP/ICPP1980/index.htm>>.

²⁷ Jin-Young Kwak, “The Social Bases of Political Parties in Korea and Japan: Measuring Dimensions of Social Support,” Unpublished PhD Dissertation (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, 1997).

Box 3: Aggregative Parties Prescribed in Sixteen National Constitutions

Afghanistan	The citizens of Afghanistan have the right to form political parties in accordance with the provisions of law, provided that: . . . The formation and the functioning of a party based on ethnicity, language, religion and region is not permissible.
Algeria	With respect to the provisions of the present , the political parties cannot be founded on a religious, linguistic, racial, sexual, corporatist or regional basis.
Bulgaria	Political parties founded on ethnic, racial, or religious basis as well as parties with the goal of forcible seizure of state power may not be formed.
Burkina Faso	All the political parties and formations are equal in rights and duties. However, tribalist, regional, confessional, or racist political parties or formations are not authorized.
Burundi	It is forbidden to the political parties to identify themselves in form, in action or in any other manner, specifically to an ethnic group, to a region, to a religion, to a sect or to a gender ¹
Congo	The political (shall) have a national character and shall not identify themselves in the form, action or, whatever manner, with an ethnicity (ethnic), a department, a religion or a sect.
Djibouti	They shall be prohibited from identifying themselves by race, ethnic group, sex, religion, sect, language or region.
Ghana	Every political party shall have a national character, and membership shall not be based on ethnic, religious, regional or other sectional divisions.
Guinea	They shall be established over the whole of the national territory. They shall not identify with a race, an ethnic group, a religion or a territorial unit.
Ivory Coast	Political Parties or Groups created on regional, confessional, tribal, ethnic or racial bases, are forbidden.
Kyrgyz	In the Kyrgyz Republic the following is not permitted: Organization of political parties on religious and ethnic grounds. Religious organizations must not pursue political aims and tasks;
Niger	The Parties with ethnic, regionalist and religious characters shall be prohibited. No party shall be created for the purpose of promoting an ethnic entity, a region or a religion, susceptible to prosecution.
Nigeria	Restriction on formation of political parties. No association by whatever name called shall function as a political party, unless—(e) the name of the association, its symbol or logo does not contain any ethnic or religious connotation or give the appearance that the activities of the association are confined to a part only of the geographical area of Nigeria; ¹
Senegal	They are forbidden from identifying themselves to a race, to an ethnicity, to a sex, to a religion, to a sect, to a language or to a region.
Sierra Leone	No association, by whatever name called, shall be registered or be allowed to operate or to function as a political party if the Political Parties Registration Commission is satisfied that—(a) membership or leadership of the party is restricted to members of any particular tribal or ethnic group or religious faith; or(b) the name, symbol, colour or motto of the party has exclusive or particular significance or connotation to members of any particular tribal or ethnic group or religious faith; or(c) the party is formed for the sole purpose of securing or advancing the interests and welfare of a particular tribal or ethnic group, community, geographical area or religious faith;
Uganda.	A political party in the multi-party political system shall conform to the following principles—(a) every political party shall have a national character;(b) membership of a political party shall not be based on sex, ethnicity, religion, or other sectional division;

Summary and Conclusion

Many developing nations regulate parties in constitutions written prior to the formation or development of parties and enact detailed statutes prescribing how fledgling parties should organize and operate. Detailed party law may have a chilling effect on the formation and functioning of parties in emerging democracies. By enacting “too much” law under the “prescription” or “protection” models, governments can deter creation of political parties. The “permissive” model of party law may encourage the formation and development of political parties in developing countries better than the “prescription” model.

APPENDIX A:**Measuring Interest Aggregation and Articulation of Political Parties
with the Surrogate Concepts of Social Attraction and Concentration**

Extracted from Chapter 5 of Kenneth Janda, *Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey*
(The Free Press, 1980), pp. 41-45

Full text is at < http://janda.org/ICPP/ICPP1980/Book/PART1/Ch.05_SocialSupport/Ch.05p41.htm>

Any society can be analyzed for social cleavages along several dimensions. As explained later, there are six dimensions that seem especially relevant to a cross-national comparative analysis of party support. These are (1) economic status, (2) religion, (3) ethnicity (including language and race), (4) region, (5) urbanization, and (6) education. With respect to each of these dimensions, three separate questions need to be answered. (1) How evenly does the party attract support from various subgroups along the dimension? (2) How heavily is the party's support concentrated within any particular subgroup? (3) How accurately does the party reflect the overall composition of society on that dimension? The concepts of attraction, concentration, and reflection address, respectively, each of these questions.²⁸ [The third dimension, reflection, has been omitted in this extraction.]

Basic to the distinctions among these concepts is a visualization of two alternative methods of assessing the social bases of party support. Suppose that sample survey data are available for a given country in the form of a crosstabulation of party preference by major groupings of a social variable—for example, occupation. How should any given party's social support be assessed? Two alternatives present themselves immediately to the analyst. (1) Assess the party's support in terms of the proportions of the groups' preferences it receives, or (2) assess the party's support in terms of the proportions of its total preferences that come from each group. These alternatives are perhaps more easily explained graphically than described verbally. Table A.1 depicts the hypothetical situation. Calculating percentages by columns conforms to method 1; calculating percentages by rows conforms to method 2.

Voting studies have tended to analyze data such as those in Table A.1 by columns, reporting the percentages of a given group—for example, unskilled laborers—that support each of the parties. This mode of analysis conforms to the major interest of voting studies in predicting voting choice of individuals. The percentage that prefers a given party can be regarded as an estimate of the probability that a member of that group would support that party. Students of voting behavior have been less apt to calculate percentages by parties (by rows in the preceding example), because the resulting percentages indicate nothing about the probability of voting choice of individuals—as the party rather than the group of individuals becomes the unit of analysis. Thus, the voting studies are more likely to produce information on the percentage of blue-collar workers voting "leftist" in Western democracies than on the proportion of the "leftist" vote that comes from blue-collar workers.

From the standpoint of parties research, both methods for calculating party support are important, for they can be interpreted as component values in distinct measures of social "attraction" and social "concentration." Based on the proportions of the groups' support given to a party, a measure can be devised for the attractiveness of the party to various social groups. Based on the proportions of the party's support drawn from given groups, a measure emerges for the concentration of subgroups within the party. Moreover, comparing the party's support drawn from different groups (its social composition) with the composition of society offers an opportunity to measure social reflection. Precise conceptualizations and operationalizations of each of these measures will be discussed in turn.

²⁸ The concepts of social attraction and social concentration are as surrogates for Almond's concepts of interest aggregation and interest articulation (Almond and Coleman 1960; Almond and Powell 1966). This required the theoretical assumption that the processes of interest aggregation and articulation follow from the underlying structures of social support for the parties. It seems wiser to provide for independent testing of this linkage by keeping these pairs of concepts analytically distinct and labeling those pertaining to party support in a more denotative fashion, which we attempt to do with "attraction" and "concentration."

Table A.1: Generalized Distribution of Support for n Parties across k Social Groups

	Group ₁	Group ₂	...	Group _k	Total %
Party ₁	<i>data</i>	<i>data</i>	...	<i>data</i>	100
Party ₂	<i>data</i>	<i>data</i>	...	<i>data</i>	100
...	100
...	100
Party _k	<i>data</i>	<i>data</i>	...	<i>data</i>	100
Total %	100	100	100	100	

Social Attraction

"Social attraction" is defined as the extent to which the party attracts its supporters evenly from each significant subgroup within any dimension of social cleavage. For the present, "party supporters" can be interpreted as those who express a preference for a given party in answer to direct questions about their partisan feelings. In the case of the United States, for example, we can count as party supporters those who "think of themselves" as Republicans or Democrats in response to interviewers' questions about their party identifications.

Under our conceptualization of social attraction, it makes little difference what overall or mean level of support is enjoyed by a party. We are interested instead in the evenness of its support from social groups. Thus we seek to measure social attraction in terms of absolute deviations from the mean level across all groups (percentages calculated by column in Table 5.1) for a major social variable. The average amount of deviation (sum of absolute deviations divided by the number of groups) is then divided by the mean to express the deviations as a proportion of the mean. The average deviation is normed by dividing by the mean because an average deviation of 1.0 percentage points is judged to be relatively small for a mean support level of 50 percent, but relatively large for a mean support level of only 10 percent.

The value resulting from these operations is then divided by the maximum deviation that could be obtained for a specified number of groups. This maximum is achieved when any single group gives a party 100 percent of its support and the party gets no support from any other group. These several concerns are included in our formula for measuring social attraction:

$$\text{Social Attraction} = 1 - \frac{\sum_{j=1}^k |x_j - \bar{x}|}{\frac{2(k-1)}{k} \bar{x}}$$

where k is the number of subgroups within the cleavage dimension included in the analysis; X_j is the proportion of the jth group's support given to the party; and \bar{x} is the mean proportion of support for the party, calculated over all social groupings, k.

The social attraction values produced by this formula range from 0 to 1.0, with higher values meaning higher attraction. A score of 1.0 is achieved only if there is no variation in the percentages of support received by the party from the different social groups in the analysis. A score of 0 results only if a party receives all the support of one group while winning no support from any other. This formula has an operational interpretation as the proportion of evenness of support enjoyed by the party--measured against the situation of equal support from each social group.

Social Concentration

"Social concentration" is defined as the extent to which party supporters are concentrated in specific subgroups within any dimension of social cleavage. In this concept, the focus is on the pattern of party composition, with the pattern based on the percentages of the party's strength received from each group (i.e., percentages calculated by rows in Table 5.1).

There is considerable literature on measuring concentration in economics (Singer 1968, esp. ch. 13) and international relations (Ray and Singer 1973). A complementary literature has developed within comparative politics

over the measurement of social fragmentation--the counterpart of concentration (Rae 1968; Rae and Taylor 1970; Mayer 1972). The concentration measure used in the ICPP project was independently derived, but it has links with both bodies of literature. In contrast to our social attraction measure, our concentration measure expresses unevenness of a percentage pattern. Because of the special quality of the percentage score ingredients for the concentration variable (the percentages must total to 100), we can take advantage of a different approach in measuring that pattern.

Our approach is similar to that used in economics to measure the concentration of firms in the marketplace. We square and sum the proportions of each group's contribution to the total set of party supporters. In the limiting case of perfect concentration--when all the party's support comes from only one of several existing groups--the concentration score is 1. A simple summing of squared proportions of support components, however, does not allow for comparison across parties or countries when the number of existing groups varies. For example, when there are only two significant groups within a social category (e.g., religion divided into Catholic and Protestant) and the two groups contribute equally to the party's composition, the sum of the squared proportions (.502 + .502) is .50. But, when there are three groups also equally divided (.332 + .332 + .332), the value is .33. Thus, a correction must be introduced to allow for the number of groups and to render the concentration scores comparable in the two cases. This correction factor is included in our formula for measuring social concentration:

$$\text{Social Concentration} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^k Y_j^2}{1 - 1/k}$$

where k is the number of subgroups within the cleavage dimension included in the analysis and Y_j is the proportion of the party's support coming from the j th subgroup of k groups.

This formula ranges from 0--when the party's support comes equally from the competing groups--to 1.0, when one of the groups contributes all its supporters. The scores are comparable across parties and countries, regardless of the number of groups included in the analysis.

Attraction and Concentration Measures Compared

As conceptualized, our measures of social attraction and social concentration pertain to distinctly different perspectives from which to evaluate the bases of party support. Under certain conditions, however, these different perspectives converge, offering the viewer essentially the same picture from each vantage point. This can be seen by examining some logical interrelationships among the formulas underlying the measures.

According to party theory, we expect the concepts of social attraction and social concentration to be inversely related: highly attractive parties being low on concentration and vice versa. This is again a matter for empirical test and verification. Mathematically, however, there is a built-in inverse relationship at the extremes of low attraction and high concentration--that is, when the party attracts support from only one group, all its support is necessarily concentrated within that group. This situation yields an attraction score of 0 and a concentration score of 1. But perfect attraction (1.0) does not imply an absence of concentration (0)--except under the special condition that the k subgroups involved in the analysis are equal in size.²⁹ If the subgroups are not equal in size within the society, which is most apt to be the case, the measures can vary widely from each other within constraints introduced by the relative proportions of society embraced by each of the k subgroups. In general, if the k subgroups are grossly disproportionate in size, it is possible to obtain both high attraction and high concentration (or alternatively, low attraction and low concentration) simultaneously.

From the preceding discussion, it follows that the concentration and reflection are also related to each other, but the relationship is more tenuous. Only under the very special condition of two subgroups of equal size are the measures mathematically determined (see footnote 29). To the extent that the subgroups depart from equality, social concentration can vary widely. Even the extreme conditions of perfect attraction or perfect concentration can

²⁹ Under the very special condition of only two subgroups of equal size (i.e., each claiming .5 of the population), the square root of the concentration formula is equivalent to 1 - social attraction. Because, in this case, social attraction is also equal to social reflection, the same equivalence holds for social reflection. But this relationship applies only to the condition of society divided into two subgroups of equal size; it does not hold true for any number of k equal subgroups.

produce different degrees of reflection when the subgroups are of different size. Because the student of comparative politics typically analyzes societies composed of majorities and minorities, each of these Concepts offers its own contributions to understanding the social bases of party support.

Attraction, Concentration, and Reflection Measures Applied

Note that these measures apply to individual parties, not party systems. Note also that they apply to specific social variables--such as occupation, religion, or race--and not to attraction or concentration reflection in general, overall aspects of society. More encompassing measures, if they are desired, will have to be constructed later from the several specific measures that we generate for the major social variables within a given country.

The determination of a "major social variable" varies considerably across countries. Anderson et al. (1967) identify four categories of "cultural differentiators" that are significant for developing nations: race, ethnicity and language, religion and caste, and regionalism. Rose and Urwin, who are concerned primarily with developed Western nations, select religion, regionalism, and communalism (ethnicity and language) as significant for politics in modern societies, and they cite urban-rural and occupation as two other significant social groupings (1969, pp. 12-14). Although they list some twenty "dimensions of voter alignment," Lipset and Rokkan concentrate on social status, religion, urban-rural, and regionalism (1967, p. 527). Converse would add education to this list for its part as a "prime predictor for the whole class of dependent variables reflecting political interest, participation and mobilization" plus its "remarkable discriminating power as a status measure in predicting to variables on the other side of the watershed-ideology and party position" (1968, p. 4).

We have selected all six cultural differentiators cited here for our treatment of social attraction, concentration, and reflection. Specifically, we include (1) occupation (or social status or income in lieu of occupational data), (2) religion, (3) ethnicity/language/race, (4) region, (5) urbanization, and (6) education. Not all of these six major variables--which we hereinafter refer to as "cultural differentiators"--are present as forces for political division within each country. In particular, the religion and ethnicity / language / race differentiators are apt to be inoperative in highly homogeneous countries. Occupation as a differentiator, moreover, has less relevance for underdeveloped than developed countries. In addition to limits on the relevance or applicability of, these differentiators, the problem of missing data continually lurks in the background. Consequently, not all of our six variables apply to all party systems, and not all the parties are coded on all the differentiators, however appropriate they may be to the country in question.

If the applicability of the cultural differentiators varies from country to country, so too does the nature and number of groups within the differentiator. In the United States, for example, there are only two major racial groupings, whereas in Malaya, there are three major groups: Malay, Indian, and Chinese. In other cases, the underlying divisions are generally comparable, but the available data on party support use quite different breakdowns--for example, reporting only a crude urban-rural dichotomy in one case but detailed data by size or cities in another. Our data recording and data analysis procedures are quite flexible, and we accept whatever groupings the research literature identifies as relevant for the country and whichever appear to be supported with the best data.