

DIVERSITIES AMONG POLITICAL PARTIES IN
INDUSTRIALIZED SOCIETIES

by

Kenneth Janda

Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, and
Visiting Fellow 1970-71, Foreign Policy Research Institute¹

Prepared for the Symposium on Comparative Analysis of Highly
Industrialized Societies, sponsored by the International
Social Science Council in Bellagio, Italy,
August 1-7

1971

Introduction

This paper draws heavily upon two recent papers and needs to be read in conjunction with them (Janda, 1971a; 1971b). All three works deal with data on 90 political parties in 33 countries that have been produced by the International Comparative Political Parties Project. The first paper presents a new technique, called Z analysis, which has been devised to cope with the problem of assessing "conceptual equivalence" in cross-cultural analyses of political parties. The second paper proposes a concept of political party suitable for cross-cultural research and uses the Z analysis technique to assess the conceptual equivalence of seven sets of indicators proposed for measuring seven major concepts in the comparative analysis of political parties. The tests of conceptual equivalence examine the patterns of interrelationships among the conceptual indicators applied to parties across and within three cultural-geographic areas: Europe and the Anglo-American countries; Africa south of the Sahara; and the remaining countries in North Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America. After some refinement of the initial sets of indicators, the patterns of interrelationships among the conceptual indicators within these areas were found through Z analysis to be generally similar--with parties in non-Western areas showing slightly better fits among the indicators. Our findings were not offered as proof of conceptual equivalence but as failure to disprove claim of conceptual equivalence. The ultimate test of conceptual equivalence must come through substantive research into the relationships within areas among the seven concepts being measured and between those concepts and others in comparative politics.

This paper does not yet deliver on the promise of comparing relationships to test conceptual equivalence, which is a task to be undertaken in due course. It instead attempts to contribute to the ends of the Symposium on Comparative Analysis of Highly Industrialized Societies by examining the means and variances of party properties (represented by the same seven concepts) when the parties are grouped into three levels of industrialization attained by their parent nations. This examination will allow for testing some rudimentary propositions concerning party properties and levels of industrialization across nations, and it will foreshadow some possible problems in building and testing any social theory that involves party variables and pertains specifically to highly industrialized societies.

Nature of the Data

Data on political parties used in this analysis come from the International Comparative Political Parties Project.² Eventually, the project will cover some 150 political parties that operated in 50 countries during 1950-1962, but at present data are available only for 90 parties in 33 countries. With the exceptions of the American and British parties, which were coded impressionistically by pairs of judges,³ the data were obtained from hundreds of documents and thousands of pages of library-type material pertaining to party politics in our countries. The data were retrieved through the use of some modern microfilm and computer techniques, and the parties were painstakingly coded with special attention to problems of data quality control (Janda, 1970b). The full set of data on all the parties originally identified for the study will not be available for at least another year after coding resumes in the Fall of 1971.

The data collection efforts of the ICPP Project have been guided by a conceptual framework based on the theoretical literature about political parties (Janda, 1970a). The ICPP conceptual framework isolates eleven major dimensions of variation employed in the comparative analysis of political parties and classifies them according to their relevance for the party's "external relations with society" or their pertinence to its "internal organization." In order to measure these relatively abstract concepts, measurement models were constructed which involved multiple indicators for each concept, with the multiple indicators usually--but not always--incorporated in an additive measurement model. The eight concepts which were approached through a straight additive measurement model have been subjected to a first series of tests for conceptual equivalence, which resulted in the refinement of certain scales by deletion of some indicators and the outright rejection of one set of indicators for not supporting the assumptions of the additive model. Table 1 names the major concepts in the ICPP framework, and summarizes the status of the measurement efforts for each concept at this stage of the project.

TABLE 1: ICPP Conceptual Framework--Original and Refined Scales

Groupings	Major Concepts	No. Indicators Originally	No. in Refined Scales
External Relations	1. Institutionalization	6	4
	2. Governmental Status	6	5
	3. Social Aggregation	6	Not involved in additive models and not yet tested
	4. Social Articulation	6	Not involved in additive models and not yet tested
	5. Issue Orientation	13	5
	6. Goal Orientation	36	Not additive; not tested
	7. Autonomy	5	0
Internal Organization:	8. Degree of Organization	7	6
	9. Centralization of Power	8	8
	10. Coherence	6	4
	11. Involvement	6	4

The eight sets of scales tested for conceptual equivalence were subjected to a combination of factor analysis--for the purpose of determining intercorrelations among the indicators across the entire set of 90 parties--and Z analysis--a technique developed to determine the patterns of interrelationships among indicators separately for parties within each of three cultural geographic areas (Janda, 1971a). With the exception of the concept of Autonomy, which resisted our attempts to measure it through an additive model, each of the concepts could be measured by sets of the original indicators and meet certain levels of satisfaction for conceptual equivalence within each of the cultural areas (Janda, 1971b). The scales that passed that evaluation of conceptual equivalence will be used in this paper. In the interests of efficiency in treating the subject at hand, the conceptual bases and precise nature of these scales will not be repeated here.

The analysis of these data will be conducted with the parties grouped into three levels of industrialization experienced in their national settings roughly at the end of our time period. The levels of industrialization were determined by using six different indicators and the data contained in the WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS (Russett *et al.*, 1964). The indicators chosen are given in Table 2 along with some relevant statistical data for the set of 141 countries included in the WORLD HANDBOOK.

TABLE 2: Industrialization Indicators and Statistics

WORLD HANDBOOK Variable Name	Mean	Std. Devn.	No. of Nations Coded
1. Wage and Salary Earners as a Percentage of Working-Age Population	35.2	14.0	79
2. Percentage of Population in Cities of Over 20,000	23.0	18.2	121 ^a
3. Daily Newspaper Circulation per 1,000	128.	102	125
4. Percentage of Labor Force Employed in Agriculture	51.0	23.0	99 ^b
5. Employment in Industry as a Percentage of Working-Age Population	15.1	8.4	78
6. Percentage Literate of Population Aged 15 and Over	52.2	34.1	118

^aData on Albania was added to raise the number of cases coded to 121.

^bData on North Korea was added to raise the number of cases coded to 99.

As can be seen, data were not available for all of the 141 countries on any of the six indicators, and some data similarly were lacking for our smaller set of 33 countries. In an effort to use as many of the indicators as possible in rating our countries on industrialization, I transformed the original data into z-scores, using the familiar formula:

$$z\text{-score} = \frac{\text{Observation for Case } i - \text{Mean of the Distribution}}{\text{Standard Deviation of the Distribution}}$$

and assigned the nations their mean z-scores summed over all the indicators for which the data was available. The result of this procedure was a ranking of nations according to mean z-scores, with a high z-score (the scaling for indicator 4 being reversed) meaning high industrialization as measured by these indicators. Table 3 shows the resulting grouping of our 33 nations into three levels of industrialization and indicates their previous positions in the three culture area groupings used in assessing the conceptual equivalence of the indicators of party concepts. The maximum numbers of parties within each nation that are included in the ICPP study are also given, although the numbers of the parties included in the subsequent analyses may vary below these because of missing data and the discontinuation of some parties by the end of our time period.⁴

TABLE 3: Nations Grouped by Level of Industrialization

Mean z-score	No. of Indicators	Name of Nation	No of Parties	Previous Grouping	Level of Industrialization
2.19	6	United Kingdom	2	E ^a	High
1.61	6	West Germany	3	E	
1.58	6	New Zealand	2	E	
1.56	6	Australia	3	E	
1.55	6	East Germany	5	E	
1.40	6	Denmark	4	E	
1.35	6	United States	2	E	
1.28	6	Iceland	4	E	
.95	6	France	5	E	
			30		
.65	6	Ireland	3	E	Medium
.36	6	Cuba	4	O ^b	
.15	6	Venezuela	3	O	
.07	2	North Korea	1	O	
.03	6	Portugal	1	E	
-.03	4	Lebanon	4	O	
-.35	4	Albania	1	E	
-.44	6	Nicaragua	3	O	
-.46	6	El Salvador	2	O	
-.60	2	Congo-Brazz.	2	A ^c	
-.59	4	Burma	4	A	
-.73	4	Indonesia	4	O	Low
-.76	6	Tunisia	1	A	
-.81	6	Turkey	2	O	
-.85	4	Cambodia	2	O	

TABLE 3 - (continued)

Mean z-score	No. of Indicators	Name of Nation	No. of Parties	Previous Grouping	Level of Industrialization
-.89	2	Guinea	1	A	Low
-.90	3	Uganda	3	A	
-.92	2	Centl. Af. Rep.	1	A	
-.97 ^a	4	Kenya	2	A	
-.97	2	Upper Volta	1	A	
-1.00	5	Ghana	4	A	
-1.01	3	Sudan	3	A	
-1.03	3	Togo	6	A	
-1.25	3	Chad	2	A	
			38		

^aTotal number of parties = 90

^aThe letter E represents European and Anglo-American Countries.

^bThe letter O represents North Africa, The Middle East, Asia, and Latin America.

^cThe letter A represents Africa South of the Sahara.

The mean z-scores in Table 3 separate the nations rather well along what can be regarded as an industrialization continuum, and every nation's score is based on at least two indicators. Choosing cutting points for grouping the nations into high, medium, and low categories is obviously somewhat arbitrary. A slightly greater gap in mean z-scores exists between Iceland and France, than between France and Ireland, but France seemed to belong with the first group as least as well as Iceland, so the division was made below France. The relationship of the industrialization grouping to the culture area grouping is strong, with all the highly industrialization countries in our sample being European or Anglo-American countries. With three European countries now in the middle category, that grouping demonstrates by far the greatest areal diversity. The lowest level of industrialization consists of all the African countries joined by two from Asia and one from the Middle East. Given the considerable overlap between the two sets of groupings, the tests of conceptual equivalence that were conducted with the culture area groupings will not be repeated, and the evidence collected through Z analysis for conceptual equivalence using those groupings will be accepted for the industrialization breakdown. Therefore, the full set of right-hand columns, which contain the coefficients of indicator covariation and case variation--the two main measures of measurement equivalence. The interested reader is invited to compare these with the corresponding entries in the tables in Janda (1971b). Our attention will focus instead on the two left-hand columns, which report the concept scores and coefficients of concept variation--the means and variances for the data calculated for all the parties and calculated for the parties within the three industrialization groupings. In the succeeding sections, we will consider first the means and then the variances.

Reference Table 4Industrialization and Party Tendencies: Examining Concept Scores

The concept scores in Table 4 are in actuality the means of the mean z-scores calculated for different sets of parties and thus are expressions of the central tendencies of the phenomena as measured with the sets of indicators. As a consequence of the z-score technique, the overall means will tend toward 0, with slight deviations from 0 due to missing data. The means of the subgroups, however, can and do vary, revealing the tendencies of the phenomena within each subgroup in relationship to 0--the means for the entire group. Deviations from the grand mean can be attributed to systemic factors associated with the grouping. In this case, the deviations might be attributed to the influence of industrialization, but this inference must be made cautiously because of the overlap of culture area factors with industrialization in our present groupings.

The concern of the Symposium with "Comparative Analysis of Highly Industrialized Societies" might suggest that we focus attention on the findings for the "high industrial" categories in Table 4, but reference will have to be made to the other categories for benchmarks from which to judge the scores for parties in the high industrial subgroup. Expectations regarding the patterns of scores among the three groups depend upon the conception one has of industrialization. If industrialization is viewed as a continuous variable, with nations arranged along it on a continuum, then one might be encouraged to think in terms of linear (or at least monotonic) relationships between industrialization and party tendencies. But if one views industrialization in terms of "stage" concepts, then he may expect curvilinear relationships between the levels of industrialization and party tendencies. Under the former conception, parties in the medium industrial category would be expected to demonstrate party tendencies that are intermediate between those shown by the "high" and "low" groupings. While under the latter conception, the tendencies of parties in the medium category may vary outside the boundaries set by the other two.

My own knowledge of the industrialization literature is meagre at best, and I am unable to advance sets of propositions rooted in that literature that would predict to party properties from either perspective. While I am generally familiar with the parties literature, I have not been attuned before to industrialization as an independent variable predicting to party properties, and I again find it difficult to document my understandings with reference to the literature. But it seems that most discussions of the impact of industrialization on political parties treat their socio-economic composition (e.g., Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Blondel, 1969; pp. 116-118)--which we tap through our yet unavailable measures of Social Aggregation and Social Articulation--and say little about the consequences of industrialization upon the other important dimensions of party variation. Therefore, the procedure I will adopt to guide this inquiry will be to fashion some unsupported propositions about the effect of industrialization on party properties, with industrialization viewed as a continuous variable affecting these properties monotonically. The propositions will be tested primarily with reference to the observed differences in party tendencies between the high and low categories, with any patterns of deviations shown by the medium group left for possible interpretation in terms of "staging" theories. The data in Table 4 are presented in graphic form in Figure 1 for reference in testing the following hypotheses.

TABLE 4: Z Analysis Results for Seven Party Concepts for the Worldwide Sample and Industrialization Groupings

Conceptual Dimensions and Sample Groupings ^a	Concept Score	Coefficient of Concept Variation	Coefficient of Indicator Covariation	Coefficient of Case Variation
<u>Institutionalization</u> : All (N=90)		.61	.38	.10
High Industrial: N = 30	.70	.30	.40	.14
Medium Industrial: N = 22	-.05	.20	.44	.10
Low Industrial: N = 38	-.60	.35	.32	.07
<u>Governmental Status</u> : N = 86	-.05	.73	.31	.09
High Industrial: N = 30	-.02	.29	.33	.04
Medium Industrial: N = 19	.08	.74	.40	.19
Low Industrial: N = 37	-.15	1.1	.24	.07
<u>Issue Orientation</u> : N = 76	.03	.75	.29	.09
High Industrial: N = 26	-.15	.67	.30	.04
Medium Industrial: N = 19	-.22	1.2	.42	.15
Low Industrial: N = 31	.34	.43	.19	.08
<u>Degree of Organization</u> : N = 77	-.08	.63	.38	.11
High Industrial: N = 30	.22	.29	.47	.12
Medium Industrial: N = 18	-.01	.68	.21	.02
Low Industrial: N = 29	-.45	.68	.41	.13
<u>Centralization of Power</u> : N=79 ^b	.01	.48	.48	.11
High Industrial: N = 30	-.16	.42	.49	.06
Medium Industrial: N = 17	.30	.27	.40	.07
Low Industrial: N = 32	.02	.56	.51	.17
<u>Coherence</u> : N = 77	-.04	.64	.41	.27
High Industrial: N = 30	-.06	.37	.48	.23
Medium Industrial: N = 18	.12	.56	.18	.03
Low Industrial: N = 29	-.12	.93	.48	.42
<u>Involvement</u> : N = 81	-.01	.56	.46	.22
High Industrial: N = 30	.01	.43	.40	.15
Medium Industrial: N = 19	-.22	.48	.43	.26
Low Industrial: N = 32	.10	.67	.57	.26

^aThe numbers of cases reported here will tend to be slightly larger than those given in Janda (1971b) for the worldwide samples in tests of conceptual equivalence. This is due to our interest only in the mean z-scores and variance among the means. Data on only one indicator will suffice here, but data on at least available for were needed in order to calculate the coefficients of indicator covariation and variation for the purpose of testing conceptual equivalence.

^bIn order to improve the comparison of the Z results and simply explanation, the four deviant cases were dropped from the Centralization of Power results.




FIGURE 1: Concept Scores for Parties Grouped by Levels of Industrialization

Reference Figure 1

Prop. 1: Highly industrialized societies will tend to have political parties that are high in institutionalization.

This proposition derives from the stability achieved by industrialized societies following the initial disruptions of industrialization. The graph of the concept scores in Figure 1 for the three industrialization groupings strongly supports this proposition.

Prop. 2: Highly industrialized societies will tend to have political parties that are higher in governmental status.

This proposition is based on the belief that the political systems of industrialized societies will be more receptive to organized expressions of interests in the form of political parties, which are unlikely to suffer repression by the current regime and therefore are able to gain some amount of governmental status. This proposition is also supported by the graph in Figure 1 for the comparison between the high and low industrialization categories, but parties in the medium grouping tend to be distinctly higher in governmental status, reflecting the greater incidence of one-party or one-party dominant states in these societies.

Prop. 3: High industrialized societies will tend to have political parties that are more "rightist" in issue orientation.

This proposition comes from the thought that opposition to governmental intervention in different aspects of the economy and social life is again more likely to receive expression through parties in the political systems of industrialized societies, whereas parties in the less industrialized countries will tend to push more uniformly for socialism. The prediction is strongly supported by the graph, although parties in the medium group are even more inclined to socialism.

Prop. 4: Highly industrialized societies will tend to have political parties that are more highly organized.

One obvious proposition in the industrialization literature is that social groups will tend to become more organized (Moore, 1963; p. 347). Proposition 4 applies this directly to parties as a type of group, and the data graphed in Figure 1 again strongly supports it.

Prop. 5: Highly industrialized societies will tend to have political parties that are less centralized in their distributions of power.

A high degree of organization is not the same thing as the centralization of power. It is expected that while parties in highly industrialized societies tend to be highly organized, general pressures for participation in decision making and the organization of groups outside the party will combine to work against the centralization of power within the party. This proposition is supported by the graph, but parties in the middle industrialization group deviate even more from the range than before, showing distinctly more centralization of power.

Prop. 6: Highly industrialized societies will tend to have political parties that are less coherent.

This proposition and the one following were formulated with less conviction than the previous ones. The reasoning behind it is that the greater diversity of elite interests within highly industrialized societies will be reflected within the parties, making them less coherent and more factional. The graph shows that this proposition is unsupported, as parties in the low grouping tend to display somewhat more coherence. Again, parties in the medium grouping are strikingly deviant in exhibiting more coherence than the others.

Prop. 7: Highly industrialized societies will tend to have political parties that are based on lower degrees of militant involvement in the party.

My reasoning here is that party dogma will have less of a role for attracting militants in industrialized societies, and pragmatic considerations will become more important. As the graph shows, this proposition is also unsupported, as parties in the high grouping are somewhat higher in involvement scores and the medium parties again are decidedly deviant.

Our examination of the findings concerning the impact of industrialization on party properties reveals that industrialization does have the expected impact in five out of seven cases. The effect is strongest upon institutionalization, degree of organization, and issue orientation respectively. The effect is least upon coherence and involvement--concepts in the two unsupported propositions. Parties in nations experiencing a medium amount of industrialization often deviate from the patterns that might be expected if the relationships between industrialization and the seven party properties were monotonic. Parties in these nations tend to be higher in governmental status, more leftist in issue orientation, more centralized, and more coherent--but showing lower involvement for party militants. One explanation of this puzzling involvement score is that material incentives rather than purposive incentives may figure more prominently in motivating militants' behavior within the single-party states, and our low involvement scores may be reflecting such a shift in incentive structures. This possibility remains to be examined. Otherwise the tendencies presented by parties within the medium category of industrialization seem to conform closely to the "modern" type of party as idealized by Duverger.

Clearly, the level of industrialization in the national setting does have some readily predictable effects on party properties and some other effects that remain to be interpreted theoretically. The question now becomes, is there any variation in party properties remaining within different levels of industrialization after the effects of industrialization have been removed? This question is especially important for the concerns of the Symposium, for if there is not, then the analytical utility of these concepts of party properties cannot be great for studies that are limited to highly industrialized societies. If the variables do not vary much within systems, then there is little opportunity for theories which incorporate these variables to explain much variance in behavior within any highly industrialized society or even between two or more nations at a high level of industrialization. We turn to an examination of the variances around the party tendencies for a resolution of this issue.

Industrialization and Party Variation: Examining Variances

Values for the coefficients of concept variation in Table 4 are graphed in Figure 2. Recall that these values do indeed represent variance around the mean, z-scores, and for our decimal data are thus smaller in magnitude than standard deviations would be if calculated instead. They are also considerably smaller than the full range of scores, so the lack of overlap in variance within certain groupings does not mean that there would be no overlap for the mean z-scores themselves. Nevertheless, the variance is a good measure for our purposes as it differentiates better among instances of little and great dispersion.

Reference Figure 2

The first graph, that for party institutionalization within levels of industrialization, presents a picture of distinctly limited variance in institutionalization within each grouping. It is clear that much of the variation in this concept as measured is accounted for upon grouping the parties into industrialization levels. Some variance is retained within each of the levels, but whether or not the retained variation is sufficient to permit the concept of institutionalization--again, as measured--to be useful analytically is open to question. Any attempt to answer this question by relating institutionalization to other variables within each level of industrialization will be complicated by the amount of random error that exists in the institutionalization scale. The effect of a given amount of measurement error is proportional to the amount of retained variation. (See Blalock, 1970). Therefore, the reliability of the institutionalization scale is certain to be less for the highly industrialized nations than it is for the nations overall, and the effect of the lower reliabilities (as a consequence of random error) will be to attenuate the correlations between institutionalization and any other variables to which it is related. (See Rutherford, 1970.)

If one suspects that there is more variation among the parties within the levels of industrialization than disclosed by our measure and if one has a theory involving party institutionalization within levels, he might try to increase the variance by re-measuring the concept. He might have more success in this regard by following the suggestion of Przeworski and Teune (1970) and devising indicators that are specific to measuring institutionalization in each of the three levels of industrialization. If they then relate to the common indicators that have been used across level, evidence exists for conceptual equivalence both across and within levels of industrialization. (pp. 124-130).

With the exception of institutionalization, however, the problem of greatly reduced variances does not seem to be common to the division of parties into industrialization levels. Considerable variance is found within levels for most of the other concepts. Recalling that the total amount of variance by the z-score procedure is set at 1.0, one finds that the variance for parties within the low category for governmental status and within the middle category for issue orientation actually exceeds the variance for the entire set of parties. But there is a pattern in the graphs that must be pointed out. Parties in the high industrial grouping never display the greatest amount of variation--a distinction which is earned by parties in the low grouping six of the seven times. And for only three of the seven concepts (institutionalization, issue orientation, and centralization of power) do parties in the high category claim the second highest amount of variation. For four of the seven concepts, they display the least amount of variation.




FIGURE 2: Concept Variations for Parties Grouped by Levels of Industrialization

Thus the problem of reduced variation in measuring party properties, while not generally present within the industrialization levels, seems to be of some concern for parties within the high category. The concepts of institutionalization, governmental status, and degree of organization--which demonstrate the least variance for these parties--should be closely watched in this regard. If subsequent research in the analysis of highly industrialized societies employs these concepts and measures and if the observed relationships are not as strong as expected, attention should shift to the adequacy of the measurement before giving up on the theory. If re-measurement is in order, consideration should be given to formulation of system-specific indicators that may increase the amount of variation for parties within the system and thus increase the explanatory potential of the concepts.

NOTES

¹This paper was prepared while I was on leave from Northwestern University for 1970-71 as a Visiting Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia. I am grateful to Dr. William Kintner, Director of FPRI, for supporting me while I devoted full time to my parties research from September to February in Philadelphia and from March to June at the University of Essex in England. I am also indebted to Professor Henry Teune, Acting Chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, and Professor Anthony King, Chairman of the Department of Government at the University of Essex, for welcoming me into their departments as a visitor on leave and allowing me to make extensive use of their computing time and facilities. Jean Blondel, through his many kindnesses, helped to make my stay at Essex particularly enjoyable, and Mary Welfling, who administered my research project at Northwestern so capably in my absence, improved my peace of mind the entire year by insulating me from crises at home.

²The International Comparative Political Parties Project was established in 1967 with support from the National Science Foundation, Grants GS-1418 and GS-2533. The ICPP Project uses a variety of information retrieval techniques to extract data about political parties from the available literature. Discussions of the project's methodology are contained in Janda (1968 and 1969). Its substantive objectives are described in Janda (1970a).

³Mark Seigel and Richard Hula, while graduate students at Northwestern University, advised me on coding the American parties. Val Herman and David Robertson of the University of Essex kindly advised me on coding the British parties. These people did not always agree with my coding decisions, and they should not be held responsible for the results.

⁴The ICPP Project looks at parties at a particular "slice" of time following the Second World War. The time period chosen for study was the thirteen years from 1950 through 1962. With one exception, all of our observations of party properties can be regarded as "cross-sectional" in time. While our basic design is cross-sectional, we do provide for some expression of party change during this period by scoring parties separately for the first and second halves. Given the nature of library materials on which the study was based, it was felt that only a two part division in time could be supported with available information. Wherever possible, we tried to divide our scoring for parties in all countries into 1950-1956 to represent the first "half" of our time period and 1957-1962 to represent the second. But fundamental changes in the political systems of certain countries during our time period argued for different cutting points to produce more homogeneity into the political systems within the two halves. Thus, we have departed from the standard 1950-56 and 1957-62 breakdowns for these countries as follows: France, 1950-57 and 1958-1962; Cuba, 1952-1958 and 1959-1962; El Salvador, 1950-1955 and 1956-1960; Burma, 1950-1957 and 1958-1961; Cambodia, 1950-1955 and 1956-1962; Sudan, 1953-1958 and 1958-1962; Turkey, 1950-1956 and 1957-1960; Ghana, 1951-1956 and 1957-1962; Kenya, 1950-1956 and 1957-1963; and Uganda, 1952-1957 and 1958-1962. With the exception of institutionalization, which was coded according to observations over the entire time period, all of our variables are coded separately for the first and second halves of our time period. The data selected for presentation in this paper, however, come only from the second half--which usually means 1957-62 with exceptions as noted above.

All the statistical analyses reported herein were performed at the University of Essex Computing Centre using the flexible SALY system for social science data analysis on the ICL 1900. James Alt was kind enough to prepare my data for SALY initially and then help me use the system. Lynn and Michael Doscher also answered my questions and solved many of my problems in using SALY. In addition, Lynn Doscher was kind enough to write a special z-score program for use under SALY that served my special needs.

REFERENCES

- BLALOCK, H.M. (1970) "A Causal Approach to Nonrandom Measurement Errors," American Political Science Review, 64 (December), 1099-1111.
- BLONDEL, J. (1969) An Introduction to Comparative Government. New York: Praeger.
- JANDA, K. (1968) Information Retrieval: Applications to Political Science. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- _____ (1969) "A Microfilm and Computer System for Analyzing Comparative Politics Literature," in G. Gerbner et al. (eds.) The Analysis of Communication Content. New York: Wiley. Pp. 407-435.
- _____ (1970a) "A Conceptual Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties," Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, Volume 1, 75-126.
- _____ (1970b) "Data Quality Control and Library Research on Political Parties," in R. Naroll and R. Cohen (eds.) A Handbook of Method in Cultural Anthropology. New York: Museum of Natural History Press.
- _____ (1971a) "A Technique for Assessing the Conceptual Equivalence of Institutional Variables Across and Within Culture Areas." Paper prepared for delivery at the 1971 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Chicago: September 7-11.
- _____ (1971b) "Conceptual Equivalence and Multiple Indicators in the Cross-National Analysis of Political Parties." Paper prepared for the Workshop on Indicators of National Development, sponsored by ISSC/UNESCO/ECPR; Lausanne, Switzerland, August 9-14.
- LIPSET, S.M. and S. ROKKAN (1967) "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds.) Party Systems and Voter Alignments. New York: The Free Press. Pp. 1-64.
- MOORE, W.E. (1963) "Industrialization and Social Change," in B.F. Hoselitz and W.E. Moore (eds.) Industrialization and Society. UNESCO-Mouton. Pp. 299-359.
- PRZEWORSKI A. and H. TEUNE (1970) The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New York: Wiley.
- RUSSETT, B. et al. (1964) World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- RUTHERFORD, B. (1970) "Dilemmas in Construct Validation: An Integration of Measurement Criteria in Political Science." Paper prepared for delivery at the 1970 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago: May 1-2.