Effects of Party Organization on Performance during the ‘Golden Age’ of Parties

KENNETH JANDA AND TYLER COLMAN

Introduction

The study of parties and party systems has always been central to the study of politics, but the study of party organization per se has had its ups and downs. Party organization as a field owes much to the foundations laid by Ostogorski and Michels early in this century. Nevertheless, contemporary scholars hold that the ‘dearth’ of recent empirical studies of party organization has formed ‘lacunae’ in modern party research. Much contemporary research focuses on the party system level, notably on questions of change and stability overtime. Other recent studies examine the sociological bases of party support. Currently, there is renewed interest in the study of party organization – most impressively demonstrated with the publication by Katz and Mair of a ‘data handbook’ on party organization in twelve countries from 1960 to 1990. Indeed, after a long period only occasionally punctuated by the study of party structure, the 1980s and 1990s produced a spate of works that range from models of party organization, to the study of comparative organization in...
advanced industrial democracies, and even to organization in emergent party systems, such as Eastern Europe.  

Mair contends that thinking about party organization ‘remains caught’ within concepts ‘established almost a generation ago’. He mainly meant Duverger’s distinction between ‘old’ cadre parties, based on informal groupings of a few political notables, and ‘modern’ mass parties, that recruit large numbers of formal members. This distinction still figures prominently in a recent, comprehensive text on comparative political parties. According to Mair, the mass party model defines party organizations with reference to their relationships with civil society; party organizational strength is measured primarily with reference to the size of the membership and the capacity of the party to close off (often predefined) sectors of the electorate; and party structures are understood and assessed primarily in terms of modes of internal representation and accountability. If any of these elements are attenuated, it ‘involves also the attenuation, and decline, of party per se’.

In the first two decades after World War II, European politics was shaped by mass membership parties. But from the 1960s to the 1980s, all but two of eleven European countries experienced a decline in party membership as measured by the percent of the electorate. Mair says, ‘the period of the mass party can therefore be seen to coincide with the “golden age” of parties, and since then everything has been downhill’. The shift away from the mass party has led to hypotheses of party ‘decline’ or even party ‘failure’. However, other models of party that de-emphasize relations with civil society have emerged to replace the mass-party model and to underscore the continued importance of vitality of parties in general terms. They have led to a more explicit focus on the study of...
party organization to determine the extent and nature of party change and whether such change can be interpreted as party decline.

As it has become acceptable to study party organization for organization’s sake, recent studies have examined specific aspects of organization, such as changes in the size and role of membership. In this article, we study party organization to assess its effect on party performance. Although some other studies have focused on party organization and party performance, this literature is relatively sparse and its findings often inconclusive. Moreover, virtually all previous research on organizational effects on party performance has been micro-analytical, using data from local electoral districts. This is perhaps the first macro-analytical study that uses national-level data to assess party performance.

The data for this analysis come from the International Comparative Political Parties Project data. The ICPP Project collected data on 158 parties operating in 53 randomly selected countries from 1950 to 1962. Parties were scored on approximately 100 variables – separately for the first half of the period (1950–1956) and the second half (1957–62). We selected a small set of variables from that dataset and studied only the subset of 95 parties operating in 28 ‘democratic’ countries that held free (or mostly free) elections during 1957–62. The counties and the parties are reported in Table 1.

We readily admit that the data are dated, involving parties – and in some cases, even countries – that no longer exist. However troubling this may be, this study is valuable for several reasons. First, because structuring of current party systems and the organization of current parties depends on paths taken in their past, the history of causal relationships among a random sample of the world’s parties during their ‘golden age’ is relevant to understanding party politics today. In the words of Panebianco, ‘a party’s organizational characteristics depend more on its history, i.e. on how the organization originated and how it consolidated, than on any other factor’. Second, we unite two literatures which have grown independently of one another but have much to share. Work on various aspects of party performance such as electoral fortunes and legislative


17 The project was supported by grants GS-1418 and GS-2533 from the US National Science Foundation. The code book for the original raw data file is available as K. Janda, Comparative Political Parties Data, 1950–1962 (Ann Arbor, Michigan, Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1979). The data are distributed by the ICPSR as Study 7534. For methodological discussions, summary statistics, and how specific parties were coded, see K. Janda, Political Parties: a Cross-National Survey (New York, Macmillan and Free, 1980).

18 Panebianco, Political Parties, p. 50.
success has been overly separated from work on party organizational variables such as organization and financing. Finally, this study is important now because it will serve as precursor to a subsequent study with an updated data set.

19 For studies that have integrated aspects of party organization to performance, see G. Evans and S. Whitefield, ‘Economic ideology and political success: communist successor parties in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary compared’, *Party Politics*, 1,3 (1995), 565–78.
This article analyses the effects of party organization on party performance. It is organized along the following lines: first, we present variables that measure three aspects of party performance; second, we introduce the variables on party organization; third, we assess organizational effects on each aspect of performance; fourth, we assess organizational effects on all three aspects taken together; finally, we conclude with a general discussion.

Measuring Party Performance

Unfortunately, the literature on party organization is rarely linked to that on organizational theory, which is based mostly on business firms.20 Barney and Hesterly recently reviewed studies in organizational theory that ask, ‘Why do some organizations out perform others?’21 One approach, called the resource-based view of the firm, builds on two assumptions: ‘(1) that resources and capabilities can vary significantly across firms (the assumption of firm heterogeneity), and (2) that these differences can be stable (the assumption of resource immobility)’.22 Our present study reflects that approach; we assume that parties differ in their organizational features (resources and capabilities) and that these differences, while not immutable, are relatively stable over adjacent elections.

Although firms and parties are both organizations, do they both operate in a marketplace? Schlesinger says yes: elections are a type of political market, in which parties offer their candidates and their policies in exchange for the votes needed to gain office. In this market, parties gain what is surely their key resource, control of public office . . . And, just as the economic market sends clear and unambiguous messages to the business firms concerning the success or failure of its product, the political market evaluates openly, automatically, externally, and with exquisite numerical precision the output of the political party.23

Political and economic markets are not identical; e.g., ‘the political market operates much more discontinuously in accord with the electoral cycle’.24 Competitive parties get their ‘revenue reports’ from periodic elections. Of course, parties use polls to estimate their status in the marketplace, but only votes define how parties fare against their competition in elections.

Most businesses focus on ‘making profit’ as the main criterion of success, and most parties focus on ‘winning elections’. Party research, in the United States and in Europe, typically assesses electoral performance by votes won.25 But


22 Barney and Hesterly, ‘Organizational Economics’, p. 133.


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seats won in parliament and winning control of government are other possible measures of electoral success. Moreover, parties have goals other than winning elections, so different criteria of party performance deserve consideration.26 Among these are the party’s success in shaping governmental policy, its ability to command cohesive behaviour from MPs, and the extent and breadth of the party’s activities in promoting its message and attending to the needs of its members. All these conceptions of performance present their difficulties in measurement. Even more difficult is the party’s success in shaping public policy, which, although crucial, is too complex to conceptualize and study in this essay.27 The other aspects mentioned, however, are feasible to study with the ICPP data. Our research will therefore focus on assessing the party’s electoral success, the breadth of its activities, and its cohesion. Party performance along each dimension will be assessed with our data set. To illustrate how parties were scored, we will cite scores assigned to the major parties in the United States and the United Kingdom for 1957–62.

**Electoral Success**

Electoral success can be measured in several ways – in terms of votes won, seats won, and governments formed. We have data on each indicator, but for this analysis we use only ‘Electoral Strength’, which is the average proportion of votes won in elections to the national legislature or parliament.28 For the 95 parties in 28 ‘democratic’ countries that held free or fairly free elections, the typical competitive party won 27% of the votes in elections held from 1957 to 1962.29 We illustrate our scoring of electoral strength, with reference to parties in the US and UK. The Democrats and and Republicans respectively won 54% and 45% of the votes cast in House elections from 1957 to 1962, while the British Conservative and Labour parties won 49% and 44% of votes in parliamentary elections during the same period.

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27 For a recent cross-national study of how parties affect government policy, see H. Klingemann, R. I. Hoffert, and I. Budge, *Parties, Policies, and Democracy* (Boulder, Westview, 1994).

28 The data also contain indicators of ‘Government Leadership’ and ‘Legislative Strength’. The conceptual discussions, operational definitions, and summary statistics for all variables and all parties in the ICPP dataset are given in K. Janda, *Political Parties*. These three variables are discussed on pp.33–8. Note that 1957–1962 corresponds to the subfile ‘Second’ in the tables published in *Political Parties*.

29 The average party in our study also held one-quarter of the seats annually, and led the government nearly 30% of the time. Parties demonstrated more variation in governmental leadership than in electoral and legislative strength. Of course, votes won is a major cause of legislative seats won. In parliamentary systems (i.e., 21 countries and 71 parties in the study), the number of seats won directly affects the party’s chances for heading the government. If the causal path were truly electoral strength → legislative strength → government leadership, the correlation between electoral strength and government leadership would equal the product of the intervening correlations, or \(0.81 \times 0.81 = 0.66\). This is nearly identical to the observed correlation, 0.64. The causal chain presumably runs: votes → seats → leadership, which is consistent with the observed correlations: \(r = 0.81\) for votes with seats, \(r = 0.81\) for seats with leadership and \(r = 0.64\) for votes with leadership.
Unfortunately, party success cannot be directly measured by electoral strength, which is affected strongly and negatively by the number of parties in the system: the more parties, the harder it is to be ‘successful’ competing for vote shares. Because electoral success is relative to the party system, we adjust for system differences by recomputing the parties’ votes as deviations from the mean values for all parties in that system. For example, the more successful parties – e.g., Democrats in the US and Conservatives in the UK – obtained positive deviations while Republicans and Labour received negative scores. In essence, we are measuring electoral success relative to other parties in the system.

**Breadth of Activities**

Parties engage in activities that have functions for society. Activities are what parties actually do while functions are what scholars see as the social consequences of those activities. Presumably, the more activities in which parties engage, the more multi-functional they are. At a point, activities and functions become blurred, as in the list of about a dozen functions attributed to American parties. The ‘breadth of activities’ concept focuses on what parties actually do rather than on imputed consequences of their actions. It is measured by the sum of party scores on two distinct factor-analytic dimensions: (a) propagandizing ideas and programs and (b) providing for members’ welfare.

The ‘propagandizing’ factor contained four indicators: (1) passing resolutions and platforms; (2) publishing position papers; (3) operating party schools; and (4) operating mass communications media. The ‘welfare’ factor contained five: (1) providing food, clothing, and shelter to members from party resources; (2) running employment services; (3) interceding with government on members’ behalf; (4) providing basic education in addition to political education; and (5) providing recreational facilities or services. Thus the breadth of activities scale is based on nine different indicators.

Due to missing data on the ‘welfare’ indicators, only 50 parties were scored on breadth of activities. The mean for all parties was 0.11. The US parties, which did few of these nine things, scored low on the scale (Democrats –0.47 and Republicans –0.67). The British parties scored somewhat higher (–0.24 for both Conservatives and Labour).

**Cohesion**

In a ‘proper’ party, party members are expected to carry out party policy, especially in voting on issues in the legislature, where a perfectly cohesive party would vote unanimously. Blondel even cites ‘unity’ as one of the four requirements of an ideal party, and Özbudun contends, ‘the more cohesive a party is,}

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31 R. K. Scott and R. J. Hrebenar, *Parties in Crisis* (New York, Wiley, 1979), provide a list of eleven functions, p. 2; Wattenberg, *the Decline of American Parties 1952–1994*, cites twelve, pp. 1–2; and Beck subsumes most of these functions under three party activities (acting as electors, propagandizers, and governors) and the ‘indirect’ consequences of these activities, pp. 14–16.

32 These two dimensions, which were strongly related (r = 0.51), and their indicators are described in Janda, *Political Parties*, pp. 84–89 and 150–151.

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the greater is its role as a policy-making agent.\textsuperscript{33} The concept of Legislative Cohesion was operationalized by computing (or estimating) the Rice Index of Cohesion for samples of party votes on issues before the legislature.\textsuperscript{34} It proved difficult to obtain the data for computing the index of legislative cohesion, and the index often was estimated from impressionistic judgments of the party’s cohesiveness. Even so, we were only able to score 70 parties on their legislative cohesion, so there is considerable random measurement error in this measure of party performance.

The mean level of legislative cohesion for 70 parties was 0.85. The Democrats and Republicans averaged 0.63 and 0.65 respectively on voting in the House of Representatives during this period, while the Conservatives and Labour parties displayed virtually complete cohesion (1.0).

**Measuring Party Organization**

The conceptual framework of the ICPP Project proposed ten major concepts for comparing political parties. We focus on only four dealing specifically with organization: complexity, centralization, involvement, and coherence (re-conceptualized for our purposes as ‘factionalism’).

**Complexity**

This concept taps the complexity of regularized procedures for coordinating the efforts of party supporters in executing the party’s strategy and tactics.\textsuperscript{35} We measured Complexity of Organization with six indicators: Structural Articulation; Intensiveness of Organization; Extensiveness of Organization; Frequency of Local Meetings; Maintaining Records; and Pervasiveness of Organization. Each of these items was measured on a multi-point continuum. Factor analysis of the items for all 158 parties in the original data set showed that a single factor accounted for 52\% of the variance among the six items, which formed a scale with reliability of 0.82.\textsuperscript{36} The mean level of complexity for our parties was \(0.09\). The Democrats at 0.14 and the Republicans at 0.01 were slightly above average on complexity of organization, but they were substantially below the more highly organized British parties (Conservatives scored 0.51 and Labour 0.42).

**Centralization**

The location and distribution of effective decision making authority within the party are the components of ‘Centralization of Power’.\textsuperscript{37} A centralized party is one that concentrates effective decision-making authority in the national party


\textsuperscript{34} The Rice Index of Cohesion and the process of coding parties on legislative cohesion are described in Janda, *Political Parties*, pp. 118–19.


\textsuperscript{36} Janda, *Political Parties*, p. 152. All reliability coefficients reported are Cronbach’s alpha. All scales were formed after the items were standardization into z-scores and summed.

organs. We tapped the locus of power within a party with eight indicators: Nationalization of Structure; Selecting the National Leader; Selecting Parliamentary Candidates; Allocating Funds; Formulating Policy; Controlling Communications; Administering Discipline; and Leadership Concentration. These items were also scored on a multi-point continuum, factor analysed, and combined into a composite scale with reliability of 0.83.\(^{38}\) The mean centralization score was \(-0.14\). The Democrats and Republicans were among the least centralized parties in the world, scoring \(-1.48\) and \(-1.41\) respectively – far below the British parties (Conservatives scored 0.41 and Labour 0.21).\(^{39}\)

**Involvement**

‘Involvement’ assesses the extent to which party activists or militants are psychologically committed to the party and work to further the party’s objectives.\(^{40}\) This concept was indicated with five items – Membership Requirements; Membership Participation; Material Incentives; Purposive Incentives; and Doctrinism. These items were also factor analysed and subjected to the same procedures for scale construction, resulting in an Involvement scale with a reliability of 0.78.\(^{41}\) The mean was \(-0.04\) for all parties. As expected, activists in both the Democratic and Republican parties had low levels of involvement in furthering party objectives, each rating only \(-0.77\). Participation in the Conservative and Labour parties, featured higher levels of involvement (\(-0.20\) and 0.20), with greater involvement shown within the Labour party.

**Factionalism**

The ‘Factionalism’ concept captures four sources of intraparty disputes: Ideology, Issues, Leadership, and Strategies or Tactics. Each type of factionalism was scored on a 7-point continuum ranging from 0 (the basis of division was not subject to debate or disagreement among party leaders) to 6 (the matter created a ‘large’ faction within the party with some formal organization of its own or provoked a split after the beginning of the period). Factionalism of one type tends to spill over into another type, and these four items formed a scale with reliability of 0.71.\(^{42}\) In the US, suffice it to say that the Democrats were scored higher for ideological and issue factionalism, while Republicans were more factionalized on leadership and strategy. In the UK, the Labour Party was rated as more factionalized than the Conservative Party on every indicator.

Factionalism is certainly an aspect of party organization, but it differs from the other concepts – complexity, centralization, and involvement. Given a particular political environment and their unique goals, parties presumably determine their appropriate levels of complexity, centralization, and involvement. They do not ordinarily settle upon an ‘appropriate’ amount of factionalism, which occurs in spite of organizational intentions rather than because of


\(^{39}\) Note that complexity and centralization are quite different concepts, and the two scales are virtually unrelated \((r = -0.10)\) for our set of parties.

\(^{40}\) Janda, *Political Parties*, pp. 126–32.


\(^{42}\) See Janda, *Political Parties*, pp. 109–23, for a discussion of these indicators. Note that this four-item factionalism scale differs from the five-item coherence scale discussed on page 154.

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them. Because factionalism is not a matter of choice, the variable will be employed only when it helps explain performance.

Organizational Effects on Each Aspect of Performance

In theorizing about the relationship of party organization and performance, we must be clear on our assumption of causality. For example, do we assume that high complexity, low centralization, and low involvement cause electoral success? Or, do successful parties develop more complex organizations, become more decentralized through expansion, and sacrifice the psychological involvement of their members? Clearly, there is feedback in the relationship, but like most scholars we assume that organization causes performance, not the other way around. Inquiring further into the direction of causality is the task for another study with a different design. Recall also that we are dealing with party organization and performance at national, not sub-national, units. Up to now, there has been no firm evidence that organizational traits and party performance are significantly related at the national level.

Assessing Effects on Electoral Success

Any theoretically complete explanation of party success in winning votes must involve such critical factors as the parties’ positions on issues, the voters’ attitudes toward party policies, the state of the economy, and the parties’ traditional bases of social support. Our analysis includes none of these factors, so our explanatory model will certainly be incomplete. Seeking the causally correct model of political phenomena is, like pursuing the Holy Grail, inherently elusive. Causal models improve by a process of correcting theoretical errors and omissions through continuing research. Our goal is not to provide a complete explanation of electoral success but to determine whether organizational factors alone have significant effects – and whether their apparent empirical effects make theoretical sense. Later, however, we will include institutional factors to tease out additional effects of organization.

The theory that guides our inquiry comes from several sources. The effect of complexity on electoral success is treated in the empirical research literature cited above. Studies of party organizational activity to mobilize voters were concerned closely with what we have called ‘organizational complexity’. This yields our first proposition:

H1: The greater the complexity, the greater the electoral success.

There is no scholarly consensus about the effect of the next concept, centralization of power, on electoral success. Some major non-quantitative studies theorize that centralized parties are also more successful in mobilizing voters. Certainly this figured in Duverger’s explanation of the superiority of ‘modern’ mass-membership organizations, adopted by leftist parties, over the loose

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43 As Pomper says, ‘organization must be regarded as the independent variable and electoral success as the dependent variable’, in ‘Party Organization and Electoral Success’, p. 190.

caucus-type organizations of older, more conservative parties.\textsuperscript{45} In contrast, Epstein argued that modern technology favored rightist parties that could afford to campaign via television. The counter-organizational tendencies he saw in the ‘new’ modern party rejected only the \textit{complexity} or mass-membership aspect of leftist organization, not centralization of power. Indeed, Epstein believed that the small membership and less complex parties ‘made it easier to impose a central and an efficient direction of campaigns by professionals’.\textsuperscript{46}

On the other hand, some scholars have stressed campaign advantages from the \textit{decentralization} of power, which enables parties to capitalize on local environmental conditions.\textsuperscript{47} This argument appeared in Agranoff’s early analysis of the ‘new style’ in election campaigns and is echoed in some modern explanations of the ‘decline of parties’.\textsuperscript{48} Reflecting this more recent argument, our second proposition is:

\textbf{H2: The less the centralization, the greater the electoral success.}

Conventional parties’ wisdom says that ‘pragmatic’ parties are more successful in elections than ‘doctrinaire’ parties, which are reluctant to bend principles to win votes.\textsuperscript{49} In 1964, many Republicans worried that nominating the right-wing candidate, Barry Goldwater, would cost the presidential election. In 1972, many Democrats opposed nominating the left-wing favorite, George McGovern, for the same reason. For both groups, the folklore was vindicated. Kirchheimer saw a tendency to abandon doctrinaire involvement in favor of electoral rewards in the ‘catch-all’ party, which collected votes from socially diverse groups by adopting policies to fit their interests.\textsuperscript{50} In our terminology, the relevant proposition becomes:

\textbf{H3: The less the involvement, the greater the electoral success.}

The data in Table 2 support the argument that variations in party organization do indeed affect electoral success. About 20\% of the variance (\textit{R square}) in relative electoral strength can be attributed simply to differences in complexity, centralization, and involvement – without taking into account the state of the economy, political personalities, or other important electoral factors. If we assume that these organizational variables pertain mainly to ‘the party on ground’ that helps mobilize the electorate, we would expect such results.\textsuperscript{51} However, the organizational effects are not entirely as hypothesized. While

\textsuperscript{45} Duverger, \textit{Political Parties}, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{49} But for a different argument, see A. A. Etzioni, \textit{A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations} (New York, Free, 1975), pp. 8–9.
complexity increases electoral success and involvement decreases it as predicted, contrary to expectation centralization also increases success. This finding supports Duverger-style arguments for party centralization over later arguments for decentralization in campaigning. But it may only hold for the 1957–62 period, which predates the impact of television on elections in most of the nations covered. In sum, the manner in which parties are organized does relate to party performance at the polls. Involvement of party members in the broader purposes of the party has a significant negative effect on electoral success, meaning that pragmatic parties do indeed win more votes. Well-organized (i.e., more complex and more centralized) parties also do better in elections. The beta coefficients in the regression analysis demonstrate that, when the other two factors were controlled, each organizational variable had a stronger effect on electoral strength than suggested by their simple correlations.

These findings shed no light on questions about alternative forms of party performance. For example, do parties with greater involvement of their members do better on other aspects of performance? Do they spend their members’ energies in activities beyond electioneering? We turn to the concept of ‘Breadth of Activities’ for a partial answer.

**Assessing Effects on Breadth of Activities**

To construct a ‘complete’ explanation of party efforts in propagandizing their ideas and programs and providing for members’ welfare, one might cite the type and intensity of the party ideology, the economic condition of the party’s supporters, the nature of the competition the party faced from other parties, and the social welfare role assumed by the government itself. In attempting to explain parties’ reliance on propaganda and welfare activities using only organizational characteristics, we again rely on only a few factors theoretically important. As before, we seek only to determine what proportion of the variance in breadth of party activities can be attributed to organizational characteristics in theoretically sensible ways.

The basic theory underlying this analysis was expressed in different terms by several scholars during or soon after the ‘golden age’ of parties. Duverger wrote of variations in the ‘nature’ of participation within parties, some of which were

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<th>Variables</th>
<th>Elec. St.</th>
<th>Complexity</th>
<th>Centralization</th>
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N of parties = 92.
Adjusted $R^2 = 0.20$.
*Two-tailed significance test.

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<th>Table 2. Effects of Organization on Electoral Success</th>
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<td><strong>Intercorrelation matrix</strong></td>
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<td>Variables</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elect. Strength</td>
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<td>Complexity</td>
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<td>Involvement</td>
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<td>(Constant)</td>
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‘communities’ or even ‘orders’ instead of mere ‘associations’. Neumann distinguished between the parties of ‘individual representation’ and those of ‘social integration’, which take over a good part of their members’ social existence. Blondel contrasted ‘representative’ and ‘mobilizing’ parties. All these authors separated parties which were exclusively vehicles for electing candidates to government office from those which did not confine their activities to election campaigns but conducted continuous campaigns of political education and attended to the social needs of their supporters. The general argument was that the broader the scope of party activities, the greater the need for ‘strong’ party organization and the more involved members are in party life. Limitations on organizational complexity, centralization, and involvement constituted limits to party activities. Translated into concepts in the ICPP Project, the proposition to be tested is

**H4:** The greater the complexity, centralization, and involvement, the broader the scope of party activities.

The data in Table 3 generally support the proposition. Complexity, centralization, and involvement all display simple correlations with breadth of activities from 0.42 to 0.58. Moreover, the multiple regression analysis explains 44% of the variance, with all of the Betas in the predicted direction (0.41, 0.31, and 0.15, respectively). However, only complexity and centralization have significant effects at the customary 0.05 level.

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<th>TABLE 3. Effects of Organization on Breadth of Activities</th>
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<td>Variables</td>
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<td>Breadth of Activities</td>
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<td>(Constant)</td>
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N of Parties = 50.
Adjusted R² = 0.44.
*Two-tailed significance test.

**Assessing Effects on Legislative Cohesion**

Ozbudun carefully studied the factors in party organization thought to be important for explaining the voting cohesion of parties in parliament. He cites ‘strong party organization’ (our ‘complexity’), ‘central control’ of discipline and nominations (our centralization), and the party’s ‘social integrationist
character’ (our ‘involvement’). Other studies of voting behaviour in the US Congress and in other countries have also cited high factionalism. These considerations lead to the hypothesis:

H5: Legislative cohesion is increased by complexity, centralization, and involvement – but decreased by factionalism.

To test H5, legislative cohesion was regressed on all four organizational characteristics. The results (not shown here) are unsatisfying. For all 70 parties scored on this variable, the adjusted $R^2$-square is only 0.19, and complexity and factionalism are the only significant variables. This is the time when other conditions need to be included in the model for the organizational variables to produce substantial effects.

There are several possible system-level causes of cohesion in parliamentary voting. Kornberg’s comparison of party cohesion in the US and Canada also attributes fundamental importance to the legislative structure, confirming Özbudun’s contention that parliamentary systems elicit more cohesive behavior than presidential systems. Accordingly, the parliamentary status of the party system will be included as an institutional variable, supplementing our organizational factors. Moreover, trying to explain legislative cohesion makes sense only in countries that have effective legislatures, and 7 of our 28 countries did not have effective legislatures during the period of the data. The revised model holds that party cohesion in effective legislatures is a positive function of one environmental variable, parliamentarism, and three organizational variables: complexity, centralization, and involvement. Only factionalism is expected to predict negatively to cohesion:

H6: Legislative cohesion in effective legislatures is increased by parliamentarism, complexity, centralization, and involvement – but decreased by factionalism.

The data reported in Table 4 demonstrate the effects of organizational characteristics after features of the parliamentary system are taken into account. Eliminating systems lacking an effective legislature reduces the sample size from 70 to only 53 parties. However, the adjusted $R^2$-square is 0.39 and all of the variables are significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed test. As hypothesized, party cohesion in legislative voting is positively related to parliamentary government, organizational complexity, and centralization – and negatively

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<td>Centraliz.</td>
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<td>0.40</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
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<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
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<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>0.002</td>
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<td>Parliament**</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.28</td>
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<td>0.028</td>
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<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.08</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

N of parties = 53; Adj. R-square = 0.39.

*Two-tailed significance test; given a one-tailed test, involvement is significant <0.05.

**Scored 1 if the parties operated in a parliamentary system; scored 0 otherwise.
related to factionalism. But, contrary to theory, cohesion is negatively related to ‘involvement’.

Involvement has an insignificant, but positive, simple correlation with cohesion (0.08). Yet its effect is significant and negative once the other conditions are taken into account. Controlling for the parliamentary system, complexity, centralization, and factionalism, the analysis shows that high citizen involvement in the party actually decreases cohesion. Ex post facto explanations are suspect, of course, but parties with high levels of member involvement in party purposes may be more apt to have legislators who deviate from the majority on matters of principle in voting. In contrast, going along with the majority may be easy for legislators when there is little involvement by party activists.

Organizational Effects on Overall Party Performance

Up to now, we have been concerned with explaining variations in three different aspects of party performance. Can we provide a more comprehensive explanation which simultaneously involves all three? If so, it would approximate scholars’ efforts to ‘type’ parties according to similar organizational and behavioural traits. Wright, for example, distinguishes between the ‘rational-efficient’ and ‘party democracy’ models of behaviour according to their functions, structural characteristics, party processes, and evaluative criteria. For Wright, rational efficient parties focus on their electoral function, engage in limited activities, are motivated by material incentives, employ organization suited to situational requirements, lack formal membership, neglect the policy role of the party, and evaluate effectiveness solely by electoral success. In contrast, those fitting his party democracy mold pursue ideological and governing functions, engage in activities beyond campaigning, stress purposive incentives, feature extensive and integrated structures, require formal party membership, emphasize policy making, and judge their effectiveness in terms of policy results. If we can somehow relate variations in all four organizational variables (complexity, centralization, involvement, and factionalism) simultaneously to all three aspects of performance (electoral success, breadth of activities, and legislative cohesion), we can give empirical content to such trait configurations, which we will call ‘party syndromes’.

Canonical analysis provides a method for relating two such sets of variables on each side of an equation. It weights the variables on each side to produce two sets of composite scores and then calculates one or more canonical correlations, which are equivalent to product-moment correlations between the sets of weighted variables. The number of canonical correlations computed is equal to the number of variables in the smaller set. $R_{can1}$ can be interpreted as the maximum correlation that can be obtained through the best linear combinations of both sets of variables. $R_{can2}$ is the next best linear combination of the variables, under the constraint that this pair of composite scores is uncorrelated to each other.

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with the first pair – and so on. Whether the first or any of the subsequent correlations are significant, of course, depends on the relationships within the data. In essence, the number of significant canonical regressions indicates the number of clusters of relationships in the set of elements analysed. Since we have posited two sets, more or less equivalent to the ‘rational-efficient’ versus ‘party democracy’ distinction, we expect two groupings from the canonical analysis.

Our canonical analysis of organizational characteristics and party performance is guided by the theory discussed above. To simplify the interpretation of the results, we dropped the two environmental variables, a parliamentary system and an effective legislature. The need for complete data for all variables on all cases reduced the number of parties to 44. Most of the findings discussed above reappear in the canonical results in Table 5. Of the three canonical correlations produced from the analysis, only the first two, $R^2_{\text{can}1} = 0.61$ and $R^2_{\text{can}2} = 0.32$, were significant at the 0.05 level.

Canonical correlations are essentially product-moment correlations between sets of weighted scores. So the squared canonicals in Table 5 express the variance in one set of variables explained by the other. Each correlation represents a different, unrelated solution to the relationship among the observations. The analyst’s task is to interpret these solutions by referring mainly to two sets of values on the computer output. One set is the standardized canonical variate coefficients, which are akin to the beta-coefficients in an ordinary regression equation. These coefficients can be compared for the relative effect of each variable in one set to the composite score constructed from the other set of variables.

The other and perhaps more useful indicators are the simple correlations between the canonical scores and their composite variables. These correlations are called canonical ‘loadings’ – like variable loadings in factor analysis. Based on the variables’ standardized variate coefficients and their loadings on both canonical scores, we interpret the two canonical correlations reported in Table 5 as reflecting different syndromes of party performance. They correspond to Wright’s ‘party-democracy’ and ‘rational-efficient’ party models, but we prefer to label them the ‘doctrinaire’ and the ‘mobilizing’ party syndromes. Whereas ‘model’ implies categorization, ‘syndrome’ suggests a measurable pattern of traits that are common to all parties but are exaggerated by some.

**Doctrinaire Parties**

The first canonical solution is called the ‘doctrinaire’ party syndrome due to the configuration of canonical variate coefficients on the performance side in Table 5: high values for legislative cohesion and breadth of activities and a negative value for electoral strength. The simple correlations on the far right show that cohesion and breadth of activities correlated 0.81 and 0.76 with the composite score, while electoral strength barely had any correlation (0.12). The canonical correlation squared reveals that 61% of the variance in the

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60 For a lucid discussion of canonical analysis, see M. S. Levine, *Canonical Analysis and Factor Comparison* (Beverly Hills, Sage University Paper series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 07-001, 1977).

61 This analysis was conducted using the ‘cancorr macro’ for SPSS 6.1. See M.J. Norusis, *SPSS Advanced Statistics 6.1* (Chicago, SPSS, 1995), Appendix A. The terminology comes from that source.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlations with Composite Scores&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Organizational Variables</th>
<th>Canonical Variate Coefficients&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Canonical Variate Coefficients</th>
<th>Three Aspects of Party Performance</th>
<th>Correlations with Composite Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Canonical Analysis:</strong> the <em>Doctrinaire</em> party syndrome</td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>Second Canonical Analysis:</strong> the <em>Mobilizing</em> party syndrome</td>
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<td>-0.18</td>
<td>Factionalism</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>This canonical analysis is based on 44 parties that had valid data on all seven measures.

<sup>b</sup>The simple product-moment correlations between the variable and the composite scores computed in the canonical analysis.

<sup>!</sup>The standardized coefficient of the variable used in computing the canonical variate that generated the composite scores.

<sup>→</sup>indicates high loadings that define the two unrelated party syndromes.
performance composite can be linked to the composite score of the organizational variables, for which centralization and involvement are the most important. In fact, centralization by itself correlates 0.88 with the organizational composite. Of little importance in the analysis is complexity, a condition that figured in most of the regression analyses above.

Although involvement has a negative effect on cohesion alone (Table 5), it makes a positive contribute to the doctrinaire party syndrome (0.70), which is somewhat puzzling. The effect of involvement on party performance appears to vary considerably, depending on the control of other variables and the mix of performance indicators. It deserves closer scrutiny at a later time. A succinct verbal summary of the first canonical analysis might be that highly centralized parties with highly involved activists, moderate complexity, and little factionalism tend to be very cohesive, engage in many activities, but are not particularly successful.

This analysis is illustrated in Figure 1, which identifies and plots the composite organization and performance scores from the first canonical analysis for 44 parties. Note that the most doctrinaire parties, located in the upper right corner of the figure, according to their performance in 1957–62, were the West German SPD, the French and Indian Communists, and Peru’s APRA. At the other extreme, the least doctrinaire – in the sense of pursuing electoral success at the cost of legislative cohesion marked by very low centralization and considerable factionalism – were both US parties and the Dutch CHU.

**Mobilizing Parties**

The second canonical correlation (Table 5) corresponds to the ‘mobilizing’ party syndrome – so named for the dominant influence of electoral strength, which by itself correlates 0.79 with the composite score, followed by breadth of activities at 0.53. The mobilizing syndrome reflects a second attempt to maximize the correlation between the two sets of variables, under the constraint that the second solution be uncorrelated with the first. The squared canonical correlation for the mobilizing syndrome explains only 32% of the trait variation – much less than that for the doctrinaire syndrome. Nevertheless, its theoretical linkage is clear. Mobilizing performance is related mainly to high complexity (0.04) and very low involvement (−0.02). Centralization and factionalism have virtually no effect. A brief summary of these results might be that very successful parties that engage in a moderate range of activities – but have little legislative cohesion – tend to be distinguished by high organizational complexity and little else in the way of party organization.

The plot for all 44 parties in Figure 2 illustrates the second analysis of party performance in 1957–62. The highest performers on the mobilizing syndrome were the Uruguayan Blancos, the German Christian Democrats, and the Swedish Social Democrats. The lowest performers were the Mayalan MIC and the Australian Country party. The Democrats placed in the upper group, while the Republicans placed in the center followed by the British Conservatives and British Labour.

**Summary and Conclusion**

We believe that our cross-national study offers two main contributions to the parties literature. First, we demonstrate that party organization features do
correlate significantly with indicators of performance, even in a macro analysis at the national level. Most of our six hypotheses were supported in their broad outlines. Concerning the concept of ‘party performance’, we argue for looking at more than electoral success, and our empirical findings substantiate the case for measuring different aspects of performance. In fact, electoral success was less well explained by organizational conditions than were legislative cohesion and breadth of activities, two other aspects of performance. While this may strike some observers as disappointing, the predominant finding in the scarce literature on sub-national electoral districts is that organization variables

62 Except that centralization significantly increased, rather than decreased, electoral performance.

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provide only weak explanations of electoral success.\textsuperscript{63} Recall also that we omitted all variables usually thought to explain why parties win votes, e.g., the state of the economy, civil unrest, political scandals, politicians’ popularity, and so on. In retrospect, our findings that complexity, centralization, and involvement are better explanations of a party’s legislative cohesion and breadth of activities than its electoral success, seem intuitively reasonable.

Second, our use of canonical analysis introduces an empirical method for identifying party syndromes, clusters of interrelated organizational and behavioural traits. Scholars often loosely characterize parties as packages of

\textsuperscript{63} Pomper, ‘Party Organization and Electoral Success’, reviews studies that fail to demonstrate much relationship between measures of organization and measures of electoral success, pp. 190–1.
attributes. Duverger excelled in this, and more recently Epstein described ‘responsible parties’ as ‘organized, centralized, and cohesive’ – using precisely our language.\(^6^4\) We demonstrate that parties we call ‘doctrinaire’ experienced high degrees of centralization and involvement with low levels of complexity and factionalism in their organizations and fared poorly at the polls while maintaining strong cohesion in the legislature and engaging in many activities. On the other hand, parties that we call ‘mobilizing’ tend to do well in elections while engaging in several non-campaign activities although showing little legislative cohesion. Organizationally, mobilizing parties tend to be highly complex but not very centralized, and they have little factionalism and low levels of membership involvement.

These findings on party organization and performance reflect arguments in Duverger’s *Political Parties*. This is with good reason since the data come from the ‘Golden Age’ of political parties – the time of his writing. But what Duverger theorized, we can support empirically.\(^6^5\) Whether or not such findings would hold today is questionable. Presumably if parties have moved more toward ‘electoral professional’ or ‘cartel party’ models, the more society-oriented variables of involvement and breadth of activities would diminish in significance while complexity and electoral success might increase. As this study has supported Duverger’s thinking for his time period, we hope to test contemporary theories of party with more current data in a future cross-national study.

\(^6^4\) Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, p. 7.

\(^6^5\) See also K. Janda and D. King, ‘Formalizing and testing Duverger’s theories on political parties’, *Comparative Political Studies*, 18,2 (1985), pp. 139–69.