Toward Terminating the Terminological Turmoil
The Proper Nouns Solution

by Mitchell S. G. Klein, and Kenneth Janda
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NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Philosophers of science are quite correct in alerting us to the necessity for clear conceptualization in the scientific enterprise. To be sure, philosophers of science are themselves guilty of utilizing their key terms to refer to a whole host of competing concepts. Philosophy of science terms such as "theory," "paradigm," "model," and "concept" have been used in many distinct ways depending upon the particular scholar's formulation. But there is a deep need for political scientists to pay heed to the preachings rather than the breachings of the lessons in terminological and conceptual clarity. The political science discipline is in a terminological and conceptual mess. Giovanni Sartori (1970) has pointed to the dual dilemmas of an empirical and a theoretical problem spawned by this shortage of conceptual clarity in political science. In order that the discipline can make further advances in theory-building, we require both the filing system provided by discriminatory conceptual boxes and a disciplined utilization of terms and procedures for comparison. In political science as currently practiced, the concepts referred to by terms appearing in journal articles are often vague rather than well defined. The same term is frequently employed, moreover, to refer to countless different concepts. For example, there is an enormous array of concepts embraced by the single term "political party." In any given case it can prove to be exceedingly difficult to determine the intended concept. Of late the problem has been exacerbated by an influx of new concepts which are attached to the already existing, already over-burdened terms. Under these conditions it has been exceedingly difficult for political scientists to engage in effective communication or cumulative research.
SOME CAUSES

The terminological and conceptual troubles in the discipline have not gone unnoticed. The severity of the problem and the need for implementing remedial action have been highlighted by the activities of the International Political Science Association's Committee on Conceptual and Terminological Analysis (COCTA). This group (COCTA, 1974: 164) was formed in order "to confront the terminological confusion and conceptual morass of the core social sciences, notably political science and sociology." The COCTA chairman, Giovanni Sartori (1974: 202-4), has directed our attention toward a number of factors contributing to the terminological and conceptual confusion:

(1) Loss of etymological anchorage--Scholars have traditionally possessed an extensive knowledge of Latin and Greek. The roots from these languages were used in the creation of new terms. Today, the lack of knowledge of these languages among contemporary social scientists makes the creation of new terms far more difficult.

(2) Loss of historical anchorage--The behavioral movement has made us less mindful of the historical development of the meanings assigned to terms. These meanings have grown out of a "survival-of-the-fittest" process. Yet, the meanings used today are frequently arbitrary stipulations rather than "existential reminders" that have developed in the course of history.

(3) Loss of the mainstream of discourse--The enormous division of labor in the social sciences has produced considerable specialization in language. Across the various disciplines, even so, key terms such as "leadership," "elite," and "law" are in use. Although such terms are conceptualized quite distinctively across disciplines, reported research
is often treated as if only a single concept of the relevant term (e.g., 
"leadership") is in existence. The disparate use of these words across 
disciplines adds to our conceptual and terminological difficulties.

(4) Novitism—The transmission of knowledge was until recently 
the primary job of the scholar. The central goal now in vogue is 
originality. Too often, the difficult nature of achieving "true 
originality" is resolved by not truly being original. By slightly 
altering the meaning of terms—and thereby the nature of the ultimate 
empirical results—the academic is able to produce seemingly "original" 
research. A by-product of this desire to demonstrate originality is 
terminological turmoil through the scientifically pointless prolifera-
tion of meanings for political science terms.

EFFECT UPON SCIENTIFIC GROWTH

Conceptual and terminological turmoil work hand-in-hand with 
scientific stagnation. Parties research, for example, is plagued by 
an overabundance of conceptualizations for the term "political party." 
The definitional content of a concept is quite important. Its 
significance is felt both on the theoretical and empirical levels. 
Concepts, of course, are never either "right" or "wrong." Useful 
concepts are precise, theoretically fruitful, and contain homogeneous 
units within the conceptual boxes they create. Fred Riggs (1973) has 
provided a very engaging conceptual treatment of critical differences in 
the nature of definitions for the term "party." He distinguishes among 
the concepts of party in terms of the nature of the actor, types of 
action, and functions or consequences.

In common sense language, all of us believe we know what a 
political party is or is not. Yet when we attempt to construct a 
systematic definition for use in a theory of parties, it becomes
apparent that we are not talking about the same thing, after all. The current tendency among researchers is to redefine terms anew. Unfortunately, when multiple conceptions of "political parties" are in use, research is relatively noncumulative. Among the definitions for "political party" treated in the Riggs' piece are the following four:

(1) William J. Crotty (1970: 294)--"A formally organized group that performs the functions of educating the public...that recruits and promotes individuals for public office, and that provides a comprehensive linkage function between the public and governmental decision-makers. It is distinguished from other groups by its dedication to influencing policy making on a broad scale, preferably by controlling government and by its acceptance of institutionalized rules of electoral conduct--more specifically, capturing public office through peaceful means."

(2) Kenneth Janda (1970: 83)--"Organizations that pursue the goal of placing their avowed representatives in government positions."

(3) Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan (1950: 169)--"A group formulating comprehensive issues and submitting candidates in elections."

(4) Fred W. Riggs (1970: 580)--"Any organization which nominates candidates for election to an elected assembly."

There is considerable diversity to the content of these definitions. For each definition, the rules for inclusion of a case as a "political party" are different. Each definition seeks to exclude, for purposes of theory-building, those entities which are not to be considered as genuine political parties. From among the four definitions cited above, Crotty's seems most demanding. In order to be considered a political
party, the entity must: (1) be a formally organized group, (2) educate the public, (3) recruit people for government, (4) promote people for government, (5) link the public with government, (6) be dedicated to broadly influencing government, (7) attempt to control government, (8) accept peaceful elections, and (9) participate in peaceful elections. Turning to Janda's conceptualization, most notable is that the standard of competition in elections is not imposed. To be included as a "political party," for Janda the entity must: (1) be an organization, (2) attempt to place their representatives in government. Lasswell and Kaplan are more restrictive than Janda. To them, the entity must (1) be a group, (2) formulate comprehensive issues, (3) submit candidates in elections. Finally, Riggs demands that the entity (1) be an organization, (2) nominate candidates for legislative elections.

This listing of parties definitions is far from complete. We shudder at the thought of how long an exhaustive accounting of definitions for "political party" would be. Political scientists could indefinitely continue to add ever more notions of political parties. In this way, parties researchers would continue to "do their own thing." Yet, if such a course of action is pursued, this subfield may never get around to producing cumulative development. The very last thing that parties research requires is the continued proliferation of conceptions for the term "political party." Any solution to terminological turmoil must address itself in part to the standards of concept introduction. To do less would fall short of rejuvenating the prospects for scientific growth in parties research and in the political science discipline more generally.

To be sure, the impact of terminological and conceptual disarray upon cumulative development in a discipline is the subject of contro-
versy. Convinced as we are that terminological turmoil is severely restraining scientific growth in the study of politics, the verdict nevertheless is far from unanimous. Referring to the terminological crisis thesis as "the semantic myth," Abraham Kaplan (1964) asserts that the focus upon linguistic difficulties in the sciences is quite misplaced. Kaplan (1964: 71) observes:

for the most part the behavioral scientist, like everyone else, manages his semantics very well without extreme and self-conscious exertions. The human mind—even the mind of a behavioral scientist—is quite remarkable for its capacity to understand and to make itself understood.

According to Kaplan, semantic "problems" are often nothing more than contrived arguments by scholars. Kaplan (1964: 72) asserts: "Like Alice, we are often in that state of mind in which we want to disagree with something, even if we don't know what."

Such a sweeping disavowal of the conceptual and terminological difficulties in social science is not tenable. As we have seen, scholars in parties research do not agree on a notion of political parties. They are not talking about the same thing. When Lasswell and Kaplan analyze political parties they are not treating the same entities as Crotty, Janda, Riggs, etc. The same can be said about the literature dealing with other subject areas. In a conceptual analysis of notions attached to the term "leadership" in the sociology and social psychology literature, Janda (1960: 347) concludes that "it is not unfair to say that these disciplines have distinguished themselves more by accumulating studies on leadership than by cumulating knowledge on leadership." A key difficulty noted by Janda is the lack of comparability within the leadership literature. Because these studies
operate under quite divergent conceptions of "leadership," they are not focusing upon common phenomena. Similarly, Zuckerman (mimeo: 2) shows that a key difficulty with the literature on the "political elite" concept "is that the varied definitions of the concept have played havoc with the analysis of research problems." Differential findings by researchers of political elites can usually be explained by "the use of incommensurate definitions." All of this brings Zuckerman to believe that the concept of the political elite has moved "from Mosca and Pareto to muck and mire."

Communication among scientists is itself far more problematic than the Kaplan thesis would suggest. A reading of Thomas S. Kuhn's (1962) _The Structure of Scientific Revolutions_ makes clear how very severe communication problems can become. Kuhn finds that scientists, quite unintentionally, often talk through each other. This occurs in a most dramatic fashion when the scientists are working under different conceptions of their field. From our own standpoint, Kuhn's arguments on this matter seem nearly as exaggerated as is Kaplan's thesis an understatement of the situation. We believe that through the conscientious exercise of "discipline" by scientists, linguistic remedies to communication difficulties can surely be applied successfully. Currently, however, there are some very real communication problems within political science. Terminological turmoil is the principal culprit.

Crystal clear conceptualization is a requisite for scientific development. At the very heart of cumulative growth in a discipline is the capability of its members to communicate with one another. The relationship of new research to previous scholarship is never clear when conceptualization is fuzzy. When a term has a wide
assortment of meanings, the cumulative development synonymous with the practice of science is impossible. Political scientists need some practical method for overcoming this "multiple meanings problem" by providing independent recognition to the array of concepts now embodied in single terms. It is necessary for example to disentangle the term "political party" such that its various conceptualizations can be distinguished, referred to, and either built upon or rejected. Clarity in conceptual and terminological usage is very much a building block in the advancement of a scientific discipline.

A DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIES

We have argued that the rather severe terminological difficulties in political science have had a serious restraining effect upon growth in the discipline. Political scientists will be unable to travel very far on the road to theory without clarity in concepts and terms. Several alternative courses of action aimed at counter-acting these problems are available. But it is important to remember that no solution can be unilaterally dictated to a community of scholars. In view of this, certain sorts of strategies seem more viable than others. It is essential that the program set in motion not be complex, unwieldy, presumptuous, or unpopular. In the end, it will be the political science community at large that determines the relative success of the initiatives taken.

At a high level of abstraction, there are two fundamental strategies available to alleviate the terminological troubles of the discipline. The first would be directed towards reducing the pool of concepts in political science. Antinovitism is the most notable example of such an approach. The second strategy would aim at increasing the pool of terms. This approach would vanquish terminologi-
cal turmoil by pairing each existing concept with a new and unique identifying label. The joint implementation of these two strategies is also quite possible. This has been the approach of IPSA's COCTA. Through some combination of reducing the number of concepts and increasing the quantity of terms, the desired goal of possessing one unique term for each concept is ultimately reached.

'REDUCING THE POOL OF CONCEPTS

One example of the first strategy—reducing the total pool of concepts—is exemplified by the antinovitism approach. As used here, novitism refers to the scientifically pointless proliferation of new definitions for existing terms. Antinovitism would diminish the influx of new concepts in the discipline. The pool of concepts in political science would actually decrease if antinovitism became the new norm, since a portion of current concepts fall into disuse with the passage of time. It is somewhat controversial to argue for a new professional norm embracing antinovitism. Stifling the development of new ideas would be undesirable in many respects. But antinovitism would not seek to prevent the introduction of the "cream of the crop" of new notions. Moreover, at the present time many presumably "new" concepts differ only trivially from previous notions and have no theoretical consequences. The ultimate upshots are a contrived creativity and a concomitant lack of cumulative development in the discipline. A norm of antinovitism would place a premium on building upon established frameworks. Enforcement is not unfeasible. Journal editors, reviewers, and book publishers are the immediate judges. A demonstration of the theoretical utility would be demanded of those seeking to introduce new concepts. In the
long term, the scientific community itself determines the "staying power" of new conceptions.

At the same time, antinovitism alone cannot solve the terminological troubles of political science. At the core of the current dilemma is the existence right now of multiple meanings for single terms. The vast array of conceptions for the term "political party" which we have pointed to previously is part of a widespread phenomenon throughout political science of multiple meanings for terms. Antinovitism would be able to make inroads towards preventing the influx of new concepts. But with antinovitism alone, existing concepts will not easily diminish to the point where there is one concept per term. Political scientists require some immediate method for distinguishing the alternative notions which presently are represented by a single term. Whatever its benefits, antinovitism cannot resolve the confusion spawned by the multiple meanings problem.

INCREASING THE POOL OF TERMS

A second general strategy offered for tackling our terminological problems is the generation of a sufficient number of new terms such that each concept has a unique term. Two methods of increasing the pool of terms have been identified in the literature. First, numbers can be used in conjunction with descriptive words as identifying labels. One might begin to untangle the term political parties by listing all of its various meanings. A number would then be assigned to each of these concepts. Resolution of the terminological problem is then achieved through a consensus in the discipline to refer to concepts by their appropriate number (i.e., "We use in this investigation conception
11 of political parties."). A second suggestion along these lines is the use of neologisms. New terms would be introduced and uniformly utilized to refer to the different conceptions of each existing political science term. Hence, the various meanings embodied in the single term "political party" can be disentangled by referring to each conception by a unique term (i.e., CROOG, GLOND, SPAVE). Clearly, neither solution could be effective lacking a consensus to consistently refer to our concepts by using some fixed neologism.

A simple description of these two term-generation approaches suggests that both methods are laden with difficulties. If greater communicability is the need, neither numbers nor neologisms would seem to be what we are looking for. Indeed, merely to read a scholarly book or journal article could become a monumental task. Certainly, numbering is an essential labeling device. Finding one's way on city streets would be far more difficult if stores and houses were not numbered. The critical difference here, however, is that such street numbering involves and ordering of sorts. Small numbers are orderly followed by larger numbers. The random assignment of street numbers—even given that each store and home still had its own unique number—would prove to be very confusing to all of us. The attachment of numbers to political science terms (i.e., "political party") cannot be anything other than nonsystematic assignment. There can be no meaningful ordering involved.

Unfortunately, the use of new words as identifying labels likewise poses severe linguistic problems. Lawrence C. Mayer (1972) has been highly critical of Fred Riggs' penchant for introducing neologisms such as "bazaar canteen" and "pariah entrepreneurship." Mayer (1972: 254-5) concludes: "Riggs's predisposition toward the use of neologisms becomes a predominant characteristic of the book and reaches a point where
Riggs's meaning becomes obscured to all but the most careful reader."
We are quite convinced that in principle the generation of new terms could resolve the current difficulties we face. But the use of numbers or neologisms is far too cumbersome and unwieldy a device. Certainly neither method could gain the support of political scientists at large. The "trick," if there is one, would be to attach some meaningful descriptive label to current terms such that each concept has a unique, appropriate, easily-remembered term.

JOINT IMPLEMENTATION

The Committee on Conceptual and Terminological Analysis has envisioned an ambitious program aimed at synthesizing competing concepts and linking them with appropriate terms. The operations suggested by COCTA (1974: 164-8) include the following:

(1) Concept Inventory--construction of an inventory of concepts to be drawn in large part from the salient theoretically-oriented social science literature in the major world languages.

(2) Modeling Exercises--modeling by groups of scholars committed to various paradigms, approaches, and ideologies in order to structure the relationships among selected concepts.

(3) Terminological Consensus--achievement of agreement within each group of scholars on utilization of appropriate terminology for identification and handling of relevant concepts.

An estimate of $100,000 for completion of the first and second operations has been offered by COCTA (1974: 167). COCTA has further noted that, given the increasing extent of information retrieval through computers, the resulting linkages of concepts and terms would be enforceable by "computer pressure."
There are, however, several obstacles in the way of a successful COCTA program. Funding, of course, could prove to be a serious problem. Beyond that, it is obvious that the group has a long way to go in bringing their case to political scientists. Currently, COCTA consists of a relatively small group of activists rather than a broadly based movement. Knowledge and acceptance of the COCTA program must increase considerably—preferably prior to the modeling stage. Widespread participation in the modeling process would be desirable and perhaps necessary. It would also be helpful if the modeling stage were a central focus of the discipline rather than an isolated activity.

Neither is there a high probability that, once completed, the COCTA-developed terms and concepts would be extensively employed. The results of the COCTA program would not generate very much enthusiasm in the discipline if COCTA relies upon numbers or awkward neologisms to label concepts. Finally, the use of computer pressure as a coercive tool seems somewhat presumptuous. Even so, the COCTA program deserves support and encouragement. At a minimum, the efforts planned can only increase the discipline's concern about the consequences of conceptual and terminological turmoil.

THE PROPER NOUNS SOLUTION

In this age of technological complexity, simple solutions are often given insufficient attention. The proposal sketched below is in many respects a rather modest one. But perhaps in our efforts to resolve terminological turmoil, "modesty is the best policy." Implementation of the solution outlined here would not necessitate vast expenditures of scarce academic resources. No concerted or systematic scholarly effort to compose new terms or reduce the pool of concepts would be required. Neither do we call for large-scale modeling exercises or
computer pressure as a means of enforcement.

Ours is a mixed strategy, although its immediate impact would be to simply increase the pool of political science terms. The major selling point is this: unlike the numbers or neologisms strategies we have spoken of, in the approach we have formulated new terms would not actually have to be generated. In our approach, not only are the terms preexisting, but in principle each is already attached to its appropriate concept. Frequently in the literature a concept is referred to by a set of words such as "Weber's conception of bureaucracy." The use of an adjoining proper noun (e.g., Weber) is an easy, preexisting device to distinguish the various conceptions attached to a single descriptive term (e.g., bureaucracy). The label "Weber's bureaucracy" is a convenient means of distinguishing the relevant concept from other notions of bureaucracy. As a method for extricating political science from its terminological turmoil, we propose the uniform utilization of proper nouns alongside the descriptive word(s) for identifying our key concepts.

MEDICAL TERMINOLOGY

We usually associate the terminology of medicine with the use of Greek and Latin roots to devise neologisms. Certainly, this is not a wholly inaccurate picture. Yet, the proper nouns solution is very central to the terminology of medical science. In Listing 1 we find

LISTING 1

50 selected medical terms utilizing the proper nouns approach. Laymen to medicine are well aware of many of these terms (e.g., Addison's disease, Cushing's syndrome). We have compiled these terms from the
Listing 1: 50 Selected Medical Terms Using Proper Nouns

Addison's disease
Albarran's glands
Babcock's operation
Barton's fracture
Bennett's fracture
Bezold's ganglion
Bidder's ganglion
Blalock-Taussig operation
Carter's fever
Chopart's amputation
Cushing's syndrome
Donald's operation
Edelmann's disease
Friedman test
Gerlach's stain
Gram's stain
Gritti-Stokes amputation
Haverhill fever
Heberden's nodes
Hippocratic oath
Hodgkin's disease
Ishihara's tests
Jacksonian epilepsy
Jerisch-Herxheimer reaction
Killian's operation
Kozhevnikov's epilepsy
Ludwig's angina
Mackel's ganglion
Mills' disease
Nuck's glands
Osler's nodes
Pasteurization
Plaut's angina
Quick's liver-function test
Rammstedt's operation
Renon-Delille syndrome
Riggs's disease
Sachs-Georgi reaction
Sanger's operation
Semon's law
Sendai's virus
Trommer's test
Turner's syndrome
Underwood's disease
Vincent's angina
Volhynia fever
Wegner's disease
Wilms' operation
Ziehen-Oppenheim disease
Zollinger-Ellison syndrome

Terms are taken from L. T. Morton's (1970) A Medical Bibliography
index to *A Medical Bibliography* (Morton, 1970). The total count from this source was an astounding 730 separate terms using proper nouns as a labeling device. Included in this total are 202 proper nouns adjacent to the descriptive term "disease." Among the other descriptive terms were syndrome, test, operation, sign, phenomenon, tumor, method, ligament, law, reaction, and incision. It might be noted as well that, for our purposes, the index in the Morton text was incomplete. For example, the index did not list the Salk or Sabine vaccine. In any case, it is certainly clear that the proper nouns solution is a key labeling technique used in the field of medicine to avoid terminological disarray.

**TERMS IN STATISTICS AND METHODOLOGY**

Closer to home, a host of terms utilizing proper nouns are already in use in statistical and methodological analysis. Proper noun terms are essential to the vocabulary of these fields. Listing 2 presents 50

**LISTING 2**

selected terms from statistics and methodology which utilize the proper nouns solution. Some of the concepts associated with these terms are unknown to many of us in political science. But once having learned the ins and outs of statistical analysis, the political scientist will have no trouble in associating a term (e.g., "Mann-Whitney test") with the uses and operations of the procedure associate with that term. The use of a proper noun adjacent to the descriptive word enables us to easily and meaningfully distinguish the Mann-Whitney test from other statistical tests (e.g., Fisher's exact test, Wald-Wolfowitz runs test, etc). To the extent that we are unfamiliar with some portion of the terms in Listing 2, it must be confessed that our own incomplete stas-
Listing 2

50 Selected Statistical and Methodological Terms Using Proper Nouns

Arfwedson distribution
Abelson-Tukey method
Bernoulli random variable
Bernoulli trials
Bayesian inference
Coomb's theory of data
Cartesian space
Cramer's V
Cochran's Q
Campbell-Stanley quasi-experimental design

Doolittle method
Durban-Watson statistic
Dwyer square root method
Euclidean space
Fisher's exact test
Friedman test
Fechner's law
Flanagan correlation coefficient
Goodman and Kruskal's Tau
Goodman and Kruskal's Lambda

Goodman and Kruskal's Gamma
Guttman scaling
Helmert transformation
Kendall's tau
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
Kruskal-Wallis test
Kuder-Richardson reliability test
Likert scale
Long's index
L' Hôpital's Rule

Mann-Whitney test
Maclaurin's series
Neyman allocation
Pascal's triangle
Pythagorean theorem
Pearson correlation
Poisson distributions
Rolle's theorem
Simon-Blalock method
Spearman's r

Stirling's approximation to factorials
Student's t distribution
Taylor's series
Thurstone scales
Tchebycheff's inequality
Tukey's quick test
Wilcoxon test
Wald-Wolfowitz runs test
Yule's Q
Zelnèr's inequality
tical and methodological knowledge is at fault. The use of proper nouns to generate the needed terms does not impose any critical linguistic problems. Moreover, it would appear that proper nouns are far more helpful linguistic aids than either numbers or neologisms. Terming the associated concept as a "Pearson correlation" is undoubtedly more useful than would be a term such as "correlation type 3" (number) or "correp" (neologism). Another alternative would have been to make no effort at trying to disentangle the various concepts associated with the descriptive term "correlation." Surely, however, the use of proper nouns adjacent to statistical and methodological terms is also far superior to the application of no remedy at all.

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PROPER NOUNS

To a limited extent, proper nouns are already in use by political scientists for concept identification. In political science literature an assortment of terms exist which include a proper noun. A portion of these terms appear in Listing 3.

LISTING 3

Those in the various subfields of political science and the other social sciences are well aware of the concepts associated with these terms. The use of a proper noun alongside the descriptive word does not appear to pose any linguistic difficulties in political science.

We have proposed a far more thorough, systematic, and explicit utilization of proper nouns to identify political science concepts. Through such a device political scientists will have the capacity to disentangle the various notions associated with single terms like "political party." Before introducing still another conceptualization of "political party," an analyst would be required to present a strong case for the theoretical significance of the new notion. Such a norm
Listing 3

50 Selected Political and Social Science Terms* Using Proper Nouns

Arrow's paradox
Becker-von Wiese personality types
Benedict's culture patterns
Benthamism
Blackstonian law
Blumenbach's racial classification
Bucher's stages of economic development
Centers' method for determining class
Comte's stages of social development
Cooley's Wishes
Cowgill index
Crowne-Marlow social desirability scale
Dillon's rule
Douglas' principle of suburbanization
Duguit's theory of law
Duncan scale of occupational status
Durkheim's stages of societal development
Estonian systems analysis
Edwards' occupational classification
Gini Index

Hare system
Hawthorne effect
Jacksonian democracy
Jeffersonian democracy
Jim Crow laws
Keynesian economics
Korsakow's psychosis
Kovalevsky's stages of society
Kretchmer's personality types
Lineberry and Fowler's reformism index

Lockean contractualism
Lombrosian criminology
Lorenz Curve
Marxian class analysis
Michel's iron law of oligarchy
Morgan's stages of society
Novicow's stages of societal development
Paretian optimality
Parkinson's law
Peter principle

Quesnay's classification of economic classes
Ratzenkofer's interests
Ross' Desires
Rossi's crowd classifications
Rummel's field theory
social darwinism
Spencer's stages of society
Stanford Crisis Study
Weber's bureaucracy
Wirth's urbanism

*a some of these terms are taken from Dunner's (1964) Dictionary of Political Science and Zadrozny's (1959) Dictionary of Social Science*
within the discipline will permit political science to move from novitism to normal science in the Kuhnian sense. Political science researchers would increasingly employ their existing concepts, conceptual frameworks, and theories as exemplars.

From a stylistic standpoint, the proper nouns solution is perfectly consistent with readable prose. The proper noun could be affixed before the descriptive word(s)—e.g., "Crotty's political parties"; or it could follow the descriptive word(s) in parentheses—e.g., "political parties (Crotty)." The proper noun need not clutter the entire article or book. In a sense, Kaplan (1964: 71) was quite correct in noting the human mind's "capacity to understand and to make itself understood." In this light, the proper noun need appear only once for any concept. Throughout the text of the article or book, only the descriptive word(s) would be necessary in order to convey the intended meaning. Of course, one could "cleverly" construct a paragraph made unintelligible through use of the proper nouns solution. But the proper nouns approach need not interfere with effective and interesting writing style. Significantly, its implementation would not diminish our ability to communicate with noncolleagues—public officials, undergraduates, lawyers, the general public, etc. Uniformly utilized by members of the discipline, the proper nouns solution would actually enhance intelligibility rather than detract from it.

Were political scientists to adopt the proper nouns approach, the alternative concepts currently attached to the same term would each automatically possess a unique term all its own. Political scientists would no longer be burdened by the multiple meanings problem. The terminological confusion underlying the presence of numerous conceptions
Listing 3

50 Selected Political and Social Science Terms Using Proper Nouns

Arrow's paradox
Becker-von Wiese personality types
Benedict's culture patterns
Benthamism
Blacksonian law
Blumenbach's racial classification
Buchner's stages of economic development
Centers' method for determining class
Comte's stages of social development
Cooley's Wishes

Cowgill index
Crowne-Marlow social desirability scale
Dillon's rule
Douglas' principle of suburbanization
Duguit's theory of law
Duncan scale of occupational status
Durkheim's stages of societal development
Eastonian systems analysis
Edwards' occupational classification
Gini Index

Hare system
Hawthorne effect
Jacksonian democracy
Jeffersonian democracy
Jim Crow laws
Keynesian economics
Korsakov's psychosis
Kovalevsky's stages of society
Kretschmer's personality types
Lineberry and Fowler's reformism index

Lockean contractualism
Lombrosian criminology
Lorenz Curve
Marxian class analysis
Michel's iron law of oligarchy
Morgan's stages of society
Novicow's stages of societal development
Pareto optimality
Parkinson's law
Peter principle

Quesnay's classification of economic classes
Ratzenhofer's interests
Ross' Desires
Rossi's crowd classifications
Rummel's field theory
social darwinism
Spencer's stages of society
Stanford Crisis Study
Weber's bureaucracy
Wirth's urbanism

*Some of these terms are taken from Dunner's (1964) Dictionary of Political Science and Zadrozny's (1959) Dictionary of Social Science*
for the term "political party" would vanish. When seeking to introduce a
new conceptualization, the author would note his new definition of terms,
its theoretical significance, and the inadequacy for his purposes of previous
conceptions. In the future, researchers would refer to "X's political party"
concept, where X is Crotty, or Janda, Lasswell and Kaplan, Riggs, etc. With
uniform reference to proper nouns attached to the descriptive word(s),
cumulative research would be made far more feasible. Knowledge of existing
literature would be made far more vital and political scientists would
finally have a strong incentive to labor under established concepts, frame­
works, and theories. When pointless, minor modifications of existing
concepts would be strongly discouraged. Presumably, political scientists
can then move on in each subfield to the business of establishing and
working with paradigms. A dramatic reduction in the pool of concepts
would then occur through disuse of a host of notions. Even so, political
scientists would continue to have the capability to readily refer to other
conceptions by use of their proper noun-descriptive word(s) label.

The approach we have formulated has the advantage of distinguishing
concepts through unique terms without the use of either numbers or
neologisms. Comprehension of the parties literature would not be
greatly enhanced by reference to a concept named "political parties no.
12" or a political party concept termed "CROOG." Strategies based on
such numbers or neologisms would undoubtedly meet with intense resistance
by members of the discipline. Such friction should not be a problem
with the approach we have specified. For many political scientists, it
is already second nature to use the appropriate proper noun to help
specify the concept of interest. In this light, writing style would
surely not be hampered by attaching a proper noun as a part of a concept's
term. Understanding will also be enhanced. Quite contrary to a numbers
or neologisms strategy, our approach will enable undergraduates' and
others to continue to have the opportunity to comprehend political
science literature. The method and its applications within the literature could easily be learned by future generations of political scientists as a part of graduate training.

IMPLEMENTATION

We suggest a three-pronged strategy for the implementation of the proper nouns solution:

(1) The Researcher—Individual scholars need to be convinced of the utility of employing this approach. More broadly, the creation of a consensus among members of the discipline is vital. This consensus would be built around both the seriousness of current difficulties and the appropriateness of the solution suggested in these pages. The entire political science community has a stake in obtaining a trouble-free terminology. A full-scale discussion of the terminological and conceptual problem is in order.

(2) The Publisher—Rather than resorting to "computer pressure," our approach is easily enforceable through existing channels. Journal editors, editorial boards, and book publishers must be convinced of the merits of the proper nouns solution. Through their efforts, a requirement for future publication could be the use of proper nouns alongside descriptive word(s) to refer to major concepts. Stricter standards for introducing new concepts could be imposed. A demonstration of the theoretical significance of new concepts would be demanded.

(3) The Professional Organization—The critical role of professional organizations in the sciences suggests another method to generate support for the proper nouns solution. Endorsement of the proper nouns solution by the American Political Science Association and other professional organizations in the discipline would greatly facilitate its widespread adoption.
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