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Integrative Mechanisms in Literature Growth by Manfred Kochen
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drop from sight altogether? What is the relationship between classical liberalism and Kirk's conservatism with regard to representative government, checks and balances, separations of power, liberty, private property, individualism, free enterprise, stability, toleration, and continuity?

In important respects, Kirk offers a confession of faith rather than a rigorous historical or philosophical analysis. If you come to it as a believer, you'll be overwhelmed. But how can you respond as an infidel? Yet, respond you must. The heuristic stimulation of this book is enormous, as is the danger that it may be swallowed whole. Solace may come inadvertently. The seeds of this harvest may succumb to the sterility of their own purity of breed.

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Integrative Mechanisms in Literature Growth.

This book was not written for political scientists, and, unfortunately, there is little in the book that most would find useful. I say "unfortunately" because Professor Kochen, a distinguished information scientist who stands at the forefront of his field, addresses a question which should be of central interest to all scholars: "If a society possesses, at a certain time, a body of knowledge, what laws, if any, govern the way this body of knowledge can grow?" (p. 3). If Kochen has answers to this question, our entire discipline should take notice. That this is not the case renders the book interesting only to those political scientists who are especially concerned with "research on research," to use Kochen's phrase.

The book was published as Number 9 in the series, "Contributions in Librarianship and Information Science." It consists of eleven chapters, seven of which are reprints of lectures or articles dating from 1968 to 1972. The "library science" vs. "information science" distinction is roughly analogous to the "traditional" vs. "behavioral" approach in political science, and this book is an excellent example of the empirical and quantitative orientation of modern information scientists. Rigorous use of mathematics is prominent in the book, especially in chapter 5, which formulates alternative models for evaluating "the extent of literature integration in any year by the number of review papers published in that year," with the key variable being "the fraction of the literature published in year t which is ever cited by one or more review papers" (p. 91). The models, with stringent assumptions, were evaluated for their mathematical properties rather than tested against the literature in any field. Kochen realizes the limitations of his analyses, but he nevertheless contends that they "open up an area of exploration which sharpens our understanding of literature growth, suggests the kind of logic and mathematics which applies, and points to a variety of experimental and empirical studies to be done" (p. 106).

Some parts of the book are decidedly less relevant for political scientists than others. Chapter 5, just described, would fall in the marginal category. Six other chapters, all of which are reprints of previous work, appear to be even less valuable. The assessment of "Information Processing with Contemporary Computers" (chapter 4) is based on 1969 information, and, despite the brief updated appendix, neither advances the knowledge of one already familiar with computer applications nor serves as a useful tutorial. Chapter 6, "Information Science and Computer Aids in Education," would be read by many who have already had firsthand experience with systems like those he outlines. His results of "An Experiment to Change Attitudes Toward New College Mathematics" (chapter 7) are not conclusive, and the experiment is only obliquely related to the subject of the book. The title of chapter 8, "Newer Techniques for Processing Bibliographic Information," seems pertinent enough, but the specific system pertains largely to library administration; the information is also dated, having been published previously in 1968. His "Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of See-Reference Structure in Directories" (chapter 9) could have had considerable practical significance for political scientists engaged in indexing books, document or data collections, and so on, but he found no optimal number for See-references in directories. Finally, his study of "Information-Seeking Behavior of Catalog Users" (chapter 10) is clearly aimed at librarians.

Political scientists who are especially interested in the history of science are most likely to find stimulation in Kochen's first three chapters. In chapter 1, he stakes out his quest for laws which govern the growth of knowledge: "basic laws of principles, analogous to those sought by biochemists and physiologists, can be discovered" (p. 8). The phenomenon of "fragmentation" of knowledge is a central
concern in his pursuit of such laws. Chapter 2 employs mathematical models of epidemics to examine the “spread” of scientific ideas. Kochen concludes that works of evaluation and synthesis are necessary to produce stability and that theory is necessary to avoid fragmentation.

Kochen employs mathematical models of epidemics to examine the “spread” of scientific ideas. He pursues this line in chapter 3, which argues that “forces leading to the accumulation of isolated specialized facts act independently of forces leading to the formation of structures that cross-link facts” (p. 44). Institutions engaged in the production of knowledge must, therefore, stimulate imagination and creativity in order to promote intellectual bridge building.

Kochen discusses “Integration and Disintegration in the Knowledge Industry” in his final chapter. How well does he think he has achieved his prime objective? “Inasmuch as we have not yet established any new and really basic laws governing the growth of knowledge, we have not yet answered the first question to our complete satisfaction” (p. 248). While I agree, I would also urge Kochen to continue his inquiry, for the question is important to us all, and few scholars demonstrate the combination of experience, imagination, and rigor that seem necessary for the task.

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In Alexandre Kojève’s Kant, one is offered a Kant refracted through an Hegelian lens ground with Marxian equipment; given this limitation, or this advantage (depending on one’s point of view), one finally has a Kojevian account — found among his posthumous papers — of the sole philosopher considered by Kojève himself to be on a level with Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel.

In his brilliant and influential Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, which Allan Bloom has rightly called the most “subtle” effort to find foundations for a more adequate Marxism in Hegel, Kojève makes his treatment of the Phenomenology revolve around Hegel’s great set piece, “Master and Servant.” And in this treatment Kojève argues that for Hegel human society and human “discourse” began when men were first willing to risk their “animal” and biological existence in a “fight to the death” for “pure prestige,” for “recognition” by the “other”: the man who became the Master was he who was “willing to go all the way” in this fight, while the Slave was the one who saw and feared his own “nothingness” should he die in the struggle; the Slave “recognized” the Master rather than die. The Master, for his part, finds that he is not “satisfied” with mastery, since he has risked his life for recognition by a mere Slave whom he uses as a “thing”; the Master has the “pleasure” of not having to work, but this pleasure is not a true satisfaction. The Slave, on the other hand, who works in the service of the Master, can ultimately find satisfaction in his work (by which he transforms the natural world of “given-being” and himself as well): through work, which “negates” “given-being,” the Slave overcomes the world.

Since this overcoming is not historically complete until men choose their own work in Hegel’s “civil society” and become citizens of the Hegelian state, history is inter alia, a history of “slave ideologies” by which Slaves conceal their slavery from themselves. For Stoicism, Epicurus in his chains and Marcus Aurelius on his throne are “equal” as “wise men”; hence for the Stoic “ideology” the chains do not “matter.” In Christian “ideology” equality is of a different sort: all men are “equal” before God, whatever their earthly stations; but this is simply another escape to a “beyond” (beyond the historical world of work and struggle) in which, though there are no “masters,” there is one “universal” Master (God) to whom everyone is enslaved. A modern bourgeois may, by contrast, appear to be “his own master”; but he is simply enslaved to property and to capital. And so long as there is slavery, whether to a Master, to God, or to Capital, man will never be truly “satisfied” or truly free, since true satisfaction and freedom come from being “recognized” as an equal by an equal, which is possible only given Hegelian “civil society” and the Hegelian state.

No one has doubted the ingenuity of this reading of the Phenomenology: if it is not an irresistible or a “natural” reading — since, to use George Kelly’s language, it treats the Master and Servant “tableau” as “the synoptic clue to a whole philosophy” — it is one which “works” for substantial and important sections of Hegel’s greatest work. The notions of “work,” “struggle,” “recognition,” “satisfaction” and “freedom” are really there; and if, strictly speaking, the notion of “ideology” is a Marxian importation, it is arguably prefigured in Hegel’s remark about philosophy (as the “thought of the world”) arriving after reality is “cut and dried.”

However far work, struggle, recognition, satisfaction, freedom and even ideology may go in illuminating Hegel’s Phenomenology, they are arguably not the notions which cast the