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7 / Some Theory and Data on Representational Roles and Legislative Behavior

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EDMUND BURKE'S SPEECH IN 1774 TO HIS CONSTITUENTS AT BRISTOL HAS had a lasting impact upon the study of representative-constituency relationships. Traditional inquiry into this topic had accepted Burke's approach as exemplified by the question, "How ought a representative act in reference to constituency demands?" Thus phrased, the topic is a normative problem and does not invite empirical inquiry. For almost two hundred years, the study of representative-constituency relationships focused on this classic normative question, as scholars built a literature of opinions and arguments about the proper role of the representative.¹

In recent years, however, research in representative-constituency relationships has shown a concern for empirical questions, which ask not how representatives ought to act but how they do act. This redirection is due largely to the work of Eulau, Wahlke, Buchanan, and Ferguson, who in 1959 published an article that distinguished between the style and focus of representational roles.² They used the style of representation to refer to the particular criterion of judgment the legislator might use in deciding on legislative issues. A representative who feels that he ought to decide on the basis of his own values and evaluation of the facts is labeled a trustee. One who feels that he ought to disregard his personal opinions and to obey his constituents is called a delegate. Trustees and delegates differ in the norms they have internalized concerning the proper style of representational behavior.

In addition to representational style, Eulau and his co-authors, formulated the concept of representational focus, which refers to the particular group of persons whose welfare the representative feels he ought to consider in making his decisions. A representative who feels that he ought to consider primarily the welfare of his constituents is labeled as district-oriented. One who feels that he ought to consider the welfare of all the people in the state is called state-oriented.

plex and expensive, and research on the topic in the foreseeable future is unlikely to employ sample surveys to any large extent.

Pending the availability of appropriate data on constituents' opinions, what strategy promises the greatest payoff for studying representational behavior? A two-step procedure seems to be in order: The first step should be to formulate and codify propositions relating representational roles to legislative behavior; the second step should be to test propositions that utilize interview data on legislators.

Relatively few explicit propositions are set forth in the literature on representational behavior, which is richer by far in implicit consequences of representational roles. A systematic presentation of these hypotheses would help determine research priorities and provide a base for the cumulation of knowledge about representational behavior. Not all the propositions in such a theoretical framework would link representational roles with legislative behavior; some would relate representational roles to psychological, sociological, and political variables associated with the individual. In the absence of appropriate data to test propositions between roles and behavior, remaining propositions could at least be tested with interview data on legislators; this is the second step in the suggested strategy. Assuming some coherence among sets of propositions in the theoretical framework, validation of some sets would support, but not prove, the validity of the others. This indirect attack on the problem will build up our knowledge while we await appropriate sample survey data for testing the remaining propositions.

This chapter attempts to follow the research strategy briefly outlined above. It will first set forth a systematic statement of hypotheses relating representational role orientations to legislators' behavior, attitudes, and perceptions. It will then test some of the propositions with available data. After evaluating the results of these exercises, it will make some suggestions about the needs of future research on representational behavior.

Theoretical Framework

The sets of propositions presented below are referred to as a theoretical framework instead of as a theory because they are not interrelated in a rigorous deductive system. Whether or not these propositions prove to be deducible from a smaller number of propositions and thus constitute a theory of representational behavior is a subject for later study. At present, there is a need for straight forward formulation and codification of individual propositions. Extensive revisions and re-

finements of the hypotheses undoubtedly will be prompted by bringing them into the open and organizing them for critical review.

The theoretical framework will be limited only to propositions employing the four representational role concepts: delegate, trustee, district-oriented, and state-oriented. The two hybrid concepts of politico, for the style of representation, and district-and-state-oriented, for the focus of representation, will not be incorporated into these propositions. This limitation is imposed both because of the unclear nature of the hybrid concepts and because of a desire to simplify the task of constructing the theoretical framework by dealing only with the "polar" concepts for each role orientation. But as Hyman and Sheatsley point out in their methodological critique of "The Authoritarian Personality," which also studied only extreme groups on both sides of the authoritarianism scale, the middle group may differ from the extremes in unexpected ways.¹² Therefore, legislators in the hybrid or middle categories cannot always be expected to occupy a place in the propositions between the delegates and trustees or between the district-oriented and state-oriented representatives.

In fact, despite the past treatment of these hybrid categories as role orientations, there is reason to regard them as indicating the absence of any role orientation, using the term "role" in its technical sense to refer to normative expectations of behavior. The individual legislators' normative expectations of the behavior they think ought to be demonstrated by one who occupies a legislative office can serve as a motivational basis for their official behavior. This conception is similar to Simon's definition of role in terms of "the premises that are to guide the decisions of the actor as to his course of behavior."¹³ These premises are normative in nature. In representational behavior, they state how the representative ought to act, using "ought" in the sense of duty.¹⁴

The legislator's personal norms about the proper style and focus of representation are acquired and internalized through a process of verbal learning and political socialization. The argumentative literature which has arisen over the "proper" role of the representative indicates that social norms are ambiguous or contradictory concerning representational behavior in the face of constituency demands. Political socialization may cause some individuals to internalize behavioral norms concerning their relationships with their constituencies and may not cause others to internalize such norms.

It is sufficient to say that (1) the internalization of behavioral norms of role performance derives from a complex process of political socialization, (2) not all individuals will internalize norms for representational behavior, and (3) those who do may reveal differences in the

specific nature of the norms internalized. By recognizing that some individuals do not internalize behavioral norms of role performance (i.e., that some individuals do not act according to self-defined standards of behavior), we are not required to fit every legislator into a representational "role." Thus the hybrid categories of politico and district-and-state-oriented are omitted from the theoretical framework of propositions relating representational roles to legislative behavior.

Several assumptions underlie the formulation of these propositions. It is assumed, for example, that legislators with internalized norms will behave consistently with those norms and that legislators will not incur behavior costs unless they judge the rewards worth the costs of acting. Assumptions are also made about the political socialization process in American culture and about the need to achieve consistency among roles, attitudes, and behavior.

The theoretical framework will follow this format: classification of dependent variables in terms of roles, attitudes, and behavior; separation of propositions within each classification to compare delegates with trustees and to compare district-oriented with state-oriented legislators; explanation of reasoning underlying specific propositions; and presentation of the propositions.

Dependent Variables: Representational Roles

I. Style of Representation

A. Because representational roles will be internalized as a result of idiosyncratic factors in political socialization, there is no a priori reason to expect role orientations to be related to standard sociological variables. This produces the following propositions.

1. Style of representation is unrelated to education.
2. Style of representation is unrelated to occupation.
3. Style of representation is unrelated to age.
4. Style of representation is unrelated to income.
5. Style of representation is unrelated to urbanization.

B. There is no apparent conflict between representational style and positions on broad public policy issues.

6. Style of representation is unrelated to party affiliation.
7. Style of representation is unrelated to liberal-conservative ideology.

C. One who has held public office has experienced the problems of obtaining information for making decisions, and he is aware of the communication problems between the representative and his constituency.

8. In comparison with candidates who have not served in the legislature, incumbent legislators are more likely to be trustees than delegates.

D. An elected official's style of representation depends on the nature of the office to which he is elected: higher offices encourage greater reliance on personal judgment in decisions.

9. In comparison with representatives, senators are more likely to be trustees than delegates.

E. The political socialization process operates in the context of constituency politics to affect the style of representation: the threat of political reprisal reduces reliance on personal values in decisions.

10. In comparison with legislators from safe districts, those from competitive districts are more likely to be delegates than trustees.

II. Focus of Representation

A. Because representational roles will be internalized as a result of idiosyncratic factors in political socialization, there is no a priori reason to expect role orientations to be related to standard sociological variables.

11. Focus of representation is unrelated to education.
12. Focus of representation is unrelated to occupation.
13. Focus of representation is unrelated to age.
14. Focus of representation is unrelated to income.
15. Focus of representation is unrelated to urbanization.

B. There will be no apparent conflict between representational focus and positions on broad public policy issues, unless support and opposition for such issues are defined along geographical lines. *If geographical regionalism is not a political factor:*

16. Focus of representation is unrelated to party affiliation.
17. Focus of representation is unrelated to liberal-conservative ideology.

If geographical regionalism is a political factor:

18. Members of the minority party, in comparison with members of the majority party, are more likely to be district-oriented than state-oriented.
19. Members of the minority ideological position, in comparison with members of the majority position, are more likely to be district-oriented than state-oriented.

C. Service in the legislature is unlikely to disclose any impracticalities in pursuing either focus of representation.

20. Focus of representation is unrelated to the absence or presence of previous legislative service.

D. An elected official's focus of representation depends upon his personal identification with his district.

21. In comparison with others, legislators representing single political units (e.g., a county or a whole city) are more likely to be district-oriented than state-oriented.

22. In comparison with others, legislators who went to public school in the district are more likely to be district-oriented than state-oriented.

E. The political socialization process operates in the context of constituency politics to affect the focus of representation: the threat of political reprisal draws attention to the district.

23. In comparison with legislators from safe districts, legislators from competitive districts are more likely to be district-oriented than state-oriented.

III. Interrelationships between Style and Focus of Representation

A. Although the style and focus of representational roles are analytically distinct, they are empirically related because political responsibility is enforced through elections on the basis of districts.

24. Delegates are more likely to be district-oriented than state-oriented.

25. Trustees are more likely to be state-oriented than district-oriented.

26. District-oriented legislators are more likely to be delegates than trustees.

27. State-oriented legislators are more likely to be trustees than delegates.

Dependent Variables: Attitudes toward Constituency

I. Comparison of Delegates and Trustees

A. In order to maintain consistency between their personal norms of conduct and their attitudes toward their constituency, delegates must believe that their constituents are informed about politics. Therefore, in comparison with trustees, delegates are more likely to believe that

28. their constituents possess opinions on legislative issues.

29. their constituents know what goes on in the legislature.

30. their constituents know about their stands on issues.

31. their constituents know about their election opponents' stands on issues.

B. Not only must delegates believe that their constituents are informed about the legislative process, they also must believe that they can determine their constituents' opinions. Therefore, in comparison with trustees, delegates are more likely to believe that

32. they know their constituents' opinions.

33. they can find out their constituents' opinions.

II. Comparison of District-oriented and State-oriented Representatives

A. In order to maintain consistency between their personal norms of conduct and their attitudes toward their constituency, district-oriented representatives must believe that their districts have special interests that may conflict with those of the state. Therefore, in comparison with state-oriented legislators, district-oriented representatives are more likely to believe that

34. their districts have special interests to be represented in questions of public policy.

35. the interests of their districts may conflict with the interests of the state.

B. In order to maintain consistency between their personal norms of conduct and attitudes toward their constituency, district-oriented representatives must believe that they are well informed about their districts. Therefore, in comparison with state-oriented legislators, district-oriented representatives are more likely to believe that

36. they know their constituents' interests.

37. they can find out their constituents' interests.

Dependent Variables: Behavior To Determine Constituency Opinions

I. Comparison of Delegates and Trustees

A. Because of their motivation to act in accordance with their constituents' wishes, delegates will readily incur behavior costs in attempts to determine constituency opinions. More specifically, in comparison with trustees, delegates are more likely to

38. conduct public opinion polls.

39. visit their constituencies more frequently.

40. pay more attention to their mail.

B. By definition, state-oriented legislators are motivated to decide in accordance with their perceptions of the state's interests. In comparison with district-oriented representatives, therefore, state-oriented representatives are more likely to

68. introduce bills which they believe promote the interests of the state.
69. speak on behalf of bills which they believe promote the interests of the state.
70. vote for bills which they believe promote the interests of the state.
71. reflect their own political attitudes in their actions.

The above theoretical framework obviously does not exhaust the possible relationships between representational roles and various aspects of legislative behavior; many other dependent variables could be brought into the framework. Moreover, it does not present propositions cutting across the style and focus of representation, stating, for example, whether a delegate is more likely to conduct opinion polls than a district-oriented legislator. The framework was severely limited in scope to simplify this initial attempt at building a theoretical framework. Even with its limitations, the framework encompasses seventy-one propositions which suggest the magnitude of the task involved in building theory about political behavior.

Despite the complexity and frustration involved in constructing propositions or theoretical frameworks for inquiry, this task must be done as a part of systematic empirical research in political behavior. The above propositions may seem arbitrary or downright wrong, but at least they are explicit; they are open for review, criticism, and validation. Initial attempts to codify propositions about an aspect of political behavior may be awkward or naïve, but they are also a necessary precursor to more sophisticated theory.

Data to Test Some Propositions

Data from a previously unpublished study are available for testing some of the propositions in the theoretical framework.¹⁵ The data were gathered during the summer of 1960 from 238 interviews with candidates for the 1961 Indiana Legislature and with holdover Senators from the 1959 session.¹⁶ Although the Indiana research was inspired by the four-state study previously cited,¹⁷ the studies differed substantially in the operations performed to identify legislators' representational roles.

The four-state study assigned representational role orientations to legislators by coding their free answer responses to the question, "How would you describe the job of being a legislator—what are the most important things you should do here?" The coding procedures are described as follows:

In constructing stylistic and areal-focal role orientation types, the responses to the question were coded in terms of (a) characterization of the job; (b) objectives of the job; and (c) criteria of decision. . . . In general, data concerning criteria of decision yielded the stylistic orientation, and data concerning the objectives of the job yielded the areal orientation.¹⁸

The authors report that somewhat more than half of the 474 respondents could be assigned stylistic role orientations and about half could be assigned a real role orientations. In their words:

The reduction in the number of respondents from the total samples is, of course, due to the open-endedness of the question. Hence not all respondents could be used in the construction of the role types as they emerged from representatives' own definitions, and in the analysis.¹⁹

Their experience in obtaining such a high proportion of unusable responses with an open-ended question prompted the formulation and use of closed questions in the Indiana study. Legislators' representational styles were tapped by having them disclose their attitudes toward two statements which advanced opposing views on the proper style of the representative. Each of the 238 respondents was handed these questions interspersed among ten other attitude items and asked to check the extent of his agreement with each statement. The items and the distribution of responses among the five available response categories are given in Table I.

TABLE I

STATEMENTS ABOUT THE STYLE OF REPRESENTATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO THOSE STATEMENTS

Delegate: "Even though the legislator is firmly convinced that his constituents are not properly evaluating the issues, it is his job to disregard his *own* views and vote the way they want."

Trustee: "Because his constituents seldom know all the various aspects of important issues, the legislator serves his constituency best if he is left alone to make careful decisions by himself."

	Agree	Tend to Agree	Undecided	Tend to Disagree	Disagree	
Delegate	28	32	10	58	106	N = 234 ^a
Trustee	32	33	7	70	94	N = 236 ^b

^a Four persons gave no answer.

^b Two persons gave no answer.

PROPOSITION 5: Style of representation is unrelated to urbanization.

SUPPORTED

	Over 50% of district in cities over 20,000	Under 50% of district in cities over 20,000
Delegate	21	23
Trustee	16	26

$x^2 = 0.81$ 1 df. Not significant

PROPOSITION 6: Style of representation is unrelated to party affiliation.

SUPPORTED

	Democrat	Republican
Delegate	22	23
Trustee	21	26

$x^2 = 0.16$ 1 df. Not significant

PROPOSITION 7: Style of representation is unrelated to political ideology.^a

SUPPORTED

	Conservative	Liberal
Delegate	21	24
Trustee	20	27

$x^2 = 0.16$ 1 df. Not significant

^a Ideology was determined by separating legislators at the median according to their summated scores on three agree-disagree statements about government intervention in the economy, business' role in government, and labor's influence in politics

All six of the preceding propositions were supported by the Indiana data. In one sense, however, these propositions might be considered very trivial, for they state no relationships, only the absence of relationships. It is a fact that any number of nonsense variables with random values can be cross-classified to produce statistically insignificant relationships. But there are two reasons these propositions are not trivial. First, they do derive from the assumption that the political sociali-

zation process works upon individuals in idiosyncratic ways to produce representational role orientation and that the standard sociological and political variables do not account for role orientations. But perhaps more important, these null propositions establish that other existing differences between delegates and trustees cannot be due to spurious correlations on behalf of standard sociological and political variables. The force of this argument awaits the validation of propositions that state directional relationships.

PROPOSITION 8: In comparison with candidates who have not served in the legislature, incumbent legislators are more likely to be trustees than delegates.

SUPPORTED

	Inexperienced Candidates	Experienced Candidates
Delegates	26	19
Trustee	17	30

$x^2 = 4.31$ 1 df. Significant at .025 level.
One-tailed test.

PROPOSITION 9: In comparison with representatives, senators are more likely to be trustees than delegates.

UNSUPPORTED

	Candidates for House	Candidates for Senate
Delegates	32	13
Trustees	37	10

$x^2 = 0.71$ 1 df. Not significant

PROPOSITION 10: In comparison with legislators from safe districts, those from competitive districts are more likely to be delegates than trustees.

UNSUPPORTED

	Candidates' perceptions of party competition ^a		
	Safe one Party	Mostly one Party	Competitive
Delegates	14	24	7
Trustees	13	21	13

$\chi^2 = 2.02$ 2 df. Not significant

^a Variable was formed from responses to the question: "How about the relative strength of the parties in your district—over the years has the district been safe Republican or Democratic, fairly close, or what?"

PROPOSITION 28: In comparison with trustees, delegates are more likely to believe that their constituents possess opinions on legislative issues.

SUPPORTED

	Proportion of constituents seen to have preferences ^a	
	Almost none—a few	Some—almost all
Delegates	16	28
Trustees	28	19

$\chi^2 = 4.90$ 1 df. Significant at .025 level.

One-tailed test.

^a Variable was formed from responses to the question: "Do you think that the average voters in your district have any specific preferences concerning the more important bills you vote on in the legislature?"

PROPOSITION 29: In comparison with trustees, delegates are more likely to believe that their constituents know what goes on in the legislature.

SUPPORTED

	Amount known by voters about the legislature ^a	
	Almost nothing to very little	Some to almost everything
Delegates ^b	5	13
Trustees	18	11

$\chi^2 = 5.23$ 1 df. Significant at .02 level.

One-tailed test.

^a Variable was formed from responses to the question: "In general, how much would you say the average voter knows about what you do in the legislature?"

^b The numbers of delegates and trustees are reduced because this question was asked only of candidates with previous legislative experience.

PROPOSITION 30: In comparison with trustees, delegates are more likely to believe that their constituents know their stands on issues.

UNSUPPORTED

	Voters' knowledge of his stands on issues ^a	
	Almost nothing to very little	Some to almost everything
Delegates	21	23
Trustees	26	21

$\chi^2 = 0.52$ 1 df. Not significant

^a Variable was formed from responses to the question: "How much do you think the average voter knows about your stands on issues like those we've talked about?"

PROPOSITION 31: In comparison with trustees, delegates are more likely to believe that their constituents know their election opponents' stands on issues.

SUPPORTED

	Voters' knowledge of opponents' stands on issues ^a	
	Almost nothing to some	Quite a bit
Delegates ^b	18	10
Trustees	39	—

$\chi^2 = 16.37$ 1 df. Significant at the .001 level.
One-tailed test.

^a Variable was formed from responses to the question: "How much do the people of your district know about your opponents' stands on issues?"

^b The numbers of delegates and trustees are reduced because this question was asked only of candidates in single member legislative districts.

PROPOSITION 32: In comparison with trustees, delegates are more likely to believe that they know their constituents' opinions.

UNSUPPORTED

	When candidates know about preferences ^a	
	Hardly ever to some-times	Quite often to almost always
Delegates	10	31
Trustees	18	29

$\chi^2 = 1.95$ 1 df. Not significant

^a Variable was formed from responses to the question: "Do you think that you generally know how the rank-and-file voters in your district feel about issues that concern them?"

PROPOSITION 60: In comparison with delegates, trustees are more likely to support legislation which they feel is morally right.

SUPPORTED

	Extent of agreement with statement ^a	
	Agree or tend to agree	Undecided to disagree
Delegates	29	16
Trustees	41	6

$\chi^2 = 6.56$ 1 df. Significant at the .02 level.
One-tailed test.

^a Variable was formed from responses to this attitude statement: "A legislator can decide how to vote on most issues by asking himself if the proposed law is morally right."

PROPOSITION 62: In comparison with delegates, trustees are more likely to support legislation supported by their party.

SUPPORTED

	Extent of agreement with statement ^a	
	Agree or tend to agree	Undecided to disagree
Delegates	13	31
Trustees	24	23

$\chi^2 = 4.36$ 1 df. Significant at the .025 level.
One-tailed test.

^a Variable was formed from responses to this attitude statement: "If a bill is important for his party's record, a member should vote with his party even if it costs him some support in his district."

Of the sixteen propositions tested with data from the Indiana study, twelve were supported, including all six that predicted the variables to be unrelated. Of the ten propositions that predicted positive relationships between variables, six were supported. While evidence from this study validates most of the propositions tested, failure to support all the predictions suggests that parts of the theoretical framework need to be re-examined, considering the negative findings for four propositions. Each of the four will be discussed below.

Proposition 9, which states that in comparison with representatives,

senators are more likely to be trustees than delegates, is flatly unsupported by the data. The reasoning behind this proposition is that the style of representation depends on the nature of the elected office and that higher office encourages greater reliance on personal judgment in decisions. Interestingly enough, Friedman's and Stokes' comparison of Michigan legislators with delegates to the state's recent constitutional convention also found no difference between the two groups of officials on the style of representation.²¹ Where focus of representation was concerned, however, they found convention delegates more state-oriented than district-oriented. Despite the plausibility of the reasoning, this proposition should be seriously questioned. And the theoretical framework, which does not contain any proposition relating nature of office to focus of representation, might be re-examined in the light of Friedman's and Stokes' study.

Proposition 10, which states that in comparison with legislators from safe districts, those from competitive districts are more likely to be delegates than trustees, falls short of support in the data. The proposition derives from the idea that threat of political reprisal reduces reliance on personal values in decisions. Wahlke and his co-authors report a relationship between competitiveness and focus of representation, with competitive districts producing more district-oriented legislators (see Proposition 23).²² Their failure to report such a finding for the style of representation may mean that the relationship also did not appear in their data. If this is true, Proposition 10 and its underlying reasoning are probably false.

Proposition 30, which states that in comparison with trustees, delegates are more likely to believe that their constituents know their stands on issues, is also unconfirmed. This might seem indeed unusual because of the apparent soundness of the reasoning behind the proposition. In order to maintain consistency between their role orientation and attitudes toward their constituency, delegates would be expected to believe that their constituents are informed about politics. One factor which might have smothered this expected relationship is the ego-involvement of candidates, who took pride in stating that they made sure their positions on issues were known. If ego-involvement is indeed a factor and the reasoning behind Proposition 30 is sound, then the relationship should be found in Proposition 31, which is limited to constituent's knowledge of their opponents' stands on issues. Proposition 31 is supported by the data at the .001 level of significance. The reasoning does appear to be correct, although Proposition 30 is probably false.

The final proposition unsupported by the Indiana data—Proposition 32—states that in comparison with trustees, delegates are more

likely to believe that they know their constituents' opinions. The data lean in the expected direction but not at the .05 level of significance. The question that produced the data—"Do you think that you generally know how the rank-and-file voters in your district feel about issues that concern them?"—once again may have constituted a threat to the candidates' ego, causing them to claim omniscience rather than ignorance. Some subtler method should be devised for testing this proposition before it is regarded as false.

Suggestions for Further Research

This article has attempted to follow a two-step strategy of research by (1) formulating and codifying propositions relating representational roles to legislative behavior and (2) testing them with available data. In general, theory construction and theory validation constitute the strategy of scientific inquiry. Variations on this theme for particular topics of research are sometimes dictated by the state of the theory and availability of data. Research on representational behavior has been conducted without much explicit theory and without the availability of crucial data. This article proposes no new method for acquiring the missing data on constituents' opinions, but it hopefully contributes to the development of explicit theory.

In addition to the ever-present need for continued development of theory, there are several immediate needs for future research on representational behavior. Perhaps most obvious and pressing is the need for better measures of representational roles. The single open-ended question used in the four-state study and the two closed-ended questions used in this study and in others²³ indicate that crude operationalizations are adequate for revealing the existence of relationships with other variables. But the goal of scientific research should be not only to establish the existence of relationships but also to specify the form of those relationships.²⁴ For this purpose, more precise measures are required.

Research should be undertaken on the operationalization of representational roles. Various methods ought to be investigated or, if necessary, created especially for the task. Even within the interview situation, many different techniques and procedures can be tried in an attempt to construct better measures of representational roles. For example, batteries of items might be prepared and administered to appropriate populations. Intercorrelations among items might be studied, and Guttman scales might be investigated. Other techniques or procedures found in the literature on attitude scaling and psychologi-

cal measurement might be studied for application to representational roles. We ought to be able to develop measures of the focus and style of representation that improve considerably on those used in existing studies.

Research should also be undertaken to test propositions that relate roles to perceptions of constituency interests and opinions. Although sample survey data are necessary to determine the actual opinions and interests within constituencies, the representatives' perceptions of these variables can be determined through interviews. Complete understanding of representational behavior ultimately requires that constituency attitudes be matched against legislative behavior, but much can be learned about representational behavior without these data. In fact, none of the seventy-one propositions in the theoretical framework require data on actual constituency opinions and attitudes.

Miller and Stokes demonstrated the feasibility and fruitfulness of gathering data on legislators' perceptions of their constituents' opinions.²⁵ They showed that legislators vary considerably in the extent to which they execute their perceptions of constituency opinions. Moreover, correspondence between perceptions of opinions and legislators' behavior varies greatly with the issue. Miller and Stokes were fortunate in also having data on actual constituency opinions for comparison with legislators' perceptions; these data made their study the pioneering effort that it is. But even without these data, their study is important for its findings on behavior and perceptions.

Finally, future research should certainly seek to establish connections between representational roles and legislative behavior. Legislators' perceptions are important variables affecting representational behavior, but it is the behavior of the representatives which we are ultimately interested in explaining. Data on bill sponsorship and roll call voting, for example, should be included in research on representational behavior.

To summarize, further research on representational behavior should concentrate first on developing better measures of representational roles. These measures should then be related to data on legislators' perceptions and behavior in an attempt to validate propositions contained in the theoretical framework. And throughout the process, of course, careful attention should be given to the elaboration and refinement of theory on representational behaviors.