Path: Table of Contents > Essay on Party Politics > Party 355
Ecuadorian Concentration of Social Forces, 355
Variables and Codes for 1950-1962
For the concepts and variables below, use these links to Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey:
Governmental Status
Issue Orientation
Goal Orientation
Organizational Complexity
Organizational Power
Organizational Coherence
Membership Involvement
The "ac" code is for "adequacy-confidence"--a data quality measure ranging from 0 (low) to 9 (high)
Party name and code number
EcuadorianConcentration of Social Forces, 355
Contracion de Fuerzas Populares, CFP

Institutionalization Variables
, 1.01-1.06
1.01 year of origin and 1.02 name changes
1950, AC9
0, AC9
The Concentration of Popular Forces began as an active Party in 1950, founded by Carlos Guevara Moreno. Throughout the literature this Party was constantly referred to as the Concentration of Popular Forces, and thus did not seem to undergo any name changes during its entire existence.
1.03 organizational discontinuity
0. AC8
In 1950, 1500 members of the Concentration of Popular Forces quit the Party because of the practices of their leader Guevara Moreno. The nomination of another leader besides Guevara, in an effort to reunify the Party, may have split Party lines even further.
1.04 leadership competition
12, AC9
Carlos Guevara Moreno founded the Concentration of Popular Forces in 1950. He remained the leader of this Party and ran for president in 1956. He lost, and three years later, in 1959, was ousted by a majority of the members of the CFP. He was replaced by Vicente Norero de Lucca just before the 1960 elections.
1.05 legislative instability
Instability is .01, AC6
The data on legislative representation for the CFP is not good, especially before 1956. It seems that the
Party had 10 percent of the seats in 1950 and 1951 but that it lost all its seats until the presidential
elections of 1956, when it again won 10 percent. Its representation dropped again in 1960 to 2 percent.
1.06 electoral instability
Instability is 1.33, AC4
The high instability score for the CFP is due to the fact that it sponsored a candidate for the presidency only in 1956, when Guevara won 24 percent of the vote.

Governmental Status Variables, 2.01-2.07
2.01 government discrimination
-4 for 1950-56, AC5
0 for 1957-62, AC3
It is difficult to code the CFP on government discrimination because of the problem in separating the treatment given Guevara, the CFP leader, and the CFP itself. In 1952, the CFP was indeed denied access to government owned newspapers, and following the elections that year, Guevara was banned from the country. But he was allowed to return and to run as the CFP presidential candidate in 1956. Basically, however, it seems that the CFP itself was not the target of severe government discrimination. In the second period, there were no incidents of repression reported against either Guevara or the CFP.
2.02 governmental leadership
0 out of 7 for 1950-56, AC9
0 out of 6 for 1957-62, AC9
During our time period, the perennial leader of the Concentration of Popular Forces, Carlos Guevara Moreno, never became president of Ecuador, although he ran a strong third in the 1956 presidential election.
2.03 cabinet participation
0 out of 7 for 1950-56, AC4
0 out of 6 for 1957-62, AC4
It appears that the CFP never received any cabinet positions during our time period.
2.04 national participation
3, AC8
This Party was established by the mayor of Guayaquil, Guevara Moreno. Thus support for it came mainly from this area. In the 1956 election, the CFP received 77 percent of the vote from the coastal area, which contains Guayaquil, although the region cast only 44 percent of the total vote.
2.05 legislative strength
Strength is .04 for 1950-56, AC5, and .07 for 1957-62, AC8
The data on legislative representation for the CFP is not good, especially before 1956. It seems that the
Party had 10 percent of the seats in 1950 and 1951 but that it lost all its seats until the presidential
elections of 1956, when it again won 10 percent. Its representation dropped again in 1960 to 2 percent.
2.06 electoral strength
Strength is .24 for 1950-56, AC6
The high instability score for the CFP is due to the fact that it sponsored a candidate for the presidency
only in 1956, when Guevara won 24 percent of the vote.
2.07 outside origin
5, AC9
The Concentration of Popular Forces was founded by Carlos Guevara Moreno. Previously, he was a legislative member and a member of the president's cabinet. At the time he founded the Concentration of Popular Forces, he was mayor of Guayaquil.

Issue Orientation Variables, 5.01-5.15
5.01 ownership of means of production
No information.
5.02 government role in economic planning
No information.
5.03 redistribution of wealth
No information.
5.04 social welfare
No information.
5.05 secularization of society
No information.
5.06 support of the military
No information.
5.07 alignment with east-west blocs
0, AC3
The Concentration of Popular Forces was thought to be a Nazi-Fascist Party. Moreno was previously a Communist.
5.08 anti-colonialism
No information.
5.09 supranational integration
No information.
5.10 national integration
No information.
5.11 electoral participation
No information,
5.12 protection of civil rights
No information.
5.13 interference with civil liberties
No information.
5.14 / 5.15 us--soviet experts left-right ratings
US says 3 non-Communist left
Soviets say 2, founded by representatives of various classes, from the proletariat to the bourgeoisie.

Goal Orientation Variables, 6.01-6.55
6.00 open competition in the electoral process
2 for 1st half, AC6
2 for 2nd half, AC3
Although Guevara ran for the presidency in 1956, electoral competition played only part of the CFP strategy.
6.10 restricting Party competition
1, AC6
Guevara headed the anti-Ponce Forces in 1956 which attempted to keep Ponce from assuming the presidency.
6.20 subverting the political system
1, AC6
Guevara headed a plot to overthrow the Plaza government in 1951. Subversive activity but later allowed to return.
6.30 propagandizing ideas and program
6.31, 6.32, 6.33, 6.34, AC1
No information.
6.50 providing for welfare of Party members
6.51, 6.52, 6.53, 6.54, 6.55, AC1
No information.

Autonomy Variables, 7.01-7.05
7.01 sources of funds
There is no information in our data collection describing the source of CFP funds.
7.02 source of members
6, AC3
Guevara Moreno appealed to many, ranging from wealthy businessmen to the discontented lumpen proletariat, especially in Guayaquil. Because the CFP has incorporated the lumpen proletariat of Guayaquil, the Party probably has no membership requirements.
7.03 sources of leaders
The only leader whose background is illustrated at any length in our data is Guevara Moreno. We are told that he was minister of the interior and mayor of Guayaquil. In reverse of this governmental orientation, it is important to note that he was allied with the Communists before forming his Party, and was in an alliance in 1962. He can hardly be considered from the governmental bureaucracy (which would lead one to misinterpret his political leanings as pro-government). He is generally anti-government during our time period, becoming Velasco's enemy (after one-time alliance) and strongly anti-Conservative. This variable should not be coded because it would give us the wrong impression of Guevara Moreno and a narrow description of the leadership of the CFP.
7.04 relations with domestic parties
5 for 1st half, AC3
5 for 2nd half, AC5
During the first half of our time period, the CFP supported Velasco in his regime. The data does not fully describe what type of alliance this was, but it certainly was not a lasting one. Velasco grew tired (or afraid) of Guevara Moreno and relieved him of his governmental duties. Around 1960 the CFP entered into a nongovernmental (perhaps anti-governmental is a better description) alliance with the Communists and the Socialists. The dependence or responsibility engendered is not considered to be particularly great in this second alliance.
7.05 relations with foreign organizations
5, AC3
It appears that this Party, with its caudillistic beginnings, is a national Party with no international linkages.

Organizational Complexity Variables, 8.01-8.07
8.01 structural articulation
4. AC5
The information for this variable is in the forms of indirect statements about the CFP. There appear to be at least two distinct national organs, an executive and a convention (following the structure of the Liberal and Conservative parties). But there is no further information describing the responsibilities or the selection process of the membership of these Party bodies.
8.02 intensiveness of organization
There is no documentation of the structural levels of the CFP.
8.03 extensiveness of organization
There is no information defining the local structure and its regional variation of strength, besides the fact that the CFP stronghold is Guayaquil.
8.04 frequency of local meetings
There is no information concerning the frequency of local meetings.
8.05 frequency of national meetings
Our data collection does not enumerate the national meetings during our time period.
8.06 maintaining records
2, AC5
Guevara Moreno's weekly, 'El Momento,' is famous for caustic remarks about Ecuadorean governmental policy and CFP (or Guevara Moreno) propaganda. As with the other Ecuadorean parties, there are no membership lists. There is also no evidence of a Party archive for the CFP.
8.07 pervasiveness of organization
0, AC3
There is no evidence in our data collection of any ancillary socioeconomic organizations of the CFP. Naturally, they may have a tendency to belong to other organizations, such as the Guayaquil workers union. But it does not appear that this organization is directly related to the CFP.

Organizational Power Variables, 9.01-9.08
9.01 nationalization of structure
There is no information defining the structural hierarchy of the CFP.
9.02 selecting the national leader
8, AC7
It appears that there may be some institutionalized means of selecting the national leader, but either it has not often been used (except temporarily during Guevara moron's ouster), or Guevara Moreno is the founder/leader and the presidential candidate of the CFP, or the mode of writing about this Party has become institutionalized into defining Guevara Moreno as the self-selecting leader (caudillo) although he is actually selected by a governing body. (This is a possibility as seen in the action taken by the CFP leaders during Guevara Moreno's purge. If there was more information about this event and the means by which Guevara Moreno regained power, it may have added a new dimension to the possible coding of this variable.) There is no doubt that Guevara Moreno is generally the national spokesman, but perhaps the literature does not emphasize the power of the Party structure.
9.03 selecting parliamentary candidates
Our data collection does not document the CFP selection of parliamentary candidates.
9.04 allocating funds
There is no information about the allocation of funds by the CFP.
9.05 formulating policy
The formulation of Party policy is not described for the CFP.
9.06 controlling communications
7, AC3
If we can define Guevara Moreno's weekly, 'El Momento,' as always speaking for the CFP, we can then view the control of communications of the CFP as being national. There is not really sufficient evidence as to the relationship between El Momento and Party leadership. Therefore, this variable is given the lowest adequacy confidence code.
9.01 administering discipline
4, AC3
In reference to this variable we have only the cases where Guevara Moreno quit the Party and where he was temporarily ousted. It appears that top Party leaders caused his actions in both decisions.
9.08 leadership concentration
6, AC7
Guevara Moreno is generally seen as the CFP caudillo who is able to direct the Party. The only problem with concluding this never-failing leadership for the Party is that in 1958 he quit the Party temporarily in an effort to re-integrate angry Party members, and in 1959 he was ousted temporarily. It is not discussed whether the temporary leader was also considered the centralized authority, or if the authority existed in some other group during this time. These are the exceptions, it is generally fair to say that Guevara Moreno is the central leader of the Party.

Coherence Variables, 10.01-10.06
10.01 legislative cohesion
As with the other Ecuadorean parties, the CFP may have had intra-party dissension during our time period, but there is no information in our data collection as to its reflection in the parliamentary cohesion of the Party.
10.02 ideological factionalism
There do not appear to be any factional tendencies in the CFP that are created by ideological differences.
10.03 issue factionalism
2, AC5
Protest by various groups in the CFP leads to disruption and disagreement among members. Often great numbers may (temporarily) leave the Party, but it does not appear that factions are formed in the sense of a group of Party members organized to act as a permanent bloc within or outside of the Party. These people simply leave, provoked by a member of the Party. It is not described how or whether these people return to the Party fold, but these momentary disruptions appear to be effective protests.
10.04 leadership factionalism
AC1 for 1st half
2 for 2nd half, AC6
My interpretation of the data is that Guevara Moreno's 1959 ouster was not performed by a faction supporting a specific leader, but a group of leaders (perhaps an institutionalized organ) who felt that in order to retain unity in the Party, they would have to oust Guevara Moreno, at least temporarily. There is no evidence of this 'coup' being part of a greater leadership competition among factions.
10.05 strategic or tactical factionalism
There is no information enabling me to define factionalism caused by strategy disputes in the CFP.
10.06 Party purges
0, AC5
There is no evidence of a true purge of CFP members during our time period. The only `purge' was really more of a disciplinary action against Guevara Moreno in an effort to re-unite the dissatisfied INIP.

Involvement Variables, 11.01-11.06
 11.01 membership requirements
0, AC3
There is no indication of any membership requirements in the data. And it is assumed there are no requirements.
11.02 membership participation
There is no data relating to the levels of Party participation by the membership during our time period.
11.03 material incentives
There is no information describing the possibility of material incentives for militants in the CFP. At first one might attempt to code this variable by the fact that the CFP, as a perpetual opposition Party during most of our time period, could not offer strong material incentives, but it is important to remember that the CFP rules Guayaquil and thus material incentives may be available in that specific region.
11.04 purposive incentives
0, AC3
Because there is no reference to a Party program, it is assumed that purposive incentives cannot be a significant motivational factor.
11.05 doctrinism
0, AC3
There is no evidence of a written doctrine for the CFP. The fact that the Party is a young nationally-oriented Party supports the conclusion that there probably is no such body of written literature.
11.06 personalism
3 for 1st half, AC3
2 for 2nd half, AC3
Our data gives two opposing impressions of the importance of personalism to the CFP. One impression is based on the word choice of the authors who spoke about the CFP. They constantly refer to Guevara Moreno as a caudillo: a personalistic leader, a leader who selects himself and attracts his members by his charisma. Yet there are unanswered questions developing from this interpretation--why was he ousted in 1959, and why did he temporarily step down from power in 1958. It appears that Guevara Moreno's power and authority were limited in some way; that his charismatic hold was not complete. Further investigation should be made on this subject in order to clear up the disagreement evident in the available data.