The "ac" code is for "adequacy-confidence"--a
data
quality measure ranging from 0 (low) to 9
(high)
Party Name and Code Number
Indian Communist Party, 082
Institutionalization
Variables, 1.01-1.06
1.01 Year of Origin and 1.02 Name
Changes
1925, AC7
0, AC9
A variety of dates are cited in the
literature for the founding of the Communist Party of India. Some
writers give 1925 as the origin, when the party was said to be
founded on a covert basis. Others give 1927 or 1928, and still
others fix the origin in 1933 or 1934. Because the CPI itself
establishes the party's founding at 1925, this date will be
favored for this code. There have been no name changes of the
CPI.
1.03 Organizational
Discontinuity
5, AC7
The CPI experienced a minor split in the
late 1940's, when opposition developed over its armed revolution
policy, and hundreds were expelled from the party. There was also
a significant drop in party membership during this period. Another
minor split occurred in 1955, when Harishchandra Patil and about
200 followers left the CPI for the Congress Party. Other minor
losses might have occurred during our time period, but the
organization remained surprisingly stable, given the internal
dissent and factionalism. Following our time period, the party did
split into two, and later three, distinct organizations, but that
is not included in our coding.
1.04 Leadership competition
14, AC7
There were numerous leadership changes
during our time period. B.T. Ranadive was general secretary from
1948 to 1950. He was followed by C. Rajeshwar Rao from 1950 to
1951. A.K.Ghosh then served from 1951 until his death in 1962. He
was succeeded by Namboodiripad as general secretary, but S.A.
Dange was elected to the new and presumably more important post of
chairman. Although the changes were accomplished through votes of
the central committee, the early changes, at least, reflected
inner power struggles as much as overt processes.
1.05 Legislative Instability
Instability is .31, AC8
Only one source (The Making of the Indian
Republic, by P. Misra) deals with the 1946 election to the
constituent assembly, later the provisional parliament. It appears
that no communists won seats in this body, and that the CPI
representation was gained first in 1952, with the first general
elections to the Lok Sabha in 1951-52.
1.06 Electoral Instability
Instability is .33, AC9
During our time period, elections were held
in 1951-52, 1957, and 1962. The Communist Party won only 4 percent
of the vote in the first election, but won 10 percent in each of
the others.
Governmental Status Variables,
2.01-2.07
2.05 Legislative Strength
Strength is .04 for 1950-56, AC9, and .06
for 1957-62, AC9
Only one source (The Making of the Indian
Republic, by P. Misra) deals with the 1946 election to the
constituent assembly, later the provisional parliament. It appears
that no communists won seats in this body, and that the CPI
representation was gained first in 1952, with the first general
elections to the Lok Sabha in 1951-52.
2.06 Electoral Strength
Strength is .04 for 1950-56, AC9, and .10
for 1957-62 , AC9
During our time period, elections were held
in 1951-52, 1957, and 1962. The Communist Party won only 4 percent
of the vote in the first election, but won 10 percent in each of
the others.
2.01 Government Discrimination
6 for 1950-56, AC9
-6 for 1957-62, AC9
Although in the more recent years, the
government became a little less severe with the CPI, it
systematically opposed the party by harassing its leaders through
travel restrictions, limiting its meetings, and conducting an
intensive anti-communist propaganda campaign.
2.02 Governmental Leadership
0 out of 7 for 1950-56, AC9
0 out of 6 for 1957-62, AC9
There is no ambiguous information
concerning this variable. There is no question as to the fact of
who had been the national leader of India since 1950, and it was
never a communist.
2.03 Cabinet Participation
0 out of 7 for 1950-56, AC9
0 out of 6 for 1957-62, AC9
There is no mention at all in the
literature of a member of the Communist Party belonging to the
cabinet.
2.04 National Participation
4, AC9
Dividing India into five regional zones
(see Zagoria, 1971), we find the composition of Communist Party
identifiers deviating from the distribution of the electorate
across these zones by an average of 10.6 percentage points, based
on the 1961 all-India poll. Its greatest strength lay along the
southern tip of the sub-continent and along the southern coast, in
the five states of Kerala, Madras, Andhra, Orissa, and West
Bengal. The CPI obtained from about 60 to 80 percent of its vote
in the three elections during our time period from these five
states, which contributed only about 33 percent of the total
vote.
2.07 Outside Origin
12, AC7
Several elements were involved in the founding of the CPI. There
is agreement that the very early plans for the party were
discussed in the city of Tashkent in the USSR in the 1920"s. M.N.
Roy, an Indian active in the international communist movement, is
cited most frequently as the chief founder of the party, along
with such others as Ahmed, Ghate, and Dange. But agents of the
British Communist Party are also given credit for its founding.
Many of the Indian founders later served time in jail for their
activities in the CPI. The party is given the most extreme score
on this variable because foreign nationals were definitely
involved in its creation.
Issue Orientation Variables, 5.01-5.15
5.01 Ownership of Means of
Production
3, AC9
Although socialism was the long run goal of
the party, it was not being advocated to take place immediately.
The policy which the CPI considered as practical was
nationalization of foreign industries and the heavy basic
industries (e.g. mining). The CPI believed in government
regulation of all industries, but ownership of only the basic
industries and not ownership of all of them, by any
means.
5.02 Government Role in Economic
Planning
5, AC9
Throughout the history of the party, the
CPI indicated that the government should play a large role in the
economic planning of the country. The party's major criticism of
the government's planning was that it was not strong enough nor
extensive enough. The government should be allowed to decide what
industries should be promoted and what the national economic
priorities should be.
5.03 Redistribution of Wealth
5, AC9
The Communist Party unambiguously stated in
all its goals that a drastic redistribution of wealth should take
place in India. Covering everything from land, to taxes, to
minimum and maximum incomes, the CPI felt one of its main
responsibilities was to the suppressed masses of
India.
5.04 Social Welfare
5, AC9
The CPI realized that because of the
dreadful conditions of the majority of the Indians concerning such
problems as famine and epidemics, a wide reaching program of
social welfare had to be initiated. The programs which the CPI
liked to see initiated were very complete, covering all aspects of
welfare and including all individuals in need of help.
5.05 Secularization of Society
0, AC8
The Communist Party took two stands
concerning religion, which although they are not ambiguous or
contradictory, they must allow the variable to be coded as zero.
On the one hand, the CPI believed in a secular state with no ties
between government and religion, yet at the same time, it took a
stand of religious toleration and maintained the belief that the
rights of religious minorities had to be maintained. The highest
confidence cannot be given because there is not quite enough
information to be found concerning this code.
5.06 Support of the Military
0, AC3
There is very little information in the
literature which indicates the Communist Party's stand on
government allocation of resources to armed forces. This in itself
would seem to indicate that the party was not pro-military. The
data which has been collected shows the CPI maintaining two
contradictory positions. The CPI was interested in improving the
military so it would aid the people, and at the same time it also
demanded military budget cuts.
5.07 Alignment with East-West
Blocs
3 for 1st half, AC9
0 for 2nd half, AC8
The attitude which the Communist Party
maintained towards the west changed from 1950 to 1962. During the
earlier time period, the party was anti-American and pro-Russian,
advocating ties with the Soviet Union. The policy of the party
during the later time period changed, and it became contradictory.
Some sources cite anti-American attitudes, others cite a
benevolent attitude towards the West at the expense of the East. A
great deal of this contradictory information may have been due to
the growing internal split concerning CPI policy. The second time
period has been coded with a confidence of 8, taking into
consideration the fact that more information might clear up this
somewhat contradictory information. However, many sources are
cited, and the contradiction seems to be inherent in the party and
not in the information.
5.08 Anti-Colonialism
5, AC9
The CPI believed that one of the main
reasons that India was not advancing as fast as desired was due to
the oppressive presence of Britain. The CPI did not want to remain
a member of the commonwealth or to have any economic exploitation
by this country. Not only was it against British control over
India, it was also for the causes of all remaining colonies
wishing independence, and the CPI tried to support
them.
5.09 Supranational Integration
0, AC8
The CPI's position on surpranational
integration, the establishment of economic and political unions
with other countries, was ambiguous. It was against monopolistic
control and exploitation of India by foreign nations on one hand,
but then it said it would like to have economic relations with
some countries at other times it said that foreign trade should be
taxed. The CPI did not have a clear-cut stand on such an issue and
often states positions which were contradictory.
5.10 National Integration
3 for 1st half, AC8
1 for 2nd half, AC8
It seems that the CPI changed from a
radical anti-national attitude concerning national integration
towards one which was more moderate. In the early years, the CPI
advocated the creation of linguistic provinces and the position
that these provinces voluntarily belong to the Indian nation and
should be allowed to leave whenever they felt that national Indian
policy went against there views. In the later years, the CPI
maintained its positions concerning linguistic provinces, but no
more mention was made about the system of voluntary membership in
the union by the separate provinces. The CPI always recognized the
fact that India is made up of many different types of people with
different views, cultures and languages. Its stand was always that
these differences must be respected and not
suppressed.
5.11 Electoral Participation
5, AC8
The sources unambiguously state that the
CPI was for universal adult suffrage. Unfortunately, only two
sources can be found which state this fact.
5.12 Protection of Civil Rights
5, AC9
The Communist Party stood for the civil
rights of all individuals throughout its history. It would not
tolerate any form of discrimination. It wished to destroy all
lingering discriminatory actions of the past, particularly those
of caste, untouchability, and the inferiority of
females.
5.13 Interference with Civil
Liberties
3, AC9
An unambiguous stand was maintained by the
Communist Party that there should be complete freedom of speech
and press. Not only should there be no control by the government,
there should be no control by the bourgeoisie. The government and
the bourgeoisie are the two monopolizing forces at this
time.
5.14 / 5.15 US--Soviet Experts Left-Right
Ratings
US says 4, communist
Soviets say 3, represents the interests of
the working class, the peasants, and the national patriotic middle
classes of India.
Goal Orientation Variables, 6.01-6.55
6.00 Open Competition in the Electoral
Process
3 for 1st half, AC9
4 for 2nd half, AC9
Since 1950, the communists of India changed
their attitude towards elections to one which was more and more
legal and democratic. In the early 1950s, the CPI was still more
or less committed to a policy of armed revolution. However, after
the elections of 1951-52, the CPI saw that it could gain more
power through the electoral process than through revolution. But
still, the CPI maintained that ultimately its policy was one of
revolution. However, in 1957-58, with increased electoral
strength, the CPI changed in attitude and made a general decision
to devote itself entirely to the democratic process of elections.
Revolution was no longer maintained by the vast majority of the
members of the CPI. As always there were individuals who held out
for revolution, but these members were overruled. This policy of
non-revolution was mainly the cause for the split in
1963-64.
6.10 Restricting Party
Competition
0, AC9
There is no indication in the literature
that the CPI was committed to a policy of restricting party
competition. The CPI did, to a great extent, cooperate with other
parties during the elections, which was done since the party
system in India called for such a procedure. There were a great
many local parties, and due to the great amount of sectionalism in
the country, the CPI often joined with their local parties to
achieve electoral success. This policy cannot be viewed as one of
restricting party competition, since it helped both parties gain
power when as separate powers they would not have had much
success.
6.20 Subverting the Political
System
1 for 1st half, AC9
0 for 2nd half, AC9
The CPI discontinued it policy of
subverting the political process in two stages. The change began
when Ranadive was removed in 1950, and was completed when Rao was
removed in 1951 and Ghosh became the general secretary. The main
reason that working through the elctoral system became so popular
with the CPI was because of the great electoral success it was
achieving (relative to the rest of the opposition parties).
Although there was still some talk that the CPI never completely
gave up revolutionary means, the evidence of the party policy at
the top and the vast amount of time and effort the CPI devoted to
elections suggested that the talk about a violent revolution was
mostly talk.
6.30 Propagandizing Ideas and
Program
6.31--2, AC9.
The CPI considered the newspapers it
published be its main source of information to the people. The
journals published by the party were also important. No mention at
all is made of communist use of tv to propagate its goals. It is
assumed that no information is mentioned not only because tv was
probably nationalized as was radio but also because there was
probably not widespread ownership of tv. However, the CPI did use
the media of films to advance its ideas, which can be considered
to be similar to tv. The nationalization of the radio made it
impossible for the CPI to use the Indian radio to advance its
goals. However, it encouraged the people to listen to the Moscow
and Peking broadcasts which could be received in
India.
6.32--1, AC8.
Although only 2 documents were found
concerning the operation of party schools, they both state the
same facts so that a high confidence code can be given. Although
there had been some attempt at party schools, this attempt was
half- hearted. Lack of organization and inspiration hampered the
effectiveness of these schools.
6.33--2, AC9.
The CPI to a great extent exposed the
public to its ideas through the use of resolutions and platforms.
After most major conferences and meetings where major changes were
made, resolutions of the party were established. During all three
general elections the CPI made its position on all major issues in
its election platform known throughout the country.
6.34--2, AC9.
The CPI published policy papers as a means
of educating the public. Quite prolific in its publication of the
current CPI policy, the Communist Party always made the current
CPI policy concerning most major issues.
6.50 Providing for Welfare of Party
Members
6.51--1, AC6.
The small amount of information concerning
this code seems to indicate that there was some amount of welfare
assistance by the party members, but not to any great
extent.
6.52--0, AC3.
There is no data concerning CPI sponsored
employment services. This may indicate that the party did not run
employment services, but this was not clearly stated in the
literatue.
6.53- 0, AC6.
Even though there is no data concerning
this code, it has been given an adequacy confidence of six for two
reasons. The first reason is because the lack of information seems
to indicate that no such activity took place. But more important
than this is the fact that the CPI was very unpopular with the
Congress government in power, and it seems that it would not
follow the practice of interceding with the government on the
citizen's behalf since the party would probably be
ineffective.
6.54--1, AC6.
Because of the one information source which
gave data on this code plus the search for code number 6.32, it
seems that this code can be fairly well supported. The CPI
generally had well intended aims for education of the party
members, but with the lack of organization and enthusiasm, it
could not fully carry out its goal.
6.55--2, AC8.
From the sources available, its seems that
the CPI engaged frequently in providing recreational activities
for its members. The CPI used these recreational activities, such
as drama clubs, for sources of propaganda and a method of
indoctrination.
Autonomy Variables, 7.01-7.05
7.01 Sources of Funds
7, AC7
There is little hard information available
in the file on the sources of CPI funds. Many writers contend that
the party received funds from the Soviet Union before World War
Two, and some hold that Moscow supported the party afterwards as
well. It is well documented that the CPI received large
contributions from wealthy individuals on occasion, but the extent
of this support is not clear. What is certain is that the party
collected modest dues from each member, and that it also levied
special assessments when necessary, e.g., at election time. It is
also clear that the party obtained some funds, the amount is
debatable, from the sale of foreign publications supplied at
little or no cost to the Indian party. Moreover, the party
received support from its governmental officials in the form of
salary rebates. Although it is a common theme in the literature
that the CPI was short on funds, the picture of CPI funding is one
of numerous sources of support, most of which had origins in the
party itself. Therefore, the party is coded high on autonomy for
this variable.
7.02 Source of Members
5, AC9
Membership in the CPI was taken out
directly by individuals, and there was no provision for
organizational membership within the party.
7.03 Sources of Leaders
1 (sector 03), AC8
The two sources which discuss the
composition of the CPI parliamentary deputies both emphasize their
non-proletarian backgrounds. Apparently the same was true of
delegates to the CPI congress. Most of the deputies and delegates
were from the professions--law, education, and journalism--and
more than half had college educations.
7.04 Relations with Domestic
Parties
7, AC7
The CPI clearly engaged in electoral
alliances with other parties at the local level and occasionally
negotiated broader alliances at the state level. Usually, these
were entered with leftist parties, although the socialist party
continually refused such coalitions. But more generally, the
alliances suited the local situation, with the goal being
opposition to the congress party. At the national level, however,
the CPI was far more guarded in seeking alliances with other
parties. It once explored the formation of a united democratic
opposition to the Congress Party in parliament, but the coalition
failed, in part, because the CPI did not wish to surrender
autonomy of action in such a group.
7.05 Relations with Foreign
Organizations
1 for 1st half, AC9
2 for 2nd half, AC7
Discussions of the CPI are replete with
references to external influences upon the Indian party.
Especially during the first part of the time period, party policy
was said to be guided from Moscow, with representatives of the
British Communist Party providing the communications pipeline. For
example, the shift in CPI strategy in 1951 from armed revolution
to constitutional opposition was identified as prompted by Soviet
foreign policy needs. But Soviet influence began to weaken
relative to Chinese influence, and this process was hastened by
the 20th congress of the CPSU in 1956. By the time of the
Sino-India border dispute in 1959, the CPI was exercising some
maneuverability between the two outside influences, although it
was clearly linked to international communism. These links were
drawn thin, however, following the armed clash with China, when
the CPI defended the Congress government in opposing the
communists with force.
Organizational Complexity Variables,
8.01-8.07
8.01 Structural Articulation
9 for 1st half, AC7
10 for 2nd half, AC7
Before the extraordinary congress of 1958,
the national organs of the CPI consisted of a congress, central
committee, politbureau, and a control commission for handling
party discipline. After 1958, the central executive committee and
additional secretaries were created to constitute a secretariat.
Before 1958, the central committee had and used the power of
cooptation of members. Although this power was denied the national
council, it exceeded its maximum size of 101 soon after creation.
Neither before nor after 1958 were the respective functions of the
organs clearly specified. Nowhere is there mention of a distinct
parliamentary organization.
8.02 Intensiveness of
Organization
6 for 1st half, AC9
6 for 2nd half, AC6
Before the 1958 congress, the CPI
definitely employed the classic communist cell as its basic form
of organization, with small membership and primarily a workplace
location. However, in an effort to broaden its appeal by shedding
some of its conspiratorial character, the CPI changed its
designation of local units to branch from cell. It is not clear if
this change was real or nominal, for authors continue to refer to
the cell as the basic unit. Indeed, one reports that the branches
were further divided into "groups", which would bring us back to
cell organization.
8.03 Extensiveness of
Organization
4 for 1st half, AC3
5 for 2nd half, AC3
The literature does not mention the number
or distribution of CPI cells, but some inferences might be drawn
from party candidacies for the Lok Sabha. The CPI only contested
10 percent of the seats in 1952, 21 percent in 1957, and 28
percent in 1962. Throughout this period, the CPI contested only 5
seats or fewer in the states of Assam, Gujarat, Haryana, Madhya,
Mysore, Orissa, and Rajasthan--which comprise about 30 percent of
the vote. Additionally, in 1952 the CPI contested 5 or fewer seats
in six other states, most notably the area of Uttar Pradesh, the
most populous in India. Assuming that parliamentary candidacies
reflect to some extent the distribution of party cells, one would
judge that CPI local organizations did not blanket the country
during our time period and that there were considerable gaps in
the coverage, especially in the first half of the
period.
8.04 Frequency of Local
Meetings
AC1
Surprisingly, there is no discussion of the
frequency or even character of the CPI cell meetings.
8.05 Frequency of National
Meetings
3, AC6
There are references to discussions at
central committee meetings, but few reports on the frequency of
these meetings. The one source which does observe the frequency
concludes that although the central committee was supposed to meet
every three months, it probably met less often.
8.06 Maintaining Records
16, AC7
The CPI had an extensive publishing program
in both english and the regional languages. Sale of communist
publications is said to have been a major activity of the party.
Moreover, there was a research staff that is said to have supplied
communist mp's with excellent material for parliamentary debates.
There is no lengthy discussion of membership lists, but it appears
that these were maintained with the customary care of communist
parties.
8.07 Pervasiveness of
Organization
12, AC7
No mention is made of a women's
organization affiliated to the CPI, but the all-India students
federation was communist aligned. Of more importance, however, is
the all-India trade union congress and two peasant organizations,
the more important being Kisan Sabha. During our time period,
membership of the Aitu rose above one million, with the Kisan
Sabha under a million. There was also an all-India progressive
writers association, but its importance seemed
minimal.
Organizational Power Variables, 9.01-9.08
9.01 Nationalization of
Structure
6 for 1st half, AC8
5 for 2nd half, AC6
The national organs of the CPI had more
extensive powers before the 1958 congress than afterwards. Before
the reorganization, the central committee could dissolve or
reconstitute any lower committee. This power was removed from the
central committee and relegated to the provincial committees.
Moreover, the central agencies were required to consult state
agencies when deciding on issues of importance to the state. Thus,
some element of federalism was introduced.
9.02 Selecting the National
Leader
7, AC8
The procedure for selecting the general
secretary of the party is not discussed at length, but it appears
that he was chosen by the central committee from among its
members.
9.03 Selecting Parliamentary
Candidates
5, AC8
The district committees suggested names for
candidates to the state assemblies and the Lok Sabha, the lower
house in the national parliament. These recommendations were
forwarded to the provincial committees, which finalize the
assembly choices and approved the Lok Sabha recommendations. A
central election board, named by the central committee, finalized
these candidacies.
9.04 Allocating Funds
3 for 1st half, AC6
4 for 2nd half, AC7
These codes do not quite describe the
situation. Monies came into the party at the lower levels from
monthly dues, special taxes on party members, and special fund
drives. Before 1958, the dues were used mainly at the district
level and below, and the central committee had to rely on the
provincial committees for support. After 1958, 10 percent of the
dues were earmarked for the national level, indicating some
movement toward centralization but still considerable
decentralization in collecting and allocating funds.
9.05 Formulating Policy
5, AC5
Party congresses were reported to be held
in 1953, 1956, 1958, and 1962. While the members of the central
committee did make policy on important matters, there is
considerable division of opinion on such issues within the
committee. The party congresses were thus significant from the
standpoint of policy formulation. Debate was often contentious,
and added authority accrued to positions adopted by the
congress.
9.06 Controlling Communications
7, AC9
The central committee and the politbureau
had agit-prop subcommittees, and the party's publication program
was under close supervision of the central organs, who supplied
the editors of the main publications, including the "party letter"
for members and the "central committee information document" for
provincial and district committees. The communication system is
thought to have provided a great source of power to those at the
top, although its importance faded somewhat in recent years as
international travel increased, providing alternative sources of
information.
9.07 Administering Discipline
3 for 1st half, AC6
2 for 2nd half, AC6
A control commission was elected by the
party congress to review decisions of party units relating to
discipline. But at least during the first part of our period, this
commission was thought to handle only the less important matters.
But in 1958, the commission was made more independent of the
central committee, which required a 2/3 vote to overrule its
decisions.
9.08 Leadership Concentration
4, AC5
There is general agreement on the lack of
unified leadership within the CPI, and indeed the leadership
changed hands often during our time period. At any given time, the
general secretary himself could not dictate policy without some
broader support from others on the politbureau. One source reports
that only two or three politbureau members were involved in a tiny
leadership core at any given time.
Coherence Variables, 10.01-10.06
10.01 Legislative Cohesion
1, AC3
There is really no discussion of CPI cohesiveness in parliamentary
voting. One source does state that communist mp's had to act as
disciplined factions with the state legislatures and national
parliament, however.
10.02 Ideological Factionalism
6, AC9
The CPI showed signs of left-right
factionalism throughout virtually all of our time period. In the
early 1950's, this division showed in a vote at the 1953 congress
over whether British imperialism or American imperialism was the
real enemy, which revealed a 105 to 105 tie. Later the left and
right factions drafted and presented separate resolutions to the
central committee, and these strains were felt at subsequent
congresses. The Sino-Indian border crisis produced somewhat of a
realignment of factional membership beginning in 1959, but the
basic tension was still between left and right forces, with the
rightists supporting India, or the "nationalist" position, against
the "internationalists", or pro-chinese leftists. Finally in 1964,
after our time period, the CPI formally divided into the CPI and
the CPI (m), for Marxist. Some authors refer to them simply as
CPI-right and CPI-left.
10.03 Issue Factionalism
6, AC9
Virtually every issue facing a Communist
Party becomes interpreted in ideological terms. Thus the
left-right factionalism discussed for variable 10. 02 is reflected
here. But the choice between the US or Britain as the real enemy
facing the party in the first half of our period, and the choice
between supporting china or India in the border clash are
identified as issues which provoked factions in their own
right.
10.04 Leadership Factionalism
1, AC5
Although the left-right factions became
identified with individual leaders, e.g., Ranadive for the
internationalist or leftist wing and dange for the nationalist or
rightist wing, their leadership was not based on any form of
personalism but instead on the perceived merits of the issue of
ideology.
10.05 Strategic or Tactical
Factionalism
6, AC9
Again, the ideological dimension overlays
factions based on strategy and tactics. The rightist strategy
favored parliamentary participation and constitutional opposition.
The leftist one favored the more violent variants of the class
struggle. During our period, the rightist strategy won over the
armed struggle in 1951, when the CPI participated in the
elections, but the revolutionary alternative was always present,
ready to be pushed by a significant group of activists. The party
headquarters unit, the PHQ group, was one concrete manifestation
of the formal organization adopted by the rightist
faction.
10.06 Party Purges
1 for 1st half, AC8
0 for 2nd half, AC5
In 1950, the central committee, under
Ranadive's leadership, dissolved the Bengal provincial committee,
expelled or suspended perhaps hundreds of members, and even
succeeded in expelling one of their own numbers. This is counted
as a minor purge. There appears to be no comparable expulsion of
members or leaders during the second half of our time
period.
Involvement Variables, 11.01-11.06
11.01 Membership Requirements
7, AC9
The CPI followed the standard practice of communist parties,
requiring two members to sponsor an individual for membership, and
the individual to serve a period of candidacy--six months in the
CPI, and then to renew his membershipannually. Each member paid
monthly dues.
11.02 Membership Participation
5, AC3
One source says that the Communist Party
worked its members very hard, but others report complaints from
the leadership of indifference to party publications. On the basis
of scanty evidence, the bulk of the members are judged to have
been militants or at least participants.
11.03 Material Incentives
0, AC3
There is no evidence about motivational
forces for CPI militants. The party is said to have recruited
heavily from the educated unemployed, but it was hardly in a
position to offer many jobs. Although the party employed hundreds
of workers, it did not command enough resources to support at
least a third of the militants.
11.04 Purposive Incentives
3, AC3
The literature suggests that purposive
incentives did not serve to motivate all party militants. In some
areas, caste rivalries drew members into the CPI, and the social
links are said to have been important for those alienated from the
traditional society.
11.05 Doctrinism
3, AC9
Although many members of the party may have
been almost completely ignorant of Marx and Engels, the leaders
certainly were not, and quotations from authoritative communist
sources were common in party debates. Indeed, some say the
attention to theoretical abstraction in the CPI bordered on
scholasticism.
11.06 Personalism
0, AC9
One of the common themes in the literature
is that the CPI lacked leaders with commanding
personalities.