Path: Table of Contents > Essay on Party Politics > Party 082
Indian Communist Party, 082
Variables and Codes for 1950-1962
For the concepts and variables below, use these links to Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey:
Governmental Status
Issue Orientation
Goal Orientation
Organizational Complexity
Organizational Power
Organizational Coherence
Membership Involvement
The "ac" code is for "adequacy-confidence"--a data quality measure ranging from 0 (low) to 9 (high)
Party Name and Code Number
Indian Communist Party, 082

Institutionalization Variables, 1.01-1.06
1.01 Year of Origin and 1.02 Name Changes
1925, AC7
0, AC9
A variety of dates are cited in the literature for the founding of the Communist Party of India. Some writers give 1925 as the origin, when the party was said to be founded on a covert basis. Others give 1927 or 1928, and still others fix the origin in 1933 or 1934. Because the CPI itself establishes the party's founding at 1925, this date will be favored for this code. There have been no name changes of the CPI.
1.03 Organizational Discontinuity
5, AC7
The CPI experienced a minor split in the late 1940's, when opposition developed over its armed revolution policy, and hundreds were expelled from the party. There was also a significant drop in party membership during this period. Another minor split occurred in 1955, when Harishchandra Patil and about 200 followers left the CPI for the Congress Party. Other minor losses might have occurred during our time period, but the organization remained surprisingly stable, given the internal dissent and factionalism. Following our time period, the party did split into two, and later three, distinct organizations, but that is not included in our coding.
1.04 Leadership competition
14, AC7
There were numerous leadership changes during our time period. B.T. Ranadive was general secretary from 1948 to 1950. He was followed by C. Rajeshwar Rao from 1950 to 1951. A.K.Ghosh then served from 1951 until his death in 1962. He was succeeded by Namboodiripad as general secretary, but S.A. Dange was elected to the new and presumably more important post of chairman. Although the changes were accomplished through votes of the central committee, the early changes, at least, reflected inner power struggles as much as overt processes.
1.05 Legislative Instability
Instability is .31, AC8
Only one source (The Making of the Indian Republic, by P. Misra) deals with the 1946 election to the constituent assembly, later the provisional parliament. It appears that no communists won seats in this body, and that the CPI representation was gained first in 1952, with the first general elections to the Lok Sabha in 1951-52.
1.06 Electoral Instability
Instability is .33, AC9
During our time period, elections were held in 1951-52, 1957, and 1962. The Communist Party won only 4 percent of the vote in the first election, but won 10 percent in each of the others.

Governmental Status Variables, 2.01-2.07
2.05 Legislative Strength
Strength is .04 for 1950-56, AC9, and .06 for 1957-62, AC9
Only one source (The Making of the Indian Republic, by P. Misra) deals with the 1946 election to the constituent assembly, later the provisional parliament. It appears that no communists won seats in this body, and that the CPI representation was gained first in 1952, with the first general elections to the Lok Sabha in 1951-52.
2.06 Electoral Strength
Strength is .04 for 1950-56, AC9, and .10 for 1957-62 , AC9
During our time period, elections were held in 1951-52, 1957, and 1962. The Communist Party won only 4 percent of the vote in the first election, but won 10 percent in each of the others.
2.01 Government Discrimination
6 for 1950-56, AC9
-6 for 1957-62, AC9
Although in the more recent years, the government became a little less severe with the CPI, it systematically opposed the party by harassing its leaders through travel restrictions, limiting its meetings, and conducting an intensive anti-communist propaganda campaign.
2.02 Governmental Leadership
0 out of 7 for 1950-56, AC9
0 out of 6 for 1957-62, AC9
There is no ambiguous information concerning this variable. There is no question as to the fact of who had been the national leader of India since 1950, and it was never a communist.
2.03 Cabinet Participation
0 out of 7 for 1950-56, AC9
0 out of 6 for 1957-62, AC9
There is no mention at all in the literature of a member of the Communist Party belonging to the cabinet.
2.04 National Participation
4, AC9
Dividing India into five regional zones (see Zagoria, 1971), we find the composition of Communist Party identifiers deviating from the distribution of the electorate across these zones by an average of 10.6 percentage points, based on the 1961 all-India poll. Its greatest strength lay along the southern tip of the sub-continent and along the southern coast, in the five states of Kerala, Madras, Andhra, Orissa, and West Bengal. The CPI obtained from about 60 to 80 percent of its vote in the three elections during our time period from these five states, which contributed only about 33 percent of the total vote.
2.07 Outside Origin
12, AC7
Several elements were involved in the founding of the CPI. There is agreement that the very early plans for the party were discussed in the city of Tashkent in the USSR in the 1920"s. M.N. Roy, an Indian active in the international communist movement, is cited most frequently as the chief founder of the party, along with such others as Ahmed, Ghate, and Dange. But agents of the British Communist Party are also given credit for its founding. Many of the Indian founders later served time in jail for their activities in the CPI. The party is given the most extreme score on this variable because foreign nationals were definitely involved in its creation.

Issue Orientation Variables, 5.01-5.15
5.01 Ownership of Means of Production
3, AC9
Although socialism was the long run goal of the party, it was not being advocated to take place immediately. The policy which the CPI considered as practical was nationalization of foreign industries and the heavy basic industries (e.g. mining). The CPI believed in government regulation of all industries, but ownership of only the basic industries and not ownership of all of them, by any means.
5.02 Government Role in Economic Planning
5, AC9
Throughout the history of the party, the CPI indicated that the government should play a large role in the economic planning of the country. The party's major criticism of the government's planning was that it was not strong enough nor extensive enough. The government should be allowed to decide what industries should be promoted and what the national economic priorities should be.
5.03 Redistribution of Wealth
5, AC9
The Communist Party unambiguously stated in all its goals that a drastic redistribution of wealth should take place in India. Covering everything from land, to taxes, to minimum and maximum incomes, the CPI felt one of its main responsibilities was to the suppressed masses of India.
5.04 Social Welfare
5, AC9
The CPI realized that because of the dreadful conditions of the majority of the Indians concerning such problems as famine and epidemics, a wide reaching program of social welfare had to be initiated. The programs which the CPI liked to see initiated were very complete, covering all aspects of welfare and including all individuals in need of help.
5.05 Secularization of Society
0, AC8
The Communist Party took two stands concerning religion, which although they are not ambiguous or contradictory, they must allow the variable to be coded as zero. On the one hand, the CPI believed in a secular state with no ties between government and religion, yet at the same time, it took a stand of religious toleration and maintained the belief that the rights of religious minorities had to be maintained. The highest confidence cannot be given because there is not quite enough information to be found concerning this code.
5.06 Support of the Military
0, AC3
There is very little information in the literature which indicates the Communist Party's stand on government allocation of resources to armed forces. This in itself would seem to indicate that the party was not pro-military. The data which has been collected shows the CPI maintaining two contradictory positions. The CPI was interested in improving the military so it would aid the people, and at the same time it also demanded military budget cuts.
5.07 Alignment with East-West Blocs
3 for 1st half, AC9
0 for 2nd half, AC8
The attitude which the Communist Party maintained towards the west changed from 1950 to 1962. During the earlier time period, the party was anti-American and pro-Russian, advocating ties with the Soviet Union. The policy of the party during the later time period changed, and it became contradictory. Some sources cite anti-American attitudes, others cite a benevolent attitude towards the West at the expense of the East. A great deal of this contradictory information may have been due to the growing internal split concerning CPI policy. The second time period has been coded with a confidence of 8, taking into consideration the fact that more information might clear up this somewhat contradictory information. However, many sources are cited, and the contradiction seems to be inherent in the party and not in the information.
5.08 Anti-Colonialism
5, AC9
The CPI believed that one of the main reasons that India was not advancing as fast as desired was due to the oppressive presence of Britain. The CPI did not want to remain a member of the commonwealth or to have any economic exploitation by this country. Not only was it against British control over India, it was also for the causes of all remaining colonies wishing independence, and the CPI tried to support them.
5.09 Supranational Integration
0, AC8
The CPI's position on surpranational integration, the establishment of economic and political unions with other countries, was ambiguous. It was against monopolistic control and exploitation of India by foreign nations on one hand, but then it said it would like to have economic relations with some countries at other times it said that foreign trade should be taxed. The CPI did not have a clear-cut stand on such an issue and often states positions which were contradictory.
5.10 National Integration
3 for 1st half, AC8
1 for 2nd half, AC8
It seems that the CPI changed from a radical anti-national attitude concerning national integration towards one which was more moderate. In the early years, the CPI advocated the creation of linguistic provinces and the position that these provinces voluntarily belong to the Indian nation and should be allowed to leave whenever they felt that national Indian policy went against there views. In the later years, the CPI maintained its positions concerning linguistic provinces, but no more mention was made about the system of voluntary membership in the union by the separate provinces. The CPI always recognized the fact that India is made up of many different types of people with different views, cultures and languages. Its stand was always that these differences must be respected and not suppressed.
5.11 Electoral Participation
5, AC8
The sources unambiguously state that the CPI was for universal adult suffrage. Unfortunately, only two sources can be found which state this fact.
5.12 Protection of Civil Rights
5, AC9
The Communist Party stood for the civil rights of all individuals throughout its history. It would not tolerate any form of discrimination. It wished to destroy all lingering discriminatory actions of the past, particularly those of caste, untouchability, and the inferiority of females.
5.13 Interference with Civil Liberties
3, AC9
An unambiguous stand was maintained by the Communist Party that there should be complete freedom of speech and press. Not only should there be no control by the government, there should be no control by the bourgeoisie. The government and the bourgeoisie are the two monopolizing forces at this time.
5.14 / 5.15 US--Soviet Experts Left-Right Ratings
US says 4, communist
Soviets say 3, represents the interests of the working class, the peasants, and the national patriotic middle classes of India.

Goal Orientation Variables, 6.01-6.55
6.00 Open Competition in the Electoral Process
3 for 1st half, AC9
4 for 2nd half, AC9
Since 1950, the communists of India changed their attitude towards elections to one which was more and more legal and democratic. In the early 1950s, the CPI was still more or less committed to a policy of armed revolution. However, after the elections of 1951-52, the CPI saw that it could gain more power through the electoral process than through revolution. But still, the CPI maintained that ultimately its policy was one of revolution. However, in 1957-58, with increased electoral strength, the CPI changed in attitude and made a general decision to devote itself entirely to the democratic process of elections. Revolution was no longer maintained by the vast majority of the members of the CPI. As always there were individuals who held out for revolution, but these members were overruled. This policy of non-revolution was mainly the cause for the split in 1963-64.
6.10 Restricting Party Competition
0, AC9
There is no indication in the literature that the CPI was committed to a policy of restricting party competition. The CPI did, to a great extent, cooperate with other parties during the elections, which was done since the party system in India called for such a procedure. There were a great many local parties, and due to the great amount of sectionalism in the country, the CPI often joined with their local parties to achieve electoral success. This policy cannot be viewed as one of restricting party competition, since it helped both parties gain power when as separate powers they would not have had much success.
6.20 Subverting the Political System
1 for 1st half, AC9
0 for 2nd half, AC9
The CPI discontinued it policy of subverting the political process in two stages. The change began when Ranadive was removed in 1950, and was completed when Rao was removed in 1951 and Ghosh became the general secretary. The main reason that working through the elctoral system became so popular with the CPI was because of the great electoral success it was achieving (relative to the rest of the opposition parties). Although there was still some talk that the CPI never completely gave up revolutionary means, the evidence of the party policy at the top and the vast amount of time and effort the CPI devoted to elections suggested that the talk about a violent revolution was mostly talk.
6.30 Propagandizing Ideas and Program
6.31--2, AC9.
The CPI considered the newspapers it published be its main source of information to the people. The journals published by the party were also important. No mention at all is made of communist use of tv to propagate its goals. It is assumed that no information is mentioned not only because tv was probably nationalized as was radio but also because there was probably not widespread ownership of tv. However, the CPI did use the media of films to advance its ideas, which can be considered to be similar to tv. The nationalization of the radio made it impossible for the CPI to use the Indian radio to advance its goals. However, it encouraged the people to listen to the Moscow and Peking broadcasts which could be received in India.
6.32--1, AC8.
Although only 2 documents were found concerning the operation of party schools, they both state the same facts so that a high confidence code can be given. Although there had been some attempt at party schools, this attempt was half- hearted. Lack of organization and inspiration hampered the effectiveness of these schools.
6.33--2, AC9.
The CPI to a great extent exposed the public to its ideas through the use of resolutions and platforms. After most major conferences and meetings where major changes were made, resolutions of the party were established. During all three general elections the CPI made its position on all major issues in its election platform known throughout the country.
6.34--2, AC9.
The CPI published policy papers as a means of educating the public. Quite prolific in its publication of the current CPI policy, the Communist Party always made the current CPI policy concerning most major issues.
6.50 Providing for Welfare of Party Members
6.51--1, AC6.
The small amount of information concerning this code seems to indicate that there was some amount of welfare assistance by the party members, but not to any great extent.
6.52--0, AC3.
There is no data concerning CPI sponsored employment services. This may indicate that the party did not run employment services, but this was not clearly stated in the literatue.
6.53- 0, AC6.
Even though there is no data concerning this code, it has been given an adequacy confidence of six for two reasons. The first reason is because the lack of information seems to indicate that no such activity took place. But more important than this is the fact that the CPI was very unpopular with the Congress government in power, and it seems that it would not follow the practice of interceding with the government on the citizen's behalf since the party would probably be ineffective.
6.54--1, AC6.
Because of the one information source which gave data on this code plus the search for code number 6.32, it seems that this code can be fairly well supported. The CPI generally had well intended aims for education of the party members, but with the lack of organization and enthusiasm, it could not fully carry out its goal.
6.55--2, AC8.
From the sources available, its seems that the CPI engaged frequently in providing recreational activities for its members. The CPI used these recreational activities, such as drama clubs, for sources of propaganda and a method of indoctrination.

Autonomy Variables, 7.01-7.05
7.01 Sources of Funds
7, AC7
There is little hard information available in the file on the sources of CPI funds. Many writers contend that the party received funds from the Soviet Union before World War Two, and some hold that Moscow supported the party afterwards as well. It is well documented that the CPI received large contributions from wealthy individuals on occasion, but the extent of this support is not clear. What is certain is that the party collected modest dues from each member, and that it also levied special assessments when necessary, e.g., at election time. It is also clear that the party obtained some funds, the amount is debatable, from the sale of foreign publications supplied at little or no cost to the Indian party. Moreover, the party received support from its governmental officials in the form of salary rebates. Although it is a common theme in the literature that the CPI was short on funds, the picture of CPI funding is one of numerous sources of support, most of which had origins in the party itself. Therefore, the party is coded high on autonomy for this variable.
7.02 Source of Members
5, AC9
Membership in the CPI was taken out directly by individuals, and there was no provision for organizational membership within the party.
7.03 Sources of Leaders
1 (sector 03), AC8
The two sources which discuss the composition of the CPI parliamentary deputies both emphasize their non-proletarian backgrounds. Apparently the same was true of delegates to the CPI congress. Most of the deputies and delegates were from the professions--law, education, and journalism--and more than half had college educations.
7.04 Relations with Domestic Parties
7, AC7
The CPI clearly engaged in electoral alliances with other parties at the local level and occasionally negotiated broader alliances at the state level. Usually, these were entered with leftist parties, although the socialist party continually refused such coalitions. But more generally, the alliances suited the local situation, with the goal being opposition to the congress party. At the national level, however, the CPI was far more guarded in seeking alliances with other parties. It once explored the formation of a united democratic opposition to the Congress Party in parliament, but the coalition failed, in part, because the CPI did not wish to surrender autonomy of action in such a group.
7.05 Relations with Foreign Organizations
1 for 1st half, AC9
2 for 2nd half, AC7
Discussions of the CPI are replete with references to external influences upon the Indian party. Especially during the first part of the time period, party policy was said to be guided from Moscow, with representatives of the British Communist Party providing the communications pipeline. For example, the shift in CPI strategy in 1951 from armed revolution to constitutional opposition was identified as prompted by Soviet foreign policy needs. But Soviet influence began to weaken relative to Chinese influence, and this process was hastened by the 20th congress of the CPSU in 1956. By the time of the Sino-India border dispute in 1959, the CPI was exercising some maneuverability between the two outside influences, although it was clearly linked to international communism. These links were drawn thin, however, following the armed clash with China, when the CPI defended the Congress government in opposing the communists with force.

Organizational Complexity Variables, 8.01-8.07

8.01 Structural Articulation
9 for 1st half, AC7
10 for 2nd half, AC7
Before the extraordinary congress of 1958, the national organs of the CPI consisted of a congress, central committee, politbureau, and a control commission for handling party discipline. After 1958, the central executive committee and additional secretaries were created to constitute a secretariat. Before 1958, the central committee had and used the power of cooptation of members. Although this power was denied the national council, it exceeded its maximum size of 101 soon after creation. Neither before nor after 1958 were the respective functions of the organs clearly specified. Nowhere is there mention of a distinct parliamentary organization.
8.02 Intensiveness of Organization
6 for 1st half, AC9
6 for 2nd half, AC6
Before the 1958 congress, the CPI definitely employed the classic communist cell as its basic form of organization, with small membership and primarily a workplace location. However, in an effort to broaden its appeal by shedding some of its conspiratorial character, the CPI changed its designation of local units to branch from cell. It is not clear if this change was real or nominal, for authors continue to refer to the cell as the basic unit. Indeed, one reports that the branches were further divided into "groups", which would bring us back to cell organization.
8.03 Extensiveness of Organization
4 for 1st half, AC3
5 for 2nd half, AC3
The literature does not mention the number or distribution of CPI cells, but some inferences might be drawn from party candidacies for the Lok Sabha. The CPI only contested 10 percent of the seats in 1952, 21 percent in 1957, and 28 percent in 1962. Throughout this period, the CPI contested only 5 seats or fewer in the states of Assam, Gujarat, Haryana, Madhya, Mysore, Orissa, and Rajasthan--which comprise about 30 percent of the vote. Additionally, in 1952 the CPI contested 5 or fewer seats in six other states, most notably the area of Uttar Pradesh, the most populous in India. Assuming that parliamentary candidacies reflect to some extent the distribution of party cells, one would judge that CPI local organizations did not blanket the country during our time period and that there were considerable gaps in the coverage, especially in the first half of the period.
8.04 Frequency of Local Meetings
Surprisingly, there is no discussion of the frequency or even character of the CPI cell meetings.
8.05 Frequency of National Meetings
3, AC6
There are references to discussions at central committee meetings, but few reports on the frequency of these meetings. The one source which does observe the frequency concludes that although the central committee was supposed to meet every three months, it probably met less often.
8.06 Maintaining Records
16, AC7
The CPI had an extensive publishing program in both english and the regional languages. Sale of communist publications is said to have been a major activity of the party. Moreover, there was a research staff that is said to have supplied communist mp's with excellent material for parliamentary debates. There is no lengthy discussion of membership lists, but it appears that these were maintained with the customary care of communist parties.
8.07 Pervasiveness of Organization
12, AC7
No mention is made of a women's organization affiliated to the CPI, but the all-India students federation was communist aligned. Of more importance, however, is the all-India trade union congress and two peasant organizations, the more important being Kisan Sabha. During our time period, membership of the Aitu rose above one million, with the Kisan Sabha under a million. There was also an all-India progressive writers association, but its importance seemed minimal.

Organizational Power Variables, 9.01-9.08
9.01 Nationalization of Structure
6 for 1st half, AC8
5 for 2nd half, AC6
The national organs of the CPI had more extensive powers before the 1958 congress than afterwards. Before the reorganization, the central committee could dissolve or reconstitute any lower committee. This power was removed from the central committee and relegated to the provincial committees. Moreover, the central agencies were required to consult state agencies when deciding on issues of importance to the state. Thus, some element of federalism was introduced.
9.02 Selecting the National Leader
7, AC8
The procedure for selecting the general secretary of the party is not discussed at length, but it appears that he was chosen by the central committee from among its members.
9.03 Selecting Parliamentary Candidates
5, AC8
The district committees suggested names for candidates to the state assemblies and the Lok Sabha, the lower house in the national parliament. These recommendations were forwarded to the provincial committees, which finalize the assembly choices and approved the Lok Sabha recommendations. A central election board, named by the central committee, finalized these candidacies.
9.04 Allocating Funds
3 for 1st half, AC6
4 for 2nd half, AC7
These codes do not quite describe the situation. Monies came into the party at the lower levels from monthly dues, special taxes on party members, and special fund drives. Before 1958, the dues were used mainly at the district level and below, and the central committee had to rely on the provincial committees for support. After 1958, 10 percent of the dues were earmarked for the national level, indicating some movement toward centralization but still considerable decentralization in collecting and allocating funds.
9.05 Formulating Policy
5, AC5
Party congresses were reported to be held in 1953, 1956, 1958, and 1962. While the members of the central committee did make policy on important matters, there is considerable division of opinion on such issues within the committee. The party congresses were thus significant from the standpoint of policy formulation. Debate was often contentious, and added authority accrued to positions adopted by the congress.
9.06 Controlling Communications
7, AC9
The central committee and the politbureau had agit-prop subcommittees, and the party's publication program was under close supervision of the central organs, who supplied the editors of the main publications, including the "party letter" for members and the "central committee information document" for provincial and district committees. The communication system is thought to have provided a great source of power to those at the top, although its importance faded somewhat in recent years as international travel increased, providing alternative sources of information.
9.07 Administering Discipline
3 for 1st half, AC6
2 for 2nd half, AC6
A control commission was elected by the party congress to review decisions of party units relating to discipline. But at least during the first part of our period, this commission was thought to handle only the less important matters. But in 1958, the commission was made more independent of the central committee, which required a 2/3 vote to overrule its decisions.
9.08 Leadership Concentration
4, AC5
There is general agreement on the lack of unified leadership within the CPI, and indeed the leadership changed hands often during our time period. At any given time, the general secretary himself could not dictate policy without some broader support from others on the politbureau. One source reports that only two or three politbureau members were involved in a tiny leadership core at any given time.

Coherence Variables, 10.01-10.06
10.01 Legislative Cohesion
1, AC3
There is really no discussion of CPI cohesiveness in parliamentary voting. One source does state that communist mp's had to act as disciplined factions with the state legislatures and national parliament, however.
10.02 Ideological Factionalism
6, AC9
The CPI showed signs of left-right factionalism throughout virtually all of our time period. In the early 1950's, this division showed in a vote at the 1953 congress over whether British imperialism or American imperialism was the real enemy, which revealed a 105 to 105 tie. Later the left and right factions drafted and presented separate resolutions to the central committee, and these strains were felt at subsequent congresses. The Sino-Indian border crisis produced somewhat of a realignment of factional membership beginning in 1959, but the basic tension was still between left and right forces, with the rightists supporting India, or the "nationalist" position, against the "internationalists", or pro-chinese leftists. Finally in 1964, after our time period, the CPI formally divided into the CPI and the CPI (m), for Marxist. Some authors refer to them simply as CPI-right and CPI-left.
10.03 Issue Factionalism
6, AC9
Virtually every issue facing a Communist Party becomes interpreted in ideological terms. Thus the left-right factionalism discussed for variable 10. 02 is reflected here. But the choice between the US or Britain as the real enemy facing the party in the first half of our period, and the choice between supporting china or India in the border clash are identified as issues which provoked factions in their own right.
10.04 Leadership Factionalism
1, AC5
Although the left-right factions became identified with individual leaders, e.g., Ranadive for the internationalist or leftist wing and dange for the nationalist or rightist wing, their leadership was not based on any form of personalism but instead on the perceived merits of the issue of ideology.
10.05 Strategic or Tactical Factionalism
6, AC9
Again, the ideological dimension overlays factions based on strategy and tactics. The rightist strategy favored parliamentary participation and constitutional opposition. The leftist one favored the more violent variants of the class struggle. During our period, the rightist strategy won over the armed struggle in 1951, when the CPI participated in the elections, but the revolutionary alternative was always present, ready to be pushed by a significant group of activists. The party headquarters unit, the PHQ group, was one concrete manifestation of the formal organization adopted by the rightist faction.
10.06 Party Purges
1 for 1st half, AC8
0 for 2nd half, AC5
In 1950, the central committee, under Ranadive's leadership, dissolved the Bengal provincial committee, expelled or suspended perhaps hundreds of members, and even succeeded in expelling one of their own numbers. This is counted as a minor purge. There appears to be no comparable expulsion of members or leaders during the second half of our time period.

Involvement Variables, 11.01-11.06
11.01 Membership Requirements
7, AC9
The CPI followed the standard practice of communist parties, requiring two members to sponsor an individual for membership, and the individual to serve a period of candidacy--six months in the CPI, and then to renew his membershipannually. Each member paid monthly dues.
11.02 Membership Participation
5, AC3
One source says that the Communist Party worked its members very hard, but others report complaints from the leadership of indifference to party publications. On the basis of scanty evidence, the bulk of the members are judged to have been militants or at least participants.
11.03 Material Incentives
0, AC3
There is no evidence about motivational forces for CPI militants. The party is said to have recruited heavily from the educated unemployed, but it was hardly in a position to offer many jobs. Although the party employed hundreds of workers, it did not command enough resources to support at least a third of the militants.
11.04 Purposive Incentives
3, AC3
The literature suggests that purposive incentives did not serve to motivate all party militants. In some areas, caste rivalries drew members into the CPI, and the social links are said to have been important for those alienated from the traditional society.
11.05 Doctrinism
3, AC9
Although many members of the party may have been almost completely ignorant of Marx and Engels, the leaders certainly were not, and quotations from authoritative communist sources were common in party debates. Indeed, some say the attention to theoretical abstraction in the CPI bordered on scholasticism.
11.06 Personalism
0, AC9
One of the common themes in the literature is that the CPI lacked leaders with commanding personalities.