Path: Table of Contents > Essay on Party Politics > Party 041
Canadian Progressive-conservative Party, 041
Variables and Codes for 1950-1962
For the concepts and variables below, use these links to Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey:
Governmental Status
Issue Orientation
Goal Orientation
Organizational Complexity
Organizational Power
Organizational Coherence
Membership Involvement
The "ac" code is for "adequacy-confidence"--a data quality measure ranging from 0 (low) to 9 (high)

Institutionalization Variables, 1.01-1.06
1.01 Year of Origin and 1.02 Name Changes
1867, ac7
3, ac9
Several alternate dates can be advanced for the origin of the Progressive-Conservative Party. Those seeking early roots can trace it to 1854 (Engelmann and Schwartz, 1975--27). Those who seek the origin of the party as a national organization might choose 1874 or even 1896 (Reid, 1967--16, 21). We have picked 1867, the date of the first general election and the time when John A. Macdonald emerged as the party's acknowledged spokesman (Hougham, 1967--3). The name of the party has been changed on several occasions since its inception. It started out under the contradictory name of liberal-conservative in 1854. In 1920 it went under the title of National Liberal and Conservative Party, but became known as simply the Conservative Party. In 1938 another change was made, this time to the National Conservatives. Moreover the party campaigned in the 1940 elections as the national government (beck, 1968--227). Finally in 1942, "in a serious attempt to revise its policies and improve its fortunes, it changed its name to the familiar Progressive-Conservative Party" (Corry and Hodgetts, p.251)--at the insistence of its new leader, John Bracken, a former progressive (beck, 1968--242).
1.03 Organizational Discontinuity
0, ac9
The change of the name to the Progressive-Conservatives in 1942 in no way constituted a merger with the Progressive Party of Canada. It is true that the Conservative Party did integrate many of the progressives into their party well before 1941. The addition of the term "progressive," however, was a political tactic employed by John Bracken for the party to carry the western progressive vote. Bracken was the former Progressive Party Premier of Manitoba before his entry into the conservative ranks. He stipulated in 1942 that before he would become the national leader, the party must add the title progressive, for he saw the need for a more progressive approach.
1.04 Leadership Competition
12, ac9
In December of 1942 the Progressive-Conservatives held a convention at which they elected John Bracken on the second ballot as their national leader. In 1948 George Drew won the nomination for national leader with the majority of the convention's 1242 delegates. In 1956 John Diefenbaker was elected on the first ballot to head the National Party. He lost the leadership of the party in 1967 to Robert Stanfield, who defeated ten other hopefuls in the September convention.
1.05 Legislative Instability
Instability is .59, ac9
The legislative representation of the conservatives changed dramatically during our period. The party rose from 15 percent of the seats in 1950 to a high of almost 80 percent following the Diefenbaker triumph in the 1958 elections.
1.06 Electoral Instability
Instability is .17, ac9
Parliamentary elections were held in 1953, 1957, 1958, and 1962. The conservative percentage of the vote peaked at 54 in the 1958 election, which gave the party nearly 4/5 of the seats in the lower chamber. Its low point was 31 percent of the vote in 1953.

Governmental Status Variables, 2.01-2.07
 2.01 Government Discrimination
0, ac9
The term government is often used in Canada to mean the elected " cabinet" which was made up of members of the Conservative Party during the second half of our period. The party charged that many higher civil servants, who with permanent tenure were liberal government appointees, did not fully support and implement cabinet policy. Nevertheless on elections the rules of objectivity and fairness are very strict and non-partisan. On the national level there is merely a 50 name petition and a $200 deposit required to get one "s name on the ballot. In Quebec a candidate must declare a party affiliation, or declare himself an independent. The major parties in Quebec also enjoy the benefit of being put first in line on the ballot sheet.
2.02 Governmental Leadership
0 out of 7 for 1950-56, ac9
6 out of 6 for 1957-62, ac9
The liberal party held power from 1935 through 1956. The succession of liberal governments ended in 1957, when John Diefenbaker won control with less than a majority of the House of Commons. Another election was called in 1958 and the Diefenbaker government won an unprecedented 208 of 265 seats. In 1962 the Progressive-Conservatives under the leadership of Prime Minister Diefenbaker won only a plurality of the seats in the House of Commons, and the party lost control of the government to the liberals in the 1963 elections.
2.03 Cabinet Participation
0 out of 7 for 1950-56, ac9
6 out of 6 for 1957-62, ac9
Although Diefenbaker had less than a majority of the seats in the House of Commons after both the 1957 and 1962 elections, he still recruited his cabinet entirely from the Progressive-Conservative Party.
2.04 National Participation
5 for 1950-56, ac9
6 for 1957-62, ac9
When Canada is divided into five geographic regions--Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario, prairies, and British Columbia--the distribution of PC voters deviated an average of 5.4 percent from the regional distribution of the vote in 1953 and 3.2 percent in 1962. The noticeable change in regional strength can be partially attributed to the pc's strong showing in Ontario in 1953 and its relatively weak performance in the prairies. Based on 1962 election results it appears that the PC party better reflected the distribution of the electorate in the latter half of the time period.
2.05 Legislative Strength
Strength is .18 for 1950-56, ac9 and .67 for 1957-62, ac9
The legislative representation of the conservatives changed dramatically during our period. The party rose from 15 percent of the seats in 1950 to a high of almost 80 percent following the Diefenbaker triumph in the 1958 elections.
2.06 Electoral Strength
Strength is .31 for 1950-56, ac9 and .43 for 1957-62, ac9
Parliamentary elections were held in 1953, 1957, 1958, and 1962. The conservative percentage of the vote peaked at 54 in the 1958 election, which gave the party nearly 4/5 of the seats in the lower chamber. Its low point was 31 percent of the vote in 1953.
2.07 Outside Origin
2, ac9
The Progressive-Conservatives originated from an establishment coalition of Tories, who had helped obtain responsible government and the federal union, and moderate liberals, together with French-Canadians. It was augmented by small groups from other provinces, (Williams, pp.3-10).

Issue Orientation Variables, 5.01-5.15
5.01 Ownership of Means of Production
1, ac7
The Progressive-Conservatives have consistently supported a system of free enterprise. Nevertheless they launched or accepted government ownership through independent statutory corporations for radio-TV (CBC), the railroad, films (national film board), and electric power (e.g., Ontario hydro). (Scarrow, 1965--62, 64).
5.02 Government Role in Economic Planning
1 for 1950-56, ac8
3 for 1957-62, ac9
The Progressive-Conservatives program on economic development has continually been one of promoting and stimulating the economy, although this stressed stimulating private corporations rather than more direct government intervention. With Diefenbaker, greater government intervention was accepted. In their 1953 platform they called for the decentralization of industry so that opportunities for employment and advancement would be extended to the widest possible base. They encouraged a National Development Program, including programs such as the construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway, the Saskatchewan River Power and Irrigation Project, and Hydroelectric Power Projects in the Maritimes. In 1957, John Diefenbaker, the party leader, developed a new national policy of his own, overstepping the more limited conservative position. It specifically dealt with developments in the northern frontier, the development of national resources, an energy board, a national highway policy, adjustment grants to the Atlantic Provinces and a modest reduction in corporate income taxes. This policy was associated with a record unemployment level, five successive deficit budgets, the devaluation of the dollar, and eventually the fall of Diefenbaker himself, and the resurrection of the Progressive-Conservative tradition of restricted economic intervention.
5.03 Redistribution of Wealth
1 for 1950-56, ac9
3 for 1957-62, ac9
In 1949 the Progressive-Conservative platform asked for reduction of taxes of the working class, but nothing more than rhetoric came of these proposals and the PC generally continued to support business. The Diefenbaker interlude again saw a drastic change in the PC tradition. He reduced personal taxes, and his program was judged to be left of the liberals. He attempted to encourage the welfare of social institutions through multiplying government handouts.
5.04 Social Welfare
1 for 1950-56, ac8
3 for 1957-62, ac9
In the first time period, the position of the PC's was one of a contributory social security program, with contributory health insurance. Diefenbaker brought increased old-age pensions, extended and enlarged unemployment insurance benefits. His social programme was even more welfare-oriented than that put forward by the liberals. (see Meisel, 1962--53.) Most of his proposals were enacted during his tenure in office. It should be noted that the Canadian tradition for major parties has been generally sympathetic to social welfare programs since World War II.
5.05 Secularization of Society
0, ac7
This is only slightly applicable in national party politics. Under the BNA Act such questions as property and civil rights and education-&endash;which have major religious implications--come under provincial jurisdiction. The federal government may become involved in making treaties or activities of international organizations and would normally consult provinces in these matters. Since in the first time period the PC Quebec vote never pulled more than 9 out of 75 Quebec seats, the party was accused of being less sympathetic to Quebec Roman Catholics. The charge was sometimes made even after the winning of 50 seats in the 1958 election. The religious issue elsewhere appears to be of minor significance in terms of this category definition.
5.06 Support of the Military
1, ac9
The party platforms may appear contradictory to the traditional Conservative Party position of strong support of the armed forces as illustrated by the conscription crises in both world wars. Responding to growing sentiments for economic prosperity measures and protection against increased USA influence, conservatives have opposed several pro-armed forces policies. The PC platforms continually stressed the cutting down of waste on defense measures. The 1949 platform asked for a standing committee on defense to assure the effective use of money. In 1953 the party advocated a reorganization of the department of national defense. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 initiated a concern with Canada's military involvement with the US. Diefenbaker objected to the placement of nuclear war heads on Canadian soil and failed to give full support to his Minister of Defense, who resigned in 1963 just after the end of our period.
5.07 Alignment with East-West Blocs
5, ac9
The PC's gave their unqualified support of the North Atlantic Security Pact. The PC's resistance to communism was in their words "in keeping with our conception of freedom of the individual and our international commitments."
5.08 Anti-Colonialism
0 for 1950-56, ac9
2 for 1957-62, ac9
Canada's relationship to the United States is our focus for coding the party on anti-colonialism. Up until the Diefenbaker ascendance to power the PC's were content with their relationship with the United States. In 1957 Diefenbaker brought the latent dissatisfaction out of the Canadian public, saying that the U.S. was a danger to Canada's sovereignty by its shipment of Canadian natural exhaustible resources in raw materials to the U.S. He called the American investors carpetbaggers, and attacked the liberal "buddy-buddy" position. He asked for all investment to benefit Canada, and this position struck a nationalist chord. This anti-Americanism divided the country, and the side favoring American investment was partially responsible for his removal from office.
5.09 Supranational Integration
1, ac9
The PC's valued their British and commonwealth trade, and supported the United Nations. There was also interest by the PC's in the Colombo Plan, the first multi-national aid program. As a middle power, Canada found comfort in international organizations.
5.10 National Integration
0, ac7
The PCs endorsed the BNA Act--constitutional separation of authority between the federal and provincial governments--although in this time period their positions sometimes appeared inconsistent. Their 1949 platform stated that "national unity depends on respect for the federal constitution." In 1957 they asked for a dominion provincial conference with a spirit of unity and mutual tolerance. In 1958, one of the chief issues was the centralizing of the federal government by the liberals, and Diefenbaker consequently gave extra attention to a policy of strict federalism. Once in power, the Diefenbaker position sometimes appeared more centralist.
5.11 Electoral Participation
4, ac9
Although the PC platforms accepted equality of suffrage for all Canadians at 21 years of age, there was an obvious omission concerning the extension of the franchise to Indians. In 1960 the Indians received the right to vote. It was the liberal initiative that brought about this action in the PC administration.
5.12 Protection of Civil Rights
3, ac7
The PC platforms repeatedly assured that all Canadians would have the opportunity for industry, skill and enterprise. "The PC platform of 1957 advocated a vigorous immigration policy consistent with Canada's ability to absorb," (Meisel, 284). An independent board was recommended to review certain decisions by the department of immigration. Diefenbaker had little predisposition to grant Quebec special status. The historically negative image of the conservatives partially collapsed in the 1958 election, but his conduct following this election appeared, by subsequent election results, not to have impressed the French Canadian voters. Personally, Diefenbaker was committed to protection of civil rights and liberties and won passage of a Civil Rights Bill in 1960.
5.13 Interference with Civil Liberties
3, ac9
The Canadian Government has a unique relationship with its system of mass communication. Until the 1961 establishment of the private CTV network, the independent statutory corporation, the CBC controlled the network facilities, and privately owned stations were network affiliates or broadcast exclusively for local audiences. Pre-eminence does not negatively affect the freedom of speech of the population. The PC platforms continually stressed the widest possible measure of media liberty consistent with the law. The platform of 1949 warned against the government owned radio stations becoming a
Propaganda agency. It asked for the abolishment of license fees for radio receiving sets. In 1957 the party recommended the establishment of a board independent of the CBC and of the independent stations to regulate radio and television in Canada. Newspapers were, of course, privately owned and operated.
5.14 / 5.15 US--Soviet Experts Left-Right Ratings
U.S. says 1, conservative
Soviets say 1, represents the interests of monopolistic circles tied to English capital, a national bourgeoisie (mainly middle class) and wealthy farmers of the plains provinces. Domestically, more reactionary than the liberals.

Goal Orientation Variables, 6.01-6.55
 6.00 Open Competition in the Electoral Process
4, ac9
The PC relies on working within a constitutional system of open competition.
6.01-6.05--2, ac9. It is common practice for the PC party to advertise candidates through various media, to canvass votes during campaigns, to hold campaign rallies, and to facilitate voting for PC supporters.
6.10 Restricting Party Competition
0, ac9
The practice of subverting the political system is incongruent with the PC's political practice.
6.11-6.15--0, ac9. The Conservatives, although occasionally not following the letter of the electoral law in presenting names to the courts of revision, cannot be characterized as often guilty of fraudulent practices.
6.20 Subverting the Political System
0, ac9
The PC's, being one of the major parties of the Canadian political system, have nothing to gain from subverting the political system.
6.21-6.26-0, ac9. Subversive tactics were never employed by the PC's.
6.30 Propagandizing Ideas and Program
6.31--1, ac5. A bimonthly newspaper "Public Opinion," is published by National Headquarters. In 1949 the circulation had risen to about 30,000, (Williams, p.132). In the 1957 election the PC's received 30 percent of the free programme time offered by the CBC several newspapers such as the Ottawa Journal adapt an editorial policy which generally supports the PC party, but are not controlled by the party.
6.32--0, ac9. The conservatives run no party school, but do support conservative youth groups.
6.33--1, ac9. The practice of adopting platforms usually coincides with leadership conventions.
6.34--1, ac9. The election year usually brings about various position papers by the PC's.
6.50 Providing for Welfare of Party Members
6.53--0, ac3. Individual party leaders, notably members of parliament, may intercede with the government on behalf of citizens or raise questions in "question hour." Little is done regarding party operated social welfare activities.

Autonomy Variables, 7.01-7.05
 7.01 Sources of Funds
1 (sector 04), ac9
The PC's main source of money for campaign funds and operating funds between general elections is obtained from "a few wealthy supporters, manufacturers, distilleries, the Canadian pacific railway, brokerages, retail distributors,...and a myriad of other large and small businesses," (Williams, p.144). The PC's have tried to widen their base of financial support to their rank and file members, but most of these attempts have had little success (Paltiel, 1970--42).
7.02 Source of Members
5, ac6
The literature does not discuss membership in the Conservative Party at any length, but it is clear that membership exists and is direct (Engelmann and Schwartz, 1975--170).
7.03 Sources of Leaders
2 (sectors 03, 04), ac9
The PC's have shown a tendency to select leaders with a background in law, or another professional field. Kornberg notes that 26 percent of all conservative candidates for parliament during the period 1945-1965 were members of the legal profession, (Kornberg, p.44). Businessmen also represent a high proportion of PC MP's.
7.04 Relations with Domestic Parties
7, ac9
There were no parliamentary coalitions during our time period, and such are rare in Canada. The PC's were a minority government in 1957. The overwhelming victory of the 1958 election made all dependence on another party unnecessary. The election of 1962 resulted in a major drop in conservative support and dependence on voters of the social credit party in the House of Commons, but this occurred at the very end of our period and is excluded from our scoring.
7.05 Relations with Foreign Organizations
5, ac6
Though there may be vague philosophical sympathy with parties like the British Conservative Party, the Canadian PC party is not affiliated with any international political party organization.

Organizational Complexity Variables, 8.01-8.07
 8.01 Structural Articulation
10, ac6
The literature contains only limited material on the conservative national structure. The national progressive-conservative association has four major national organs--the structure of the PC national party seems similar to the liberal's organization. The PC's hold an annual meeting called the "general annual meeting," which includes all senators, members of commons, and defeated candidates for the house plus equal federal constituency association, two from each. The PC's seat more members at large from the provinces than the liberals and must include women and young people. They also seat all provincial legislators. The function of the convention is to either elect a new party leader, draw up a program, or in most cases usually provide an opportunity to bolster party support. The PC also has a national council called the executive officers of the national association. This organization meets twice yearly. The representation of the council includes 8 members from each province (the leader of the party, a woman, student, and youth). The functions of this organization are basically related to federal-provincial party relations. The third organ is the executive committee. This committee is elected at the conventions and is basically composed of the national table officers and the party leader and cabinet (if in office). Their function is to coordinate the actions of the executive officers. This group does not represent all provinces. The final national organ is the national director and his staff. His activities are conducted under the overall direction of the national leader. His party organ is especially important around campaign time.
8.02 Intensiveness of Organization
5, ac9
The poll organization appears to be the smallest unit visible in the PC national structure. The local structure is very tenuous, except for the constituency organizations working for the success of a PC candidate prior to an election. The local party organization largely ceases to function between elections. Permanent poll organizations are not normally established in the Conservative Party (Engelmann and Schwartz, 1975--172).
8.03 Extensiveness of Organization
5, ac5
Meisel reports "during the 1957 election there were 44,055 polling stations in Canada. It is likely that both the conservative and liberal parties tried to establish an adequate poll organization in a vast majority of those." The strength of these organizations is variable, however (Meisel 1962, p.86). Throughout our period the conservatives always contested at least 93 percent of the seats in federal elections (Beck, 1968).
8.04 Frequency of Local Meetings
2, ac6
The conservative poll organization probably operates like the voluntary liberal organization, appearing magically before elections and disappearing thereafter (Van Loon and Wittington, 1976--255).
8.05 Frequency of National Meetings
3, ac9
The executive officers of the national association meet twice yearly. The officers are comparable to the liberal"s council.
8.06 Maintaining Records
9, ac6
The PC party, like the liberals, puts out great quantities of policy papers and propaganda, but mainly at election time. The data on the PC research division were recent but quite extensive. "in 1969 parliament voted funds for the establishment of research offices for the parliamentary wings of opposition parties. The conservatives, as the official opposition, were granted $125,000 annually." (Van Loon and Whittington). The research office provides information and suggestions for MPS, and helps provide critiques for government bills. The assistance of this office to the PC's national structure is extensive. Membership lists of the PC's appear to only include local party activists and financial contributors. Lists swell at election time, but are apparently forgotten during the interim.
8.07 Pervasiveness of Organization
3, ac9
The PC's have a women's division as well as a youth's division. The women's association is integrated into the party as a standing committee. The PC's also have youth organizations, but loosely integrated into the party. The PC's pay close attention to the interests of middle class and business Canada, but avoid establishment of direct ancillary organizations.

Organizational Power Variables, 9.01-9.08
 9.01 Nationalization of Structure
3, ac6
The organization of Canadian parties makes the provincial organization the most significant unit (Engelmann and Schwartz, 1975--66). But in comparison with the liberals, the conservatives may be somewhat motralized. The powers of the national leader, the control imposed by the national office on the party organization in the provinces and the constituencies and the virtual disappearance of local organizations in some provinces had conspired to make the PC party a political machine largely dominated from the centre," (Meisel 1, p.74). There was a competing party hierarchy. Prior to the 1957 election, John Diefenbaker the prime ministerial candidate, usually won the battles over the national director.
9.02 Selecting the National Leader
3, ac9
The national leader is selected at the PC's "general annual meeting." In 1948 the PC Ottawa Convention selected George Drew, and in 1956 in Ottawa John Diefenbaker was selected as the party leader. The rules governing the 1956 convention clearly stipulated that delegates or alternate delegates should be selected at meetings of the PC associations in each riding called for such purpose. In 1967, after our time period, Diefenbaker attempted to head off a leadership convention by arguing "that his position as leader of the opposition was a parliamentary office," but the convention rejected the argument and Diefenbaker as leader (Smiley, 1968--374).
9.03 Selecting Parliamentary Candidates
3, ac9
In the two older parties, the Liberal and Progressive-Conservative, the procedure for selecting parliamentary candidates is similar. In the 1957 election the practice was that the local party organization selects the person it desired to run, and in the case of 1957, the provincial party always accepted the local party's decision. Nonetheless, the provincial executive of each party has the final responsibility for seeing that each constituency party picks a suitable candidate (Meisel, p. 120). At the local level, when an active local organization exists, there is a special nominating meeting at which the choosing of a candidate is the main business. Exceptions to the rule exist in "safe" seats. Selection committees sometimes appoint candidates without bothering to have their choice confirmed by a meeting of the constituency party. This instance is prevalent in constituencies where local organizations have degenerated.
9.04 Allocating Funds
5, ac6
Paltiel contends that "there are some fundamental distinctions between the two major parties in the treatment of funds." (p. 12). For the more financially centralized PC party funds appear to be pooled and distributed centrally. Since 1956, when Allister Grosart assumed the position of national organizer of the PC party, funds collected centrally are distributed to candidates through provincial organizations. (p. 12). A quota of $5000 was assigned to every candidate by the National Party in 1957. This was paid to the provincial party headquarters, not to the constituency directly.
9.05 Formulating Policy
6 for 1950-56, ac9
7 for 1957-62, ac9
Policy is normally formulated by the National Party Organs. The policy positions derived from the National Conventions are usually ignored by these committees. When John Diefenbaker came to power in 1957, experts write that he apparently ignored the advice of even his closest advisors and made up his own policy statements. Dawson reports "the mass of resolutions of the party's 1956 convention was not only not used as a coherent platform, but was reportedly ordered burned by the party leader" (Dawson, p.489).
9.06 Controlling Communications
4, ac6
At election time it appears that the national office controls most of the party media. However, the provincial and national organizations each publish printed materials, but essentially these are not very important in controlling information flow within the party.
9.07 Administering Discipline
3, ac6
The principal disciplinary techniques are found in the Conservative Party's House of Commons caucus and in the traditional parliamentary control of the Prime Minister and party leadership over the backbenchers, with implicit threats of loss of party support and funds at the next election for MPS not following the party leadership. The caucus in collaboration with the party leadership decides how the party members are to vote on important issues.
9.08 Leadership Concentration
3 for 1st half, ac6
6 for 2nd half, ac9.
The leader of the opposition or Prime Minister generally is considered the leader of the party. The PCs were out of power from 1950-56 and George Drew, the leader of the opposition in the House of Commons, was responsible for leadership duties. His role as party leader did not however, make all his decisions binding. The members of the National PC Association's executive also played a substantial part in policy formation. When John Diefenbaker became Prime Minister in 1957, he not only played a dominant role in his relationship with the party's national director, it was also highly evident that he made his cabinet subservient to him.

Coherence Variables, 10.01-10.06
 10.01 Legislative Cohesion
.90, ac3
The information on voting along party lines with respect to the PC MP's, is very scarce. However, it can be inferred that party lines are broken only in cases where conditions are understood beforehand by the party member and the party (Engelmann and Schwartz, 1975--249-250).
10.02 Ideological Factionalism
2 for 1st half, ac8
5 for 2nd half, ac8
The conservative wing of the Conservative Party has been associated with the business and financial interests dominant in Ontario Province. It often stood opposed to strains of populism in the Prairie Provinces, and the conflict grew significantly with Diefenbaker's ascendance in the second half of our period (Scarrow, 1965--70, Engelmann and Schwartz, 1975--36).
10.03 Issue Factionalism
0 for 1950-56, ac7
1 for 1956-62, ac7
At the outset of the time period, there were no issues that perpetrated factionalism. However, Diefenbaker's policy of anti-Americanism of the late 50"s was rejected by many conservatives. However, no clear factions within the party were formed because of this position.
10.04 Leadership Factionalism
1 for 1st half, ac6
5 for 2nd half, ac4
The PC convention of 1956 was contested by numerous candidates, but factional tendencies did not arise. However, Diefenbaker's leadership, or lack of it, was a cause of factionalism within his own party in the second half of our time period.
10.05 Strategic or Tactical Factionalism
2, ac9
Regenstreif notes "the conservative approaches to campaigning in the elections of 1957 and 1958 rank as classics of ingenuity unequalled in Canadian political history," (p. 29). Diefenbaker's advice "reinforce success not failure" was recommended to the party on two separate occasions before 1957. It was eventually adopted and the PC's came into power. No deep factions were formed to oppose this strategy.
10.06 Party Purges
0, ac9
The PC's conducted no purges during the time period.

Involvement Variables, 11.01-11.06
11.01 Membership Requirements
2, ac5
The PC's appear to be more exacting than the liberals on their insistence of the membership fee, one dollar. The members are basically self-defined, despite this fee.
11.02 Membership Participation
0, ac5
It appears that most PC party members do not participate in meetings and are members in name only.
11.03 Material Incentives
1, ac3
The dearth of material on incentives made this variable difficult to code. Kornberg, et al., Feel that material incentives play a relatively minute part in a militant's participation level (p.27). It appears, however, that conservative poll captains tend to be paid (Engelmann and Schwartz, 1975--278).
11.04 Purposive Incentives
1, ac3
From the same data used in variable 11.03, Kornberg et al., Find participation levels not being correlated with genuine objective concerns. But surely some significant portion of the militants have a vision of improved Government.
11.05 Doctrinism
0, ac9
No material is present that can be labeled as PC doctrine (Engelmann and Schwartz, 1975--108).
11.06 Personalism
0 for 1950-56, ac3
1 for 1957-62, ac3
Personalities have been extremely important in attracting voter support to Canadian parties, but this variable concentrates on party militants, not voters. Before the Diefenbaker ascendancy, few militants seemed motivated by personalism. Regenstreif states that concerning the 1957 campaign "in view of the relatively low level of traditional support upon which the conservatives as a party could depend, the emphasis on the person of John Diefenbaker instead of the label "conservative" in the campaign is understandable," (p. 29). It is evident that a discernible number of PC militants were motivated by Diefenbaker personally, but probably no more than a third.