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Chapter 6: Issue Orientation (pp. 53-77), this is p. 60
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Coding Results. The decline in information available for coding the issue orientation variables continues in the case of "social welfare." As demonstrated in Tables 6.5a and 6.5b, we coded approximately 75 percent of the parties on BV504--a drop from over 85 percent for "ownership of the means of production" and "economic planning." It appears that either the literature or the parties tend to speak out more on these two "core" variables in leftist ideology, leading to a higher incidence of coding. Concerning the inter-time period differences in our coding, there is a barely perceptible shift toward advocacy of social welfare policies. Our coding of the variable reflects a definite bias involving the quality of the data, with social welfare scores being positively correlated with AC codes at the level of .36.

TABLE 6.5a: Mid 1950s: BV5.04 Social Welfare

TABLE 6.5b: Early 1960s: BV5.04 Social Welfare

Basic Variable 5.05: Secularization of Society*

The debate over secularization can be characterized as derivative of what Lipset and Rokkan call "the conflict between the centralizing, standardizing, and mobilizing Nation-State and the historically established corporate privileges of the Church " (1967, pp. 15-16) . Systematic attempts by secular parties "to create direct links of influence and control between the nation-state and the individual citizen" are resisted by what the authors label "parties of religious defense." Such parties may arise wherever representatives of an institutionalized religion seek through political means to preserve or extend church control over the nature and distribution of values in a society.

The existence of an institutionalized church is essential if this variable is to assume any significance in a country. Thus the issue is blunted in India not only by the traditional Hindu recognition of the basic separation of religious and secular spheres of authority, but also by the fact, as Weiner has put it, that "since Hinduish has no church, the power of the Brahman was that of an individual rather than of an institution. He could hardly challenge the authority of secular society even if he chose to" (1960, p. 161). The Islamic tradition, by contrast, makes no distinction between religious and secular life. Hence, although "Indian and Ceylonese politicians continue to exploit Hinduism and Buddhism with little fear that an organized Hindu or Buddhist clergy or church will displace them. . ., Pakistani politicians must handle the religious issue with great care.... The Jamaat-i-lslami and other orthodox parties with ulama [religious leadership] support continue to press for the creation of an Islamic state . . ." (Weiner 1960, p. 162).

"Secularization" should be distinguished from "national integration," which, again following Lipset and Rokkan, can be defined as the issue variable generated by "the conflict between the central nation-building culture and the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct subject populations in the provinces and the peripheries" (1967, p. 15). Complex and inbred cultural-behavioral syndromes such as the Indian caste system which are not derived from an institutionalized church are considered and coded as part of the "national integration" variable.

"Secularization" measures the party's posture vis-a-vis the privileges of the church. The range of attitudinal stances extends from support for government expropri-

*This section was drafted by Gilbert Rotkin.

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